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PARLIAMENT AND THE NAVY 
1688-1714 
Parliament and the Navy 1688 - 1714 
. 
In these years parliament, particularly the House of Commons, 
greatly increased its authority. Naval administration and naval 
operations provided many of the incentives and issues that led 
'paýliament to increase its powor and status. Despite the diversity 
of'personalities and political outlook within parliament the 
majority in both Houses was united in certain attitudes which governed 
thoir approach to naval affairs. These attitudes, a consciousness of 
England's vulnerability to sea-borne invasion, a belief in English 
sovereignty of the seas, are described in the first chapter. In the 
saýne chapter the ways in which these attitudes were modified by the 
developments between 1688 and 1714, particularly increasing parliamentary 
kn6wledge of naval affairs and political organisation, are considered. ' 
The interplay between these attitudes, developments and the events 
of 
' 
two wars provided the background to the legislation that affected 
the navy. The ways in which these laws were initiated and shaped 
by . parliamentary activities are considered in the next five chapters. 
Each of these chapters deals with the contribution of parliamentary 
le8islation to one aspect of naval administration - financet provision 
of'material, trade protection, manning and the maintenanc 'e 
of naval 
morale. The provision of money to the navy was the issue that 
interested most members of parliament and it was consideration of this 
topic that led to the most'decisive acquisitions of parliamentary 
power. In a strictly naval context it was trade protection, most 
obviously the concern of a merchant minority, that led to laws which 
grgatly increased the strength and responsiblities of-the 1au. -x_at-thjD-- 
same time as they limited the authority of the monarch. 
The ways in which consideration of naval issues educated parliament 
in'the techniques of power are obvious and more tangible than the 
corýtribution of parliament to the growth of British sea power. The 
last chapter assesses the parliamentary contribution to the dominance at 
sea which the navy gained between 168& and 1714. 
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1. 
PARLIAMENT AND THE NAVY 
20, - 
Between 1688 and 1714 the English navy became the 
most powerful in the world. In practically every session 
of parliament held between these two dates legislation was 
passed that directly or indirectly affected this growing 
navy. 
(') Legislation is in some ways a crude measure of the 
persistent parliamentary attention to naval affairs that 
contributed towards this naval dominance. It ignores the 
debates, addresses and inquiries that occupied much time but 
led to no statutory action. Some aspects of this 
parliamentary attention and the repercussions on the navy 
are relatively easy to define. Parliament's influence upon 
naval finance, upon the provision of material such as ships, 
timber, sailcloth and cordage, upon trade protectiong upon 
manning and the 'encouragement' of sailors provide 
convenient divisions of the involved relationship between 
parliament and the navy. 
(2) 
Yet all of these divisions are 
inter-related and unified in that they are expressions of 
parliamentary attitudes towards the navy. These attitudes 
developed from what French historians call Ila psycholOgie 
collective' and modern sociologists describe as 'generalized. 
beliefs'(3). feelings and ideas associated with the navy 
(1) See Appendix I. Indeed if money bills are'included 
in this generalisation every parliamentary session 
saw naval legislation. 
(2) Each of these topics forms a chapter of the BtUdye 
(3) N. J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behaviour (1962) 16* 
3. 
which were so widespread that they might be described as 
national. 
To generalise about parliamentary attitudes towards 
the navy is necessary but difficult. Any generalisation 
must be qualified by time and by personalities. Although 
in the twenty-six years coVered by this study the navy was 
always a major parliamentary interest there were variations 
in the intensity of this concern. Between 1688 and 1694, 
years dominated by an overall sense of crisis and fear of 
invasion, and punctuated by the failures of Bantry Bay and 
Beachy Head, the unexploited victory of La Hogue and the 
destruction of the Smyrna Convoy, the efficiency of the navy 
was of constant interest to parliament. This primacy of 
concern held true despite the competition of such issues as 
the constitutional settlement and the pacification of- 
Ireland. From 1694 to 1697 the national danger was less 
and parliament's interest in the navy was more factional. 
Between 1697 and 1702, and in 1713 and 1714, 'the main 
parliamentary concern was to secure the smallest and 
therefore the cheapest navy compatible with national security. 
From 1702 to-1707 the presence of the Queen's husband, 
George, Prince of Denmarkt as Lord High Admiral acted as a 
deterrent to parliamentary activity, especially in the 
Commons, but between 1708 and 1712 there was a revival of 
interest in the navy. 
4o 
If there were twenty-six years and twenty-eight sessions 
of parliament to give variety of attitude towards-the navy 
there were also many hundreds of members in the two houses 
of parliament. in these sessions. Different regional, 
political, professional and economic backgrounds amongst' 
these members produced a variety of attitude towards the 
nhLvy. Sir Thomas Clarges, a hard-bitten 'Country' 
politicianl(')would not debate the navy from the same 
premises as Sir Gilbert Heathcote, a Whig financier with 
diverse trading interests. (2) Elwill, a merchant like 
Heathcote, was a, repregentative of the South West and of the 
trading. interests of that area, and had', necessarily, a 
different background. from which to form his opinions of naval 
efficiency. 
(3) 
Nor was it unnatural for a man's attitude 
towards the navy to change in twenty-six years. In this 
way it could be held that between them Russell 
(4) 
and 
, 
Nottingham(5) had in parliament during this period four 
attitudes, those theyheld in office and. they held outýof it- 
He waran M. P. from 1666 to his death in 1695, 
representing variously Southwark, Christchurch (Hants) 
and Oxford University. The best. account of his 
parliamentary activities is by K..,,,. Feiling, 'who calls" 
him, "that suppressed, and prosaic figure"; see History 
of the Tory Party 1640-1714 (1924) 231 and passim; 
D. T. Witcombe, Charles II and the Cavalier House of 
Co=ons 1663-74 (1966) 199* 
(2) See below p. 230- 
(3) See below P. 240. 
(4) For Russe3l, who became Earl of Orford in May 16979 
see below Pp. 430-3. 
(5) Daniel Finch, second Earl of Notiinghamg Secretary of 
State March 1689-Nov* 16939 May 1702-May 1704. He was 
a Tory leader until Dec. 1? 11. 
5. 
After the recognition of this diversity. there is 
still the need for generalisation in an attempt to explain 
why the institution that was parliament concerned itself 
so regularly with the intractable problems of the navy. 
It is this persistence, which found expression in2 
legislation and in a confusion of debates and inquiries, 
that is worth explanation. It is the 'feeling' behind 
the persistence that explains much of parlia'ment's 
persistence, the feeling to which George Savile, first 
Marquis of Halifax, referred in a pamphlet: "A Nation is 
a great while before they can see,. and generally they must 
feel first before their sight is quite cleared. 
In his terms the period 1688 to 1714 is remarkable 
for the dominance'of 'feeling', or concern about the navy, 
and equally remarkable for the way in which the sight of 
parliament and t he natio In was partially cleared by increased 
knowledge about naval matters. In this chapter an 
attempt will be made to describe the If'eeling' of parliament 
towards-the navy. and then to consider the ways in which 
parliament'learnt-more of the navy. 
(2) 
A Rough-Draft of--a New Model at Sea (1694)9 Complete 
Works, ed. -W. 
Raleigh (1912) 173.. 
(2) The consequences for the navy of this parliamentary 
education are considered in the conclusion. . 
6. 
Whatever the word used to describe parliament's 
attitude towards the navy - teeling,. interestt or concern - 
one of the most fundamentalfactorsin it was the belief 
that England rightfully controlled-the-, seas adj acent to 
this island and that these-seas were as much English 
property as the land itself., If any one belief may be 
said. to have been common to all members of parliament 
between 1688-and 1714 it was this conviction on the 
sovereignty-of the English seas. - This, conviction found 
its most influential expression in John Selden's book, 
'Of the Dominion, or Ownership of the Sea. '(') Selden 
defined the-extent of the English seas with extravagant 
precision-anand justified English dominion, over them by a 
wealth, of legal and historical quotation. Views 
substantially the same as Selden's, often a paraphrase of 
his words, became common-ýplace in seventeenth century 
English books on theýsovereignty of the sea:, books such' 
1 (2) as Sir John Borough's 'Sovereignty of the British SeaBq 
This book was first published in Latin under the 
title, 'Mare Clausum, ' in 1635 and reprinted ih 
1636. An English version was printýed: in 1652 and 
1663 and 'Comments' were printed in 1653. 
(2) Published in 1651 and reprinted in 1686a 
740 
John Godolphin's 'A View of Admiral Jurisdiction, $(') 
John Evelyn's 'Navigation and Commerces 1(2) Richard Zouch's 
'The Jurisdiction of the Admiralty of England Assertedq'(3) 
Alexander Justice's 'A General Treatise of the Dominion and 
Laws of the Sea, 1(4 
ý 
and Charles Molloy's 'Treatise of 
Affairs Maritime and of Commerce. #(5) In the last of these 
books English claims are expressed most arrogantly. From 
books such as these, but especially from Selden's 
convincing arguments, a belief in the justice of the English 
claims became widely accepted in England. An instance'of 
Selden's influence and of the kind of evidence that nourished 
English pretensions is the cock boats of Eagar. Selden used 
as one historic proof of England's ancient'authority over the 
seas the story of the Anglo-Saxon,,. King Edgar'B fleet of small 
ships, or cock boats, numbering 3,600 according to some 
writers, 4,000 or 4,800 a6cording to others, with which'he 
effectively controlled the seas around England. 
(6) These 
Published 1661 and reprinted 16854, 
(2) Published 1674, 
(3) Published 1663 and reprinted'1686, 
(4) Published 1705 and reprinted 1710. 
(5) Published 1676; other editions appeared in 1677,1682t 
1688 and 1690. The whole subject of. England's claims 
is dealt with in T. W. Fulton, The Sovereignty of the 
Sea. (1911) 
(6) - J. Selden op. cit. 258. Edgar ruled 959-975. For 
the 
historical justification of this fleet-see 
T. W. Fulton op. cit. 27-8. 
I 
8. 
cock boats, usually 49800 of them, appear again and again 
in pamphlets of the time linked to assertions of England's 
right to controL the near seas. 
(') Widespread acceptance 
of such ideas can be found in memorials to ministers, 
encyclopaedias of useful knowledge for country gentlemen and 
even in the papers of the early statisticiang Petty. 
(2) 
Naturally the belief was held by many members of-the 
legislature and executive. Naval officers particularly 
were keenly aware by 1688 of the need to insist on the 
outward acceptance of these rights by foreigners, who were 
supposed to acknowledge them at sea by the dipping of a 
ship! s'flags. The public humiliation and imprisonment in 
the reign of Charles II of even senior naval officers who 
did not exact this salute had made them as a group extremely 
For example see: - A sktyr on the Sea officers (c. 1691), Naval Songs and Ballhds, ed. C. H. Firth (N. R. S. 1908) 
139; England's Path to Wealth and Honour (1700)t 
Somers Tracts (1814) XI, 374; Remarks on the Present 
Condition of the Navy (1700) 22; Present Condition 
of the English'Navy (1702) 10; An Historical and 
Political Treatise of the Navy (1703) 4-- 
G. Jacob, The Country Gentleman's Vade Mecum (1717) 
119; E. and J. Chamberlaynet Angliae Notitia (1704) 
220; The Petty Papers, ed. Marquis of Lansdowne (1927) 
1,220,242; Ministry of Defence Library (Naval Section) 
Corbett MSS. It Dominion of the Seas. Thomas Corbett, 
Deputy Secretary of the Navy, collected'together, about 
172?, several volumes of naval memorials, precedents 
and statistics; see D. A. B, augh, British Naval 
Administration in the Age of Walpole (1965) 533-4. 
9. 
zealous in this duty. ')"This zeal was carried 'into th 
period 1688-1714, sometimes with embarrassing consequ nces 
for a government that was anxious not to offend the 
precariously neutral Baltic powers. Shovell wa's-Anvolved 
in an episode in 1694 when he forced some Danish ships to 
(2)an' 
strike their flag d reported it to the Secretary of 
State. and Admiralty as an act worthy of praise, in that the 
affront occurred in the Downs-9 a place so English as to be, 
as it were, "their MajestieB1 bed chamber. It would seem 
that many members of both houses of parliament had as concrete 
and strong a belief that the seas were English. Certainly 
LoUiB XIVIs alleged orders to'his, ships not'to acknowledge 
English rights by saluting were considered important enough 
to be, represented as one of the reasons for-war'in 16899 
(4) 
and the'need to exact this salute was considered'by the Lords 
Commissioners of Admiralty to be oneýof the decisive factors 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
The Diary of Samuel Pepys,. ed. -H. B. Wheatley (1910) 119. 
fn. 127-8. 
S, P. Oakley, William III and the, Northern Crowns 
During the Nine Years War (London Ph. D. 1961) Iq 
222-301. For Shovell see below p. -434# 
C. S. P-Dom. -W. &'M. ' 1694-5,259; H. M. C. Buccleuch and 
Queensberry'II'Pt. -I 116; Documents relating to Law 
and'Custom. of'the Sea, -, -ed. R. G. Marsden (N. R. S. 1916) 
119 1649-17679-16 
- 
50 Shovell was particularly 
sensitive on this, issue- The Tangier Papers of Samuel 
Pepys',, ed., E. -Chappell, '(N. R. S. ' 1935) xxxvi- 
The History of England by Mr. Rapin de Thoyras continued... ý 
by N. Tindal, 111, '(1747) 90. 
100 
in determining the strength, of the fleet in, peace time. 
(') 
Pepys made mention of the parliamentary concern,. for, this 
sovereignty (2)and Selden's book was specifically quoted at 
least once in parliament, in the House of Lords in 1708, 
(3) 
Such explicit evidence for the reception of Selden's theories 
in parliament is slight but ministers were very conscious of 
the nation's patriotic, pride in English ownership of the 
seas. 
(4) 
whatever their own doubts as to the legality of the 
claims or the practical sense in demanding acknowledgement of 
,, "-, -" ,z 
them. 
(5) 
Parliament's,, persistent concern for the success of 
(1) P. R. O. Adm- 3/15,1 Nov. 1699*' 
(2) Samuel Pepysls., Naval Minutes,, ed. -J. R. S. -Ta=er-(N. R. S- 1926) 539 929 226. 
(3) See below pp. 215,292. 
(4) Shrewsbury to Blathwayt, 14'August-16949 "the Nation-- 
is so concerned for anything that may prejudice that 
. 
dominion on the seas, " H. M. C. Buccleuch and 
Queensberry IIPt. I, 166. 
(5) Doubts about"Selden's theorýes gre* in late seventeenth 
century Englandq because of the flaws in some of -, 
his 
arguments, the Mare Liberum by Grotiusl the wild 
claims of some English writers,, and the political 
dangers of alienating neutrals or even our allies, the' 
Dutch, who were in fact if not in name the target of. 
the theories. The most destructive criticism of 
Belden's ideas in England was the Observations 
concerning Dominion'and Sovereignty Of the Seasq by- 
Sir Philip Medows (1689). He gave support to some 
who had-already begun to question the whole structure 
of English claims; among them was Pepysq Samuel 
Pepys's Naval Minutes, ed. J. R. S. Tanner (N. R. S. 1926) 
299 31 9,409,489- 539 1569'2759 322. For the 
decline 
of English belief in Belden see T. W. Fulton op. cit. 219 
5179 523. 
ill* 
the navy, its-extreme seniitivity'to control, of the near 
seas, especially the Channel(l)and'its generosity in money. 
grants to the-navy*can all*berelated to-the conviction 
that the seas were-English-property. The gentry of 
England. -and parliament-contained many such, 'were as a--class 
highly conscious-of the"Amportance of property. 
ý2) 
, To them 
the seas were as much-a part of the kingdom as the common 
land and foreigners were'trespassers. 
(3), 
This--sense of property, was-most powerfully reinforced 
by-other feelings. -The'strongest of, these *as fearg-fear 
of a French invasion. MOBtzEnglishmenAn the early years 
of William could remember two successful'landings on English 
territoryq William's in 1688 and Monmouth's in 1685. They 
and-their descendants-were not allowed--to forget the danger; 
invasion was again threatened'in 1690,1692,1696 and 1708. 
The landing of small French raiding parties preserved the 
fear most sharply around the coasts. 
(4) It was a fear made 
worse by the Catholicism of the French and Jacobites and the 
vivid seventeenth century experience and tradition of danger 
to England from Roman Catholic powers. In the language of 
(1) See below P. 286 
(2) V Ogý, En land in the Reigns of James II and William LI 19635 70; see below p. 233. 
(3) It is in this sense that Steele's merchants 
Sir Anthony Freeportq described the seas as 'The 
British Common'. Spectator, ed. C. Gregory Smith 
(1958) 19 No. 2,2 Mar. 1711,8. 
(4) H. M. C. Finch 111,176. 
12# 
the pamphleteers, Louis-XIV was the-Pharaoh who-might" 
enslave the country, a tyrant-who could'-land on a'Monday, 
celebrate Mass in St. Paul's on the following-Sunday; and 
(2) dissolve parliament the day after; , and before long the 
estates of the, -gentry would be-in the -possession of-mený'-' - 
who spoke a strange tongue. 
(3) These'-forebodings'were shared 
by members of'parliament; in-1696 Rooke, envisaged-a retreat 
to the mountains of Scotland-before the forces of popery' 
and slavery, 
(4) and-in7-the same year Roger, Kenyonýwrotep 
--I 
"God Almighty, preserve old England from a-,, French conquest. ',, 
(5) 
When invasion seem'ed"probable the fear-produced a rare'and 
transieni-unanimity-in-ý'parliament; (6)little else had such 
power. - 
(1) J. Whistong, The gismanagements in Trade, Discovered- ý (1704) 79 
(2) The-Apparent Danger of Invasion (1701)9 The Harleian 
Miscellany (1810) Xq 480. - 
(3) Remarks on the Present Condition of the Navy (1700) 23. 
(4) Rooke to Trumbull, 9 May 1696, H. M. C. Downshire MSS. 
I Pt. iiq 660. Rooke was M. P. for Portsmouth 
1698-1702. See below p, 433. 
(5) R. Kenyon to P. Shakerley, 25 Jan 1696, H. M. C. Kenyon 
MSS. 397* 
(6) Burnet to Johnston, 14 Oct'16909 N. Tindal op. cit. 
1119 160 fn., Hopkins to Byng, 11 Mar 1708, The Byng 
Papers, ed. B. Tunstall (N. R. S. 1931) 111 83. 
130 
This fear guaranteed that the navy would never suffer 
dangerous, neglect but further emotional and economic 
arguments-ensured it a high place in, parliamentary attention. 
When the threat of invasion was-remote jealousy of the.. 
success in commerce of allies-and neutrals was, ever present. 
The Dutch particularly-were the object of much of this 
jealousy(l)but so were Danes, Swedes '* Portuguese, and Genoese 
to a lesser degree. 
(2) Moreover, however, reluctant. -members 
of parliament might be-to vote-money, to sustain a, war, ,, - 
there is no doubt that the majority of them. preferredýto vote 
it fora naval-, rather than a land force. The distrust the 
English felt for armies was-a product of their seventeenth 
century experience. Economic self-advantage strengthened 
the preference; soldiers were paid, out of the kingdomg... 
sailors spent much of their pay in it. 
ý3)-In-a 
wider economic 
context sailors created by war were a permanent national 
assetq and, the trade protected by a large navy benefited 
(4) 
everyone in the kingdom directly or indirectly. 
(1) D-, CoOmýs, The Conduct of the Dutch (1958), 79 37-41; 
Newsletter, 18 May 1689, H. M. C. Fleming MSS. 242; 
Correspondence of Col. N. Hooke 1703-17079'ed. W. D. 
Macray: (Ro#urghe Club 1870) Memorial to Torcy 18 
Feb-, 17P3 TJO, Memorial to de Noailles 111 86-7. 
(2) See. -below p. 221. 
(3) C&, D1Jkvenant,,, Discourses on the Public Revenues and on 
the Trade ofýEngland (1698) in Political and Commercial 
Works--of-C. '*D1Avenant,, ed. Sir C. Whitworth (1? 71) Iq 
405-8; Carmarthen to the King, 9 Sept. 16929 C. S. P. Dom. 
W. & M. 1691-2,443, Secretary of Treasury to Navy 
Board, 20 Sept 1711, Queen Anne's Navy, 202o 
(4) See below p. 233* 
14* 
National pride and tradition also contributed to 
parliament's regard for the navy. The disconcertingly 
rapid creation of a powerful French navy was an affront to 
many Englishmen as well asconstituting a national threat. 
(') 
They conveniently forgot the decades of English naval 
impotence in the reigns of James I. and Charles I and 
remembered instead the naval glory of Elizabeth's reign. 
(2) 
The convictions. Englishmen drew from this selective history 
were that England was by tradition, if not by right, a great 
sea power, that Englishmen instinctively understood the 
management of a sea war, and that properly managed, a sea 
war should largely Pay for itself out of the spoils of the 
(3) 
enemy.. 
H. M. C. Portland 11,108; H. M. C. Finch 111,189; 
R. Steele, -The Englishmang ed. R. Blanchardq 
No. 27,5 Dec. 1713,129; Rooke to ShrewsburYt 
10 Feb. 1696, H. M. C. Buccleuch and Queensberry 
II Pto 1,301- 
(2) "A spirit extraordinary stirring among our nobility 
and gentry in Queen Elizabeth's time towards the 
sea, "Samuel Pepy's Naval Minutes, op. cit. 215; cf- 
A Debate Between three Ministers. of State on the 
-present affairs of England (1702) 25* 
(3) A Boyer Life of her late Majesty Queen Anne (1721) 
'-I'l 157; t" lie 
- 
vote of thanks by the House of Commons 
to-Rooke on, his victory at Vigo, C. J. XIV, 39; Diary 
of John'Evelyn, ed. E. S. de Beer (1955) V, 516; 
Sir J. Dalrym le, Memoirs of Great Britain and 
Ireland (17713 111,6; C. D'Avenant, Discourses on 
The'Public Revenues and on the Trade of Englandq 
op. cit.. I, 408. 
150 
Any consideration of naval matters between 1688 and 
1714 would have aroused feelings'and beliefs of this kind 
amongst many members of parliament, though the strength of 
feeling or belief wou]Ld have varied in time and man. These 
feelings would at all'times and in most-members have merged 
into one-constructive conviction; that the navy should 
provide for the security of the realm, its people, religion, 
institutions and waters. The whole terminolDgy of, popular, 
description of the navy is vividly-expressive of this 
concern for security. The navy is, 'the best guard to 
England, '(11the locks' and bolts 6n the doors of their 'English 
Mansion'house, 1(2)it iBrepeatedly the guardjýnational walls, 
'our greatest security. 9(3) This identification'ofýthe navy 
with national security explains parliament's constant' 
attention to naval, matters, the'lavish grants of naval' 
(1) The Seaman's-'Opinion of a Standing Army (1698), 
A Collection of State Tracts .... (1705) Ili 6910 
(2) Present Condition-of the English Navy in a 
Dialogue .... (1702) 29* 
(3) A speech byLord, Haversham quoted in A. Boyer, 
A, History, of, the Life, and Reign of Queen Anne- 
(1722) 163, ''An Historical and Political Treatise 
of-the NaVY, -. 
(17P3) l3; The State of the Navy 
(1699) 14; --G.,, Jacob, The Country Gentleman's Vade Mecum. -(1717) 119; A Letter to a Country Gentleman.... (1698), Harleian Miscellany X, 362; H. M. C. Portland 
Ijj, ýr "515. 
16. 
supply, and the determination with which the war was 
prosecuted. 
(2) These generally held beliefs and feelings 
provided the background against which parliament discussed 
the strategic uses. of the fleet. 
It follows from a description of this background that 
the basic parliamentary requirement of the fleet was 
defensive. 
(3) 
Parliament's naval strategy was satisfied by 
the security that would be provided by the employment of the 
main fleet in home waters. This was an outlook on naval I 
strategy that the ministers fully appreciated and which 
many of them probably shared. The instructions of the 
Lords Justices to the Lords Commissioners of Admiralty in- 
1696 on the deployment of the navy give clear indication 
of this attitude : the Admiralty was told that, "if there 
"The-great, -securityýthe whole nation expects, frOM 
the fleet, the care the parliament have always 
taken and particularly the last sessions for the, 
augmentation of the strength at sea. " P. R. O. Adm. 
3/15%, l JýA, 1699; cf. Sir Edward Gregory to 
Sergisonj-23 Oct.. 1697, 'Sergison Papers, 132; 
Anon letter to the King, Dec. 1694 (? ), C. S. P. Dom. 
W. -& M. 1694-5,364. 
(2) Ibid. 1694-5, '364; Berkeley to Shrewsbury,, 16'Jul. 
1696. ' H. M. C. *Buccleuch and Queensberryq II Pt. ij 
369; L'Hermitage Transcripts, 4 Jan. 1707, B. M. 
Addit.. MSS. 17,677. CCC ff. 27-8. LIlHermitage was 
a-Dutch'ageinitwho, pýrovided the government of the 
United Provinces with reports on parliamentary 
activities. ' * 
(3) Samuel Pepys's Naval Minutes op-cit. 75* 
17. 
must be a want or failure in one part, it should be 
rather abroad than at hoýne. 11(1) No maJority in either 
house had the strategic knowledge or initiative to desire 
more constructive uses for the fleet.. In parliament's 
eyes security was most obviously guaranteed by a powerful 
.0 
fleet riding in home waters. 
t', , Naturally, between 1689 and 1692, when the fear of 
French invasion was at its-height, parliament could see 
no further than home waters as the theatre for naval"action. 
Sir Thomas Clarges in November 1691, 
(2)Robert Harley in 
November 169.2, 
(3)and 
Paul Foley in November 1693 
(4) 
all 
proclaimed to the Commons, the necessity of a-strong navy, -, ý 
In 1691, with the defeat of Beachy Head unavenged and 
Ireland partially, occupied by the'French, problems"of sea 
power dominated national thoughto(5) 
Minutes of the Proceedings of the Lords Justices, 
7 Aug., '1696, C. S. P. Dom. Wm. III 1696t 330; cf- 
Bonnet Dispatch, 11/21 Nov. 1690, L. Von Ranke, 
A History-ofEngland (1875)Wq 155. 
(2) Grey X, 177* 
(3) 'Ibid Xj 268; cf. N., Luttrell, Abstracts of, the 
Debates, ' 1692-3, ff. 54-81 126-132. 
(4) Grey, X, 311-ý2. 
(5) Carmarthen'to the King, - 22 May 1691,0 , 
S. P. Dom. 
W. & M. *-1690,385,; Sir Charles Porter to 
Nottingham, 4 Nov.: 1691, H. M. C. Finch 111,296. 
18. 
From 1693 and f or the remaining years of the war the 
problem of security was less pressing(l)but a new problem 
arose for the'government - how to employ the fleet actively 
(2) 
enough to justify to parliament the money it voted for it. 
This problem had first arisen immediately after La Hogue$ 
and in the belief that any action was better politically than 
none, the bombardment oi French harbours was suggestedl(3) 
and-a year later Russell informed the Commons of plans to 
land raiding parties of troops on the French coast. 
(4) Such 
ideas were already current in the pamphlet literature and 
apparently, popular with parliament. 
(5) Thus in the years that 
followed, a generally unsuccessful policy of bombardment and 
raids wa s pursued. 
(6) It was-half-hearted on the part of 
(1) Except during the invasion scare of 1696. 
(2) Trenchard to the Admirals of the Fleet, 9 Aug. 16939 
C0S. PiDom.,. -W. -& M. 1693,257, and see-below pp. 81-3. 
(3); Carmarthen to the King, 14 June 1692, A Browningg 
Thomas Osborne, Earl of Danby and Duke of Leeds 
1632-1712 (1944) 11,2089 210; Godolphin to the 
-King'. 13 July 1692, C. B. P. Dom. W. & M. 1691-29 3669 
(4).,., Bonnet Dispatch, 29 Nov. /9 Dec. 1692,. L. von Ranke 
op. cit. VI, 189. 
E. Littleton, The'Management of the Present War 
against,, France-Considered (1690); E. Littletong 
A Project of a Descent upon-France (1691); C S*P* 
Dom. W. "& M. 1694-59 181o The attractions ;f such 
a policy were well described by Defoft in a letter 
to,, R. -Harley, June, 17049 The Letters of Daniel Defoeqý 
ed. -G, H 0 -Healey (1955)20, The idea of using the English. navy, in this way was common in the seventeenth 
century, -as-in-J. Ha thorpe, A Discourse of the Sea 
and-Navigation (16253, The-provision of troops for 
Sea-Service in the early years of Anne's reign is 
, 
probably. an expression of this policy; see below Po374o 
See, -, below p, 262. 
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most naval officers, who loathed the dangers of inshore 
action. By 1696 most ministers had recognised the 
failure of the strategy. Shrewsbury observed that even 
when a town was in ashes the harbour could still be used. 
Godolphin's doubts on the policy had been growing since 
1692. (1) The policy was abandoned and in 1696 there were 
long and frequent consultations on how to use the fleet 
effectively, 
(2)the Admiralty being asked for an opinion for 
the first time since 1689. 
(3) The activity against the 
French coast apparently satisfied parliament; there is no 
record of dissatisfaction and with security ensured this is 
not purprising. 
Concurrently with this raiding policy a new naval 
strategy was adopted in 1694, in which year the fleetq under 
I 
the reluctant Russell, wintered in the Mediterranean and 
re-established the policy of a permanent English fleet 
dominating thýse-waters. This policy was William's 
(4) 
and 
in Anne's reign it was'Marlboroughs determination that 
Iý continued the policy. Practically everyone else of note, 
with the exception of merchantt, idisliked this distantq 
(1) C. S. P. Dom. W. & M. 1691-29 198-9; ibid. 1693,102-3t 
. 
140, 
(2) Minutes of the 
' 
Proceedings of the Lords Justices, 11 
June 1696, C. S. P. Dom. Wm. 1696,221t 224. The 
French, encountered the same problem; see J. S. Bromley, 
The French Privateering War 1702-13 in Historical 
Essays 1600-1750, ed. H. E. Bell and R. L. Ollard 
(1963) 209. 
(3) Ehrman 603; see below p. 480-3. 
(4) Ibid- 519-21o 
20* 
dangerous duty that deprived England of-security. Amongst 
I 
the flag officers Russell, Rooke and Shovell were articulate 
in their doubts. (') Ministers, among them Trumbullt Secretary 
of State 1695 to 1697, and Shrewsburyq Secretary of State 
from 1695-to i698, had similar doubts, as had many others. 
(2) 
In 1694 the argument was advanced in the Commons that this 
'strategy endangered the nation and only benefited our 
(3) 
allies. In 1707 the Mediterranean commitment was blamed 
(4) for-poor trade protection. 
The absence of any more general parliamentary opposition 
to the Mediterranean strategy can be accounted for in several 
ways. Me, mbers, were generally ignorant of the number of 
ship. s left to-defend the country and the government ensured 
Russell-to Trenchard, 21 July 1695, P. R. O. S. P. 42/4, 
f. -1,144; here he writes'of the 'imaginary service, ' 
performed,, by a Mediterranean fleet; Rooke to 
Shrewsburyll Oct. 169.5, H. M. C. Buccleuch and 
Queensberry II pt. i2 239; Shovell to Nottingham, 18 
July 1702, C. S. P. Dom. 'Anne I, 190;, Memorial on 
sending English Fleet to the Mediterranean March 
--17031 ibid. Anne 1,660. 
-Trumbull to Rooke, 30 Dec. 1695,, H. M. C. Downshire I Pt. iij 603-4; Shrewsbury to Stepney, 20 and 27 Oct. 
1703, - Epistolary Curiosities ed. R. Warner (1818) 
99'100. 
-The 
concern of the less informed is 
expressed in the Portledge Papers,, ed. R. J. Kerr and 
I-C. Duncan (1928) 179; Vernon Letters 1,299; 
C: S. P. Dom.. Anne Us 589-90. 
(3)_' Bonnet Dispatch, 23 Nov-/3 Dec. 16949 L. von Ranke 
op. cit. VI 251* 
(4) Vernon 
'Lett 
I ers 111,287. See below p. 292, 
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that in a crisis, as in 1696, the Mediterranean fleet 
II-- 1-1 
returned quickly to home waters. Thus the assumption of 
security was unchallenged. 
(') 
Nor was there apparently any 
constructive, alternative strategy, especially whenj in 
the early years of Anne's reign, the policy was successful. 
The terminology in which these victories are described 
suggests that the English became reconciled to the 
Mediterranean policy because they saw it as an extension of 
their dominion of the seas. Thus Malaga could be described 
as the battle that gave Englandt "the sovereignty of the 
(2) 
Mediterranean, as well as the British Seas, " and the capture 
of Gibraltar as a victory that extended "the English Empire 
of the Seas as far as the Mediterranean.,, 
(3) 
Parliament's lack of interest in the employment of the 
fleet other than in the interests of security and sovereignty 
can be seen in the political treatment of the "Blue Sea" 
strategy. This theory of warfare was most brilliantly 
propounded byZwift in-, his pamphlet, 'The Conduct of the 
Allies. ' 
(4) 
He maintained that England's natural sphere-; of 
(1) Although the Commons investigated the deployment of 
the navy in the crisis months of 1696 with great 
care; see below p., 271-2. . 
(2) A-. Boyer, Life of her Late Majesty-Queen Anne (1721)- 
Iq 284. 
(3) A. Boyer, A History, of the Life and Reign of Queen 
Anne-(1722),, I, 284;, cf. ' R. Davisq The Rise of the 
English Shipping Industry. (1962) 336-7o, 
(4) J. Swift, The Conduct of the Allies and of the Late 
Ministry in Beginning and Carrying on the Present 
War (1711), Prose Works of Jonathan Swift, ed. 
H. Davis (1951) VIq 8-11* 
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warlike action was the sea and that in any war her major 
contribution should be naval, with subsidiary combined 
operations against the colonies of her enemies. Swift 
claimed that William, Marlborough and the Whigs had 
disastrously and wastefully engaged England in a land war. 
Such was the power of his style that Swift gave definition 
to the strategy and associated a liking for continental land 
(1) 
war with the Whig party for much of the eighteenth century. 
The Whigs encouraged such an identification, especially in 
the last three years of Anne's reignq by criticisms of a 
Blue Sea policy, criticisms that owed much to the experience 
of such expeditions as Swift recommended. 
(2) 
To credit Whigs or Tories with such definite views on 
strategy in William's reign or-the early years of Anne's 
reign would be too sweeping. There was only spasmodic and - 
minority interest in the merits or', demerits of a Blue Sea 
(1) J'. Ralph, The Other Side of the Question (1748) 
172-4; Good Queen Anne-Vindicated (1748) passim; 
R. Pares, American Versus Continental Warfare, in 
The Historian's Business, ed. R. H. and E. Humphreys 
(1961) 130-2; H. St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, 
Letters on the Spirit of Patriotism, ed. A. HaBsall 
(1917) 116-122. 
(2) Col. L. Lillingtonj Reflections on Mr. Burchet's 
Memoirs .. *., (1704) 151-4; Marlborough to 
Godolphing 
19 May 17101, W. Cox, Memoirs of the Duke of 
Marlborough, ed. J. Wade (1847) IIIt 37; A Letter 
from an Old Whig in Town to a Modern Whig in the 
Country (1711); F. Hareq The Management of the War 
in a Letter to a Tory Member (1711) 22-9. 
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strategy in parliament. Indeed the only approach to 
consistent and'precise support for such a strategy seems to 
have been made by one man, a leading Tory politiciang the 
Earl of Rochester. 
(') 
His definition of the policy was Most 
clearly given in his preface to the first Earl of Clarendon's 
History of the Rebellion. 
(2) Events in 1691 and 1692 
favoured the exposition of a Blue Sea strategy in parliament 
though the motives for the consideration were as. much 
factional and economic as strategic. 
(3). A, debate in the 
Commons in 1691 came, to no conclusion, probably because 
English dominance, and therefore securityq was not yet 
'e A. % 
-. --I 
eBtabliBhed. ý" AS Soon as this dominance had been established 
at La Hogue Rochester advocated a reduction of land forces in 
favour of an increased naval contribution to the war although 
he appears to have given no clear indication of how the 
Laurence Hyde., first-Earl of Rochesterg son of 
Edward Hyde, the first Earl of Clarendong and- 
thus related to the two Queens, Mary and Anne; 
Lord LieLtenant of Ireland 1700-01,1702-3. He 
was described as Idur, opinatre, hautain, plein 
d'affectation2 entete de certaines maximes de sa 
facon, jugeant des choses uniquement par. rapport 
a ces maximes, ' Correspondence of Col. N. Hooke, 
ed. W. D. Macray (Roxburghe Club 1870) 11 16. 
(2) It i: k-: k (1717'edno) The first edition was in 1702. 
(3) See below pp. 102-3. 
(4) Bonnet Dispatches, 13/24 Nov. 1691, L. von Ranke 
op. cit. VI, 166,169; Burnet 111, '93; C. S. P. Dom. 
W. & M. 1690-91,450,465. 
24* 
stronger navy was to be employed. 
(') Most-of William! s 
ministers disagreed with his views(2)and they attracted 
no parliamentary support in the following years of 
William's reign. 
At, the beginning of Anne's reign, Rochesterjý, as, kinsman 
to the Queen and a-leading Tory, was--in a, strong, position 
and again he advocated a Blue-Sea-strategy., Again, in 
1702, ýit was rejected by a majority of the ministersý,, 
(3) 
Discussion of the strategy-was-not revived until 1707, a 
time when dissatisfaction-with the military and naval-conduct 
of the war was growing. -In a pamphlet published in 1707, 
'An Inquiry into the Causes of our Naval, MiscarriageBg 
(4) 
the strategy received its most explicit geographic 
definitiong-with suggestions for-squadrons to be-employed in 
the Mediterranean,, West Indies and Canada. There was some. 
C. S. P. Dom. W. & M. 1691-21 410-11. The naval 
background to this debate can be found in Ehrman 
398-403 and H. Richmond, Statesmen and. Sea Power 
(1946) 69-704oý 
(2) A. Browning, op. cit. -I, 499-5009-11,212-3; Sir 
John Dalrymple, Memoirs of Great Britain and 
-Ireland. 
(1771). II, 6-10,240-2. 
OY-. 
-J. Ralphq., The-Other-Side-of-the Questioný(1742); --- N. Tindal op. cit. 1,545; A. Boyer, Life of her 
Late Majesty Queen Anne (1721) 1,55-6; G. Holmes, 
British Politics in-the Reign of Anne (1967) 73* 
(4) Harl'e'ian'MiBcellany (1810) XIt 5-8. 
25* 
debate on this strategy in the House of Lords but the 
greater issue of'trade protection robbed the debates of 
consequence or urgency. 
(') 
The use of Swift's writings to give the Blue Sea 
strategy a retrospective importance before'1711 is not--ý 
supported by the evidence of any general interest in such 
a strategy, and his implication that the Tories were 
consistent supporters of such a policy receives little 
support. Even Rochester seems. to have abandoned 
advocacy of a predominantly naval war and after 1706 was 
urging*the use of more troops in Spain'. 
(2) Rochester's 
Tory associates were never remarkable for their consistent 
support of a predominantly'naval war policy with much 
stronger squadrons-in distant waters. Nottingham in 
1695 and Granville, Howe and Sir Edward Seymour in 1702, 
all of them Tories of repute, arped in parliament 
against-the use of the navy in-a Blue Sea role. 
(3) 
116Parliament; as a body had little interest in or insight 
into the strategic'functions of the navy, outside 
considerations of security. Indeed the-need for'Becurity 
(1) ,A0- Boyer op. cit. 111-35-8; see below pp. 288 et. seq. 
(2) R. Walcottq English Politics in the Early 
Eighteenth Century (1956) 136; G. Holmes and 
W. A- Speck, The Divided Society, 'Party Conflict 
in ingland 1694-1716 (1967) 90. 
(3) Bonnet Dispatch, 25 Jan. /4 Feb. 1695, L. von 
Ranke op. cit. VI, 268,270-1; Godolphin to 
R. Harley, 11 Sept. 1702, H. M. C. Portland IV, 
46* 
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provided the argument most frequently-put forward 
against a Blue Sea strategy. It was maintained that 
without military aid the, Dutch would be conquered, and 
much though parliament might dislike such expensive 
military support, it did keep the French one remove away 
from the English seas.. 
(') 
As the Ma: rquýs- of Halifax had written, in 1694, 
(2) 
1 
'feeling precedes, thought. - In parliament's, relation- 
ship with the navy, feeling, expressed in terms of 
sovereignty and security, preceded thought because in 1688 
palriament-knew very little-aboutthe navy and its 
administration. Parliament's acquisition of knowledge in 
all aspects of, naval business is one of the most remarkable 
and important developments, between 1688 and-171ý- The 
paper evidence for this education is everywhere, in 
parliamentary papers, letters, pamphlets and petitions. 
How much,., the members of parliament-learnt from these 
sources and others can be assessed by a consideration of 
the various sources which helped I to educate parliament 
Of parliamentary ignorance of the navy-in the early 
years of William-there is no doubt. There'l was not even 
The- French King's Memorial to the Pope (1688) 45; 
Burnet-III, -93; Bonnet Dispatch 24 Nov. 
/4 Dee. 
16919 L. 
_von.. 
Ranke-op. cit. VI, 169. 
(2) Quoted above, p. 5. 
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any certainty 'as to the numberý of ships in the English 
fleet(l)and Russell wrote bitterly of those who judged 
"the wind and weather as the smoke of their tobacco 
drives. (2) Pepys in his writings was eloquent'to the- 
point of tedium in his denunciations of'parliamentary 
ignorance; in one such he wrote, 
'The gentry of England consist either of persons 
untravelled and consequently ignorant: ........ or 
such, as having-travelled, minded nothing but the 
pleasures or vices of other countries; or else 
so many travelled gentlemen as sit in an English 
House, of Commons could never have been so 
ignorant of what is extant in print of the 
government of their navy And from this 
ignorance of our Parliaments in matters marineg 
-it, follows that when. to that ignorance is added 
either an_artificial or real suspicion of mis- 
conducts and mismanagements in the navy, they 
know not how to judge when they have truth told" 
-ýthem,, but are-apt to discredit any account that 
is given thereof. 1(3) 
Pepys. attributed this ignorance partly to the small number 
of "sea representers" who sat in the Commons. He was 
right as far: as, naval-, officers were concerned; there were 
nine in-the parliament elected in 1701 as OpPOBed-to 
(1) Grey IX, 335-t- 
(2) H. M. C., -Finch, III, '153. 
(3) Samuel Pepy'-s Naval Minutes, ed. J. R. Tanner (N. R. S. 
1926), 356-7. Similar views are expressed ibid. 
257- 2609-'267? 2779 279-80,283-49 2899 2939 3179 
33E, 357,358,359,395-6; The Tangier Papers of 
Pepys, ed. E. Chappell (N. R. S. 1935) 230. 
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thirty-nine army officers. 
(') 
Even if this small group 
had been capable of instructing the Commons and the 
House prepared to listen, the complications of naval 
administration and action were such that it was generally 
accepted that a serious study of naval affairs would 
occupy the House for several months, 
(2) 
The pressure of 
parliamentary business made such leisurely consideration 
iMPOBsible. The very nature of debate in the Commons 
made logical and persistent inquiry difficult enough. 
On 12 November 1691 the Commons were considering a 
relatively well defined issue, the lack of exploitation 
of the victory at La Hogue, but the debate was. disrupted 
by interjections on transport ships, Newfoundland trade 
and the efficiency of the Lords Commissioners of 
(3) Admiralty. A similar debate on 21 November caused 
Clarges to describe the proceedings as chaos. 
(4) Anyone 
who has experienced the debates of large committees will 
accept that such gatherings are rarely effective in the 
education of their members in complicated topics. 
(1) R. Walcott op. cit. 165. There were also eight 
office-holders with naval positions, ibid. 171. 
This figure can be compared with the 21 naval 
officers in the 1761 parliament, L. Namier, The 
Structure of Politics at the Accession of George 
111 (1957 edn. ) 31. 
(2) See below pp. 86-7* 
(3) Grey X, 244-8. 
(4) Ibid. X9 270* 
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Despite such. obstacles parliamentary knowledge of 
the navy did increase, and as theoretically the source 
of all naval knowledge should have been the government 
representatives in the Commons, the role of the Court 
group in the education of parliament must be considered 
first. It was generally expected that officials in the 
House should support the Court viewpoint by their speech 
and vote. 
(') 
The effectiveness of such'speeches as a 
means of convincing and instructing the House varied. 
They could be strong emotional appeals, as when Sir John 
Lowther appealed for naval supply in a speech demanding 
sacrifice, fewer dishes on the table and fewer servants 
in the house, and justified, such demands by reference to 
the crisis in the fortunes of the nation. 
(2) They couldq 
however, attempt to convince by reason and in such 
attempts fact and instruction were necessary* Russell 
and Papillon from 1689 to 1693 were particularly effective 
A. F. W. Papillon, Memoirs of Thomas Papillon 
(1887) 358; A. Browning op. cit. 111,178-84. 
(2) Grey Xt 30 cf. H. Luttrellq An Abstract of 
the Debates 1692-3 ff. 100-1; 'see below P- 78. 
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in instructing the Commons in matters of naval strategy 
and administration*(') Not all Court officials were as 
effective. Many of the lesser officials saw themselves 
as primarily members of the Commons and lurked quiet and 
uncomfortable in debates, afraid of losing their jobs 
if they supported the opposition and their status and 
friends if they supported the Court. 
(2) Naval officers 
BlImmoned by the CommonB to give expert evidence or advice 
spoke with cautions knowing that ill-considered speech 
could prejudice their relations with the Admiralty. 
See below PP-78#46LThose officials most able to 
instruct parliament in the mysteries of naval 
warfare and administration were the Lords 
Commissioners of Admiralty and the Commissioners 
of the Navy. The great officer of state who 
traditionally controlled the navy was the Lord 
High Admiral. After 1688 his office was - frequently put into commission and executed by 
a group of men known as the Lords Commissioners 
of Admiralty. They were the executive officers 
responsible for the administrat-lon and deployment 
of the navy. Although Pxince George of Denmark 
became Lord High Admiral between 1? 02 and 1708 he 
was advised by a council. This body, the Prince's- 
Council, was to all intents and purposes a. Board of 
Admiralty. The Commissioners of the Navy made up 
a subordinate- body, the Navy Board, which was 
responsible for the maintenance and financial 
accounting of the navy. For the changing status 
and relationship of these Boards see below pp. 480-3. 
The Navy Board supervised the work of the subordinate, 
Boards such as Victuallers and Sick and Wounded. 
(2) Samuel Pepys's Naval Minutes OP-cit- 322; Grey IXI 
415; ibid. X9,162* 
, 
(3) Delavall to Nottingham, 9 Dec. 1691, H. M. C. Finch 
1119 306; Vernon Ldtters 1,74. 
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Such poor support and inefficient control'Of'officials in 
the Commons is one reason why the Court sometimes failed 
to secure legislation on naval matters that was obviously 
necessary. Thus William's request in 1694-for 
legislation to aid manning'had no result until 1696, and 
Anne's tentative request for increased spending on the 
navy in 1708 had no result at all. 
(') 
I 
Even without such weaknesses of personnel and 
organisation the Court would have found it difficult'to 
convince or instruct the Commons. '' The arguments of 
Court officials were automatically suspect. 
(2) 
Moreoverg 
the Court was disinclined by tradition to give the Commons 
too'much information; 
(3)it 
was the-responsibility of the 
agents of the executive to administer and such agents 
were responsible most obviously to the King. On a common 
sense level every official probably felt a wholly 
justified reluctance to provide, detailed returns for 
parliamentary consideration. It was all too likely that 
they would be used in evidence against department or 
official. Returns presented to the Co=ons were usually 
See below P-352 and P-135 cf. H. M. C. Hastings III 
252; W. A. Shaw, Introduction, C. T. B. XXI Pt. It 
xvi: P. Foley to R. Harley 17 Sept. 16929 B. M. 
Harley Loan 29/135. 
(2) C. S. P. Dom. Wm. 1698,423; see below p. 76. 
(3) See below p. 110o 
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complex and sometimes confused. The complexity, 
certainly in naval returns, was usually a fair reflection 
of a complex administration but it is difficult not to 
believe that complexity and even confusion were some- 
times a defensive device to prevent parliament under- 
standing too much. 
(') 
Evidence that government officials 
went further than this and suppressed evidence that might 
be of use to the Commons is rare but there is sufficient 
to show that this was done. 
(2) However such falsifications, 
usually by omission, must have been few; the chances of 
discovery were too, great. 
(3) 
A safer way of thwarting a 
parliamentary inquiry was to disrupt the debate and the 
Certainly Burchett was supposed to possess great 
skill in such matters,, "for whoever conns the 
Ship of Admiralty the Secretary is always at the 
Helm, he knows all the Reaches, Buoys and Shelves 
of the River of Parliament and knows how to steer 
clear of lem all .... he sits at the Board behind 
a great Periwig, peeping through it like a rat 
out of a butter firkin, " Remarks on the Present 
Condition of the Navy (1700) 7. Josiah Burchett 
was Secretary to the Admiralty 1694-1742 and M. P. 
for Sandwich 1705-13,1722-41, B. I. H. R. XIV 
(1936-7) 53. For instances when confusion rather 
than clarity might have been the motive behind 
naval returns see History and Proceedings of the 
House of Commons R. Chandler (1742) 11,392; 
W. A. Shaw, Introduction C. T. B. XXI Pt. I, xvi and 
below pp.. 260-1. 
(2) Vernon Letters 1,69-70; A List of Questions to be 
Answered, B. M. Harley Loan 29/35, No. 5- 
(3) See below pp. 38-41,53-4. 
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Court could count On officials -, in b oth Lord -s and 
Commons with sufficient skill and experience to manage 
this, for example Priestman's provocative'remark on 
merchant losses in 1692, 
(')the'opportune 
arrival of 
information on the Preston Conspiracy during a series 
of debates on Russell's failure to bring the French-to 
battle in 1691 
(2) 
or the attack'-on Norris in 1698.0) 
Indeed, allowing the Commons to investigate the faults 
of one man rather than the faults of a department was the 
surest way of ending an uncomfortable investigation. 
Vernon described the technique: 
'Parliaments are grown into a habit of finding 
fault,, and some Jonah or another-must be throvai 
overboard if the_storm cannot otherwise be laid. 
But if the great Leviathan will be amused by an 
empty barrel it is a composition easily made. j(4) 
The business of managing the navy was in fact so vast 
that it was always vulnerable'in either its ope I rational 
or its administrative activitie-s. '(5) It was easy to 
(1) ý See below ýp. 243* , 
(2) Grey X, 170 ff; S. B. 
493-4* 
Baxter, William 111 (1966) 
(3) Vernon Letters 1,405,410; 11,85- 
(4) Vernon Letters 1,405- James Vernon was Under 
Secretary of-State 1690-97, Secretary of State 
1697-1702 and a Teller of the Exchequer 1702-10. 
He wrote many and informative letters to his 
political-patron, the Duke of Shrewsbury. 
(5) Vernon Letters 19 267; Grey IX, 413* 
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provide a naval Jonah and whether they realised it or 
not., several naval officers and officials provided a 
sacrifice in the cause of executive peace. 
(') 
rDespite 
the inability or reluctance of the, Court 
representatives to provide a parliament with the factual 
information necessary for debate, decision or legisla- 
tion, this material was provided. Even a cursory 
glance at the Journals of either House-or at the volumes 
of manuscripts presented to the House of Lords 
(2)reveals 
the wealth of detailed and relevant information for the 
assessment of naval policy that came before both houses 
of parliament. The procedure for acquiring such- 
information was well established in 1689 - initially a 
request from either House to inspect departmental 
archives, a request that was generally. granted, and the, 
committee appointed by the House saw the papers. requested 
or transcripts-of them. It was a procedure capable-of 
infinite expansion. By 1693 it was customary for the 
Commons to appoint a day for a debate on naval business 
Graydon, Whetstone and Hardy are three of the 
Most senior who suffered in this way; see 
below p. 283 and pp. 434-5. 
(2) Calendared by the Historical Manuscripts 
Commission. 
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early in the session, 
(') 
To assist the debate papers 
were 'ordered' by courtesy of the King. At the 
beginning of the 1693-4 session, when consideration 
of the disaster to the Smyrna Convoy was a major 
concern, 
(2)the Commons ordered as material for their 
debate copies of all the orders to the fleet during the 
summer, the stations of the main fleet, convoys and 
cruisers, and the decisions of councils of war, and 
asked that the Admirals of the Fleet and representatives 
of the Turkey Company should attend the House and that 
such Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty as were members 
(3 
of the House should be prepared to answer questions. 
Two days' notice was given of these requirements and most 
of the papers requested were presented to the House in 
this time ready for the debate on 15 November. In that 
debate the Commons asked for the evidence on the disaster 
currently being considered by a Committee of the Council. 
(4) 
This was provided on 17 November with the remaining 
material from the AdmiraltyS5) The use the Commons made 
of this information can be deduced from the records of the 
debates. (6 The information, full though it was, was 
(1) H. M. C. Finch 11,232; P. R. O. Adm- 3/1 f. 126; 
Sir John Dalrymple, Memoirs, op. cit. I-RA4 103. 
(2) See below pp. 248-54. 
(3) C. q. XI2_2* 
(4) Ibid. XI, 3-4. 
(5) Ibid. XI2 4-5- 
(6) Ibid. XI2 69 8-10,12; Grey X, 311-29,333-38, 
347-Be 
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susceptible of varying interpretations as the CommonB 
found when they pressed the Admirals questioned for 
decisive. statements on the orders they had receiyedt the 
victuals they had available and the strength of the wind. 
The Commons wanted straight, unqualified answers but 
throughout the debate on 22 November the Admirals hedged 
their anBwerB with reservations. The debate ended with 
a plea for more fact. On 27 November, when the House 
returned to the subject, the Admiralty had provided a 
precise answer to one question, - the fleet had on board 
victuals for 4-6 days - and the_Commons resolved that this 
had been enough for it to stay longer than it had, _done 
with the merchant ships. The primary impression made. bY 
reading accounts of these debates is of parliamentary 
confusion and anger, confusion because, of theýmumber of 
side issues raised(l)and anger because decisive answers 
to questions were almost unobtainable, and this despite 
the unparalleled quantity of information before the House. 
In the following years the officials of the Navy 
Board found that the Commons made frequent use of the 
lists of men, expenses, ships, guns and'victuals that they 
Some of them almost certainly to confuse the 
debate, for example the contribution of Sir 
Robert 
' 
Rich, Grey X, 329. 
(2) The House of Lords considered similar evidence 
H. M. C. H. L. Ij 93-295. 
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were required to keep for their superiors. 
(') So 
frequent were these requests for information that it was 
a natural and unnoticed step to the next development, the 
assumption by the Commons that they could demand this 
information by right. From the middle years of Anne's 
reign information is asked of the navy without any 
reference to perMiBBion"from the Queen. 
(2) Gradually and 
unconsciously the Commons had assumed a direct relation- 
ship to the executive and a relationship that implied 
parliamentary authority over the executive. 
This acquisition of knowledge was not inspired by 
any dispassionate desire for information or by the new 
statistical awareness that men like Petty and King were 
For example,, in 1695 for the House of Lords, P. R. O. 
Adi. 7/333, ff-75,76-91 80-ý92 or for the Commons 
in'November and December 1696, C. J. XI, -581-2t 
590, 
591,598,600-019 617,619. A version of the 
instructions to the Navy Board, those of 23 May 
17029 is printed by G. F. James, Lord High Admiral's 
Council, M. M. 22 (1936) 427-9. Individual members 
of committees could consult such materialg 
N. Luttrell, Abstract of the Debates 1692-3 f. 102* 
(2) The first example is probably the request of the 
Commons for financial information on 10 Jan. 17091 
C. J. XVII 16,24; cf. W. A. Shaw, Introduction C. T. B. 
XXIII Pt. Ij xxiv. In the earlier years of Anne's 
reign requests for information had often been met 
by a statement that the transcription of the papers 
necessary would take several weeks. K. M. C. H. L. V9 
483* 
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displaying to late seventeenth, century England. 
('? 
Information was required that it might be used in 
evidence against Court policies or officials. Patriotism 
and parliamentary opposition were practically synonymous 
terms. (2) Burnet summarised the motives and appeal of this 
Country antagonism to a government-. 
'In a House of Commons every motion against a 
minister is apt to be well entertained : some 
envy him, others are angry at him, many hope 
to Share in'the spoils of him.,, or of his 
friends, that fall with him, and a love of 
change and a wantonness of mind, makes the (3)- 
attacking a minister a diversion to the rest. ' 
The aim of such a Country opposition, whatever its motives, 
was never quite blind; information on whom or what to 
attack was usually available. In the debates of 1693 
referred to above, the questions put by Sir John Parsons 
on victualling were pertinent ones, not surprisingly, for 
he had been a Commissioner of Victualling and was at that 
A pamphlet by Pettyj 'A Treatise of Naval Philosophy' 
(1691), The Petty Papers, ed. Marquis of Lansdowne 
(1927)-Ij lists the statistical information a king 
should have about the navy. 
(2) N. Tindal op. cit. 111 303; R. Walcott op-cit- 94. 
(3) Burnet 111, 
-75- 
In less dogmatic terms the 
opposition to the Court in 1694 of Edward Seymour 
and Jack Howe was attributed by Stepney to their 
being 'grumbletonians' because they were out of 
office!, and that of Sir J. Thompson to his ambition 
to become a lord, The Lexington Papers, ed. 
H. MannerB Sutton (1851) 15o 
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time'ý- a contractorý-for naval stores. "(') There, were 
several members like, him who knew something of navy-- 
methods because they dealt in naval contracts. 
(2)'The 
Commons would also'contain-*a number-of financiers, 
merchants and ex-'ministers and officials whose specialist 
knowledge would be of-use, but undoubtedly the most 
important guidance-on naval matters came from naval 
officers and officials who, for a variety of reasonsq 
were prepared to us'e their knowledge against the govern- 
ment. - The usual motives for such assistance were 
disappointment and ambition. -' In' this, way the opposition 
to William's government profited by-the help and advice 
of the greatest'naval expert of the time-, Samuel Pepysli 
who found that altho'Ugh'the new-administration had no 
use for his_talents, ý-Paul, Foley and Robert Harley-, were 
very'ready to hear hi6 opinions. The-connection was 
probably made when Foley and Harley were Commissioners 
of Accounts between 1691 - and 1693. 
(3) A later and 
anonymous pamphleteer claimed that Pepys, in order, to 
distract them from investigation'of his- own accounts, 
(1) See above P-36 Sir John Parsons was M. P. for 
Reigate and one of the victuallers who had been 
dismissed in 1689 for providing faulty provisions, 
C-T. B. X Pt. 111,1293; C. J. X, 293,302. 
(2) C. S. P. Dom. -Wm. 1697,161; C. S. P. Col. Amer. 1700,161. 
(3) See below P, 113. 
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first flattered them*and"then filled their'p6cket's 
"with schemes relating to the navy. "(') Pepyst amongst 
the jottings he-made for a .., ne I ver I complet - ed-naval"hi'story, 
records-meetings-with the"'commissioners of accoi I ints aiýd4 
Foley in'partiCular, (2)but there is'no indi6atibn of'the 
schemes, 'if, ýany that he'may have I -passed to-them. 
(3) It is 
almost certain, however, that his-advice was"'of use to 
them in matter's, that'concerned the navy. Both'Foley'and 
Harley received information as'well from''officials still 
serving in the administration, probably including 
Sergison, the Navy Board Clerk of Acts, especially between 
1697 and 1699, when dislike'of'Orford's administration 
inspired the leakage. ý 
(4) 
In a'similar way Orfo'rýd used, his 
knowledge of naval finance to attack the Tory Administra- 
tion in 1704, (5)and am'ongs't-less informed naval, experts 
who from-jealousy or disappointment used their knowledge 
(1) Some remarks-on-the, Bill for, Takingi--Examin: Lng 
and-Stating the Public Accounts (1702) 5-6- 
(2) Samuel'Pepys's Naval Minutes op-cit. 389,400. 
(3) See, below . ýp. 42-and- p. 247 0, 
(4) Vernon Letters 1,272; 11, 
-395-6; 
Questions to 
be answered 16997 B. M. Harley L6an, 29/35, 
No. 5. 
9 
-! - 0, , (5) See below pp 131'4-,, 
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against, the-ýgovernment. -were., Captain George Churchill(l) 
and - Admiral Killegrew. 
(2) 
Without such'advice from*"naval--administratorg"or 
officers'it-iB likely-that such--'naval legislation, as, -the 
opposition initiated. wOuld have been*more, ineffective 
than'it was. Uninformed-"political jealousy based upon 
feeling rather than, -, knowledge, is'a poor starting-point 
for legislation. 'The dangers of, such, legislation'can 
be illustratedýbyýan, Act of 1694. The. habit of naval 
captains who'acted as"Judges at courts martial-of 
acquitting-brother, *officers; out-of-sympathy or as'an 
insurance for their-own future, had, ý'by thistime; - 
become notorious. ' The opposition-group-of, which, Paul 
Foley was a-leaderý-brought-in-'a, bill-, to-ýstop thiB.,, 'and 
such was the generalýsympathy fOr'Some, -reform that'the 
bill-became law. 
(3) The first clause of this Act, stated 
that. after, 24 June 1694. any, naval officer*thought guiltY 
of professional failure might be tried before the 
justices of Oyer and"Terminer by, the-processes of Common 
law-instead-of court martial.; The-Act'did, nott-howevers 
defineyho, was to, decide, the court before which 
(1) Samuel, Pepysls. Naval Minutes op. cit. 293-4,322; 
-see--below pp* 244-5. 
(2) See-below-P. 54. 
(3) 5 W. & M. c 25, An Act for the better Discipline 
of their Majesties Navy Royal. EFFIELP 
UK tflt # 'ý', TYi 
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an officer would be tried and there was no doubt which 
court naval", off icers would choose ý-The 'Act was 
moreover,, an infringement-'of-, the'7prerogatives of the 
Lord-High Admiral andq byýimplication,, of-the-. Monarch 
himself, yet this'point was, notapparently Made in- 
debate though'it wisýone'thatvould'haveýweighed heavily 
with conservative members. ý Pepys--described it as "a 
useless unintelligible Act. 11'and--held'Fol6y and"his, 
associates to be responsible for itsvinitiationrand: - 
wording. 
(') 
Such-an Act. - it'lapsed after three, years 
was a natural"'consequence of. -. uninformed,, and Country 
inspired legislation. - Yet the act-ean-stand as-an 
exception; the majority of the Acts described in the' 
chapters-that'-follow-were effective-to-a--greater-or- 
lesser'degree,, -one indication of the growing parliament- 
ary appreciation of the, problems of the navy. The 
development of party politics contributed towards this 
increasing appreciation. 
The degree-of political-organisation'that existed 
between 1688, and 1714-isýa subject of debate and seems- 
(1) Samuel Pepys's, Naval Minutes op. cit. 388-91 
399-4009 ' Bonnet described the Act as 'fort 
utile"when it was passed, Dispatch 24 April/ 
4-May 1694, L., von-Ranke op. cit. VI, 248,. 
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?I 
likely to remain so. 
(') It would seem that to describe 
the political groups in the early years of WilliaM'S 
reign as 'parties'. with all the precision that. such 
a word involves, is-rather toolsweeping. In these 
years a shifting of groups against the background of 
the traditional antagonism. -, ý of Court and Country 
seems a fair description of a confused and imprecise 
political scene. This confusion continues into the 
reign of Anne but increasingly, the politicians led by 
the Whig Junto show those charaeteristics of 
organisation and loyalty that make a party. Comparable 
Tory development. was slower. The Tories were a natural 
The two extreme viewpoints are those of R. WalcOttq 
English Politics in the Early-Eighteenth Century 
(1956),, who. explains the political scene by Namier 
-style, groups of kindred and clients-, and 
J. H. Plumb who, in The Growth of Political 
Stability in England 1675-1725 (1967), sees party* 
-principle and party organisation 
in parliament. and 
country; The latter viewpoint-is powerfully and 
convincingly supported by G. Holmes in British 
Politics in the Reign of Anne (1967) and by 
G. Holmes and, W. A. Speck in The Divided Society: 
Party Conflict in England 1694-1716 (1967)- 
D. Ogg! s England in the Reigns of James II and 
William 111 (1963) gives balanced'-and uncombative 
conclusions. K. Feiling, History of the Tory 
Party "1640-1714-(19241 has, an older but still 
valuable'outlookj-andýthe classic 'Whig' 
interpretation-remains-G. M. Trevelyan's England 
under Queen Anne (1930). - 
1 1111 
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majority in the nation, and usually in parliament, and 
they suffered from the natural reluctance of a majority 
of conservatives'to copy the techniques of their 
political opponents. St. John, in the years after 1710, 
was their most effective instructor. 
Between 1688-and 1694 party politics were in 
abeyance. William's ministry was a coalition made'up of 
men'representing most viewpoints and most political groups 
with Carmarthen as leader. Non-party government 
appealed to William as. it did to Anne. The years were 
ones of national emergency in which such political 
compromise was acceptable to many. As the sense of 
emergency faded Country hostility to the government, 
expressed by such men as Clarges,, William Sacheverell and 
William Garraway, (2)became more difficult to contain. 
The Ministry itself was weakened by the antagonisms of 
its leaders; the feuds between, Carmarthen and Nottingham 
and between Nottingham and Russell. As early as 1692 a 
member of the Commons had advised William that if he. 
wished to govern efficiently he must do so through 
K. Feiling op-cit. 275-6; D. Ogg, op-cit. 360. 
Thomas Osborne, MarquiB-Of Carmarthen 1689-949 
Duke of L*e'eds 1694-1712. 
(2) For-Clarges see above p. 4 Sacheverell was 
M. P. -'for. Derbyshire and Garraway M. P. for Sussex., All-three are described in D. T. 
Witcombe, "Charles II and, -the Cavalier House of Commons 1663-74 (1966) 199,201,207. D. Ogg 
op., cit. '225, G. Holmes and W. A. Speck op. cit. 
143-7; 'J. H', Plumb op. cit. 132-3# 
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ministers of, one principle and one interest. 
('), In-order 
to manage-, t his parliaments --and., obtain f avourable votes 
of supply for, his war policy-, William, was, foreed to 
depend upon those politicians who favoured this. policy. 
This meant-depending on the,, Whigs and. the appointment, of 
Somers as-Keeperýof, the Great Seal in, 1693ýcan be taken 
as signifying William's, acceptance of-the need toxely, 
on party support. 
(2) 
After this Whig and Tory, settled downýto the-political 
struggle that was to end-with,. Whig victory., in 1716.,, . 
Between 1694 and.. 1700-Whigs dominated the government. The 
King's dependence oný. the party was ensured by theadvice 
of Sunderland, who saw. more-clearly.. than Most the necessity 
for aýgovernment-tO secure the-, support of a, -united -- 
political group. 
(3) 
The Whig,, leaders,,.,, Shrewsbury and the 
able, politicians who were, to become,, the, Juntol POSSeSBed 
the status, following and political-skill. to. manage, k- 
government-and, parliament as. the-King wished* 
(4) 
-, The 
N. Luttrell, * Abstradt of the Debates 1692-3, f210- 
(2) G'* HolMes. OP-cit- 55-6; J. H. I Plumb opý. cit- 132-3; 
S. B* Baxter, William 111 (1966) 270,277-8,295; 
and W. A. -Speck op. *cit. 8-9ý' - 
(3j Ibid 10; ýJ. H. Plumb op. cit. 135; K. Feiling OP. 
-cit. 291; J. P. Kenyon Robert Spencer, Earl of - Sunderland 1641-1702 Z1958) 256. Sunderland (1640 
, -1702) was 
the second earl. 
Charles Talbot, Duk e of Shrewsbury, see D. H. 
'Somerville, The Kin; of Hearts: Charles Talbot, ' 
Duke of: Shrewsbury, 
4962) 
84-5. The Whig leaders 
were Somers, Wharton, Charles Montagu (later Earl 
of Halifax) and Russell. 
- 
Li r- T%J 
numerical weakness of the Whigs had some compensations 
in that it compelled leaders and followers to appreciate 
the importance of party'unity and organisation. 
(') 
Powerful traditions and an astutely led opposition 
worked against the consolidation of a Whig party. The 
Whig tradition was one of opposition to monarch and 
government. It was difficult for some Whigs to accept 
as one of the conditions of party politics and 
discipline that they should have to. Bupport the govern- 
ment even though theministers of that government were 
their own leaders. It was made more difficult by the 
development of an opposition group led by Paul Foley 
and Robert Harley which seemed to act on the old Whig 
principles of opposition. 
(2) This fundamentally Tory 
group representedl as did the Junto led Whig partY a 
political adaptation to the post-Revolution situation:. 
(3) 
It was an adaptation that the more orthodox Tory leaderss 
such men as Rochester and Nottingham and Musgrave in the 
(4 
Co=ons, found' difficult to make. Their identification 
of their class and followers with the defence of the 
(1) J. H. Plumb op. cit. 136. . 
(2) Ibidý 133; K. Feiling op. cit. 287,291. For Foley 
Bee below p. 244'for Harley. below P-381. 
(3) D... -Ogg op-cit. 391-29 444* 
(4) Rochester and Nottingham are described above p. 23 
and' p. 4 , Seymour and MUBgrave below p. 
383and 
P. 383* 
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monarchy, and Anglican. Church Wasý. t#al. -The,, doctrine, 
of Passive, Obedience and Non-Resistance. was-, the,, basic 
tenet of Tory philosophy. -. -, Yet they. had acted against- 
thiB philosophy. -in. supporting theý. Revolutionýof 1688. 
They preferred to ignore-the, implications of this,, action. 
(l) 
Their refusal to rethink their philosophy and expliqiýlýr 
define their-attitude, to.., the-Revolution, eventually 
prevented-them from enjoying-the, political dominance-to 
(2) 
which their numbers entitled them. 
The dominance. of the Whig--party in,. the years after. 
1694 was made possible. by,,. the, patriotic support-the, 
government enjoyed from politically uncommitted members of 
parliament-An time of-war. 
-The 
peace of Ryswich- 
weakened this support., Peace, also weakened the 
discipline of the Whig party -, itself. Many, ý, of its 
members cherished, the-right to make theýr, ownlndependent 
choice on, each,, issue before-parliament. The success of 
the Whig leaders had, excited,, envy and. opposition. Their 
political philosophy and, mýthodsvere,, uncongenial to IýW- 
As a. result their ability, to manage:.; the-Commons 
G. Holmes and W. A. Speck op. cit. 103-4; G. Holmes 
OP! cit. 58--ýO; WO Bisset, Moae'rn Fanatic (1710); 
Managers, Pro and Con, (1710); Doctrine of Passive 
Obedience, (1710);. -. Serious Adirice to the Good People of-England; Shewing them their True 
Interest (1710); True. -Genuine Tory Address 
(1? 10) 
(2) D. -,, Ogg-op. cit. 476-7. 
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disappeared in the factiousýsessions between 16Wand 
1700 and William was forced. to form-a Tory ministry. &(') 
Between 1700 and-1702 events-in parliament. - particularly 
consideration-of the problems-of the-, Successiong- the 
Church and-England's responsibilities towards Buropet' 
forced manyýmembersýto define their political outlook. 
(2) 
The impeachment of the Whig leaders furtherýunited_the 
Whig part-y., 
(3) By the time-of William's death in 1702 
there were two political-'partiesAn England. - It would 
be impossible to underst6nd the politics of'Anne's reign 
without an, acceptance of the fact that there were Whig 
and Tory parties. 
(4) 
Anne would have preferred'a, moderates-non-partisan 
government. The two-men, on whom, she based her govern- 
ment between-1702 and 1710, Godolphin and Marlboroughg'-, 
_v 
(5) had-similar inclinations* Unfortunately, for them-all 
such-a policy-proved impossible. - Anne herself was not' 
neutral in the-political issues that divided her 
kingdom* She was a natural Tory in-her devotion to the 
S. B. Baxter, OP. c: Lt. 359-619,374,377; D. Ogg 
op. cit. 442. 
(2) G. Holmes and W. A. Speck op'cit. *20-l-, G. Holmes 
--op. cit. 47-8,63-4; J. H. 
Rumb 
op-cit. 74ý289* 
The political complexities of the period are 
illustrated". in the detailed account of the election 
oflthe, ý-Speaker in--Feb 1701, N. MýM. Sergison Ser/103 
ff; 62ý4 cf. ý. G. Holmes and W. A. Speck op. cit. 20,23. 
(3). Tbid. 21 D*. Ogg. op. cit. 459-64. 
(4) G. ýHolmes op. cit. 7. 
(5) Sidne "-first Earl of Godolphin and John Churchill, 
firsI'Duke of Marlborough. 
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Anglican Church and her high concept, of the status of 
the monarchy. 
_ 
These convictions gave a Tory bias to. 
what was epsentially, a moderate ministry in the first 
year of Anne's reign. 
(') 
The bias was sufficient-to 
prevent the smooth. functioning of, the government., The 
Tory leaders, ': Ln the persons of Rochester, Nottingham., 
and Seymour, attempted to, dic#Lte. government policy in 
domestic and foreign affairs and win total control of 
the ministry. 
(2) 
The removal or resignation of these 
three between 1702 and 1705, encouraged Godolphin to 
attempt a government made up from the moderates of both 
parties. The appointment to office of moderate Whigs 
like Cowper and Walpole and. moderate Tories like Harley 
created an efficient government but one that was by 
definition precarious. 
(3) Godolphin. found, as William. had 
done, that such a government had to contend with the 
inevitable pressures from the more extreme members of both 
parties and the divided loyalties and opposed principles 
of the. members of'the government itself. 
(4) He found too 
that only the Whig party was wholehearted in its support 
G. Holmes and W. A. Speck op. cit. 27. 
K". Feil'ing OP'. Cit . 
"' 367-70. 
(3) William Cowper, later first Earl Cowper, became 
Lord Keeper in 1705, Robert Walpole, later first' 
Earl of'Orford, joined the Prince's Council in" 
the same year. 
(4) K. Feiling OP-cit- 398-9*9 G. S. Holmes and W. A. Speck, 
-, The-Fall-of-Harley--in 1708 Reconsidered,, Eng. Hist. Rev. LXXX No. 317 (Oct. 1965) 689-914, 
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of Marlborough's war policy. By 1708 Godolphin's 
moderate government was in ruins and from 1708 to 1710 
the Whigs dominated again. 
This'domination had been reluctantly conceded by. 
the Queen. By 1710t the imprudent Whig prosecution of 
Sacheverell, the war weariness of the nation, a growing 
discontent with both Godolphin and Marlborough$ had 
convinced her that a predominantly Whig ministry was not 
in the best interests of the nation. 
(') Robert Harleyt 
as the queen's chief adviser from 1710 to 1714, attempted 
to follow more moderate policies than, many of his 
supporters-in the strongly Tory parliament of 1710-13 
would have wished. The need to end the war. and secure a 
good peace preserved a semblance of party unity and 
Harley's dominance. After the ]Peace of Utrecht in 1713 
m- ill considered policy towards"the dangers threatening 
a Protestant Succession when Anne should, die split-the 
Tory party and placed it ýnder overihelming disadvantages 
when George, of, -Hanover 
became King. 
ý Party politics dominate&theyears between 1688 and 
1714, and because of this parliamentary debate and 
legislation are permeated by the antagonisms of Political 
ýrOUPB. Although the efficiency of the navy was a 
national-rather than a party concern it was, not immune 
(1) K. Feiling op. cit. 404-12, 
51. 
from the effects of, party rivalry. on practically 
every occasion on which the navy was discussed in 
parliament orlaws were passed effecting it and for 
which sufficient evidence survives to base a conclusion 
it is possible to discern ways in which political 
attitudes determined the attitudes of men and sometimes 
the form of naval legislation. Even on an issue as 
politically neutral as the manninglof the navy. the 
speeches in 1703 on, this subje 
, 
ct. show the infection of, -.,,, _ 
party bias. 
(l) Every, naval issue that concerned., 
parliament was susceptible to political interpretation 
and exploitation by party politicians. 
Yet although. thqse party polliticians dominated the 
parliamentary scene between 1688 and 1714, less than half 
the., me. mbers of the Commons consistently accepted the, leader- 
ship of such men. 
(2) 
In William's reign the Country 
tradition of1political independence, waB strong. In 
Anne's reign, the 
'tradition 
lingered and.,, even though 
parties were better defined each had on its wings 
individuals or groups whose, *sporadic. loyalty, e, arned them 
the name 'Whimsicals. t(3) The majority of the Commons, 
"1 - 1- 
--See -below, pp. -383-5- 
(2) G. Holmes op. cit. 116,118; Ogg op. cit. 127* 
(3) G. Holmes'op. cit. 8,248 ff* 
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made up of the politically uncommitted, 'represents the 
most nebulous,, the most difficult to study yet, in some 
ways, the most influential of all the political groups 
in'parliament between 1688 and 1714. The members voted 
from motive's that must have been, as diverse as the 
personalities who made up the group. One motive that 
involved many of them must'have been concern for the 
national well being. In the crises that began and 
ended this periodl that of the'Revolution*in 1688 and the 
Succession'-of 1714,, a majority of the Englishmen involved 
in politics acted together to promote &`: national not a 
party policy. When the issue was obviously of national 
importance the politically uncommitted held the balance. 
Their influence on the less decisive political events 
between 1688 and 1714 is, generally'inealculable but when 
naval matters were, discussed in parliament it must often 
have been important... -The navy, symbolised. national. 
security. No legislation or inquiry that concerned the 
navy was likely to-, be effective, no matter what govern- 
ment or party initiated the, proceedings, unless some at 
least of the politically neutral members were convinced 
that action was consistent with the national goode: 
The political animosities of these yearst between 
groups developing_into parties or between parties, 
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produced in parliament and in the navy an environment of 
political dualism in which the discontented and 
ambitious and the men of principle could find a pat h 
for their ambitions or a focus for their loyality. 
(l) 
For the navy this meant the infiltration of--political 
animosity into every rank of naval administration. This 
in turn meant that whenever parliament considered the 
navy the opposition groups could draw on'the advice of 
their own experts. Every party and political group had 
these naval experts. The: Whigs had Orford*and the whole 
constellation of flag officers he had favoured. ' 
(2) The 
ing Rooke. ough Tories had the rather unwill Marlb6r*' 
(4) 
and Godolphin had George Churchill and Captain Elkinss 
Nottingham had his cousin, 'Dering, in naval serviceg and 
(5 the advice of Killegrew and Captain Price. Bir-Joseph 
(6) 
Banks spoke'with the Seymour Group and St. John had his 
(1) D. Ogg op. cit. 505, 
(2)' See below pp. 430-2. 
(3) See-below --p. -433., 
(4) -The'Byng-, Pipers, edo B. Tunstall-(N. R. S. 1931) II-t 
xiii; George Churchill was the Duke of Marlborough's 
p.? 45* --brother; see 
below 
(5) W*P.: Aiken, The. Admiralty in'Conflict and, Commission 
1679-1684-,,, -Confliet 
in Stuart England, ed. 
W. P. -Aiken. and, -B. D. Henning, (1960) 211- N M'M- Edward Southweli w&s*clerk to 
the Privy Councilop (6) See'below'-p. 383. 
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Hovenden Walkc%r e . 
(l) 
Thus every administration-had to 
take into account the presence of hostile experts when 
ever naval matters were under discussion in, parliament. 
I 
Russell's plausible explanation of how the wind had 
prevented him from leading out the fleet in 1691 was 
shattered when Killegrew produced his own journal to 
contradict'Russell. 
(2) 
The party leaders were the obvious 
recipients for the information from informers, when-they 
were in opposition; thus Wharton in 1703 received- 
information about irregularities, in the conduct of the- 
Office for Sickýand Wounded(3)for the same-reason as", 
Harley- and -Foley received- such information between 1697 
and 
1699,, (4) 
Just as the naval officers, although-a minority in 
parliamentg-had an important influence, on naval-business 
in both Houses, --so another minority groupq far less 
partisan than'the naval"-officers,, 'had an importancefar 
in, lexcess of their numbers. The merchants 
in the 
Commons-were, about a-tenth of-the-, House, but their 
The Walker Ex edition to Quebec, ed. G. S. Graham 
(N. R. Se-19533 14* -- 
(2) Bonnet Dispatch, 10/20 Nov. 1691, L. von'Ranke' 
op. cit. -VI, 164.., - -After this they were open 
enemies, ibidý VIýq- 177;, Luttrell 11,337; Reasons 
to Prove-therehath been Negligence, Ignorance, 
or Treachery in the Lords of Admiralty.... (1693) 
(3) H. M-.; C*-, H&L*--VP 533-5. 
(4) See-, above-Pp. 39-40. 
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influence was great in naval matters, 
(l)too 
great to 
please Pepys: 
'I would observe how hard it is for anything 
to be well understood in the Navy when those 
that even our Parliament do commonly put 
most weight upon in their meetings upon the 
business thereof-are so much mistaken as 
they have been (I mean our merchants). j(2) 
Merchant opinion on naval matters was valued in the 
Commons because it was likely to be informed-by relevant 
knowledge and because it was usually voiced with no bias 
as obvious as that of Court or naval speakers. Thus 
most committees in the Commons that dealt with naval 
matters included all members who sat for the City or the 
sea ports. Their influence on parliamentary legislation 
is particularly evident in trade protection, manning, and 
the encouragqment of seamen. 
(3) Their power was very 
obvious to naval captains who failed in their convoy 
duties* If the Admiralty did not take action against 
them the merchants would carry the issue to parliament. 
Killegrew, in 1690, the Marquis of Carmarthen in 1695 and 
A more d etailed consideration of the numbers and 
influence. of'the merchants, particularly in 
relationýto trade protection, is given below*pp-224-30. 
(2) The Tangie r Papers of Samuel Pepys, ed. 
E. -Chappell '(N. R. S. 1935) 230; cf. Sir John 
Dalrymple. ' Memoirs of Great Britain and Ireland 
, (1771) 1 it,, ' 65. 
(3) See, belowpp. 297,385-6,450. 
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Sir Thomas Hardy in 1707 are three examples of flag 
officers who suffered because of merchant complaint. to 
the Commons. (l) The way-the merchants used their 
knowledge and authority in the Commons is well illustrated 
by Sir Alexander Rigby's campaign in 1696 and 1697 against 
those members of the Board of Admiralty, particularly 
Sir John Houblon. and Sir Robert Rich, who hadýbeen 
responsible for his not obtaining lettdrs of marque. 
(2) 
By organising statements and evidence from several other 
merchafits, and including in his account many indications 
of the failures of naval organisation and hints at the 
ways in'which Rich particularly us'ed his position to 
make illegal profits, Rigby was able to convince the 
Commons'that the Admiralty had been partial in the 
allocation of letters of marque. 
(3) Rigýyls ships were 
(2) Killegrew to Nottingham, 25 July 1690, H. M. C. 
-Finch 111 384; Luttrell 111,506; S. Martin Leake, 
-Life of Sir John Leake, ed. G. Callender (N. R. S. (1920) 155-8; for Carmarthen see below p. 264. 
(2) H. M. C. H. L. 111' 14-17,29-30,307-13,362. Rigby 
was M. P. for Wigan and a wealthy merchant with 
interests in Portuguese, Mediterranean and Turkish 
trade. 
(3) C. J. XII 699. Rigby implied that an associate of 
Rich, one Aldred, collected bribes for Rich. The 
literature of the times contains many accusations 
against Rich; Remarks on the Present Condition of 
_the 
Navy (1700) 18-19; H. Speke, Some Consid- 
erations .... concerning the Lords of the Admiralty; Present Condition of the English Navy Set Forth in a 
Dialogue .... (1702) 89 13; H. M. C. Portland III, 500; Grey X$ 273. 
f 
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well looked after by the navy in the years that followed. 
(') 
The influence of the merchants in parliament increased 
throughout the period, and by the end of Anne's reign 
their importance in the CommonB and for the nation waB 
generally recognised. 
(2) 
Court officials, Country politicians, naval officials 
and officers and merchants helped to instruct members 
within the Houses of Parliament but there were sources of 
information outside parliament. Newspapers, pamphlets, 
petitions and reports by experts increasingly provided 
such information about the navy. Information from such 
sources was in some ways easier to digest; it had the' 
perennial advantage for the learner of written over 
spoken evidence; it could be consulted at leisure apart 
from the rush of parliamentary activity; it could 
theoretically reach all members of parliament, a major 
advantage when attendance in the Commons was seldom 
much above half. 
(3) 
The government's failure in 1695 to renew Charles 
Il's Licensing Act of 1662 allowed printers to publish 
without the control of a censor. This freedom in a 
C 
C. S. P. Dom. Wm. 1697,148* 
(2) See below P. 305. R. Steele, The Englishman 
(1955) 15; J. Addison, The Spectator'. ed. G. Smith 
(1958) It 214; Ut 19. 
LIHermitage Dispatch, 2 Nov. 1696, B. M. Addit MSS. 
- 17,677 OR f-573; Eng. Hist. Docs. VIII, 956-7. 
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timie-'of national unrest'stimulated writing, particularly 
in the form of news-sheets. 
(') The result was a flood of 
information which the government realised created public 
opinion on national and parliamentary events and provided 
a basis for'criticism of the government. 
(2) By 1710 the 
freedom of the press was such that the publication of 
ship movements was a threat to national securitye(3) The 
influence of these papers in shaping parliamentary 
opinion on the navy is diffuse but generally, between 
1695-and 1712, they were helping to make the Englishman 
the best informed of any European national. 
(4) Much in 
the newspapers was a mere catalogue of events but some 
contained the equivalent of present day articles on 
contemporary--problems. The most obvious example of a 
newspaper influencing parliamentary action on the navy 
is when the House of Lords summoned'the journalist 
Defoe to elaborate for it his scheme from the Review for 
, (5) manning, the navy. The coffeeýhoUBes at which these 
(1) G. A. Cranfield, The Development of the provincial 
Newspaper (1962) 6-17; G. S. Holmes and W. A. Speck%, 
The Divided Society : Party Conflict in England 
1694-1716 (1967) 66-8; J. M. Price, A Note on the 
Circulation of the London Press 1704-14, B. I. H. R. 
ýX. Xý- (1958) 217* 
(2) H*'MoC- Finch 111,. 50; Luttrell 111,176. 
(3) P. R. O. Adm. 3/23,12 Aug. 1708; ibid 3/24,24 Feb. - 
1710* 
(4) G. A.. Cranfield op. cit. 187-8; M. A. Thomson$ 
Parliament and Foreign Policy 1689-1714, History., 
XXXVIII (1953) 236; M. Foot, The Pen and-the Swopd 
(1957) 73-7* 
(5) See below p. 442& 
I I- 
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papers were collected provided a place for the 
discussion of events, and Burchett, Secretary to the 
Navy, was one naval official cautioned for speaking too 
freely in one. 
(') 
It is easier to, define the-value to parliament of 
the pamphlets written about, the navy. Many of them 
were specifically addressed to parliament, particularly 
to members of the Commons, for example, the series 
(2) devoted to the abuse of 0. and R Sq and theset like 
Maidwell's proposals for. a maritime schoolq(3)were 
certainly read by members. and, their proposals considered 
in parliament., There is evidence of broadsheets and 
pamphlets on trade and naval matters being distributed 
to members, presumably free-of charge. 
(4 ) 
There is 
evidence too of members buying such pamphlets, and of 
committees of the Commons calling on the authors to 
(1) Miscellaneous State Papers, ed. P. Yorke, Earl, 
of Hardwicke (1778) Ut 480; cf. H. M. C. Portland 
IV9 483- 
(2) See below p. 456; . -many of the pamphlets mentioned are dedicated to parliament. 
(3) See below Pp. 391t 398'. 
(4) William Hodges claimed to have presented 500 
copies of one of his pamphlets to the twoýHousesq. 
Humble Proposals for the Relief .... of the "' Seamen of England (1695) 62. Richard Butleý**** 
-made similar claims for his broadsheet advocating 
a Registry of seament C. S. P. Dom. Wm. 1696,115; 
cf. James Whiston'A claims, B. M. Addit. MSS. 179677 
qQ f. 235. 
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explain their PrOPOBal§. 
(') 
The value of many of these 
pamphlets as treatises, of naval instruction for members 
of parliament can be seen in the fact that many of them 
were written by men well versed in naval affairs. 
Between 1690 and 1695 BiX-important pamphletB were 
written BUggesting BOMe form of registration Of seamen. 
(2) 
One was anonymouss(3)two were 
. 
written by Captain George,, 
St. To, an experienced naval officer who as a prisoner of 
war had observed the working of the French system of 
registration. 
(4) 
Two-more were by naval officers, one. by 
Henry Maydmant who was a warrant officer with thirty years' 
experience as a purser, the other by John Perry, who had 
J. H. Plumb, Sir Robert Walpole: The Statesman in 
the Making (1956) 83 fn. See the hand-written 
comments 
-, 
on the B. M. copy (816 m. 7. ) of S*t. Lo's 
pamphlet, Reasons, Humbly-Offer! d ..... for 
reducing Seamen Wages (1693). 
(2) Reasons for' Settling Admiralty Jurisdiction and 
Giving Encouragement to Merchants, Ownersq 
Commanders, Masters of Ships, Materials Men and 
Mariners-, (1690), The Ha-rleian-Miseellany IX 
(1810) 465-475; H. Maydman, Naval Speculations 
and Maritime Politic s'(1691); G. St. Lo, England.. ' s 
-Safety-(1693); 'J- Perry, A Regulation for Seamen 
(1695); G. Everett, Encouragement for Seamen and 
Mariners (1695)9 Harleian Miscellany X, 221; 
G. St. Lo, Englahdls_IntereBtp (1698). 
-- 
(3) Reasons for Settling Admiralty Jurisdiction ..... 
opecit* Thig. pamphlet was influential in other 
ways;. see below, p. 473. 
(4) See below pp. 
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the enforced leisure-of a gaol, sentence in which'to 
write his pamphlet. The'last author; George Everett, 
was a Thames boat builder with a knowledge of naval, 
administration-and a dislike of naval officials. 
(') 
Between 1694 and 1699, the Chaplain-General to the Fleet 
addressed three eloquent pamphlets'to parliament, the 
most vivid, -and d'etailed'accounts in'print of the miseries 
of the naval sailor. 
(2) 
It was in pamphlets that the 
administrative successes-of foreign nations in their 
naval problems were described and sometimes, ýrelated to 
the English situation, asýwas, the-French system of 
registration'. - There'-were-many bad, -, ill-informed and 
biassed-, pamphlets, but the general standardýof_knowledge 
and common sense in the better onesýis high*- From-the- 
numerous well-informed-pamphletsit was, possible to 
learn of the human and administrative-weaknesses of-the 
navy,, the fundamental problems of English sea powerl and 
sensible suggestions for their solution., 
Ehrman'595-7- 
(2) A Humble Representation of the Seaman's Misery (1694); Humble Proposals forthe, Relief, 
Security and Happiness of the ...... Seamen of England (1695); Ruin to Ruin after Misery to 
Misery (1699). , He is identified as Chaplain Generallin-the B. M'. -'Catalogue, a more likely 
description than'the conventional one as a 
merchant. "(D. N. B. ). 
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Petitions, 'to parliament were in effect usually-- 
concise pamphlets formallypresented. to the Commons"or 
Lords. Frequently they were supported by pamphlets but 
they usually had the advantage of being particularly 
sponsored in the House by a group of members. Thus 
they were generally cons'idered-by the House or a committee 
ofýmembers. The petitions from S. W. England on'trade 
protection in 1705-6(1)and the merchant petitions of 17079 
(2) 
also for trade protection, are examples of petition 
campaigns that aroused the Commons to action. -A series 
of petitions that had less obvious effects were-those in 
1695 and 1696 by-the watermen's companies of the City and 
the Thames. They wished to-be made exempt from-the 
compulsory register of seamen that was being considered,, 
and the Thames Waterman feared that-in any scheme of this 
sort the London Waterman might gain control'over them. 
Six petitions'instrUCted parliament in the problems 
involved (4)and pamphlets were available as well. 
(5) This 
(1) See below'pp. 281-2. 
(2) See-. 
-below.. -P. 
291, 
(3) See below' p. '252. 
(4) C. J. XII'299,300s 315,387,392,429. 
(5) The-Waterman's Case in Relation to* the Billrfor 
Increase and, Encouragement of Seamen; Some - 
Reasons-Humbly Offerld for Rejecting the Bill 
Entitled, 'For Compelling of Fishermen to come 
-into'-their Majesties Service'. (Both c. 1695) 
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use of petitions to stimulate-parliamentary action was 
nationally understood, sometimes very well organised, 
and as a device for securing-the attention of the 
Commons especially, one of the'zost effective. 
Another written-source that sometimes-had a wider 
A 
audience than was originally-intended was the--report 
written by an expert on some aspect of naval activity. 
These were usually written for a-particular member of 
the government at his request, as Gibson produced a 
Memorial on the Fleet probably at Trenchard's request in 
1693. (') The-reforms suggested by Gibsont who had a wide 
knowledge of naval life and administration, 
(2)would have 
transformed the life of the sailor and made the navy much 
more efficient. 
(3) The Lords Commissioners of-Admiralty 
and Pepys were amongst those who saw this memorialand 
some of Gibson's recommendations were carried out in 
, William's reign. 
(4) Similar reports by experts outside 
UY Mr. -Gibson'-s Memorial'for-the-King, Oct, 5th 1693; Containing Remarks upon the Present State 
of, theNavy Private Correspondence .... of Samuel Pepys, ed. J. R. Tanner (1926) 1,118-26. 
-Trenchard was made-Secretary of. State in 1693 and, the memorial was probably written. at his request. 
(2)ý 'He was an associate, of Pepys and-had been a purserl-- 
victualler, Judge Advocate and Clerk to Trinity 
A -House, N. M. M 'Southwell, Sou/2, f-195; H-M-C- Downshire MSS, - ýI *flt-, 11,516. 
(3) See, below-, Appendix IX. 
*-(4) See below-p**e' 473-4. 
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the administration were fairly common in all aspects 
of government. 
(') When specifically requested by a 
minister or official they were likely'to be influential 
because they had a purpose and a sponsor; when hope- 
fully produced by a writer with the aim of winning 
attention or office they were less likely to be 
effective. 
(2) j 
By listening to-debate in parliament and reading 
outside, it was possible for a member of parliament 
during William's reign to acquire'a more detailed and 
comprehensive knowledge of the navy in all its branches. 
than ever before in English history. The teaching 
material for a naval education was available but the 
effectiveness-of such an education'depended, as ever, 
on, 'the pupil and the-incentive to learn. ' Some of the ways 
in-, which the knowledge available to'parliament was 
refracted by personal interest and political"bias can be 
illustrated by reference to the House of Lords. With a 
total membership of about 200 between 1688 and, 1? 14, of whom 
no, more than ?0 were-usually, in, attendance at WeStMinBterj(3) 
the membership of the Lords was-more static than that of 
(1) R. M. Lees,, Parliamentýand the Proposal for a 
Council of, Trade 1695-6. E. H. R. LIV. (1939) 44do, 
(2) See below --p. 473-4. p 
(3) A. S' Turbervilles.. The House of'Lords in the' 
Ei; hteenth Century (1927) 4. 
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the Commons. 'As-a group the Lords were keenly -- 
consciousýof their own status and of the privileges 
they possessed. ý Like., the members of the Commons they 
shared in the interest in naval affairs and like the 
-Commons only a small minority had personal-knowledge of 
them. (') The-Lordsq howeverjýýmade, better use, of-theirý- 
experts than the Commons. These experts could speak 
with greater confidence in the socially homogeneous 
House of Lords and would. be lesson the defensive thýn 
naval officers and officials in the Commons. In z-- 
William's reign Torrington, despite-his disgracesin , 
M 1690, was most referred-to for advice on the-navy. 
In: Annel-s-reign Orford, wa8,, -the-obvious'naval expert but 
his blatant Whig-bias perhapsýmade him less generally 
acceptable. The, purposefulness andorganisation-that 
are-,, characteristic of investigation made by the Lords 
into-, iiaval affairs, must owe, much to the knowledge of-these 
men. -In,,, contrast,, the-; Commons, demandedýevidence wholesale 
-'Apýrt, from"tho'se-name'd below only Charles powlett, 
2nd Duke of Bolton, and Thomas Herbert, 8th Earl 
-of, Pembroke,, seem. _to have displayed a persistent interest in naval affairs. 
(2) L'Herm4tage'-Dispatch. -17 Jan- 16961 B. M. Addit. ' MSS''-l7j677`QQ. f. 209; 'H. M. C: "Hastings 111 256- i693-. he was, helped-in-, hisl -consideration of the 
Smyrna,,, -disaster,, by-Berkeley, -and Osbornet H. M*Co H. L. 
' -It 
"96..,. 
_. _F6r 
Berkeley see below p. 252; for 
Peregrine Osborne, Earl of Danby and Marquis of. 
Carmarthen 1694-1712 and 2nd Duke of Leeds 1712- 
1729, see below p-264. 
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and their inquiries often lost direction in the sheer 
bulk of written and verbal evidence.. 
Party feeling increasingly distorted, the clarity 
with which the Lords considered naval matters., and Whig 
exploitation of their strength in the Lords during, the 
early years of Anne's reign made every consideration of 
the--navy a party exercise. TheýLords already possessed 
bias enough, inherent in theirýaristocratic status, --. 
without the additional distortions of political 
allegiance. Their concern-for their status displayed 
itself in.. sporadic squabbles with the Commons,, such as 
those, over the impeachment of the Whig ministers after 
Ryswieh,, -the disbandment of the, army or Irish 
forfeitures. ;, It-, was. a concern strong enough-to dominate 
any, -, debate-on naval matters, that a majority of the-Lords , 
might-consider a. challenge_toýtheir position. Torrington 
found-, supporters-. in, the-Lordi; after his defeat at Beachy 
Head-Aný. 1690 because: hisl-punishment might demean-the 
2 
peerage. as-a group*(,. T. -,, 
), 
-In 1692 similar caste loyalty made 
a-ýmajority of: -the, Lords support-their., man, Nottingham, 
(l). -, A, S. -Turbevi1le, The-House of-Lords in, the, Reign 
of William 111 (1913) 196-210. 
(2 Ibid; '-67-8-;, H*, M-'C. ' H. 'L., MSS. 1690-1,93-4; H. M. C. 
''Finch. II, 333-ý; N*M. M. Southwell Sou/1, ff-105-8; Ehrman 359-ý66-,, 
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against Russell, who had the support of the Commons, 
in a dispute on the giving of orders. 
(') This Jealousy-, 
between the two Houses, could lead. to petty actions., In 
1697 the Commons refused to allow those of their members 
who were on the Board of Admiralty to attend the Lords, 
to give them information about the movement of the 
French fleet from Toulon to Brest. (2) ]Probably the most,, -, 
serious consequence for the navy of this ill-feeling was 
the delay, of legislation. Consideration of the naval. 
legislation initiated by one House could be so neglected 
in the other that a session ended before the necessary 
readings, had been completed. 
(3) In this way action would 
be postponed for at least a year.. 
.,,, 
The complexities and inconsistencies prevalent in 
both. Houses appear clearly in their respective treatment of 
privateers. Trivateers had a relevance to the navy in 
that-they took the'sailors needed by the fleet. For this 
and other reasons. the government was anxious to restrict, -. - 
their number. 
(4) 
During William's reign there was a group 
in the Commons sufficiently powerful and persuasive to, 
present almost annually bills making it easier for 
HiMOC*ýKenyon, 269; Luttrell 11,637-8- 
(2) C. J. xIt 749,756,757. 
(3) Sei below- pp. ý 689,396* 
(4) G. X, -*Clark, Threl)ý 0h 
Alliance and the War 
against tim encs 1688.;. 1697 (1923) 45-9; 
C. S. P"Dom. W. &, M. 169t-5,3? 0ý N. Luttrell 
Abstrict of the Debates 6 2-3 ff. 4099'417- 
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privateers to operate. The Lords as regularly 
opposed these bills and rejected them or by neglect let 
the ending of a session defeat them. 
(') Whatever the. 
motives for this opposition in the Lordsq statesmanlike 
conviction that the government was right, or antagonism 
to the profit-making motives displayed by the Commons, 
the roles were reversed in the reign of Anne. Now, the 
Lords sponsored bills encouraging privateers, especiallyý. 
to the West Indies, and the Commons opposed them or let 
them lapse. 
(2) The most likely explanation of this 
reversal is that the merchants had converted the Whig 
Lords who dominated the House of Lords and that the 
Tory majority in the Commons between 1-702 and 1708 was 
prepared to support the government's view. 'The Whig 
Lords and themerchants were successful in 1708, when 
the Act for the Encouragement of Trade to America was 
(3) 
The inconsistent treatment by the House of passed. 
An act of, 1692,4 W. & M., c 25, did something'to 
encourage privateers but the resistance of the 
Lords to greater encouragement can be seen in 
1694, H. M. C. H. L. It 383-90; Bonnet Dispatchq 
24 Ap. /4 May 1694, L. von Ranke oP. cit. -VIj 248; -C. S. P. DomAA. M. 1694-5.370; C. J. XIj 669 100,, *144 or for 1695-6, C-J-XI9 366,367,368, 
408; B. M. Addit. MSS. 179677 QQ f. 228. 
(2) C. J. XIV, 203,204; H. M. C. H. L. V, 42-4,2089, 
Bashet Transcripts, 62ar. 1703, P. R. 0- 3/191 f. 89 
(3) See 'below pp. ýU2-4; Addison to the Earl of Manchester, 
20 Feb. 1708' The'Letters of JOBeph Addisong ed. 
W. Graham-(1941) 93. - 
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Lords of naval business is sufficient-general evidence 
for : bhe ways in which facts and issues connected with 
the navy were, refracted in the minds of politicians. 
There were many other viewpoints, some common to, 
both houses. - There-were regional loyalties. In 
December 1691 Clarges and Seymour in the Commons argued 
that the strength of the army should be reduced. They 
found themselves deserted by their-usual supporters from 
the South-West of England because-: thOBe members feared 
that a reduction-. of the English army would lead 
eventually to more powerful-French naval action$, and, the 
coast of the South. West was most vulnerable. 
(') An 
extreme-example of-such regiona1loyalty is-the 
nationalism of'-the Scottish, peers who entered the House 
of Lords after the Act of Union. They voted for Kerr 
in 1708 because he was'Scottish and despite clear 
evidence that he was guilty of demanding bribes. 
(2) The 
interests of a 'country' or county or region were of 
great consequence to most members of parliament; these 
interests could at times appear more important to them 
(3) than the needs of the navy. 
Yet - when all allowance is made for the - strength of 
(1) Bonnet Dispatch 24 Nov. /4 Dec. 1691, L. von Ranke, 
op. cit. -VI, 169. 
(2) Court'and Society from Elizabeth to Anne, ed. 
WORD. -Montagu, Duke of Manchester (1864) 11,274 
see below- pp. "28*-5. 
(3) See below pp. 187-9, o'. 
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selfish and sectional interests involved in parliament's 
consideration of the navy a qualification is necessary., 
This was an age more openly emotional than the twentieth 
century., The House of Commo ns could sit numb and dumb 
at the news of-militýry failure or its mimbers"weep 
publicly as they listened-to speeches. 
(') There is no 
reason to doubt that the fierce-and-chiuvinistic 
patriotism that is so frequently expressed in letters and 
speeches was sincere. Behind the obviously selfish 
political and economic attitudes towards the navy in 
parliament there was still a strong patriotic concern. 
When the Earl of Sunderland, 
(2) 
a devoted Whig, wrote in 
1709 about the possible promotion of his party leader to 
the position of Lord High Admiral, 
'I think this settling of the Admiralty right, 
in Lord Orford's hands, is a thing of so great 
consequence in itself, so national, and so 
(3) 
great a strengthening of the Whig party o**9 
it is too easy and too simple to emphasise the political 
implications of his letter, even thougb: 'he gives the 
national good a precedence. HistorianB are trained to 
(1) W. S. "Churchill, Marlborough, His Life and Times. 
- -(1ý47)-II9-315; ý 
(2) Charles Spencerg-third Earl. of Sunderland. 
(3) Sunderland to-Somers,, 8 Aug. 1709, Miscellaneous' 
State Papers- ed., P.: Yorke, Earl of Hardwicke (1778 11 ý,,, -47'9 
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suspect emotion, but there was strong national feeling 
and patriotic emotion in parliament whenever the navy 
was considered. Emotion and patriotism are neither so 
articulately described nor so sympathetically received 
by twentieth century analysts. Every act that 
parliament passed concerning the navy and every debate, 
on the navy between 1688-and 1714 Must have drawn 
support from this patriotism, 
(') 
Cf. the unconcerted opposition of the Country 
gentry to a small army in 1699, although this 
would cost them money, C. S. P. Dom. W. 1699-1700 
27-8,90; Correspondence of the Family of Hatton, 
ed. E. M. Thompson (Camden Society 1878) 111 -238* 
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II 
FINANCE- 
73. 
1688-1702 
The navyl-: Lf-it'was to-provide the Becurity that" 
parliament desired, needed money, equipment and men. 
It was the responsibility of parliament, particularly 
the House of--Commons, whose'money bills were not 
liable to amendment in the, Lords,,, ýtogrant--the money 
that powered the-ships of war. ' This financial' 
relationship-produced the most regular and-most 
influential debate on naval matters. Such debate 
developed from'what was, at'least initially, a simple"' 
and--generally'-comprehensible scheme of naval finance. 
The basic*9 annual, grant-of money in wartime' was always- 
related-toýýthe-cost of one seaman per lunar month. The 
sum-decided"for'-. this basic unit was divided into four 
unequal parts,. one! to provide wages, - one for the 
maintenance of, -ships, "and shore 
installations, one for 
food and on n The sum of these e to provide munitio's. 
four'divii3iOnB; -Wages, -Wear"and Tear, -VictualB and 
Ordnancel"could-easily be multiplied by thirteen to give 
the annual-. -expenditure--, andý-, then by the number of men 
'determlýie-'the-annual cost of the navy. The, servingýtol 
"this'simple mathematical exercise was total producedýby. 
always thebiggest--ann: lial-grant to the navy. It was 
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often associated with two small grants, one termed the 
Ordinary, which represented the normal peacetime charge 
of the navyq and the other the Extraordinary, under 
which heading parliament granted sums for abnormalq 
major charges made necessary by war, such as new ships 
or new dockyard installations. (1) 
administration. Usually in the September before a, 
parliament assembled the Navy, Board was directed by the 
Lords Commissioners of Admiralty to provide an estimate 
of naval requirements for the following year. This 
estimate was a, crude starting-point for the deliberations 
of, Admiralty, Ministers of state and Monarch. It was no 
more than a starting-7point because the Navy Board had no 
foreknowledge of the naval strategy planned for the year. 4- ", III 
Tlie. Board_simply. calculated the maximum, number of ships 
that could be fitted out for the next year, assumed that 
each-of, these. ships would be. fully manned, worked out 
the cost, using the charge of a seaman per lunar monthl 
- -', 1, -I. ' (2) and presented the total for discussion. Discussion 
(1) It,, ýas"c'ommon,,,. especially, after, 17029-ýto define 
the Extraordinary in this-way, -but properly all 
grants'to the, navy, 'other. ý, than'the Ordinary were I 4Extrao. rdinax-ýol-., -Thus-the-., 
Princels, Counci1 
couldý. write-, in l7q4,, ýafter it-had, given a, detailed 
account, ý. of,, the. -Ordinary,, "extra, expense. is-, 
according. to,,,, the., -number of, seamen the House shall 
think, fit to-, -give, -for. 
the year 1705-11 N. M. M. 
Southwell,., 'Sou/7., f. l25- 
(2) Fýr_"example-jý the, 
-Navy'Board'estimate-for 
1693 
ýiven in'October 16929-N. M. M. Sergison Ser/161, 
. 563- 
The financial initiative came always from the 
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always reduced the total; the assumptions, both for the 
numbers of ships and men, were over optimistic. A 
smaller estimate, but with Ordinary and Extraordinary, 
added, ' was then presented to parliament, usually in the 
early days of November, 
(') This estimate was considered 
bY the Commons, usually reduced in various ways, and the 
money granted. 
The apparent simplicity of this process, both in 
its mathematical basis and the parliamentary reception 
of the executive's estimate, as so far sketched is 
false. Those members of. parliament who, as individuals 
or as a committee, sought from motives of good husbandryq 
reforming zeal, party animus or patriotic interest to 
penetrate the intricacies of naval finance were soon 
frustrated. The navy was the largest spending 
institution-in the kingdom. To the natural financial 
complications of size and diversity of business were 
added the complexities created by long-administrative 
11 
The entiri'process can"'be followed for 16-93. In 
October 1692 the Navy Board calculated variously 
that-the"navy-would require 45,249 men at a cost 
of X295009007- 5-_O-, (P. R. O., -Adm. 1/3567 ff-557-64) 
and'42,061 men at C2,323,870.5.0. (Estimat6'of 
charge-of 1693,. P. R. O. Adm. 8/3). By November 
d discussion involving Secretaries of State an- 
., Commissioners,. of-Admiralty had. reduced the 
figure 
to 33,010 men costing E1,944,505.10.0- (N-M-M- 
Southwell' U/ --On 25 Nov. Falkland -So 1ý-f. 265)- 
presented the estimate for 1693 to the Commons. By 
now, with Ordinary and Extraordinary added, the 
request was for L2,077,216.10- 0-(C-J. X, 711, ) The 
House granted Ll$926,516.10.0. (C-J-XII9380-1)o 
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evolution and the varying procedures of the subsidiary 
boards, such as the Victuallers, who paid out naval 
money, The only experts on naval finance were the 
administrative officials of the navy, who were not 
prepared by custom or able to reduce their accounts to 
readily comprehensible digests for parliamentary 
consideration. Pepys, in a paragraph probably written 
in 1693, summarised much of this background to 
parliamentary debate on naval finance: 
'Ignorance only as to the knowing how to 
contradict or control any demand of money 
v 
relating to the Navy is it, that hath 
always led our Parliaments to choose to 
lump it with the Court ...... declaring 
expressly that they never found they got 
anything by looking into the court 
accounts. 
A, consequence of such ignorance was a strong suspicion 
, 
that someof the money voted for the navy was wastefully 
spent or embezzled, by, Court officials. This suspicion 
was exploited against the Court by politicians not in 
pqwer, who, -on this issue could always count on widespread 
Country_s4pport, for however the Commons might be 
divided politically,. all the members, as tax payers, were 
at least united in a very natural aversion to taxation. 
Samuel Pepys's Naval Minutes, ed. J. R. Tannerg'. 
(N. R. S. ý1926) 333o' 
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This negative feeling of'ignorance and suspicion was, 
however, only one of the general reactions to demands 
for money. At odds with this Country reluctance to 
grant money was the parliamentary conviction that a- 
large and efficient navy was necessary for-national 
security and this made for generous 1. consideration of 
naval demands. In fact the'money the navy received 
during the reigns of William ýnd Anne was the product- 
of tensions between generosity and suspicion and between 
Court and Country. In the chapter that follows the 
ways in which these tensions shaped the various branches 
of naval expenditureq particularly in William's reign, 
are considered. Of these general feelings it-is the 
more negative ones-of ignorance and suspicion that are 
the'most remarkable in that they help to create a desire 
for greater knowledge-of naval finance, and by the 
institution of such financial devices as estimates, 
commissioners of account and, appropriation, to increase 
parliamentary-control. of-the navy. In Anne's reign the 
extent. to which'the Commons realised the implications of 
their new knowledge and authority can be assessed by 
considering. -parliamentary reaction to the growing debt 
that led to financial crisis in 1710. 
The Courtiattitude, to debates on money grants to the 
navy in this. period is obvious and unchanging. Office 
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holders in'the Common Is represented the goVernment's 
viewpoint I "and attempted-to Justify the sums requested 
and to bring on a speedy - and favourable vote of supply. 
With this as a'common aim the tenor of speech varied 
merely with the speaker and the times. In the 
session following Beachy Head Sir John*Lowther'could' 
appeal emotionally to patriotism as-the justification" 
for generosity. 
(')'Inýthis 
year even Sir Thoiw; Clarge's 
could agree-so far with Iýim aý to declare of naval 
expenditurel"God fo - rbid , that'we should cut the pattern 
too narrow. j(2) Two yearsýlater, after I La I Hogue, there 
was considerable feeling in the House that this victory 
proved the fleet was strong enough and there need, be no 
incre ase in the navy vo, te. 
(3)'Lowther 
acknowledged the 
strength of'this argument, but spoke for a stronger navy 
on the ground that reinforcement was necessary to 
protect'trade and to provide more ships for the West 
Indies. (4) Rus'sell''and Falkland elaborate Id his 
Grey X. 30. Sir John Lowther of Lowtherg a 
follower of. the-Earl of-Danby, first Lord of 
the,. Admiralty and a Court, Manager in the Commons; - 
A. -Browning, Thomas. Osborneý Earl of Danby and Duke, -of, -Leeds,, 1632-1712, 
(1951) 1,, 4229 484. 
Bee, above ý.. _-, p. 29. 
(2) Grey X9,127* 
(3) N. Luttrell'-An Abstract, of the Debates 1692-3, ) ff. 99-101 
(4) Ibid* 100-1; 
790 
statements. 
(') 
They were successful, and., the House agreed 
to increase the number of, men, for the navy from 30,000 
to 33,010 for 1693. The persuasive skill required of 
the Court speakers declined, after 1695. -when in all the t 
war years that followed to 1712 both Court and 
legislature seem to. have. accepted, a naval charge related 
to an,. unchanging. figure of, 40,000 seamen. Tact as-well. 
as skill was necessary. if the, money was. to, be speedily 
voted, and a. quick vote was important. to the government. 
Only when the vote was made would financiers make loans 
on., the security. of an assured tax and merchants feel it 
safeto contract for the next, year. 
(2) 
This need for a 
quick grant, led to some ineptness by the Court speakers 
in 1691 when they attempted to hasten the debate by 
accusing Country. speakers of obstructing the King's 
government by their long-winded consideration of naval- 
finance. This gave Clarges and Sir Christopher musgrave 
chanqes-to, make. speeches pointing out the dangers. of 
(3) 
over-hasty grants of money. Clarges it seems was the 
Anthony. Caryg fourth Viscount Falkland was a Lord 
Commissioner of th6. Admir-alty 1691-4. N. Luttrellq 
Abstract, of. th6-Debates. 1692-3 f. 98; Bonnet 
Dispatch. '29'-NoV. /g'Dee. 1692, L. von Ranke op-cit. 
VIl', 
_189 
and" see -above', pp. 29-30* 
(2) P. R. O. Adm. 1/3569 f. 948; Remarks on the Public 'Accounts (1690); Grey X. 279-81; N. Luttrollq 
Abstract of the Debates 1692-3 f-31. 
(3) Grey Xg 168-9* 
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mabter of I telling phrase, it was not the task of the 
Commons he claimed to vote money 'as we pay bills at 
eating houses. '(') Such lack of-tact'by Court speakers 
was rare; - they c ould rely on a general-sympathy 
(2)- towards naval supply. 
parliament's generos I ity towards 'the navy is 
fundamental. In the period under discussion very nearly 
a quarter of the national expendituie was devot I ed to the 
navy. 
(3) 
Observers as diverse as Pepys and Tallard 
marvelled at'the prodigality with whicli parliament 
(4) 
granted money to the navy. The motives for generosity 
in the early years of William's reign are understandable 
and these, coupled with the political and economic 
arguments that'favoured a fleet rather than an army, 
gave the navy's demands for'money an, initially 
(1) 
(2) 
(3> 
(4) 
(5) 
N. Luttrell, Abstract of the Debates 1691-2 f-13. 
In times of crisis events Spoke for them; see N. Tindal, oP. 
-cit., 
III9,128. 
D. C. Coleman, Naval Dockyards under the Later 
----Stuarts,, Econ. Hist. Rev. 2nd, Series VI (1953-4) 135-6o 
Sa , muei`P6pys1s Nava1'Minutes, % 11 e d. ' J. R. Tanner 
_, 
(N. R. S. 1926) 269; Tallard to Louis XIV, 9 May 
1698-, -'lett6rs "of William''III and Louis XIV 
,, 
169771700,, ed. '' 
P. Grimblot (1848) It 467. 
Tallard-was French-ambassador'in England. 
See-- above 
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more favourable reception in the Commons than the 
estimates of any other spending department. 
(') Lavish 
naval expenditure is a feature of the entire period. 
At no time in the war years was there a serious attempt 
to reduce grants to the navy. This basic goodwill is 
easily lost'sight of in the attacks and 'investigations 
that naval finance attracted. They are peripheral: 
the right of the navy to vast sums of money was never 
challenged. 
This generosity was, however, neither unthinking 
nor unlimited. It was a generosity that can best be 
partially defined by the negatives that limited grants 
of money. One of the most obvious checks to naval 
supply was a belief in the. Commons that the country was 
not, in plain terms, getting its money's worth. Such 
value was most easily calculated in crude terms of 
tangible, major damage inflicted on the enemy. 
St rategic, or tactical arguments justifying a bloodless 
exercise in sea power could be roughly receivedq as 
Col. Titus summed up the naval campaign of 1693: 'They 
(the navy). fiddledand danced at Torbay and we must Pay 
(1) Despite`ýthis'the"influence of the monarch or the 
monarch, ls'favourite,, was able to secure more money 
for the,, army.,. For the war years of william and 
Anne the army received E51,044,458.18.3- and the 
navy-L41,557, -844.4. '3-, ý Tables of Net 
expenditure of, army and navy 1688-1714t C. J-)CM 
(1868-9) Accounts and Papers, Part 2,7-53- 
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the musi-c. '(')ý'Ministers and admirals were well aware 
of the need for action. Nottingham's plea to Russell, 
who was commanding the main fleet in 1691, that, 
'barely to burn a French Tingmouth sicz is too mean a 
project for such a fleet, t(2)had as its background the 
inowledge that lack of naval gunfire in the summer led 
to Verbal broadsides from Country members in the autumn.. 
The summer-long evasion of the two opposing fleets in 
1691 exasperated the Commons, Sir Thomas Clarges spoke 
for the Country members. Russell's argument that he had 
attempted to save money on maintenance costs once he 
realised'that action was unlikely played into their handsý3) 
The monthly cost of each man in the navy was reduced as a 
result of these debates from L4.5. 0. a month to 
L4-. ý 0. 60 
(4) The reduction wa's just in the eyes of the 
Commons'because, as little powder and shot had been 
expended in 1691-, no'grantwas necessary for these items 
in 1692. (5) There appear to have been similar financial 
Grey'X, ý '3169ý' Col. Sila's Titus was M. P. for' 
Lostwithiel, 
(2) 4 June 1691, H. M. C. Finch 111,95- Teignmouth 
was ý the ý Devon-, port burnt by the 
irench 
after 
theirwictory at Beachy'Head. 
(3) Ibid 111, -, 252; Grey Xý 163-7* 
(4) See. Appendix II. - 
(5) Bonnet Dispatch,,. 17/27, Nov., 1691,, -L. von Ranke' 
op. cit. VI,,. 166. 
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iidýjustments when the Commons expressed their 
dissatisfaction at the bloodless cruises of 1693 annd In 
1703* 
As the finances of the navy were so closely 
related to the charge_of one seaman for a month, the 
figure of 40,000, the number of men which parliament 
rI egularly voted for every war after 1694, 
(2)became in 
practical terms a limit on naval expenditure. The 
increase Jýi, the number of seamen from 7,040 in 1689 
to 309000 by*1692 was seemingly accepted without 
serious oppo , sition. The attempt to raise this number 
to '16 , 93"did meet with oppositions'which was 33 010 for 
overcome by Court speakers*' They Claimed that more 
men would be needed for stronger trade protections a 
larger West Indian squadron and for attacks on the 
French coast. The bigger and final increase to 
40,000 men appears to have aroused no opposition, 
possibly because in 1694 the Commons had become 
(4) 
convinced of the need for much stronger trade protection. 
That"'-this-- 'f Igure 'of " 40-000-should never -have- been -altered 
or. even, apparentlyýdeVated in war years before 1713 is 
(1) See, below, p'; 105 for., the,, consequences,, of 1693, and 
below P. 90 for'1703. 
(2) See Appendix III* 
(3) Bonnet Dispatch 29 Nov. /9 Dec. 1692, L. von Ranke 
op. cit. VI, 189. 
(4) See below Pp. 247-9. 
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surprising. From the ministerial side the number may 
J 
have-had some relation to one of the early attempts to 
count the seamen of the kingdom. 
(') More practically 
it may have been related to the widespread knowledge 
by about 1693 that it was becoming-difficult to muster 
the number of seamen voted by parliament. Certainly 
/no initiative for an increase in manpower would have 
come from the navy. The Navy Board, in particular, 
assumed that it had the right to mustert, as many men as 
it could procure, irrespective of the number voted by 
the Commons, a belief that was to clash with parliament's 
(2) 0 ideas on its own powers in the reign of Anne. ne 
reason why it was never suggested in parliament that 
the navy should have more than 40,000 men may have been 
a fear that the demobilization of an excessively strong 
navy would cause trouble when peace came. 
(3) Certainly 
by the middle years of Anne's reign the vote for 
40,, 000 men was stereotyped, -and the tradition of a decade 
of war years had created an inertia in manning and 
(1) 
-See 
below -'P. ý333- 
(2) See below pp. 127-9. 
(3)----Siiýae1--PepysIs Naval Minutesq ed. J. R. Tanner 
"(N. R. S*'ýý1926) 297-8; Queen Anne's Navy, 187. 
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and--finance that meant that with each year it became 
increasingly unlikely that the figure would be challenged. 
'A'more straight forward limitation on money grants 
to the-navy was peace. Both wars were followed by 
prompt and sweeping retrenchment in which'the Commons 
took a very close interest. In 1697, despite the King's 
pleas that a strong navy be maintained, 
(')the 
seamen 
allowed for 1698 numbered only 10,000, with l5sOOO for 
the; following year and ?, 000 for 1700. 
(2) New posts that 
had,. been created since 1688 were searchingly scrutinised 
and--the Navy Board had to'fight hard for the extra clerks 
it-had acquired during the war and still required for 
work on the enormous bureaucratic backlog that had 
accumulated. 
(3)-In 
the-opinion of' the Navy Board many-of 
the economies-were-short-sighted. The maintenance of 
shipWin-Ordinary was'-prejudiced by-the shortage of money 
and'even-. their, -defence madeýhazardous, because too few 
guard ships--were-l"' 
(4)ý 
Provided. -Occasionally the Navy 
Board'., was--seen to'beýright,, asýwhen H. M. S. Carlisle 
ixploded, in_the*ýDowns because'the, post of Yeoman of the 
powder-roomýhad-been abolished. -- Such yeomen were 
(1) C* 
(2) Ehrman*'612-5'. 
(3) C. J'XII't 38l-5; 'C-J-XIII, -73-5; P. R. O. Adm. 3/15 
i My 1699, p. m.; '... '. C. S. P. Dom. Wm. 1699- 
1700,294. 
(4) Memorial of the Admiralty, 17 May 1701, C. S. P. 
Dom. Wm. 1700-02,326; Vernon Letters, 11,405. 
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re-instatedý') At-the end of the war, in 1713, similar 
retrenchment was carried out by parliamentary 
(2) direction but with rather more wisdom and knowledge. 
This was the restrained generosity to which Court 
speakers could appeal, but against this readiness to 
vote money, their opponents could exploit the far more 
natural aversion to taxation. This was a feeling 
beyond party or faction although it was naturally 
exploited by both to question naval finance in ways 
that reveal many motives and shifts of emphasis. The 
peculiai complexity of naval finance reinforced any 
suspicions the Commons might have of the effectiveness 
of naval accounting or the honesty of naval officials. 
Naval finance was not susceptible of direct question and 
simple, answer. 
(3) 
The Commons had perforce to accept 
qualifications., -or excuses, like those made by Littletons 
Treasurer of the Navy, who in l709 pleaded that his 
accounts were difficult to check because, 'in many 
voluminous books. 1(4) The Commons might agree with 
Tallard that a thorough investigation of naval affairs 
(1) ' Sergison Paperst 113, 
(2) See below pp. 167-8. 
(3) See below p. 132. 
(4) C-J-XVI, 58. He was Trea8urer 1699-1710. 
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would r6quireýfive or six months(l)but their readiness 
to grant the money required was not increased by the 
inability of naval officials to give concrete and 
convincing answers to their questions. 
Parliamentary treatment of the Ordinary reveals 
another restraint. This was the term that described 
the tO-tal normal peacetime charge of the navy in all 
it's branches. " The ambiguity of the term itself caused 
some confusion, and an understanding of the charges 
imPlied'in the term was made more difficult by the way 
in Whi ch any miscellaneous item of naval expenditure 
whi'Ch''Could not obviously be included in other accounts 
Tallard to Louis XIV, 26 Feb. 1699, Letters 
of William III and Louis XIV, 1697-1700t (1848) 
ed. P. Grimblot 11,289. 
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became a charge on the Ordinary. 
(') Such difficulties 
do not explain the persistent failure of the-Commons to 
allocate the money necessary for this item of the 
estimates. It was because the Ordinary was in peace- 
time paid by the King out of his own revenue that the 
Commons treated this item of naval estimates with so 
much suspicion. Parliament believed that over-generous 
grants to a monarch could lead to despotism and this 
traditional suspicion was linked to the Ordinary long 
after such suspicions had ceased to be justified. In 
1689 the Commons were at least sure that the King must 
contribute from his own revenue the sum that had normally 
been devoted to the upkeep of the navy in peace. 
(2 ) 
There 
remained the problem of deciding how much money was 
The Navy Board used the word as a technical and 
precisely defined term; other authorities, the, 
Commons, even Treasury officials were confused 
by attributing an everyday a, nd vague meaning 
to it. See H. Guy to the Commissioners of the 
Navy, 18 June 1694, C. T. B. X Pt. 111 659- The 
costs_of Register Office. ' Sick and Wounded% 
, -prisoners of War, and Allowances to Sea Officers on Shore were charged to the Ordinary, 
see the Ordinary Estimate for 1705, C-J-XIVs 
20. The clearest definitions of the scope of 
Ordinary charges are to be found in J. Burchett, 
A, Complete History of the Most Remarkable 
Transactions at Sea_(1720) Preface, and any 
detailed account of Ordinary charges produced 
for the Commons, for example, C. J. XVI, 59- 
(2) Grey-IX9 178; H. M. C. H. L. 1923.1 25. 
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involved and as the King was to provide it a 
parliamentary committee naturally decided on the very 
high figure of F, 1309000 for his contribution. 
(') This 
was so high, higher than all of the wartime votes for 
Ordinary between 1690 and 1712, that it was reduced to 
9100,000 for the years 1690 to 16939 
(2)possibly 
on a 
representation from the_Treasury. 
(3) By 1693, howeverg 
the Ordinary had become merged with the tormal naval 
payments for the war and was no longer drawn from the 
King's revenue though the Commons emphasised that this 
was a temporary concession made because revenue took so 
long to reach the Treasury. 
(4) Payment of Ordinary and 
wartime expenditure could not be kept in separate 
accounts and parliament was in fact paying the whole 
cost of the naval war. 
(5) After 1689 the monarch never 
again paid for the armed services out of his own revenueý6) 
C. J. Xq 80; H. M. C. H. L. 1 12. 
(2) Ibid. 19 12. 
(3)" Ibid. 1,14-15, 
(4) B. M. Harlean 1,898 f-30- 
(5) Navy Board to Burchett, 31 Dec. 1697, P. R. O* 
Adm. 1/3583. The Navy Board was saying the same 
in 17109 Navy Board to Admiralty, 6 Dec. 1710s 
P. R. O. Adm. 3/25. 
(6) B. Kemp', King and Commons (1957) 72-3; W. A. Shawt 
Introduction to Volumes XI-XVII of the Treasury- 
Books, C. T. B. XVII, x-xi. 
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Parliament, does not seem to have been generally consgious 
of this acquisition of financial responsibility and 
power., only thus can the persistently low grants for the 
i 
Ordinary be explained in the years before 1713. 
(l) The 
Commissioners of Accounts were responsible for re'ducing 
the L100,000 to L85,740 in November 1693, at which- 
figure it remained for the rest of the war. 
(2) For 1704 
nothing was granted for the Ordinary, a surprising 
reversion to the financial suspicion of William's early 
years which can probably best be explained as a result 
of dissatisfaction with the campaign of 1703- 
(3) In 
Anne's reign, after some fluctuations caused by the 
inclusion of the charge of the Register Office, 9,120,000 
became. the-routine grant for the Ordinary from 1706 to 
1711. _ This was at 
least 930,000 a year less than the 
. (4) 
real. charge., Only with the coming of peace was the 
grant for the Ordinary made realistic, one of the signs 
that parliament recogniBed its financial responsibility 
and-had out grown some of its seventeenth century 
suspicion. 
(5) 
W. A. Shaw, Introduction, C. T. B. XXII Pt. I xxi. 
(2) *H. M. C. H. L. 1 14-15; see Appendix IV. 
See above p. 839, the dissatisfaction is expressed 
Shrewsbury to Stepney 20 Oct. 27 Oct. 1703, 
Epistolary Curiosities, ed. R. Warner (1818) 
99-1010 
(4) "See-Appendix IV* 
(5) See below P. 168. 
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Suspicion ofýgrants-to the, -monarch was the apexý 
in a hierarchy of suspicion which ranged the hierarchy 
of naval command from administrators and admirals to 
the dockyard worker taking home chips of government 
wood for his fire4io Country members of the Commons 
were apparently convinced that whoever was in any way 
responsible for the distribution of-the money they had 
granted was making an illegal fortune. It was a 
conviction-based presumably on memories of previous 
wars, knowledge of the contemporary world or the ability 
to. put themselves in the other man's position. During 
this period,, in one-'session or another,,, naval finance 
concerned parliament because every rank-of naval employee 
came under parliamentary investigation. Status in the 
hierarchy meant a difference in treatment and a 
different chance of successfully emerging, from, the 
investigation. At-the highest levels the attack was 
likely to be persistent; -incho , ate, Country suspecion 
would be given edge-and duration by political enemies of 
the administration. The strength, of these suspicions 
made this-one of the most effectiveýways of attacking 
any ministry. At this level those'accused had the 
advantage that political allies would rally in support 
irrespective-of the morality involved. more importantly 
the quarry could retire into a labyrinth of figures and 
92o 
tedious transcriptions leaving the accusers convinced 
of guilt but unable to prove it. At a lower level, 
that of naval officers, contractors and Junior 
employees, once parliamentary attention was aroUBed, 
1, escape or help was unlikely. 
The most persistent of these attacks-was. the series 
of charges made against Orford between 1698 and 1701. 
Orfordq as victor of La Hogue, Treasurer ofIthe Navy ., 
and Lord Commissioner of Admiralty,, dominated the navy. 
The early charges against him concentrated on his misuse 
of naval money and sought to show that his extravagant way 
of living and personal fortune were based on embezzlement. 
Naval money in effect provided a battleground for a 
political attack directed against Orford as a Whig 
(2) 
politician by Harley and Foley. 
_The 
attacks began in December 1698 with general 
accusations that waste of public money was. the main 
cause of the navy debt and that specifically, Orford 
had made a fortune when he victualled the fleet in the 
Mediterranean during. 1694 and 1695. 
(3)Even Whig writers 
acknowledged that Orford had acquired great wealth in the 
Mediterranean but they claimed it had come as gifts from 
(1) See below pp. 430-2. 
(2) See above pp. 47-8. 
(3) Vernon Letters IIt 238-99 245. The speeches of 
Harley and Foley, echo the opinions of Pepys, 
Samuel Pepys's Naval Minutes op. cit. 269. 
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foreign kings. (')The problem of feeding a fleet far 
from its-usual bases had involved, Orford in far 
greater financial responsibility, and opportunityg 
than waa possible in home waters, where the Board of 
, 
Victuallers dealt with the routine of distribution and 
payment. Moreover, the necessity of dealing with 
foreign. contractors-who were unused to the ways of the!, 
English--navy, made it impossible, so Orford claimedg for 
his agents to obtain the documentary proofs of many 
transactions which were required by the Victuallerso 
Thus the Victuallers were unable to pass his-accounts 
and the King, accepting Orford's explanations, ordered 
the accounts to be exceptionally passed by the authority 
of his own sign manual. ý This evasion of the proper 
channels of accounting was, -to the Commons, wrong and 
suspicious* 
(2) 
1 
In the-Commons the attack concentrated on one 
apparently simple and decisive issue. If Orford had 
victualled the fleet at prices, below, the sums allowed 
him, sums.. calculated on the usual cost of victualling 
in home, waters, then he had made an illegal: profit 
because there was certainly no refund, anywhere1n his 
(1) No- Tindal opýcit. 1 390. ' 
(2) C J. XII9 451-461. - The materiaL, in, the following 
paragraph is based on these pages. 
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accoun - ts ,H-e had I allowed his pursers between 6d and 
7d per man a day in the Mediterranean. If that was 
below the sum allowed him he had kept his sailors 
short of-food and made a profit. A simple statement 
of the standard cost of victualling a man for a day 
was th Ie single c. oncrete fact the Commons needed. - ý! Yet 
this was just the fact that neither - Mr. Auditor Bridgesl 
whom they had appointed to consider Orford's'accounts, 
nor Papillong the first Commissioner of the Victuallersq 
could or would provide. ' Papillons despite his Whiggish 
sympathies, had some justification. The cost of 
feeding a man in a given year depended on the state of 
the market, the harves tq the credit of the I Victuallers; 
and the retrospective calculation of such a figure 
dep I ended - upon the fulness I and-'accuracy of 'the 
Victuallers' accounts, which were renowned for the 
absence of both qualities. The apparently simple 
isSUe"vias further'confused by disputes'about exchange 
rates--between English-and Mediterranean currency' 
between Reynolds and. Doddington, respectively the agents 
of the Victuallers and Orford. Despite very detailed 
reportsýbyýBridges in which he praised Orford's economy 
in feeding the fleet, the Commons were probably 
justified in feeling that the full facts had been with- 
held. On 15 March 1699 Orford escaped censure by thp 
95'. 
narrow margin of 141 to 140 votes. 
(1) 
. -, 
Even'before this defeat Orford's accusers were 
already casting about for other weaknesses in his 
position. On 9 March the Commons asked, for details 
of his contingent account in the Mediterranean and of 
letters-that passed between him"and the Commissioners 
of the Navy on this account. 
(2) 
These accounts too had 
lacked authenticating receipts-and had been passed by 
the King's sign manual. The opposition's success in 
uncovering damaging information about the'administration 
of the navy in the sessions between 1698 and 1701 must 
almost undoubtedly have been due to the active help of 
naval officials, probably at Navy Board level. 
(3)ThiB- 
attack on Orford's accounts led to a resolution in the 
Commons on 27 March condemning the passing of accounts 
by exceptional procedures 
(4) 
Despite this resolution the attacks on Orford. had 
not damaged his reputation sufficiently to force his 
(1) C-J-XII, 589; Luttrell IV, 493-4. 
(2) C. J, XII,, 557; Sergison presenied_them. on 10 
Marcht ibid. XII, 559-61. 
(3) See above p. 40&' 
(4) C-J. XIIj 618e 
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resignation. The attack on finance had failed so a 
more general series of criticisms condemning the 
general mismanagement of the navy was commenced in the 
Commons. These were organised in the form of an 
address. The address contained the charges against 
Orford's accounts already described and in all the other 
clauses Orford or his followers are implicitly accused 
i 
of mismanagement. 
(')The 
address was presented to the 
(2 
King on 3 April, # 
)In 
May Orford resigned all his naval 
offices. It was a petulant and reluctant resignation 
but such was the scope of his responsibilities and the 
inveteracy of his political opponents that it was 
obvious he would not be allowed to rest easy in office. 
The attacks on him in fact continued for the remainder 
of William's reign but although the well worn charges 
of naval peculation and mismanagement were constantly 
remade, they are of relevance only to a purely political 
account. 
(4)The 
attacks on him in 1701 were the Tory Price 
for helping the King's Ministers in the Commonso(5) 
Those lower in the naval hierarchy than Orford had 
(1) Ibid. XIIj 618,621. 
(2) Ib id. XII9'632. 
(3) N. Tindal op-cit. 111,390-1; ' Vernon Letters 119 
280-le, 
(4) Details of, these later attacks can be found in 
Vernon Letters 11 395-6; C-J-XIII, 5209 544-5, p 562; H. M. C. H. L-V 368-413* 
(5) Furley to Lord Shaftesbury, 15 AP 1701, P. R. O. 
30/24/20 f. 22* 
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fewer perquisites and little hope of evading their 
accusers once they came under suspicion. Edward Whitaker 
was an example of such a victim to parliamentary 
suspicion of officials. He was solicitor to the 
Admiralty from 1692'to 1701; his duties mainly concerned 
the prosecUtion of pirates and'embezzlers. He first 
came to the notice of the Commons in their consideration 
of Kidd's piracies and because of failure in his duty 
W- 
was dismissed. Dismissal did not end his troubles. 
His accounts, 1,700 pages and several bundles of themg 
were carefully investigated, and items in his expense 
account, notably L137 for two dinners, led to the 
Commissioners of Accounts refusing to-pass them. He 
had made enemies amongst his colleagues and the Whigs 
exploited his case as a reflection on the administration 
of the Admiralty in 1703. He was forced into bank- 
cruptcy'in-"addition to being deprived of his office. 
Some of Whitaker's equals in the naval hierarchy were 
luckier-than-, he-in-, the-ý-friends they possessed-, -. though -', 
probably, no more honest. When George'Everett'-, - 
C_. J., XIII,. 444. 
(2) H. M. C. H. L. V-209-16; -L. J. XVII9 278,3189 320; B. M.,. Harley'Loan 29/45 Bj f-31; 1 Anne st. 2c 
-16 (1702); C. J. XVIj 14t 151-29 154-6; 7 A=e 
exxxiv (Private Act 1708)- 
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communicated information concerning fraud and abuses 
on the part of Navy Board officials to the Commissioners 
of Accounts in 1694, the Commissioners obligingly 
forwarded this information to the Navy Board, who 
thanked them effusively and prepared a most convincing 
UL 
refutation. A year later another pamphleteerq 
.I- Crosfeild, who claimed to be able to show how members 
of the Navy Board had 'advanced themselves from salaries 
of 930 per annim to vast estateb, l found the Commissioners 
of Accounts, and later the House of Lords, disinclined to 
hear his evidence with any sYMPathy. 
(2)The Board of 
Victuallers had few friends and many enemies but they 
were saved in the parliamentary investigation of 1704 by 
the confusion of their own accounts. 
(3)ParliamentarY 
interest in peculation extended to the humblest naval 
employee, though at the lowest level parliament had to 
act by directive and legiBlation rather than by 
individual investigation. The bill of 1698 to prevent 
N. M. M. Sergison Ser/100-, ff 683-4. For Everett 
see Ehrman 595-7. 
(2) 
, 
R. Crosfelld, Great Britain's Tears'(1695), 
Justice Perverted (1695); H. M. C. H. L. 1 526-37; 
Bonnet Dispatch, 22 Jan/l Feb. 1695,. L. von 
Ranke op. cit. VI, 267; for the relationship of 
the Navy Board to the Commissioners of Accounts 
see above P. 39. 
(3) C-J-XVI9 5149 522-4; H. M. C. H. L. V, 416-21. 
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theft ofmaval stores apparently awaitedthe leisure of 
peace, like the attack on Orford, to becomelaw. 
(l) 
. 
investigations such. as. have been described 
aboveg the., ordinary member of, the, Commons, might assume 
that he waB, doing something, perhaps much, -to safeguard 
the nationl. s, money. and-to inculcate-habits of good 
husbandry at, all levels. in the administration of the 
navy. -, - Such success must, have been-Blight and the many 
hours of work spent in such-activities can have achieved 
little but the ruin of a few-unskilfuLor unlucky - 
unfortunates andýsome unpleasantness and worry for the 
highest officials. - 
Suspicion -of money -, grants to the, Crown and of, -the 
agents-of the Crown was, -a-classio. Country attitudeq 
but, ---- 
essentially negative. Ignorance. and-with it a lack of 
parliamentary authority over the agents of the executive, 
were the jiistification of such BUSPiCion. Pepys saw 
clearly the consequences of this ignorance and how the 
business of the, navy suffered-from straitness of time 
and hurry of other business. ' He saw no way ofý 
educating-parliament to a. proper appreciation of-and 
sympathy-towards the problems of the navy but by the 
(1) See below p. 212. 
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establishment-of a permanent, committee, such as there 
was in France, -, totally devoted to-naval affairs. 
(')Yet 
without-such-a-committee and despite the complexity of 
naval-finance,,, 'parliament did progress between 1688 
and-1714 from the negative-'Country' attitude to one' 
that was better informed, more'responsible, and of 
great-importance to the future of both the navy and 
parliament. -- The progress was halting, at times 
apparently, retrogressive, and many members must have 
been unconscious of this changing relationship.: - Between 
1688 and 1714 parliament gained knowledge of naval, 
finance'through-its development of estimates and- 
(2) 
commissioners of accounts and throughýappropriations; 
See the quotation from Pepys above, P-76, Lord 
Baltimore said much the same to the Commons in 
1740, quoted D. A. Baugh, op. bit. 422. See 
also-Samuel Pepys's, Naval Minutes, ed. J. R. 
Tanner (N. R. S. 1926) 276-7. 
(2) Any understanding of naval finance-between 1688 
and 1714 must owe much to the introductions by 
W. A. Shaw to-the Calendars of Treasury Papers 
and Books. Some of-his conclusions and 
financial'arithmetic have been corrected by 
J. Ehrman, The Navy in the War of William III (1953) and P. G. M. Dickson, The Financial 
Revolution in England (1967)- The debt to 
-all three is especially great for the considera- 
tion-of estimates, commissioners of accounts and 
appropriations that follows. 
I 
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power and authority came with the knowledge. 
In the first debates on naval supply in March 
1689 the Commons was reluctant to vote money for 
vaguely defined numbersof men and ships. 
(')Papillon 
reported from-the committee that had considered the 
rough estimates of the force required and practically 
gave the Commons a lesson in naval accounts, commenting- 
that the'committee had found it difficult to work 
without clear indications of the ships and men that 
were to be employed. 
(2)jt 
was not until 1690 that the 
Commons were presented with estimates in the modern 
sense, in that they attempted to give a picture of the 
navy's requirements for 1691. 
(3)They 
give a more precise 
forecast with more details than any that were to follow 
in the reigns of William or Anne. 
(4)The House accepted 
C. J. X, 63,65,80-1,102t 106; Ehrman 332-4; 
W. A. Shaw, Introduction C. T. B. IX Pt. Iq 
eexxvi-exxvii. ' 
C-J-Xj 80-1* 
Ibid. X, 432. 
(4) In this estimate details are given of how men 
and ships are to be used for winter and summer 
fleets and cruises and convoys. In the years 
to come a global figure was given for men and 
ships. For the 1693 estimate see below pp. ý07-9 
for the 1694 estimate, C. J. XI, 6; for 1695, 
C-J-XI, 178; for 1696, C-J-XI9 345, and for 
1697, C-J-XI9 569. 
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these estimates with apparently little debate. 
(') 
The estimates for 1692, presented on 9 November 1691,1 
were challenged in a far more serious way. Parliament was 
factious and the nation dissatisfied. William's ministrY, 
nominally led by Carmarthen, was beset by strong groups of 
malcontent politicians, including the extremes of Whigs and I 
Tories. Clargess'Seymours Musgrave, John Howe, Paul Foley, 
Robert Harley and the friends of Orford were all to speak in 
(2 
debate against the Court. Their opposition was to be the 
more'effective because the politically non-committed 
amongst the gentry in the Commons must have been conscious 
of the national discontent over taxation and the Dutch and 
the popular belief that the nation's money was being 
wasted. There is evidence of this discontent from mQnY 
sources(3)but none is more eloquent of the 
The comment by Burnet in a letter to Johnston, 14 
Oct 1690, about the-mood of the Commons - 'they 
dare not go back into their country if they do not 
give money liberally' - quoted in N. Tindal op-Cit- 
111 160 fn., probably indicates the reason for lack 
of debate. It was the fear caused by Beachy Head 
rather than the lack of critical ability that let 
the estimates by without attack. 
(2) A. Browning op. cit. 1,491; K. Feiling opýci t. 281- 
2; S. B. Baxter op. cit. 275-8; N. Tindal op-cit. IIIs 
189. 
_ (3) Sir Charles Stdley's Speech in the House of commons 
(1691); -Sir Charles Lyttelton-to Lord Hatton, 
19 
Nov 1691, Correspondence of the Family of Hatton, 
ed. E. Maunde Thompson (Camden Society 1878) 1379 
165, R. Harley-to Sir E. Harley, 7 Nov 1691, 
H. M. C. Portland 111,4810- 
103* 
parliamentary mood than a laconic word picture of the 
1691-2 session of the-Commons in, the Southwell Papers: 
'Parliament sullen leading men"not caring 
which way matters others obstructing 
great motive to see their money spent and 
exhausted BO lavishly - that the money 
appropriated, not, accordingly disposed of 
universal silence as to management 
great delays. '(') 
The navy was a factor in this discontent. it had 
done nothing effective during 1691 in the eyes of the 
Commons, (2)NO sooner was tlie-niival"esti mate -pI rese nte -d 
on 9 November 1691 than Clarges and Musgrave directed 
the attený , ion of the, Commons-to the'necessity of 
questioning the numbers of men andiships and advised 
the members to investigate the proposed cost of 
Z4ý 5. O.,.., per man for each month, while Musgrave made a 
plea that their consideration be thorough and leisurelyg 
I 
with no pressure from the Court 'that, if we do not givel 
speedily-we obstruct the King's business. #(3)A powerful 
committee was appointed and Robert Harley reported the 
(1) Notes dated 15 Jan. 1692, N. M. M. Southwell 
Sou/1 f. 203 cf; - W. A. Shaw, Introduction C. T. B. lx Pt. It clxiii. 
(2) See above pp. 82-3. 
(3) C-J-X9 5499 552; Grey X, 167-9; Bonnet Dispatch, 
10/20 Nov. 1691, L. von Ranke op. cit. VI, 164. 
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7ý 4ýi 
findings of this committee to the Commons on 14 
Novemberý(')On 18 November the House'voted 
Z1,5759890- 0- 0., for the supply of the-navy. 
(2) 
There are no detailed accounts of the debate either in 
committee or later, when the House considered the 
estimates before a vote, but some indication of the 
findings may be deduced from a comparison of the estimate 
presented yvith the sums eventually granted, in the table 
overleaf: 
(3) 
Robert Harley, M. P. for Radnor,, Speaker 1701-5, 
Secretary of State 1704-8, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer and Lord of the Treasury 1710-119 - Earl of Oxford and Lord Treasurer 1711-14. 
(2) C-J-X, 555. 
In the-'State-Papers'Domestic''of William and- Mary, P. R. O. S. P. 32/4 f. 124 is a pre- 
parliament, government estimate for 1692 and beside the itemsýl: isted an account of what 
was granted and comments. This estimate 
provides-the second and fourth columns 6f, thip table; the third coliann is based on C-J. X, 547- In 
the paragraph that follows use is made of the 
comments in P. R. O. S-P- 32/4 f, 124. 
105. 
* V.. - 
Heads of Pre-parliament Estimate to Granted b) CL D 
- 
i 
en 3. ure Estimate Parliament n Parliame 
Ordinary 
ý100 1000 
100,000 None 
Men: cost 1,8239250 196759000 195609000 
numbers (33,000 at (30,000 at (30,000 at 
E4.5-0. ) L4.5-0. ) Z4. ) 
Extraordinary 
4 ketches 81400- 8,400 
5 hospital ships 12,300 81400 
4 bomb ships 10,1908 - - 
Plymouth (Dock) 239406 15,890 15,890 
Marines -30,000 -309000 
4x 4th rates 68,000 
ý281864 
Half Pay 
Total 1,926,560 1,855,054 19575,890 
The reduction of the estimiate'by about one sixth was 
achieved by giving no Blipply for the Ordinary(l)and 
making no grant for new ships of various'typeB, or marines. 
The monthly. cost of a sailor was also Out. 
(2)These 
reductions are uncritical in a narrow sense; each item 
could be justified and must to nav-al experts have seemed 
In P. R. O. S. P. 32/4 f. 124 there is written against 
the estimate for Ordinary, 'rejected as going to be 
provided out of the Civil List, as it is called i. e. 
the ordinary charges of government in time of peace. ' 
(2) See above p. 82o 
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necessary;. for example, hospital ships were becoming 
increasingly necessary for morale and manning by 1691. 
The reductions' were uncritical in another sense, too, in 
that if these charges were necessary the navy would have 
to hire. the ships necessary and charge this tolthe 
already overladen Wear and Tear Section of naval 
expenditure., There seems to have been no attempt to 
seek explanation of the number, Of Beamen. requiredg though 
Clarges #ad specifically suggested that this should be 
dohe; indeed Treby stated a day after the Commons had 
voted naval 
Isupplyq 
'when you had the list (estimate) of 
the fleet you did it by the lump. '(')Indeed the committee's 
and the Commons' consideration of the estimate seems to 
have'shown, little responsibility or intelligence. The 
cuts were the expression of a generalised dissatisfaction 
with_the,, ministry and all1its works and agents. Robert 
Harley, who led the committee that considered the estimatesq, 
implied as much in a. letter; 
'Thisl morning I reported the estimates of thel 
navy, and after long debate everyone of our 
resolutions was agreed to. Every question 
was carrie&, against the Court. There was 
but, one division, abouffour ships to be new 
Grey X, 178-9-o 
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built, although thirty were ordered to 
be built, last year, and the danger of the 
precedent of letting such things slip 
into the estimate carried it against the 
Shipsol(l) 
W. A. Shaw attributed the reductions in the estimates to 
a new financial maturity and critical awareness on the 
part of the Commons. 
(2)jt 
would appear however that 
political discontent was more decisive in 1691. 
Such critical awareness was to grow quickly and by 
1693 the treatment by the Commons Of the naval estimate 
displayed an amazing advance in parliamentary technique. 
The motives behind the reductions may still have been 
factional and Country, but the treatment of the estimate 
is critical and expert in a modern senBe. 
(3) The 
parliamentary estimate and the money eventually granted 
are siimmarised-in the following table: - 
(4) 
(1) To Sir Edward Harley, 14 Nov. 1691, H. M. C. Portland 
111,482. 
(2) W. A. Shaw, Introduction C. T. B. 1X Pt. I, cxl-cxlit 
see above pp. 102-4. 
(3) A silmmary of the political situation during this 
session will be found below pp. 248-254. 
(4) The figures used in this table and the arguments given 
in the paragraph. are taken from B. M. Harlean 11898 
ff. 29-30, papers certainly prepared by the 
Commissioners of Accounts (see below pp. 111-4). The 
implicationin these papers is that these were the 
arguments used in the Commons, and the sums eventually 
voted agree with the figures above-, C. J. Xl, 12; 
H. M. C. H. L. VIIt 174. 
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Heads of Estimate-to Granted ExpendIture 
I 
Parliament 
Ordinary 85,740 859740 
Men: cost 29210, tOOO 19861,483 
numberý (40,000 at (33,692 at 
L4.5.00 Z4.5.. 0-) 
lExtraordinary 
Freight 219600 
4 hired ketches 2,080 
Hospital ship 3,900 
Officers of Marines 22,812 
debts 529777 
wages debt 5009000 
Total 1 293469132 1 295009000 
The estimate was presented on 18 November 1693, 
considered on 23 November, and supply was voted on 25 
November. (') In that time the government was told that 
its estimate for men was based on the false assumption that 
the men of the main fleet would be used and in pay all the 
year. They would in fact be in service for seven months 
of the year; thus the number of men for whom a monthly rate 
(1) C. J. Xl, 61 '?, 9-11,12, 
I 
109. 
was granted was proportionately reduced. The goverhment 
or Admiralty was then accused of attempting to win from 
the Commons double charges in that the expenses of 
ketches, freight, hospital ships and marine officers 
should properly be included in the Wear and Tear section 
of the bulk cost of the men. There was also criticism 
of the inclusion in the estimate of the Ordinary as this 
was properly the King's responsibility. However, because 
revenue was taking longer than usual to reach the 
Treasury this was allowed. 
(') 
Such generosity 
. is 
surprising; even more so is the final sum granted, which 
was to make the total grant up to F, 2,500,000 and this 
Z500,000 extra was to be allocated to the debt of seamen's 
wages, This gr ant meant that despite the reductions, the 
Commons were granting more money for the navy than had been 
requested. There is evidence in the way parliament dealt 
with this estimate of knowledge, initiative and 
responsibility. 
(2) 
There is no more evidence as detailed as this for 
11 ater parliamentary reception of estimates. The habit 
of diminution continued in William's reign but it seems 
that for Anne's reign the estimates were generally accepted 
See below p-, 122. 
(2) There is another comparison of estimate and money 
granted, for 1696, in B. M. Harlean 1,898 f-55- 
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and not subjected to such criticism as was evident in 
1693. The-estimates did not become more-detailed and 
informative; this, from a ministerial point of view, 
would have made them more vulnerable. Once parliament 
had accepted a'certain level of naval expenditure it - 
was safer politically to accept this and if debt 
accumulated, hope that peace would, come before the credit 
of the navy was lost. 
(') 
The agents of the government at 
the BoardB'of Admiralty and Navy did not assume that the 
money granted by parliament defined the maximum of their 
annual expenditure. Despite this, and despite the fact 
that the form-of the estimate did not develop towards 
greater elaboration after William's early years, the 
Commons through these estimates knew more about naval 
expenditure than they did in 1689. More importantly, 
the annual right and practice of consideration and ' 
general diminution of the estimate gave the Commons not 
only real-, though limitedg-power-but the belief that by 
allocating-the money they were establishing a maximum 
of naval expenditure and controlling the strength of the 
navy. - In this way the estimates did increase the status, 
and authority of the Commons, at least in the minds of 
D. A. Baugh, op. cit. 461-7. 
ill* 
some members., -ý The-incompatibility: of attitude between 
these members of1the Commons and the'agents of the 
government over*the'significance'of the vote of suppl'y 
that followed-the-estimates-was resolved in, 1710*(') 
second-device by which the financial ignorance 
of the Commons was partially dispelled was the: establish- 
ment of Commissioners for Taking-. and-Stating the Public 
Accounts'of'the, Kingdom. Financial statements by the 
Treasury'or--Admiralty were suspect to the-majority of the 
Commons because-they were-made'by agents4of the- 
executive. 
(2). 
This distrust wasprobably aggravated by, the 
expert competenc6*of TreasurY, officials and the 
condescension-of Court'speakers. 
(3) Confused financial 
debateB between November 1689-and March, 1690 had made the 
Commons aware of the necessity-of a means, of checking how 
the money they'voted wasýspent. The idea, of a gtoup of 
parliamentary'auditors with, time'and power to study the 
problems-'of'finance was considered. 
(4) 
--Similar 
difficulties, in the-1690-1691--session led to theýappoint-- 
ment of aI number of commissioners, all members of the 
(1) See below P- 156. 
(2) Grey X. 317. 
(3) Ibid. XI 191. 
(4) W. A., Shaw, Introduction C. T. B. IX Pt. I? cli- 
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Commons, who were to have the authority to investigate 
the finances of all government departments. 
(') In this 
session, after the defeat at Beachy Head, the belief 
that the money the nation had given was being,, 
ineffectively or wrongly spent was strong. This back-_- 
ground feeling, similar to that of the 169172 session, 
is at least as important in the creation of the 
commissioners as any-parliamentarY instinct for power. 
(2) 
Thus it is not surprising that the Commission developed.,, 
more on-the lines of,, an inquisition, as the 'spearhead 
of the Country Part-y. Opposition, l than as a constitutional 
aid to parliamentary authority. 
(3) 
, 
The'aim of the_Commission was to, investigate the', 
finances of1the realm. As Paul, Foley and Robert Harley 
were the only_two permanent members of the six commissions 
appointed in William's reign, it is not surprising that 
they dominated the COMMiBsion and its aims were never 
forgotten. 
(4) 
Although the Commission was hampered by its 
(1) C. J. X, 432,523,525,5289 536. 
(2) W. A. Shaw, Introduction C. T. B. 1X Pt. I, exii-Olciii- 
(3) W. A. -Shaw,. Introduction to Vols.. -XI-XVII of the Treasury Books, C. T. B. XVII, clv. 
(4)- -The, best short accounts of the-membershipgreportB and 
working, of the commissions are in W. A. Shaw's 
introductions to the volumes Of Treasury Books, 
, C. T. B. IX Pt. I., cli - clxxi; C. T. B. XVII, clv-clxxxii- 
Ehrman 467 9 disagrees with Shaw on points of detail 
and on"the degree of partisanship in'the reports of 
the Commissioners. 
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auspicious independence of Treasury help and procedure, 
and at times overwhelmed by the complexity of the 
financial, system, its reports, especially the early ones, 
may have done much to educate those members of the 
Commons who possessed mathematical ability and intellect- 
ual stamina, in the intricacies of naval finance. 
(') The 
contacts the Commissioners made with people such as Pepysq 
or the officials of the Navy Board, were influential in 
the relationship of parliament and the navy in William's 
reign. 
(2) 
These contacts, combined with their authoritY 
to demand what documentary or verbal evidence they 
wished, gave them access to. every branch of naval business. 
There can be no doubt that the knowledge gained by the. 
Commissioners affected parliament's activity in all 
aspects of its growing knowledge of the navy. This was 
true not only of financial aspects such as estimatesq the 
deficiency of funds and expenditure of moneyl but even of 
matters like the provision of cruisers and convoys. 
(3) 
Their greatest contribution was not the discovery of - 
abuses but the diffusion of knowledge, and possibly-the 
most effective of their lessons wad the persistent 
(1) For, example, H. M. C. H. L. 1,12-92. 
(2) See above pp. 39-40. 
(3) See above pp. 40-43 and below pp. 246-7* 
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production of financial abstracts which did try to show 
clearly how soon taxes reached the Treasury and how the 
income was 'spent. These abstracts, biassed though they 
sometimes were, gave the members of the Commons a 
clearer picture'of naval finance than they had ever before 
been given. They were relatively clear because they we're 
produced by men who had themselves to master the subject. 
Undoubtedly they were considered more readily by the 
Commons because they were the product of such men and not 
of the Treasury. J 
Potentially the most useful device exploited by the 
Commons to give knowledge of and'power over naval finance 
was appropriation, that is; the allocation of the revenue 
from specific taxes to a particular spending department 
or type of expenditure. This could give real knowledge 
and control of the way in which money was spent. In 
particular, for the navy it meant that the'subordinate 
departments had to justify to their new masters, an 
investigating committee of the Commons, their reasons for 
allocating the money they received in. varying proportions 
and priorities. Members of the Commons sat to be 
convinced; the onus of persuasion, justification and proof 
was on the department, with no cushion of Treasury 
officials to delay or distort the reply. 
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Appropriation had been applied to some taxes under 
Charles II but the strong belief that money was being 
wasted by misapplication led to the practice being more 
frequently, if sporadically, used in the early years'of 
William's reign. 
(') 
The consequences for the navy of 
appropriation can-be"seen-most clearly, by a, consideration 
of the Wear and Tear section of naval expenditures the 
section which maintained the fabric of the navy, both 
thb ships and dockyards and the administration-ý 
(2) In 
William's reign, L4- 5- 0. was generally allocated each 
month for the upkeep of each mans which was unevenly 
divided among Wear -and Tear, Wages, Victuals and 
Ordnance. 
(3) 
Pepys thought such a sum excessive; 
(4)so did 
the Commons in 1691, when their disappointment with the 
, 4.0) campaign led them to reduce the monthly, rate to y 
Wear and Tear suffered the biggest reduction of 2s. 6d. 9 
which left it with Ll 
-- 
7.6., a month per man. This'new 
establishment on17 lasted a year. The earlier rate of 
L4.5.0., was restored in December 1692. Some generosity 
W. A. Shaw, Introduction C. T. B. IX Pt. Is -, "dlxxi; Ehrman 461-72. 
(2) For detailed lists of the charges on Wear and Tear 
see Ehrman 158-9 or C. J. XII, 629. 
(3) See AVpendix II for the allocations. 
(4) Samuel Pepys's Naial Minutes, ed. J. R. Tanner (IT. R. S. 
1926) 333,395. 
(5) See above p. 82. 
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after La Hogue was to be expected but the Commons 
apparently accepted the Court argument that the rising 
price of victuals made such an increase necessary. 
(l) It 
was one of the few arguments about naval finance that 
most members of the Commons could appreciate, from personal 
experience. However, in the 1693-4 session the monthly 
rate was again altered and the share for Wear and Tear was 
reduced from kl. 10.0., to Ll. 8.0; the share devoted to 
Ordnance was greatly increased, presumably to meet the 
expenditure on munitions for new ships. Through this 
division of money among the various classes of expenditure 
and by appropriating specific sums of money to each classq 
the House of Commons was in effect controlling the 
expenditure of the navy. This system of appropriation 
enabled the House to break up the bulk figure for the 
annual cost of seamen and analyse each division. Among 
these divisions the members of the Commons established 
a common sense order of priority. The importance of 
wages and victuals was obvious; 
(2)if 
economies were to be 
made they must naturally come from the administrative 
costs under Wear and Tear. 
(1) Bonnet Dispatch, 2/12 Dec. 1692, L. von Ranke 
op. cit. VII 190. 
(2) It was only in 1692 that the, money for Wages and 
Victuals was redue6d, see Appendix II. 
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The reduction of money to Wear and Tear in 1693 is 
interesting because Sergisong Clerk to the Acts of the 
Navy, (l)a dedicated naval administrator, and theýman 
mainly responsible for the expenditure of the Wear and 
Tear money, wrote to a member of parliament, poBsibly 
Harley, instructing him in the importance of Wear and 
Tear expenditure* 
(2) A topic as arid as Wear and Tear can 
never have had a more eloquent, even passionate defender. 
He demonstrated, justlyg how the systematic paymentýs, 'in 
course, $ out of Wear and Teaý organised by the Navy Board 
created a trust in the credit of the navy of which the 
beneficial effects spread far beyond-the contractors 
immediately involved. It was the organisation of these 
payments that gave the navy its reputation of being an 
efficiently run business concern, so much so that in 
naval finance, $the Wear and Tear is the foundation of 
all. 1(3) The letter was a clever one. There were 
references to parliament's great responsibility for the 
preservation of a strong navy; there was even a cautiOUB 
(1) See above p. 40* 
(2) The letter is in B. M. Harlean 6,806 f-15 and 
-Sergison's rough draft of the letter can be 
found in N. M. M. Ser/100 ff. 207-99 
(3) Cf. Ehrman, 487; see below p. 123. 
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warning of the political consequences if the nation 
misinterpreted the reduction of Wear and Tear - 
'the notion that the people will receive of 
the ParliamentIsdisregard thereto will 
create mighty suspicion ...... as on 
Englishman it is also, my wishes that men 
in power would please to apply themselves 
to support the Navy, which has always been 
reckoned the Wall and Bulwark of our 
Nation. ' 
One member of the Commons at least was learning from an 
expert the significance of Wear and Tear and learning in 
a context where political suspicion of the executive 
could be discounted. Certainly one agent of the 
executive was sufficiently aware of parliament's power to 
direct his considerable_persuasive powers at a member of 
the legislature rather than his superiors. Such a, 
relationship was the consequence of parliament's growing 
knowledge and authority. 
Parliament's intervention in the more detailed aspects 
of naval administration was neither a systematic 
progression nor always of benefit to the navy. Appropria- 
tions in William's reign were usually detailed and 
specific. 
(') 
For the navy the income from certain taxes was 
See 1 W. & M. Sess 2c1; 4 W. & M. c 1; 5 w- &- m- 
e 1; 6&7.,,,, W. &. M. c 3; 7&8W. III c 5;. 8 &9 
W-III c 24, 
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allocated to Wages, Wear and Tears Victuals or Ordnance, 
and the Treasurer of the Navy had'little financial 
freedom to support one branch of expenditure by the funds 
in his possession; parliament had decided how the moneyý 
should be spent. In Anne's reign the Treasurer of the 
Navy had far greater financial flexibility because 
parliament gav Ie up the device of specific appropriation 
and with it its insight into the subdivisions of naval 
finance. In the taxes voted under Anne the navy was 
given a general precedence over other spending depart- 
ments but parliament did nothing by way of appropriation 
to ensure the supply of money to any branch of naval 
expenditure. 
(') 
During'the first session 
of parliament 
in her reign Anne thanked the Commons for the new latitude 
(2) 
they allowed her in the appropriation of taxes. Even in 
William's reign parliament's interest in the divisions of 
naval expenditure never led it to a major initiative like 
the reorganisation of the quotas. Thus Wear and Tear 
was left with Ll. 8.0., a month until 1698. Despite 
, 
(3) 
Sergison's'letter Pepys was probably right; such"a-share'- 
of the monthly, rate was too generous. In the war years 
(1) See 1 Anne Stat 2, c 17; 2&3 Anne c- 18; 3&4 Anne 
c 3; 6 Anne c 27; '7 Anne c 31; 8 Anne c 14; 9'Anne 
c 16 
(2) C. J. XIV, 210; L-J-XVII, 321. 
(3) See above pp. 117-80 
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of Anne's reign the Navy Board managed to maintain the 
Wear and Tear and subsidise Victuallers from this fund on 
a share of Ll. 7.0. The Victuallers above all needed 
an increased share of the monthly rate but there was 
never any serious discussion of such a reform. A positive 
disadvantage of appropriation, at least in the early years 
of William's reign, was parliament's lack of concern for 
Wear and Tear. The money appropriated to this expenditure 
was frequently from a source of revenue that was slow in 
yield, or the money appropriated to Wages came from the 
funds of quicker yieldl and Wear and Tear fought a losing 
(1) battle with Victuals. The worst example of this was in 
the appropriation to the navy of the Additional Duties on 
the Excise in 1691, a tax known as the Double Ninepences. 
The Treasury Lords might assure the Navy Board that this 
was a secure fund; the Navy Board and its contractors knew 
also that it was 'remote: that the revenue due on it would 
not reach the Treasury for four or five years. 
(2) By 1693 
Godolphin to the King, 22 May, 2 July 1694, C,. SF- - P. Dom. W. & M. 1694-59 l44-59 209; Minutes of the 
Proceedings of the Lord Justices, 19 Sept 16959 
ibidq July-Dec. 1695,. 68; C. T. B. IX Pt. 11; 367; 
ibid, X Pt. I, 154. 
(2) P. R. O. Adm., 1/3564, ff. 99259; P. R. O. Adm. 1/3568 
S. f. 694; Godolphin to the King, 2 Feb. 1691, C* 
P. Dom. W. & M. 1690-1,241; C. T. B. Xq Pt. I-9 145. 
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the Navy Board's dependence-on these remote, funds for 
the payment of-contracts on Wear and Tear had gone far 
to ruin the credit which the office had previously 
enjoyed. 
(') In 1694 the East Country merchants who 
provided the navy with many of its basic stores refused 
to enter, into new contracts. 
(2) In this year many dock, - 
yard workers, deserted in desperation at not getting their 
pay and. the importunities of the Victuallers for money--, 
were such that an, alternative of victualling by COMMiSBiOn 
was seriously considered. 
(3) 
t- 
--The credit of the, navy was, saved-in this crisis by 
the formation of the Bank of England. 
(4 ) But in a more, 
general sense the credit of the nation_was preserved in 
William's reign, by parliament's guarantee that it would 
supplement the deficiencies of-any source of revenue and 
-in one way or another ensure that the great debt that 
gradually accumulated for each spending departmentg but 
especially the navy, would be paid. The consequence of 
P. R. O. Adm. 3/8,19 AP*1693; -P. R. O. Adm. 1/3568 ff. 688-94,695s 778-9; Navy Býoard to the Admiraltyt 
28 Aug. 1693, C. S. P. Dom. W. & M. 1693, -289. 
(2) See below, 'pp. 181-2. 
(3) Godolphin to the King, 24 Aug. '1694, C. S. P. 
Dom. W., & M. 1694-5,274. 
(4) Ehrman 490,540-le 
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this guarantee, to the financial stability Of the country 
were incalculable. 
(') Such a guarantee had become 
essential'. "''One of the most disquieting items of knowledge 
brought to the attention of parliament through its interest 
in finance-was evidence of the extent to which the taxes it 
voted were deficient in yield. The cost of collection, 
corruption of officials, inexact computation of potential 
revenue, ' 'and the sheer time element necessary for money 
to be collected and forwarded to the Treasury meant that 
every spending department received less money in any given 
year than parliament would have expected., 
(2) Before the-' 
war the navy had received its money in-cash and paid out in 
cash. 
(3) 
The mounting debt 'compelled it to pay in promises, 
promises in'the form of tallies or tickets. While the 
credit of the navy was good and the likelihood of these 
subBtitutes, for ready-money being realised as specie. 
within a short period of weeks or months was reasonable the 
system of payment was easily maintained. -Credit was' 
further strengthened by the inviolable habit of the Navy 
(1) W, A. Shaw, Introduction, C. T. B. IX Pt. Iq clxxix- 
clxxxii, Introduction, C. T. B. XVII, ccxxi-ii; 
C. Wilson, Anglo Dutch Commerce and Finance in the 
Eighteenth Century (1941-) 91-2. - 
(2) State of War for 1690, CJEL. S. P. Dom. Wm- 1699-17009 
332-3; N. A. Shaw, Introduction, C. T. B. XVIII lxxxiii; 
D. Ogg op. cit. 407-8. 
(3) Sergison Papersq 29. 
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Board of paying its debts by order of their registration, 
'in course. '(') The weakening of this credit, with 
particular reference to Wear and T- ear has already been 
(2) described. As Sergison implied, this did give Ilife'to 
all other parts. o(3) The debts of wages to hundreds of 
individual sailors were inconvenient but could be 
ignored - there was no chance of such debtors combining 
and the Victuallers just managed from crisis to crisis., 
But the credit of the navy reached crisis point with a 
total debt on 30 September 1693 of 919782,597- 0- 0- 
(4) 
By far the greatest item in this"debt was the deficiency 
of K, 4839804 between the money voted by parliament and 
the money received by the Treasurer of the Navy by 30 
December 1692.0)"'The Victuallers, of necessity, 
contributed to the, debt; it was impossible to victual the 
navy on an, allowance of 91 out of theýmonthly rate. By 
the end of 1692 the Victuallers had spent F, 293,747- 9- 336-- 
over their allowance. 
(6 ) The Commons considered the debt 
(1) See above p. 117. 
(2) See above p. 121* 
(3) P. R. O. Adm. 1/3568 ff. 695-6; see above pp. 117-8- 
(4) Estimates of Naval Debts, 1671-1718,30 Sept. 16939 
N. M. M. Sergison Ser/102t. 
-see 
Appendix V. 
(5) P. R. O. Adm. 1/3569 f. 219* 
(6) Victuallers' Memorial, 18 April 16939 H. M. C. II. L-Ij 
271-274; P. R. O. Adm. 1/3569 f. 219- A. F. W. Papillong 
Memoirs of Thomas Papillon (18875 358-9* 
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in 1693 and as well as granting money specifically. to 
reduce the debt on wages, 
(1)provided 
additional revenues 
to make up the deficiencies. 
(2) 
The later and more serious 
crisis of 1696, by-which date the year's supply was almost 
totally mortgaged for past debts, was dealt with in a 
similar way. 
(3) 
By the end of William's reign this method 
of dealingwith debt piece-meal as it mounted to a point 
of crisis, rather than by reform of the systemt was well 
established. 
(4) 
By 1697 the developments described above - the 
consideration of estimates, the establishment of 
commissioners of accounts, the habit of appropriation and 
the consideration of debt - had theoretically given the 
Commons procedures whereby naval expenditure could be 
understood, and, by implication controlled. The 
implications of these decisive advances were obscured, for 
all but a tiny minority, by the tactical struggles. The 
attitude of the Commons towards naval finance was 
essentially defensive against the monarch and his ministers. 
The members of the Commons were not generally conscious Of 
(1) See above p, 109, 
(2) C. J. XII 71 11,129 15; W. A. Shaw, Introduction 
C. T. B. IX Pt. I clxxxiii-cxcv. 
(3) W. A. Shaw, Introduction C. T. B. XVII9 lxxix-evii- 
(4) See below P, 159* 
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aggressive and strategic aims; their considerations of 
naval finance were not fused with major considerations 
of parliamentary status by arqpolitical philosophy. 
There was no address or printed statement that summed up 
for the ordinary, member of the Commons-the significance 
of actions in regard to naval finance which must have 
been, in the memory of-most, dispersed in time and 
subordinate to other issues*' 
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1702-1714 
Parliament waB-oventually compelled to define its 
powers over naval-finance in 1710. The debt, of the 
navy, that'grew unchecked in the-years between 1702 
and 1710, forced the-definition. These-years are 
remarkable intanother way, because they saw the almost 
total'abandonment by the Commons of the, procedures that 
had been established during William's reign. The 
evidence for this-is clear in the stereotyped votes for 
40,000 men, at-a monthly rate of L4.0. O., -Ll2OOOO for 
the Ordinary and in the abandonment of specific appropria- 
tion. Parliamentary deference to a popular Queen and to 
her husband who was Lord High Admiral help to explain 
this hiatus; a parliamentary watchdog on the navy was 
unnecessary in this context. 
keep naval finance static. 
Inertia helped as well tO 
In William's years a naval 
force had been created of a strength that satisfied 
parliament and was probably near the maximum that the 
nation co , uld afford. Parliament Was always plea I sed to 
leave matters, as--they were established by precedent. The 
governme ntl, , too Was-*content to accept what was readily 
granted for the navy rather than provide an issue for 
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opposition by adapting naval. grants to new circumstances. 
The government's lack of initiative between 1702 and 
1710 is almost total in finance. Another barrier to, -, 
change was that any potential. reformer who did wish to 
establish the reasons why a financial procedure or quota 
or figure, had been established in the past. in, an attempt 
to question something now accepted, had far less evidence 
to work on than a historian can find today. Bromley 
wrote in 1703, -7 
'For want of estimates and appropriations 
it does not so plainly appear for some 
years at the beginning Of the'Revolution 
as afterwards what the expenses of the 
army, navy and civil list were intended 
to be, at least not to me, after what 
searches I have been able to make. '(') 
Thus the interest there had been in naval, finance in 
William's reign, especially the early years, was non- 
existent in the early years of Anne. 
The unresolved confusion of parliament's power over 
naval expenditumcan be related to a single and, decisive 
question: did parliament's grant of supply to the navy 
W. Bromley to R. Harley, 25 Sept. 17039 H-M-C- 
Portland IV, 67- Even the Navy Board'B 
memory for this period was poorg P. R. O. Adm. l/ 
36089 12 Jan. 1707. 
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represent a maximum, or was the navy, as a spending 
department, entitled to exceed this grant? The Navy 
Board and Admiralty had no doubt as to the answer. The 
navy could spend more than the grant; indeed it was 
evidence of efficiency and patriotism if the naval 
administration could continue to fit out more ships and 
muster more men than parliament had sanctioned. Such 
officials would have reinforced their right to exceed 
the grant by showing that the sudden demands of war made 
it inevitable, that they should sometimes overspend and 
incur a debt. 
(') 
Moreover, they would have found wide- 
spread support for their attitude. They would have 
been justified, in the words of one pamphleteer, because 
As Sergison wrote in 1693, the care of the navy 
was in good hands, 'And it being in such hands 
where is the danger, will you not have new 
ships built, or more than you provided for 
kept at sea as you have had in this war, if 
the Provision be larger than the expenses, or 
the, -OVerplUB laid apart to repair the fleet when the war, is over, ' Ser/100 f205; P. R. O. 
Adm. 1/3606,19 Nov. 1706; see below p. 166. 
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'the money given is more properly to be 
understood in the nature of-a sum 
granted upon account, than as a sum 
fixed and limited. '(') 
The treatment by the Commons of the growing naval debt 
between 1702 and 1710 is evidence that a majority of 
them thought of their grants to the navy in these terms. 
The debt of the navy on Anne's accession, 8 March 
1702, was reported to the Commons as E, 776,602. ?. 3.. but 
by 29 September it had risen to Ll, 0161? 67.3.9. 
(2) This 
A Letter to a Friend concerning the Pablic Debts 
particularly of the Navy (1711) 1; A Letter to 
a New Member of the Honourable House of Commons 
(1710), Harleian Miscellany (1810), XI, 147;, 
Burnet IV, 269. The first pamphlet cited above 
is by a. -Whig, 
the second by a Tory. Cf. Maynwaring 
to the Duchess of Marlborough, 15 May 1711, 'All 
the great successes of the war have been carried* 
by these exceeding and extraordinary payments that 
they have censured. And the parliament always 
gives a discretionary allowance; and there was 
intimation in their debates, that if the money did 
not'answer the service of the current year, there 
could be no doubt., -but 
everything would be made good 
that was laid'out-upon great and unforeseen services$ 
W. Coxe, Memoirs of the Duke of Marlborough. ed. J. 
Wade (1848) 111,213. 
(2) C'J-XIV,, '21. Later estimates by the Navy Board ýeid the debt on Anne's accession to be 
F, 942,658- 5.6., Abstract of Money voted by 
Parliament 1702-5, P. R. O. Adm. 1/3603,30 SePt- 1705* 
See below p, 145. 
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debt-apparently occasioned no comment-in-the'1702-3 
session although finance was-generallyýconsidered in a 
debate-on-the public accounts. 
(') There appears to have 
beenýno-concern with the debt in the-, next session of- 
parliament; indeed-thisIs the only--session of-parlia- 
ment in Anne's reign in which a statementtof the naval 
debt was not, as a matter of routine,,, presented to the 
Commons. 
By 29 September 1704 the I debt of-the-navy was 
92t226,864.17.10., j(2) and-in-the 1704-5 session there 
was for the first time-in Anne's-, reign.; an attempt to 
discover the-reasons 
& -for-the growth, -of, the'debt-, The 
investigation'was initiated and managed-by the House of 
Lords as one branch'of an, enquiry intoýýall aspects of 
naval activity, - including trade-defence7and-manning. 
There was sufficient justification for. such a survey:, 
convoys, cruisers and: 'the-mainýfleetýhad been ineffective 
in-1703, ýthe debt was obvious to all-, and Lord Haversham 
in. one of his prepared-fulminations could talk in the 
Lords of-the-Ivast and fruitless' expense of-the fleet. 
(3) 
C-IJI-XITI 188-190* 
(2) Ibid. XIV, 399. 
(3) E. Timbe I rlaiýd., His-tor and Proce ,6-, d, ings -, bf the 
House'of"Lords-, (1742ý 111 65-6. 
:. 1, ý . 1- 
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Yet the survey was a Whig'attack on the Tory administra- 
tion of the navy organised in the Lords because of the 
strength of the Whigs in this House-and the fact that in 
Orford they had a knowledgeable leader-on naval matters. 
The attack on the navy was also shrewd. -parliamentary 
tactics. It had an appearance of patriotic justification 
that would contrast with the reluctance of the Commons to 
question the department-headed by the Queen's husband. 
The financial aBpeCt of the attack might attract those- 
members of the LordB, who resented the authority of the 
Commons in such matters. The considerations of trade 
defence and manning are dealt with-elsewhere(l)but; the 
initial attack and most of the time spent on the navy 
wasýon finance. Papers giving details of the debt, and 
Ordinary charge-of the navy, -were demandedýon 3 November 
1704 and delivered by Burchett on 8 November. -A select 
committee to consider these papers was formed on 14 -- 
November, and Orford-was appointed as chairman. 
(2) The. 
committee demanded more detailed financial. returns, 
interviewed two COMMiSBioners of the NbLvy, Sergison and 
See'below p. 280 and P-398. 
(2) L. J-XVII, 571,573,578. Another committee was 
fo; med on, 23 Novj with Bolton as chairman, to 
consider some of the other points at issue, ibid. 
XVII, 584. 
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Lyddell, and was throughout its activities directed-ýby 
Orford. (') Even he, with his wide background of naval 
experience, was incapable of effective criticism of the 
financial evidence. Neither the figures provided nor 
the officials, questioned made things easy for Orford. 
One important starting-point in any critical analysis 
of naval finance was the cost of the navy each year, yet 
when the two Commissioners of the Navy were asked this 
question their answer was, 'The real expense-of the navy 
is nowhere to be, had., 1(2) Technically they were speaking 
the truth, -ý- naval finance wasnot organised in,, ne4t 
annual-compartments in the modern, manner - but both could 
have provided Orford with an accurate answer. Their 
studiously unhelpful answer was, natural, from a Court 
official in such a situation. - The papers provided-for 
the Lords-gave. many facts but no concessions were, made 
to simplicity or the reader's ignorance of naval finance. 
Despite-these, difficulties Orford persevered, demanding,, 
more papers, and, summoning Lyddell to, his house for---, --,., 
questioning. 
0) 
His report was considered. by the committee 
Ibid. XVIIl 622-4; 
69-87. 
(2) Ibid VI'l 9 
(3) Ibid. VIs 10o 
H. M. C. H. L. Vl 8-14,28-35, 
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and the House of Lords in January and February 1705 and a 
rather less sharply worded version presented to the ' 
Queen as an address. 
(') 
The main financial points of the 
address were that in the last three years the navy had 
cost 92,186,375., 17.4., a year, that the Treasurer of 
the Navy had spent Z1,1421,361.2.4., more than allowed 
by parliament, and that there were serious deficiencies 
in the money received by the navy. There was no 
implication of criticism in the statement that records the 
overspending; criticisms were directed only at excessive 
expenditure on flag officers and pensions. The sums 
involved in such expenditures were minuteýif compared with 
the figures given for overspending_or deficiencies. The 
Queen's answer to the address was an acknowledgement 
lacking even the customary thanks. 
(2) Despite this rebuff 
the committee continued work, mainly on manning, and 
concluded the session with a report that was largely a 
recapitulation of the earlier address. 
(3) 
The inveBtiga- 
tion had been persistent but partisan. It is most note- 
worthy for the public declaration, which was unquestioned, 
of the Treasurer of the Navy's habit of overspending and 
(1) L. J. XVII, 622-4t 627t 643-5* 
(2) Ibid. XVIIt 649. 
(3) Ibid. XVII9 ý88* 
--4 ý 
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that the navy was running into debt by virtue-of this 
I initiative and the deficiencies of the funds Voted by 
parliament. 
The subordination of the problems of naval*finance 
to the political deference of the majority in the 
Commons continued in the next three sessions of parlia- 
ment although the naval debt rose from F, 3,211,937-'2.11-i 
in 1706 to F, 3,562,751.8.4., in 1707 and reached 
F, 39 , 628504- 16.6., -in'1708. (') Despite this evidence and 
the implicit'warning of the debates in the Lords in 1704- 
the'Common'B actually agreed to a resolutIon on 21 
February'1706 praising the administration and by implication 
the finýncial organisation of the navy. 
(2) Almost as 
surprising is the absence of any supplementary and 
extraordinar-y'grant towaras the debt such as had been 
I 
common in ýIie reign of William'. 
Concern over the debt became apparent in the'1708-9 
session of parliament. 
(3) By 29 September 1708 the'navy 
(1) C. J. XV, 226,402; C. J. XVI, 17; see Appenaix-V. 
(2) C. J*XV,, 165- In 1707, although the Commons 
demanded the fullest financial statement on the 
navy so far produced1n Anne's reign, their main 
efforts were devoted to a minute examination of 
the pensions charged on the Ordinary of the navy, 
C. J. XVj 426-329 440,441,444. 
(3) The Navy Board had already considered reasons for 
the debt, P. R. O. Adm. 1/3606,19 Nov. 1706'. 
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debt was 93,628,504.16.6., 
(l)and it was obvious to 
Anne's ministry that the costs of naval warfare would rise 
sharply because of the increasing naval responsibilities 
in the Mediterranean. This led to what appears to have 
been the only ministerial initiative in naval finance 
between 1702 and 1710 but it was tentative and unexploited 
initiative. The Queen, in her speech at the opening of 
parliament, emphasised the financial implications of 
operations in distant seas and stated that this would 
cause 'extraordinary expensell(2)phrasing that implied 
an extraordinary grant in the technical sense. The debt 
also made some such grant necessary. The credit of the 
navy was again in doubt as it had been before, in 1693 and 
1696, and as in those years the Navy Board was notifying 
its superiors of the dangers and difficulties it 
encountered with a course two years and four months in 
arrears, the yardsounpaid for a year and a halfand 
contractors disinclined to help in the future. 
(3) There 
C-J-XVI, 17; 'Cf. P. G. M. Dickson, The Financial 
Revolution in England (1967) 59-62,360-1- 
(2) C-J-XVI, 5-6, 
(3) P. R. O. Adm. 1/3610,25 Nov. 1708, Iforasmuch as the 
service subsists by the credit of this office, and 
that sai 
,4 
credit is supported by the hopes of the 
dealers are in of having some extraordinary as well 
as an ordinary provision made for the debts of the 
navy in this session. ' 
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is no evidence that-Anne's servants in-the Commons did 
anything effective to convince the House of the need 
for money even though the Commons did, at.: lastq consider 
the debt of . the navy. 
-. 
The investigation, had no sense of urgency. A 
committee-waB formed on-, 26-November to consider both 
Convoys and Cruisers and the, debt. 
(l) 
The committee's 
report was considered on 24 March 1709, -(2) The reportq- 
as, it stands in: -the Journal of the Commons, is a muddle. 
Unless, aývery lucid, verbal interpretation was given when 
the report was, presented, and the construction of the 
report implies that-the committee had few if-any members-- 
with such a-gift, it-is likely that the House was muddled, 
too. There-isýevidence of work and intelligence in the 
excellent introduction showing how the monthly rate was 
divided among Wages, Wear and Tear, Victuals and Ordnance. 
The report also-. contained the first attempt by-the Commons 
to distinguish between men borne and men mustered, and a 
recognition of the financial implications of this fact; 
but there the, value of the report ends. The recognition 
of the four sections of naval expenditure(3)had in one way 
(1) C. i. xvIt, 18-19* 
(2) C-J. XVIq 171-29 
(3) Which probably reflects the divisions of papers 
presented to them. 
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been fatal because it provided the framework of the 
report, in four separate subdivisions. There was no,, 
presentation of the overall picture of the debt. or any 
clear statement as to its causes. Some of the minor 
reasons for the debt, such as victualling army forces 
Abroadfrom naval supply, are mentioned, 
_but 
almost as 
asides. The report contained. no conclusions or 
recommendations; it would have been difficult to deduce 
anything constructive from it. It reveals strikingly 
the great limitations that still existed in the, parlia- 
mentary understanding of naval finance. 
(') 
The uselessness ofthe report led to a request by-the 
Commons-, that the Commissioners of the Navy should give 
their explanation of the debt. Sir Thomas Littleton, M. P. 
The committee did not even follow up the logic 
of its own, discoveries. The members proved that the debt for Wages was bigger on paper 
than in fact because it was calculated on the 
assumption that 40, '000 men were paid each year 
and the report showed that from 1702 to 1704 
fewer men were employed. Thus the debts under 
, 
Wear and Te 
' 
ar and Victuals, which were based on the same assumption of 40,000 men, werealso 
--exaggerated. - The report reveals that the 
. Committee did not appreciate this and there is no evidence'of the House realising the 
, discrepancy. 
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for Portsmouth and Treasurer of the Navyq presented the 
House with a full and convincing explanation of the debt 
on 4 April 1709; the Navy Board had provided eleven 
causes, the Victuallers, another ten. 
(') The first of the 
Navy Board's reasons for the debt was the cost of 
maintaining more than the 40,000 men allowed by parlia- 
ment each year. This priority, which implied that the 
cost of men in excess of 409000 caused much of the debt, 
was a most interesting choice from several points of 
view. It was the most public demonstration that the 
Navy Board expected credit for mustering more than the 
men the Commons had voted. The officials of the Board 
were too shrewd to have placed this item first if they 
had feared blame. 
(2) 
Of equal note, a parliamentary 
committee had demonstrated to the Commons less than two 
weeks earlier, that on average for the years of'Anne 
the navy had not employed more than 40,000 men, and the 
Navy Board itself knew very well that even if as many as 
43,000 men were mustered for a year, deaths and-accidents 
would ensure that no more than 40,000 were ever paid. 
(3) 
(1) C. J. XVI, 186. 
(2) See above p. 84. 
(3) Thus contemporaries and more recent historians who 
use the employment of more than 40,000 seamen as an 
explanation of the debt are. wrong, cf. B. M. 
Lansdowne 829, f. 128; Letter to a Friend Concerning 
the Public Debts, particularly of the navy (1711); 
W. A. Shaw C. T. B. XXII Pt. I, xxiii; C. T. B. XXI, Pt. I, xv; 
See Appendix III. 
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The most likely explanation of this inconsistency is 
that the Navy Board was givýng the Commons the reasons 
that it hoped would be acceptable. Such an explanation 
is made the more likely in that none of the other ten 
Navy Board reasons for the debt mentioned the deficiencies 
of parliamentary funds, -yet this was the major cause of 
the debt. The other reasons given by Navy Board and 
Victuallers sound impressive and are valid, but no 
attempt is made to allocate a proportion of the debt to 
each, and to appreciate them would require a thorough 
knowledge of naval administration. ManyIn the Commons 
must have found them puzzling and of little use in giving 
an understanding of the debt. The session ended without 
any constructive proposal-on naval finances. 
Between the end of the 1708-9 session and the meeting 
of parliament on 15 November 1709 the financial situation 
of the navy worsened and the Commons were presented with 
the routine statement of a debt for 30 September 1709 Of 
L49969,247.2- 5- (2) Godolphin's efforts to preserve the 
credit of the navy had become increasingly desperate. 
(3) 
The Commons found time, yet again, to consider 
the Ordinary, this time without asking the 
Queen's permission to order documents from the 
navy C. J. XV 1,54,58. 
(2) C. J. XVII 219; see Appendix V. 
(3) C. T. B. XXIII Pt. 11,4,31; P. M. G. Dickson op. cit. 
360-2. 
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Navy Office bills-were at great discount and the Navy 
Board was compelled to accept tenders'and material at 
prices far in excess of the normal. 
(') A bad harvest and 
a shortage of ready money added to the financial strain. 
(2) 
The Commons began another investigation, this time one 
that viewed the debt solely in the context of deficiencies 
of funds. Lowndes, M. P. for Seaford and Secretary of the 
Treasury, presented a very full and clear account of 
(3) these deficiencies. As had happened before, the Hoube 
appeared as interested in the marginal aspects of naval 
debt, 
-the 
wages of flag officers, Victuallers2 contingency 
accounts and the passing of the accounts of Treasurers of 
the Navy, as in the fundamental reasons for debt and a 
remedYS4) The Commons always, responded more readily to a 
financial issue that promised evidence of peculation and 
fraud. In the absence of-any detailed account of a 
debate on naval finance between-1702 and 1710 the reason 
for the persistent refusal by the Commons to take any 
legislative action on the navy debt must be'assumed to 
have been a general assumption that' parliament had 
See below pp. 150-1. 
(2) Brydges to St. - John,. 8 July 1709, Letters from James Brydges, Duke of Chandosl to Henry St. Johns 
ed. G. Davies and M. Tinling, H. L. B. IX (1936) 125. 
(3) C-J-XVIq 238-9; Luttrell VI, 517. 
(4) C-J. XVI, 237-8, 25% 266,328-9. 
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gu . aranteed the mone y- and that eventually debts would be 
paid. By the time the debt'had grown really formidable 
the temptation to a hard pressed ministry not to provoke 
trouble by demanding more taxes must have become stronger 
with each year. In the session of 1703-9 it does seem 
that the problem of the debt was seriously'debated but 
action deferred because it was better to suffer the 
financial disadvantages of the debt rather than to 
impose new taxes on a country already exhausted by the 
war, 
(') 
Whether active consideration of the 'debt could have 
been delayed 'in the next 'session is debatable, ' 'and 
irrelevant because even before the 1709-10 session of 
parliament had opened the savi'our of naval credit had 
already appeared and spoken. Sacheverell's sermon on 
5 November 1709 is conventionally the starting-point in 
the complex process that in the next year broke the 
political power of the Whigs and the Marlboroughs. By 
the time parliament assembled again in November 1710 an 
election had produced a strongly Tory House of Commons 
and Robert Harley led the ministry. Tory success in the 
elections can be attributed to two issues, one of which, 
A Letter to a Friend concerning the Public Debts, 
particularly that of the navy (1711) 4. 
1, I 
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the idea that-the Anglican Church*was in danger, had been 
a theme of Sacheverell's sermon, The importance of 
this theme in the, election campaigns was generally 
recognised and has been emphasised in subsequent 
historical accounts to such an extent that another theme 
in Sacheverell's sermons and, the second major issue of 
the election, has been comparatively ignored. In his 
sermon Sacheverell attacked Godolphin as''Volponeg' an 
identification with a'character in Jonson's play that 
carried with it implications of hypocri'sy and financial 
corruption. The belief that the Whigs and Marlborough 
had profited vastly from their term of-office was already 
widespread. In the context of a great national debt, it 
would be easier to substantiate charges of corruption than 
to produce evidence that the Church was somehow threatened. 
Harley, as- even Wi'A. -Shaw admitted; was an astute 
politician. He had a knowledge offinance and contacts 
with experts such as Sergison. He infinitely preferred 
the concrete 'evidence of debt and peculation, with all the 
'Country' sympathy this approach would give himl to the 
atavistic issue of AnglicaniBM. Corruption and the debt 
provided a theme which under his direction was capable of 
infinite-political variation. It was the foundation of 
his following in the Commons. As late as 25 November 1711 
,. I 
Bromley could describe the continuing political strength 
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Harley drewfrom the obsession with corruption that had 
been raised at the 1710 elections: 
'Gentlemen were anxious to answer the 
expectations of those that sent, them 
-thither, and 
to act as becomes a-House 
of Commons chosen by a spirit raised 
from-an opinion of-great corruption in 
the late administration. '(') 
The Queen's speeeb: at the meeting of parliament On 29 
November 1710 made, reference to the debt, specifically 
mentioning the'debt of the navy. 
(2) 
The Commons replied 
with an assurance that they would lendeavour to trace the 
source of this great evil. s(3) On 4 December the Commons 
learnt that the debt of the navy on 30 September 1710 was 
L51655,535.18.0. (4) "A Commission of Accounts was 
appointed to conduct the investigation, and information 
for the commissioners and the House to study was rapidly 
produced. 
(5)- 
The eventual'results of the investigation were 
politically disappointing. Harley, with great skills 
was able to keep the issue of corruption alive and to use 
the debt variously against Whigs, Marlborough and the Dutch; 
and almost as a by-product to these political considerations 
(1) H. M. C. Portland V, 116. 
(2) C. J. XVIq 403. 
(3) Ibid. XVII 405. 
(4) Ibid. XVII 414. 
(5) Ibid. XVII 446. 
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the credit of the navy was saved: but the facts that 
emerged from a study of the debt were prosaic more than 
scandalous. Consideration of the debt was the most 
elaborate and probab17 the most effective lesson in naval 
finance the Commons received between 1688 and-1714. 
(') 
The most useful sources that give the reasons for-' 
and scope of the naval debt are, in chronological 
order: - 
(a) Memorial on the Victual: Debt, 8 November'1705% 
Queen Anne's Navy, 277, 
(b) Statement by Navy and Victualling Boards of reasons 
for debt, 19 November 1705, Ministry of Defence 
Library (Naval Section) Corbett NSS. XI f-105. 
(c) Navy Board to Admiralty, 19 November 1706, P. R. O. 
Adm. 1/3606. 
(d) 4 April 1709, C. J. XVI, 186 (see above P- 138 
(e)- Treasury Memorial to the Queen, 31 August 17109 
B. M. Harley Loan, 29/40, ff. 77-8. 
(f) Memorial to Harley, 10 January 1711, B. M. Harley 
Loan, 29/40. 
(g) Navy Board to theAdmiralty, P, 'R. O. Admo 1/3615, 
26 January 1711, 
(h) C. JoXVIIý 488-493o 
M Copies of-papers prepared by the Commissioners of 
the Navy and presented to the Commons 1710-13t 
N. M. M. Sergison, Ser. /118. 
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The figure of L59655,535.18.0.. given to the 
Commons as the navy debt was calculated to shock. Although 
this figure was freely used in pamphlets and presumably in 
debate as a hard figure for the debt of the navy, it was 
possible to qualify it obviously and substantially even with 
the evidence before the Commons in December 1710-(1) There 
were tallies worth L492,617- 16.931.. available for navy 
use and the Treasurer of the Navy and an ex-Treasurerv 
Littleton, had 992,286.16- 7d., ' in their possession. 
(2) 
Moreover, the Commons in 1710 were concerned only with the 
increase of the debt in Anne's reign. At her accession, 
they were told, the debt of the navy had been F, 1,8499406. 
5.8.0) That part of the debt that was caused by the 
(1) C. J. XVIj 415-o 
(2) Ibid. XVI, 415; 
(3) Why the Commons accepted this figure-is a minor 
mystery. In the statement of debt presented to 
them in Novemper 1710 the debt at Anne's accession 
is given-as-L184,700.8.1., a figure lower than 
those given earlier in the reign, see above p. 129 
The figure of F, 1,849,406- 5.8.9 was infiltrated 
into the mathematics of the debt by the Navy 
Board, N. M. M. Sergison, Ser. /118 f. 1; Queen 
Annýe'B Navy, 39. Px'esumably this figure made their 
"explanationB of the debt easier, but it made 
Harley's more difficult. The difficulties of any 
mathematical analysis of the debt by commissioners 
of accounts or-historians are pointed by this 
multiplicity of starting points. 
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deficiencies of parliamentary grants could not rightly 
contribute to the debt. These deficiencies, on 30 
September 1710, amounted to F, 1,350,908.7.6Y4, 
(')but 
this sum did not represent the total cost to the navy. 
The loss of credit caused by these deficiencies led 
naturally to an increase in the prices the navy had to 
(2) 
pay. The cost of such increases was beyond calculation 
but delays in payment did cause two kinds of expenditure 
that could be calculated and should properly be added to 
the sum of deficiencies. The shortage of ready money 
made it necessary to pay interest on bills awaiting 
payment at a cost to the Navy Board of Z242,265 12.0.1 
and to the Vic tualler-s 
'of 
F, 209,239.12. . 6.0) Shorta ge 
of-ready money made the Victuallers resort to short 
allowance grants in lieu of-. food and these cost 
U5,537- 17- 9- 
(4) 
Thus the debt in Anne's reign that 
parliament had to consider, when those obvious items for 
(1) Navy Board Account 20 Dec. 1710, N. M. M. Sergison 
Ser/118. 
(2) See below pp. 150-lo 
(3) Godolphin to the Commissioners of Victualling, 20 
May 1706, to the Commissioners of the Navy, 11 
Sept. 1706, C. T. B. XX Pt. 111,647, ? 61; Treasury 
Warrant, 28 Sept. 1709, C. T. B. XXIII Pt-II9 375; 
Queen Anne's Navy 40; Debt of the Navy, 10 Jan. 
1710, B. M. Harley Loan 29/40. 
(4) queen Anne's Navy 41. 
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which the navy could not be held responsible were 
deducted, was a debt of L1,403,273.9.1Y4., not one of 
over five million pounds. 
(') 
Even this debt was not an entirely fair charge on 
the navy. Parliament had, by various acts and addresses, 
increased the charge of the navy and made no provision 
for the charges incurred. The first of these extra 
charges in time and cost was the establishment of the 
(2) 
Register Office in 1696. Although the Office achieved 
practically nothing of value it cost in Anne's reign 
9,299,493.1 19.10.0) Other expenses the navy met at the 
W_ Obtained by subtracting from the neat debt 
- 5,655,535.18 0 the figure 41252,262.8: 16ý., which is the sum of: - 
492,617.16.936. Tallies in hand 
929286.16.7. Treasurers 
11849,406.5.8. Debt 8.3-1702. 
1,350,908.7.6Y+. Deficiencies 
2429265.12.0. Interest : Navy Office 2091239.12.6. Interest : Victuallers 
15,537.17.9. Short Allowance 
412529262.8.1034. 
(2) For the Register Office s"ee below, pp. 355-66* 
(3) This figure for the cost of the Register office is 
obtained by subtracting its debt on 30 Sept. 1702 
from the total debt on 30 Sept. 1710. (c. i. XIV, 21; 
C. J. XVI, 415). By allowing the Commons to use 
the net debt in its calculations the Navy Board-, 
allowed the total figure of debt to be increased. 
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direction of parliament were 918,000.16.6.. in 
premiums for naval stores, 
(')F, 34,155- 0- 0- for 
prisoner'-of'war bounty 
(2) 
and 94,? 29.10.5. for 
1.1 
raising men in the counties. ý2) Moreover, the Commons 
had three times addressed the Queen and requested extra 
naval expenditure. These charges, if the responsibility 
for naval finance was theirs, as they claimed in 1711, 
should properly have been provided for by a vote of 
additional money to the navy. These addresses cost the 
navy F, 134,232.0.0., to replace the ships lost in the 
Great'Storm'of 17039 (4)F, 15,158.0.11. as Pensions to 
'(5) the dependants of seamen lost in this storm and 
(1) 3&4 Anne c9; se e below pp. 201-2. The Navy Board 
., 
figure, used here, for this expense is higher than the C169433 given for the cost of premiums 
auoted in R. G. Al-bion, Forests and Sea Power (1926) 418. The higher figure is used because it is the more contemporary. 
(2) 6 Anne c65; An Act for the better securing the 
Trade of the Kingdom by Cruisers and Convoys; 
see below p. 450 Clause VIII of this Act ordered 
the Treasurer of the Navy to pay 9,5 for every 
prisoner. 
(3), 4&5 Anne 66', An Act for'the'Enco'uragement and 
Increase of Seamen; see below p. 400. 
(4) ''For these charges generally, see Queen-Annels"N&VY 40-41. Address of, the Commons-l Dee. 17039 C-J- 
X7,240,399. 
(5) Address of, the Commons 1 Dee. 1703, C-J-M9 240- 
149*, 
930,777.13.5. - as a reward for the sailors who fought 
at Malaga. 
(') This financial generosity without 
responsibility is a good, example, of parliamentary - 
confusion over its powers. . By acts and addresses the, 
parliament added Z536,547-1-1-, to the, charge of the 
navy. . In terms of the debt that'was being considered in 
1710-11 this reduced the navy's responsibility to 
Z866,726.8. M, 
(2) 
The merit of all the above figures is that they are 
all figures produced, by the Navy Board for parliamentary 
attention. and the Navy Board could justify them by 
receipts and vouchers. Further erosion of the debt 
becomes less sure mathematically, and in part dependent 
upon the assumption that parliament supported the 
strategic developments of, the war, particularly in Spaing 
and that this support implied that. the navy was-justified 
in meeting the increased expenses. caused by the extension 
of the war. There is ample proof that parliament 
support-ed the extension of the warMthough it seems 
doubtful whether many, or any, of the members thought far 
(1) Address of the Commons 2 Nov. 1704, C-J-XIV, 394. 
(2) The figure is obtained by deducting the cost of 
parliamentary impositions, C536,547.0.3., from 
the figure of L1,403,273.9.1ý4., on p. 147. - 
(3) G-Mý Trevelyan, England Under Queen Anne (19 46 edn. ) 
119 324-6. 
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enough ahead to see the financial implications of the 
strategy they supported. The financial implications 
were considerable. They involved the cost of moving 
naval stores to the Mediterranean, greater use of bills 
of exchange, the cost of extra staff in bases abroad. 
From departmentmental accident or convenience the cost 
of maintaining the garrisons of Gibraltar and Newfoundland 
both fell on the charge of the navy. Navy Board officials 
claimed that the additional expenses forced upon them by 
these expansions of the war cost L950,992.14.0. 
(l) If 
this charge could be accepted the debt was more than 
explained. 
However, another and less well defined aspect of the 
debt must be considered. The navy debt as it increased 
in the middle years of Anne's reign had all but destroyed 
the credit ofthe navy and caused all naval coststo 
increase. 
(2) 
By 1710 navy bills were at 35% diýscount and 
(1) This figure was made up by the cost of 
Land forces 608,485. 7. ? - Freights. 153,472. 2. 434. 
Salaries abroad 45,859. - 12. 6Y4, Provisions abroad (over 
England) 114.1085. 7- 7y2* 
it 11 29,09G. 3. ll* 
950,992. 14. 0. 
Debt of the Navy, 10 Jan. 1710, B. M. Harley Loan 
29/40, cf. Burnet IV, 269. 
(2) P. R. O. Adm. 1/3610,25 Nov. 1708. 
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contractors''could--e)ipect to wait more than thre ,e years 
for'payment. (') Harley claimed that such discount was 
compelling th6ýnavy to pay two or three times th6'normal 
prices for the commoditieB"it required. 
(2)'Certaiiiiy 
prices for basic-naval victuals we. ýe'generally halved 
with the re-establishment of naval credit and -1 the 
institution of'a new course in 1712. 
(3) The Victuallers 
were the hardest hit by badýcredit and poor harvest and 
(1) Sir William Beveridge et al, Prices and Wages 
in England-(1939)-I,, 52 1-2* 1 
(2) Lord Oxford's-Account, of Public-Affairs (1714), 
H. M. C. Portland V, 464. Harley became Earl of 
Oxfordin May 1711. 
(3) The reduction in prices can be seen from a 
summary in the Sergison Papers, N. M. M. Ser/1219 
19 Ap. 17149 
1710 - ý, -1713 
-Beef per, cwt- 2,0. --0. " 1. ý 10., 8., Pork per cwt: 3 3.0. 1.8.0* 
Wheat per qtr. 4: 19.0- l. -5,0' 
Beer per tun. 3 8.0: 2.4: 0: 
Salt a way., 12: 6.3. - 8.0. -'0. 
It is, however, impossible to ascribe the high,,,,,,,, -. prices in 1709 and 1710''Wholly to the state, of 
naval credit; these were years of bad harvestsý 
and general scarcity cf. T. S. Ashton, Economic 
Fluctuations in England 1700-1800 (1957) 16-7- 
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this department was a decisive contributor to the 
growing debt because the l9s. Od., they were allowed 
for each man each month was an unrealistic-figure. In 
all but the best harvest, years the Victuallers needed 
23B. Od., to feed a, man; in bad years 25-30S. Od.,, was, 
necessary. 
(') Between 1702 and 1710,, the Victuallers 
spent L258,328.18.514d., more than their share of 
naval funds. 
(2) Although the Victuallers were the 
hardest hit all, branches of the navy suffered frOM rising 
prices. The increasing demands of a growing navy must 
have been a, factor in those rising prices, as was the 
existence of war-time conditions. The cost of hemp 
doubled between 1691 and 1710, -as did naval, demands for 
it. (3) The kind of naval war being waged was also more 
expensive in that it demanded more service from the 
ships and consequently high, maintenance, costs; a-minor 
examPle of this growing cost of war was the increased 
use of tallow for cruisers. 
(4) 
The basic monthly rate Of 
(1) P. R. O.., King William's Chest, S. P. 8/15 f. 41; ibid. 
Adm. 1/3568 ff. 1, %-60; ibid. Adm. 1/3569 f-19 
112; ibid. Adm. 1/3570 f. 650; C. S. P. Dom. W. & M- 
1694-51 209; Queen Anne's Navy 306-8 
(2) Ibid. 38. The Victuallers allocation of money for 
1710 was spent by 5 Aprilq C. T. B. XXIV Pt. 11 231. 
(3) N. M. M. Sergison Ser/103 ff. 409-11. 
(4) P. R. O. Adm. 1/3615,12 Feb. 1711* 
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F, 4 re mained static in Anne's reign despite the many 
factors that reduced its value to the navy, 
(')and there 
was no extraordinary grant to check the debt and encourage 
(2) 
contractors, as had happened in William's reign. 
It was evidence such as has been su=arised in the 
pages immediately above that the parliamentary 
Commissioners of Accounts had to study. Their task was 
made mo, 're diffi I cult by a multitude of complicated detailq 
ranging from the charge of mathematics masters to a 
decision on which department was responsible for the pay 
of marines, 
(3)before they could even see the outline of 
(1) The 94 monthly rate was not changed--until 1? 97 
when it became F, 7, J. E. D. Binney, British Public 
Finance and Administration 1? 74-92 (1958) 142. 
(2) See above p. 109. 
(3) For mathematics masters see Queen Anne's Navy, 313. 
The monthly cost and equipment of a marine was 
more expensive than that of a sailor, but no 
one seemed quite sure who was responsible for 
this charge, L. Edye, The Historical Records of 
the Royal Marines (1893) 1,313,349. Sergison 
believed the navy was not responsible on this 
account, Sergison to Harley, 15 May 1? 111 B. M. 
Harlean 6,287 f. 109. The weight of common 
sense opinion was against him; indeed'in May 
1? 03 the marines had been placed directly under 
the controIL-of the Lord High Admiral, N. M. M. 
Southwell SOU/5 f. 249. 
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their problem, but the way in which the vast figure of 
navy debt would melt away once 10giCOr JUBtice was 
applied. must have been obvious very soon. Equally 
obvious must have been the, fact that, if-the-. battalionB 
of figures hid embezzlement, it would take, longer-than 
anImpatient parliament would allow-to-find proof, of -- 
frauds. TheIssue and the figureswere too public for 
concealment; within a few months the, Whigs, using the 
same Navy Board figures that-the commissioners had,. -were,, -. 
able to produce a-brilliantly lucid, pamphlet which-proved 
that the debt onthe navy was a mere 9,5,474.13., 1114- 
(1) 
The Navy Board which included Harley's old. confidant of 
William's reign, Sergison, provided all the-evidence, 
and more,, that was. necessary, but it was an activity 
directed more to exonerating the efficiency and zeal of 
the office. than to providing the Iiind of information, that 
the politicians Wanted to find. 1ý 
While the debt was being studied matters were not 
going smoothly for Harley in the Commons. Many of his_. 
_. ___ 
supposed Tory supporters wanted more radical action than 
he was prepared to support against the Whigs or more 
A Letter to a Friend concerning the Public Debts 
particularly that of the Navy (1711) 4. 
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legislation in the Tory interest. (l) An early 
indication of the kind of scandal expected from the 
financial investigation would be politically useful and 
on 3 January 1711 Harley announced that 'considerable 
abuses' had been discovered that involved a member of 
(2) the Commons* The member was one Thomas Ridge, and it 
was hardly surprising that he was both a Whig and a 
brewer involved in Victualling contractB. 
(3) The House 
considered the evidence against him on 15 and 27 February 
and learnt that he had defrauded the navy of beer to the 
0. (4) value of E, 55,435.10. He was expelled the House 
and it was resolved that 'the said frauds and abuses have 
been one great occasion of the heavy debt that lies upon 
the navy. '('5) It was a taste-of the sort of party 
vengeance the House wanted but in some ways an unsatis- 
factory exercise. Ridge was a very minor whig and with 
this calibre of prosecution another hundred victims would 
be necessary to, explain-the debt. 
(1) K. Feiling op. cit. 430-3; G. M. Trevelyan, op-cit. 
ing 108. 
(2) C. J. XVI, 446,446-7. 
(3) He was M. P. for Poole; Lettres Historiques, Vol. 
39 (1711) 316, 
(4) C. J. XVIt 498-502,522-5. 
(5) Ibid. XVI, 525. 
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The first report of the Commissioners of Accountsq 
presented on 12 February, was another disappointment. 
(') 
The emphasis in the report was very obviously on those 
topics that were likely to be politically useful - the 
accounts of past Treasurers of the Navy, the activities 
of merchants (Heathcote was specifically named 
(2)) 
who 
managed rates of exchange, the transport service, the 
use by the land forces and our allies of navy money. 
The report is a reconnaissance showing lines of possible 
attack, an interim report promising the concrete 
accusations that the Commons wanted. 
The most important work of the Commission came at 
the end of the session in an address that was presented 
to the Queen on 31 May 1711. 
(3) 
The address dealt with 
the general causes of the debt. The principal state- 
ment was at once an accusation and a definition; 
'in several years the service has been enlarged and 
the charge of it increased, beyond the bounds 
prescribed and the annual supplies granted by 
Parliament. To this new and illegal 
practice, we must in great measure, ascribe 
the rise and growth of the heavy debts that 
lie upon the nation ... this is a 
dangerous invasion of the rights of parliament. ' 
(1) C. J. XVI, 488-93. 
(2) See below p. 230. 
(3) C. J. XVI, 683-5o 
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This was the most unequivocal statement of financial 
authority yet made by parliament. By it the habit 
of the executive departments Of spending more than 
parliament voted was retrospectively condemnedi As 
a constitutional declaration it is important but it was 
probably a second best to Harley and his supporters, who 
would both have preferred specific accusation to general 
condemnation. 
In the same address the Commons reaffirmed parlia- 
ment's responsibility for all national debt. Where the 
address made specific reference to the navy it was to 
emphasise the charges the army had contributed to naval 
expenditure, as part of the campaign against Marlborough, 
although these costs were a minute proportion of the naval 
(2) 
debt. The abuses of victualling were mentioned but 
there was no reference to the parliamentary contribution 
to the debt, to the deficiencies or the debt before 
Anne's accession. The address was in fact a typical 
product of the period, a strange mixture of valuable 
constitutional advance and partisan bias. The report 
See above p. 84* 
(2) Z6061806.7.7-ý was attributed to the land 
forces, C. J. XVII 684. 
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was-clearly interim, -with a reference to 
'the frauds 
and, depredations of, such evil ministers' as-a promise 
of renewed persecution-when, the evidence that., had, -I, 
accumulated. had been processed.. to give,., up, its secrets. 
ýIn all-the activities of the 1710-1l. session. of 
parliament, the-., navy had been. only a secondary aspect of 
consideration;, theaim, of, investigation had been to 
uncover Whig fraud. Zuch essentially negative 
activJ: ties, -, were, necessary politically, but Harley's 
retention-of- power depended on, positive success, in 
restoring, the credit of the, nation, and, navy. By the 
time, he, gained, power in 1710 such, credit, national and 
naval,. had,, been practically destroyed by the weight of 
debt. In August 1710 naval bills which carried 
interest were selling at a discount of 33%, those with- 
out interest at, 50% discount. 
('), 
Bad, harvestsq 
exhaustion of war and a general lack of confidence, 
especiallyby Whigfinanciers, in the financial ability 
of a ministry led by Harley, made the situation, worse 
by the end of 1710. 
(2) 
Harley had to create confidence 
Anon to Harley, 18 Aug 1710, B. M. Harley Loan 
29/40 f-769 
(2) W. R. Scott, The Constitution and Finance of Englishq 
Scottish and Irish Joint Stock Companies to 1720 (1912) It 385,111,292-3; W. A. Shaw, Introduction 
C. T. B. XXV Pt. I, xxv; M. Foot, The Pen and-the 
Sword (1957) 138-41; Brydges to Harley, 21 Aug. 
1710, Correspondence of James Brydges to Robert 
Harley, ed. G. Davies and M. Tinling, H. L. Q. 
1 (1936-7) 460-1; J. Carswell, The South Sea 
Bubble (1960) 39a 
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so, that the short-term loans with which, the war was 
financed would once, again flow and the contractors would 
supply the government departments, knowing that,, they -- 
could soon be paid., A-procedure for-paying off, a debt 
that-had accrued becauseýof deficiencies in-the yield 
of re venue had been, established in-William'B reign. 
(') 
In, the reign-of, Anne similar short-term, sinking funds 
had been established at intervals, by act of parliament. 
By September-1710 Harley was already considering methods 
of paying off-the debt, using these-traditional methods$ 
by allocating a specific number of taxeB,,, that-would - 
gradually pay it off, 
(3) 
With-an, army'and navy debt of 
over L99000,000t equivalent to one,, and a half year's 
(1) See ab , ove , p. 124. 
(2) These General Mortgages are listed by, -W*A. Shaw- in his introduction to C-T. B. XXV Pt. I, xxiv- 
(3) The rest of the paragraph isbased upon papers, in 
the B. M. Harley Loan 29/40; particularly Debt of 
the Navy at Christmas 1710, f. 86; A Scheme 
, 
to 
Restore the Public Credit by providing for the 
debt of the navy, 22 Sept. 1710, f. 78; George 
Caswall to R. Harley, 11 Sept. 1710, f-87; 
P. M. G. Dickson, The Financial Revolution, in 
'England (1967) 64-6* 
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supply, it was obvious that parliament would not be 
willing to vote taxes in sufficient quantity to pay off 
the debt quickly even if the country could support these 
taxes.. Thus the payment had to be made as remote as 
possible. Interest of 6% in the period of waiting 
could be paid by continuing taxes voted in, the 1709-10, 
session on-wines, vinegar, tobacco, East India Company 
goods and whale fins., In the Harley Papers that deal 
with the debt certain maxims. were stated - that the 
interest on the debt must be paid punctually at half 
yearly intervals and that naval supply and expenditure 
for each year must be adjusted to each other: the debt 
must never again be allowed-to accumulate. Despite 
these maxims the traditional methods of solving the 
problem were, inadequate by the end of 1710. In fact in 
the-papers dealing with debt is one that outlined the 
methodZarley-was to use. 
(') 
This paper listed-, the - 
advantages that would follow if all the debts could be 
combined under the direction of a corporation or society. 
If the debts were united in this way the government would 
need to pay only one person, the treasurer of the 
V 
A Scheme to restore the Public Credit by ý providing for the Debt of the navy, 22 Sept 17109 
B. M. Harley Loan 29/40 f-78. 
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corporation, which would make for flexible and 
efficient administration. Accounting would be 
easier and'it'would be easier to borrow on stock rather 
than on tallies. , Here was the embryo of the South 
Seas Company, by which Harley was to secure creditg 
liquidate the debt and win one of the greatest victories 
of his career. 
On 17 May 1711 an'act was proposed in the Commons 
which passed within two weeks under the title, 'An Act 
for making good Deficiencies and satisfying the public 
debts, and for erecting a-Corporation to carry on trade 
to the South Seas. '(') The-later,, tumultuous story of 
the South Sea: Company has obscured the brilliance of this 
legislation as a solution to the problems of credit 
facing Harley in 1711. There were few acts more 
(2) 
successful in Anne's reign,,, Anyone-who could prove 
9 Anne c15- C. J-XVI,. 670,671,, 674,676,677, 
678-9,680-1; L. J. XIX, 313,315,322. The act 
also contained clauses, to encourage fishery and 
to repeal the-acts for registering seamen; see 
below p. 366. 
(2) W. A. Shaw, Introduction, C. T. B. MLV Pt I, xxxvii; 
J. Carswell, The South Sea Bubble (1ý60) 49 ff; 
W. R. Scott op. cit. 111 294-7; A. Boyer, Life of 
Her Late Majesty (17215 111 352; Burnet IV, 269. 
The restoration of fi- nci-al stability was not 
entirely the result of the act, lotteries helped 
. to provide money, -P. M. G. Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England (1967) 70-1,363- 
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that the navy owed'him money by producing navy bills 
could now exchange that debt for stock in the new 
company. That stock paid a guaranteed interest of' 
6% and was an attractive investment in its own right 
as the Company-could hope for valuable trading concessions 
when peace came. The navy creditor could either acquire 
this stock, * draw his interest and hope for good 
dividends from his investment, or sell his debt on the 
open market, where navy billB rapidly became marketable, ' 
the diBCount on them dropping rapidly by 2(Y16. 
(l) Naturally 
the passing of an act was not the immediate end of the 
debt; its liquidation wasýa 'complex and, lengthy task, 
South Sea Company stock was not quoted at 100 until 1715: 
but the problem of national and naval credit was well on 
the way to solution by the- end of 1711. 
(2) 
The political importance and consequences of the naval 
debt lasted beyond*1? 11., Walpole', who had escaped injury 
from hisýresponsibilities as Treasurer of the Navy, was 
successfUlly_attacked on his army foraging p. ontracts, in 
January 1712. (3) In May 1713 a grant to Orford in 1710 
(1) W. R. Scott op. cit. 111,295. 
(2) Ibid. 1111 296-7. 
(3) J. H. Plumb, Sir Robert Walpole: The Making, of 
a Statesman (1956) 178-84; C-J-XVII, 30* 
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was described in lengthy terms*, 
(')the 
attraction of such 
matters for the Commons meant that the threat of 
prosecution was never absolutely dead. But the struggle 
for the peace as much as the complexities of the 
financial evidence saved the Whigs from worry over naval 
accounts in the session of 1711-12. The debt had its 
part in the struggle for the peace. On 18 February 17i2 
the House was shown how supporting our allies in Spain 
and Portugal had Cost the nation L6,540,966.14.0. 
(2) In 
a representation to the Queen on the state of the war 
made on 1 March 17129 evidence such as this was exploited 
against the allies we were about to deserte(3) Earlier 
explanations of the debt, even the responsibility of the 
Whigs and Marlborough for it were conveniently ignored. 
It was alleged to be the Dutch who, by providing fewer 
ships for the allied fleet than they had promised, had 
forced our ships to undertake expensive campaigns in 
distant waters. This damaged the credit of the navy and 
(1) C. J. XVIIj 346. 
(2) Ibid. XVIIj 93. This was an impressive figure; 
its mathematical basis was ludicrous; for example, 
it assumed that every ship in the Mediterranean or 
the waters around the Iberian Peninsula contributed 
to this charge and was manned to the highest 
complement, N. M. M. Sergison Ser/118. 
(3) C. J. XVIIj 119-20* 
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debt mounted. The war in Spain had added to the debt. 
The ships we needed to defend our coasts and convoys 
were deployed to fulfil the tasks that were a Dutch 
responsibility. Thus the Dutch, in this cunningly 
contrived representation, became responsible for two 
major parliamentary grievances, the debt and inefficient 
trade protection. With this distortion the great debt 
of 1710 ended its political life. It had served Oxford 
well, helping him to beat the Whigs at an election, to 
rally his own supporters in the Commons, to-threaten 
the Whigs, to establish himself as a brilliant financial 
statesman and to disparage his allies. The debt had 
also served the cause of parliamentary authority well. 
- The departure of the great debt of 1710 from the 
parliamentary scene did not deprive the Commons Of issues 
concerned with naval debt. Despite the laborious 
investigation of naval debt and its causes, and despite 
the attempt by the Commons to limit and define the 
financial freedom of the navy, the demands of war and 
even of the peace that came in 1713, led to the navy's- 
overspending as it had done since 1688. Thus the 
Commons had once again to consider the debt of the navy 
which although reduced by the working of the South Sea 
,, I I 
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Company, remained high by the standards of William's 
reign. 
(')The 
reasons for the overspending were not new: 
the deficiencies of funds, the payment of premiums on 
naval stores, the long process of clearing the accounts 
of a Treasurer of the Navy, the inadequacy of the sum 
allocated to victuals, and the expense of marines. All 
these came, yet again, to the notice of the Commons as 
causes of debt. 
(2) 
The most elaborate naval justification 
of the debt came in February 1714 in a memorial which is 
a miniature version of the elaborate accounts of 1710- 
ll, -(3) Ther*e were some new causes of debt, especially 
those of a technical kind relating to the funding of debt 
with the South Sea Company, 
(4)but 
the general causes are 
The debt of the navy was: - 
92,974,856.17.1. on 30 Sept. 1711, 
L29527,119.16.11., on-30 Sept. 1? 12,. 
L29045,624.5.8. on 30 Sept. 1712, 
-9,19904,282. j16.2. on 1 Aug. 1714 
(C. J. XVII, 19,286t 2889 495; B. M. Addit. -MSS. 5,439 f. 120). These are the figures parliament 
saw; the real figure fp. r debt, when tallies in 
hand were deducted, was always considerably less; 
for example, the real debt on 30 Sept. 1712 
- 
was 
9,194279549.19.1)1. See N. M. M. Sergisoni. Estimates-- 
of Navy Debts, 1671-1718, Ser/132. 
(2). C. J. XVII, 99,100,287,512t 520$ 621-3; Queen 
Anne's Navy 47-8. 
(3) Ibid. 55-7- 
(4) C-J-XVII9 32,148-50; C-T. B. XXV Pt. II, xxvig-184-5, 
565-6; Queen Anne's Navy 42-3. 
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unchanged. The navy continued to muster more than 
40,000 men after 1710(1)and in peace mustered more than 
parliament had allowed when the threat in the Baltic of 
Charles XII's ambitions caused it to fit out, at the 
government's direction, fifteen ships manned to the 
(2) 
highest complement at an estimated cost of F, 36,533-11-0- 
Such freedom of action had to be allowed: even before the 
peace Tory writers had been forced to use the arguments 
used earlier by the Whigs to justify naval. 
and a mounting debt. 
(3) 
The only realistic 
1688 and 1714 to calculate the cost of the 
basis of men actually Mustered was made in 
in the next estimate the traditional patte: 
overspending 
attempt between 
navy on the 
March 1712 but 
m was followed 
ý4) 
There are a few indications that naval officials did try 
(5)- 
to match expenditure to the sum voted but generally the 
weight of tradition and the peculiar circumstances of 
naval expenditure mean t that the prac tical consequences of 
parliament'B declaration of financial control as applied to 
(1) Ibid. 56. 
(2) Ibid. 57. 
(3) 'An Estimate of the Debt of her Majesty's Navy ...... (1711)1 is a Whig pamphlet. The Tory reply, 
'Observations on the Estimate of the debt of the 
Navy' (1711) contained statements such asq 'the 
expense of the year cannot be computed, ' (P-3Y 
(4) C. J. XVII, 164* 
(5) P. R. O. Treasury Minute Book, T. 29.20 quoted by 
K. Darwin, John Aislabie (1670-1742), Yorkshire 
Archaeological Journal, Vol. 37,271- 
I 
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the navy were fewý--- - 
The most significant innovation in naval finance 
brought, about by, the Tory ministry between-1711 and 1714 
was a reassessment of the Ordinary. - In April 1713 a 
committee of the Commons was, formed, to consider the' 
Ordinary; the grant'for 1713 had alreadyýbeen more 
generous than'usual. 
(') 
The'officials-of the Navy Board-- 
were-called-on-to provide evidence-and the,. co=ittee- 
presented, a lengthy-'report to the, House in May. 
(2) 'The 
salaries'andvduties, of each'memberýof the naval-, 
administration, from commissioners'to-servantsi were 
considered. Where money could be saved-lit was; John 
Fournier lost theTsinecure worth E200 a year which he- 
had held*as-Master Builder of'Bomb Vessels since 16890- 
Much of the-committee's time was taken up, in hopefully 
examiningýthe-, accounts of-Orford and Walpole: but despite 
this evidence of party bias the-recommendations made 
were-statesmanlike. There was-no such sweeping and- 
unrealistie'reduction of clerks and,. pffices,, -as had- 
been attempted after the, Teace in William's, reign(3)and, _ 
(1) C. J. XVII9 9; see Appendix IV. 
(2) C-J-XVII, 344-7; -Memorial from Admiralty to the 
Queen-, 13 July 1713, B. M. Harley Loan 29/40, No. 13, 
f. 69; N. M. M. SergiBon, Ser/118,30 Ap. 1713; N. M. M. 
Sergison, An Account of the Whole Proceedings of 
the Select Committee, Ser/121. 
(3) See above pp. 85-6* 
I 
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eventually the navy was granted L200,000 for the 
Ordinary. (') The vote was a significant one. The 
Ordinary had always been particularly associated with 
parliamentary suspicion of money grants to the monarch. 
In 1713 the absence of complaint from the Navy Board is 
evidence that L200,000 was a fair grant of supply. it 
did bear relation to, the upkeep of the navy in, 1713. On 
the parliamentary side, there was an assumption that such 
payments were the responsibility of parliament. It was 
an assumption expressed in a routine vote like the one for 
the Ordinary rather than a carefully worded constitutional 
declaration. Such declarations, like the one made on 
31 May 17119(2)were sometimes in advance of feeling in the 
House. But explicitly or implicitlyl, between 1688 and 
1714, the Commons had assumed control of naval finance. 
The control was somewhat precarious and would need time 
before it became for the majority of the Commons au 
unconscious assumption. The realities of this power 
probably outstripped the expert knowledge possessed by 
(1) C-J-XVII, 351-2; B. M. Harley Loan 29/40, No. 13, 
f. 69; the sum was granted against some opposition 
and was rather less than the naval estimate. The 
grant for 1714 was more generous and included an 
allowance for halfpay, C-J-XVII, 5379530; 
W. A. Shaw, Introduction, C. T. B. XXVIII, xiv-x; 
A. H. Newman, Proceedings in the House of Commons9 
March-June 1714 B. I. H. R. XXXIV (1961) 211-3. 
(2) See above P. 156. 
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the Co=ons but power and knowledge were linkedl as they 
had been in so many ways since 1688. They had both 
resulted, more often than not, from factional and Short- 
sighted incentives. Behind these motives, and 
frequently providing the real force of parliamentary 
interest, was concern for the navy. Despite financial 
crisis and endemic debt, parliament ensured that the 
navy had sufficient money to assert a dominance. 
170. 
Material 
171. 
Parliament's annual grant of money to the navy- 
provided for the pay and victuals of sailors, the 
maintenance of ships, and munitions. The four 
divisions of naval expenditure were organiBed to these 
ends but neither parliament nor the naval administration 
considered that this routine grant of money was 
sufficient if it was necessary for the navy to become 
stronger. Thus parliament made provision for any 
necessary expansion by means of extraordinary grants of 
money. The capital investment in ships and improved 
dockyard facilities represented by these grants did not 
end parliament's concern for the physical fabric of 
the navy. The provision of certain commodities, vital 
to the navy, also involved parliament. For some. of 
, 
these stores England was dependent on foreign countriesq 
and out of a concern with national security and the' 
contemporary mercantilist theories, there came 
legislation that affected the navy, 
The background to the extraordinary grants that 
provided more ships and bigger dockyards was in every 
way similar to the general'background of financial supply 
described in the, preceding chapter. The routine grantl 
calculated on the basis of the number of men who would 
172* 
serve in the navy, and the extraordinary grant in any 
year were both usually the product of precisely the 
same debates. Of the two fundamental material require- 
ments for naval security, ships and dockyard facilities, 
(') 
the former naturally had priority. The most generous 
extraordinary grants for more ships were naturally made in 
time of crisis. 
(2) 
The most spectacular accession of 
strength came after the-defeat off Beachy Head in 1690. In 
the next session of parliament F, 570,000 was voted for the 
building of seventeen third and ten fourth rate ships, 
more than the navy had requested, and an increase in naval 
strength so spectacular that the money bill authorising 
the expenditure has been described as the 'first example of 
a naval defence act., 
(3) 
A similar sense of crisis after 
the discovery of a Jacobite plot in Lancashire led the 
Lords to address the King in February 1695 for a bigger 
navy, 
(4) When danger was less obvious grants were less 
generous. Williambplea, in his opening speech to 
parliament on 7-November 1693', 'for more ships was ignored. 
(5) I 
(1) A more detailed account of the expenditures involved 
in extraordinary grants is given in J. Burchett, A 
Complete History of the most Remarkable Transactions 
at Sea (1720) Pref ace. 
(2) See Appendix VI. 
(3) Ehrman 429-31; Grey X, 155; C. J. Xj 432,506,525. 
(4) L. J. XVI 498,5059 5099 5129 513; H. M. C. H. L. 19 
497-8. 
(5) C-J-XI9 1. See below p. 252 
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A similar refusal to vote more money. for ships in the 
session of 1691-2 enabled Court speakers in the next 
session to blame some of the failures in trade protection 
on shortage of ships. 
(') One of the restraints on such 
votes was the tradition that it was the monarch's 
responsibility to provide ships from his own revenue.. 
Despite the vote of 1691 the tradition was strong and 
powerfully expressed by Country members such as Clarges-(2) 
In the early years of Anne's reign, when few of the 
parliamentary initiatives that, implied growing parlia- 
mentamy authority over. the navy were maintained$ there were 
no more grants of, money to provide ships for the navy. 
(3) 
Generally, however, in William's reign parliamentary 
concern for the upkeep and expansion, of the navy was 
persistent, and the grants of money for these purposes 
were lavish. 
(4) It was this generosity that made the 
English navy the most powerful in the world, despite the 
losses caused by the action, of the, enemy and. the sea. 
(5) 
(1) N. Luttrell, An Abstract of the Debates 1692-3 f. 60. 
(2) -Ibid. f . 102. 
(3) See above p. 126. See Appendix VI. There was a 
grant in 1706 towards the cost of equipping eight 
new ships, 
(4) See Appendix VI; Grey IX, 336; H. M. C. Kenyon 397- 
(5) See Appendix VII. The navy became as powerful as the 
figures of the Appendix show despite considerable 
losses; in the first six years-of William's reign 
95 ships were lost, C. J. XI, 348-50; in the first 
four years of Anne's reign 64 were lost, C. J. XV, ' 
410. 
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By the end of William's reign it seems to have been 
generally accepted by parliament that the navy was 
strong enough. The navy, however, continued, to grow. 
In the same way as naval officials considered they had 
the right to increase the muster of sailors above the 
number voted by parliament, so they continued to add to 
the strength of the navy by building, hiring and the 
purchase of prizes'. 
(2) 
This static period after the great 
expansion and initiatives of William's reign applies to 
nearly every aspect of parliament's relationship with 
the navy. As far as the provision of ships was concernedg 
it was probably produced by a belief that there were in- 
sufficient sailors available-to man more ships and parlia- 
ment's tacit acknowledgement of Prince George's 
responsibility for the navy during his tenure as Lord 
High Admiral, 
The navy built up during William's reign was 
adequate to meet- the needs of the French wars. '-, - The 
great increase in numbers was in ships of third rate 
and below. Although some flag officers saw dangers in 
the neglect of building first and-6econd-rate ships, 
-rightly believing that victory in'f leet action went to 
(1) See above P-173. A summary of the ways in which 
the navy increased in Anne's reign is given in 
Queen Anne's Navy, Appendix V, 362-3. 
(2) P. R. O. Ad. 8/3,18 Oct. 1692. Bee 'Above pp. 128-9* 
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the side with the greater weight of broadside, it was 
the smaller ship that was more generally useful. 
(') 
There was considerable and general feeling against the 
great ships because of a belief that they pandered to 
the vanity and despotism of captains. 
(2) Certainly in 
Anne's reign, and often under William, the first rates 
were mainly used to muster reservoirs of men who could 
be deployed to mansmaller ships. Even with the 
emphasis on building ships of lower rate it was in the 
smallest ships, those suitable for cruiser or convoy 
duties, that the most pressing and persistent shortages 
were felt. 
(3) 
This shortage was not'remedied in the 
eighteenth century. It was inherently difficult to get 
parliament to provide money for such ships, presumably 
because it was felt that the navy had sufficient 
financial latitude to provide these ships on its own 
initiative. In a wider sense parliamentary interest in 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
Berkeley to Shrewsbury, 16 July 1696, H. M. C. 
Buccleuch and Queensberry II Pt. It 369; Shovell 
to Nottingham, 18 July 1702, C. S. P. Dom. Anne It 
190. 
Diary of John Evelyn, ed. E. S. de Beer (1955) V, 
10-11; H. Maydman, Naval Speculations and 
Maritime Politics (1691)-289; Ehrman 35. 
H. Maydman-, op. cit. 287-8; P. R. O. Adm. 3/1, f-52; 
H. M. C. H. L. It 120; C. S. P. Dom. W. & M. 1693,2? 0; 
Queen Anne's Navy, '-84,91. 
1? 6 & 
the ships of the navy did nothing to improve the 
technical achievement of English ship builders, who remained 
staunchly conservative; indeed most of the third rates 
built as a result of the 1690 grant were dangerously'- 
overgunned. 
(l) 
Another and, traditional way in which-parliament-could 
k 
reinforce the navy was to encourage the building of 
stalwart merchant ships of-large size. Such ships when 
used for trade were more capable of defending themselves" 
and thus relieved men of war for. duties other-than 
convoying. They could also be used. as men of war, their 
construction and armament being usually equivalent to, 
that of a fifth or sixth rate naval ship. The years 
1688 to 1714 were transitional in that they were among 
the last in which hired merchant ships were capable of 
fulfilling an operational naval role without major 
reconBtruction. 
(2) 
Ships hired with the particular 
G, P. Naish, Ships and Ship Building,, in A History ýf Technology, ed. C. Singer et al., (1957) 1119 
482-97; G. S. Laird CloweBj Sailing Ships: Their 
History and Development (1932) 79-84; Sergison 
Papers 80-4; H. M. C. H. L.., Iq 124; P. R. O. Adm. 7/ 
336,31 Dec. 1702. 
(2) Sir G. Callender and F. H. HinBley, The Naval Side 
of British History (1954) 107; V. Barbourg Dutch 
and English Merchant Shipping in the Seventeenth 
Century, Econ. ' Hist. Rev. 
-, 
II (1930) 2, reprinted 
in Essays in Economic History I, ed. E. M. Carus 
Wilson (1961) 227-8; R. Davis he Rise of the 
English Shipping Industry (190) 312; Ehrman 32; 
R. G. Albion, ForeStB and Sea Power (1926) 76. 
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needs of convoy and West Indian services in view were 
an important source of naval reinforcement, particularly 
in the early years of William's reign. 
(l) A bill to 
e, neourage the building of such merchant ships as would 
be capable of duties like these was discussed'by the 
Commons in January 1692 and in January and February of 
1693- Difficulties of wording and definition, pressure 
of business and the lateness of the session when this 
bI ill was discussed prevented its becoming law then. The 
bill was again considered'during the 1693-4 session of 
parliament, first of all in November, and in April 
1.694 it did be come law. 
(2) The bill whi ch bee I ame law was 
substantially the one that ha d been considered in all 
three sessions of parliament. It would seem to have, been 
a*bill that was kept before the attention of the Commons 
by Country and merchant members. Three men particularly 
are associated with it at all stages, Hugh Boscawenj 
Sir Samuel Barnardiston and Sir Matftew Andrews. ' Theý-' 
first two were recognised Country-speakers and, - 
Barnardiston, was as well interested in the Levant trade. 
Ibid. 76o 
(2) 5-W. & M. 'c 24'. An Act for building good and 
defensible ships'; 'in 1692, C. ZT. X, 6189 6439 649- 50; H. M. C. -'H. L. -MSS. 1692-39'63-4; ýin 
16939 C. J-X- 
8039 806; in 1693-4, C-J-Xl, 39 46,699 1549 165- 
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Andrews was a trader to the East Indies. The House 
would naturally have-, been. sympathetic to their arguments 
in the session after the destruction of the Smyrna Convoy 
(1) in -1693, and the governiment'itself must'have been aware 
that the navy was hiring merchant'ships to'supplement'its 
force of smaller escort'vessels. 
(2) 
-By the act all 
M. erchant ships of more than 32 giin-s whi-ch'were-'built in 
the next ten years were to be allowed a remititance of one 
tenth on cuStoms'dutles''on the' goods they-imported, on 
their first three voyages. 
I- Iiament pro , The ships that-par vided, whether built 
specifically for the navy or hired, needed bigger and 
more elaborately equipped bases. New bases'were 
especially necessary to meet*the new strategic threat, posed 
by a war with France'; the bases in existence in 1688 were 
primarily designed to countera Dutch-thr'eat. '(3) Plymouth 
Dockyard was created to meet the new'problem, and parliaý- 
ment in the reigns of both William and Anne voted grants 
The Political backgroundtto'thi's session is 
considered inmore detail below pp. 248-254. 
(2) Luttrell 111,239. 
(3) D'C. C61eman, Naval Dockyards under the Later Stuarts, icon. Hist. Rev. 2nd. Series, V1 (1953-4) 134-5; 
Sir H. Kitson, Early History of, Portsmouth Dockyardq- 
1496-1800, Pts. II & III, M. M. 34 (1948) 3-10,87- 
95; G. J. Marcus, A Naval History of England I, The 
Formative Centuries (1961) 198; Ehrman 81-5.415-29. 
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to equip this and other dockyards for the maintenance of 
the greatly increased navy. 
(') 
Parliament's interest in the ships, the basic 
units of sea power, can be seen in the numerous lists 
it demanded of the navy which expressed this power in 
terms 'of vessels and guns. Such interest was a natural 
expression of parliamentary concern for the navy. 
Parliament's interest in the vast diversity of raw 
materials and manufactures that went to the making of the 
ships was naturally less, but the provision of some of 
these materials was forced on parliament's attention., 
Timber, tar, pitch, resin, hemp and, canvas were needed in 
great quantities and for the provision of-these vital 
commodities, because their supply in England was either 
inadequate or non-existent, the navy was dependent on 
foreign countries. Most of these co=odities were 
produced in the lands around the Baltic, and their controE 
of these strategic materials made it possible for them 
to increase the price practically at will. Vigorous 
action against such practice was prevented by both the 
demands of the war with France and the danger of driving 
t hese neutral powers into alliance with France. 
(2) 
(1) See Appendix VII, 
(2) See above p. 9. 
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]ýýarliamen'tls solution t10 this'problem was to encourage 
by legislation the production'of thes I e, com I modities in 
England or in English territories. In this 
legislation the executive displayed more initiative' 
ihan in any other aspe'ct of legislation that concerned 
the navy. 
The navy needed timber of many kinds in large 
quantities for both the construction and repair of 
ships. 
('), 
England could'not'pr6v'ide either . the quantity 
or the qualities of wood necessary. The provision of 
some'kinds of timber presented few problems. " The main 
mast Is for the biggest . ships, of a diameter of more than 
twenty-sev6n'inches, I were generally provid6d'from New 
England. They were bought and transported to England 
for the navy by contractors like Sir-John Shorter, '' 
(2) 
William Walli: s, Francis Collins and-John Taylor. 'This 
sI o`urce was never -a major problem although the ravages of 
French and Indians-and the inefficiency of convoys gave 
(1) Ehrman 38-42 
(2) R. Davis,. The Rise. of the English Shipping 
Industry (1962) 96; C. S. P. Dom. W. & M. 
1689-90,169; -C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W. I. '1689- 92 " : 215; -ibid., 1708-ý9t''448; C. T. B. M Pt. II 253; -Ehrman 59-61; for John Taylor see below p. 182. 
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the Navy Board sporadic cause for concern. 
(') Most 
naval timber, 'Bpars and planks of fir, pine and spruce 
as well as small-masts, -still-came from the Baltic and 
Norway. The import of such timber represented the 
most'considerable of all English imports in terms of 
t 
4, volume. The naval contractors to the, Baltic required 
a fle'et of between twenty-five and fifty ships each 
year. 
(2) 
Although the precarious neutrality of-the Baltic 
kingdoms was the major threat to the supply-of naval-- 
-stores the navy had'also to accept certain leSBer" 
disadvantages--associated with supply from, the-. Baltic. 
Most of the contractors fox naval timber were also 
ýinvolved in the supply of Baltic tar, pitch, resin and 
hemp. * The supply of all these items, was dominated by 
-a small number of merchants who were siifficiently astute 
and wealthy to, act in concert in order to get better 
prices.. from the navy, 
(3) Their action as a'group embe 
seen in 1690, when they obtained interest on their hemp 
(4) 
contracts,, in, 1691,,. when their delay in contracting 
C. S. P. Col.. Amer. & W. I. 1689-92,301- 
(2) P. R. O. Adm.. 1/3567 f 313; 1/3593,5 June 1702; 
-1/35939'24*May. 
1703', 1/3605,14 June 1706; 1/ 
3607,8,, May'1707 
(3) Ehrman 60-5- 
(4) C. T. B! lX, . 'Pt. -IIS 778; Sergison Papers 61-2o 
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and delivery was an attempt 
. 
to secure better, prices 
and in 1693- when they protested about the funds on 
which their tallies had been__assigned. 
(2)ý In this last 
instance they petitioned parliament about their 
(3) 
grievances. For 1694 they demanded F, 26,,, 
-a 
ton on'their 
hemp contracts and, the Treasury took advice on how to- 
break this 'combination'. 
(4) 
The Navy Board was advised 
to buythe hemp necessary on commission, a method that 
was generally unpopular because it removed the element 
of competition and might lead to higher prices,, as the 
supply was under the control of one merchant,. who made 
his profit from the commission granted by the navy. 
(5) 
_. 
John Taylor, a naval contractor in American and Baltic 
timber, hemp, pitch, tar and resin, was choosen to 
(6) -- supply the hemp. He was given favourable terms of 
Ibid. '64-5; P. R. O. ýAdm. 1/3564 f. 403* 
(2). ý' P. 'R.. O--Adm. 3/8,19 April 1693; N. M. M. S. ergisonq 
Ser/iOO -ffo 189-90o, 
(3) C. j,. Xls-,, 126o 
(4) The combination was- led, by W. Gore, Gold"' Martin 
-X I and -Joy; -'-C. T 0 Bo. qý Pt-III., 1382; ibido X11 11; Ehrman 64., 
(5)' CoToB. Xý. PtoII , "630--Sir W. Beveridge et al, Prices and, 'Wag6S'in'England4`Q939) Iq' 619-20o 
(6) Evidencel, of his-, -, contracts can 
be found for almost 
every year 
- 
between 1688 and 1714. The officials 
of'the Navy Board seem to have-'valued his 
efficiency and advice, see below p. 195, Taylor 
had a wide circle of political and commercial 
contacts, R. Walcott, The East India Interest in 
the General Election of 1700-1, E. H. R. TXX (1956) 
230,233o 
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commission and excused duty on some of his American 
imports.. (') Taylor provided the hemp on commission for 
1695 and 1697 as well. 
(2) In Anne's reign there is no 
such obvious action of combination by the Baltic 
Merchants. Naval tar and pitch were purchased on 
commission in 1703 and 1705 but the reason for this is 
to be found rather in Swedish politics than the 
ambitions of the Baltic Merchants. 
(3) There seem to 
have been rather more contractors in this period 
(4)and 
this fact, together with the successful Navy Board, 
resistance to any combination of merchants helped to 
maintain a fair price. 
(5) 
(1) C. T. B. X Pt. II9 6309 6439 647,6519 937,951; ibid 
x Pt. 1119 1095. 
(2) C. T. B. X Pt. 111,13829 13849 1386; P. R. O. Adm. 
1/35749 f 751; C. T. B. XII, 30,186. 
(3) See below p. 199. 
(4) J. Martin, E. Gould, N. Gould, J. Taylor and 
U. Hall, all of whom had contracted during 
William's reign, continued to supply the navy. 
They were joined by E. Haistwell, F. Collins, 
R. Knipe,, W. Astell, Sir T. Webster, and others. 
There is a useful list of contractors in P. R. O. 
Adm. 1/3609,17 April 1708. 
(5) The Baltic merchants were still capable df 
concerted action, as when they ruined onet Hester, 
who had attempted to monopolise the naval hemp 
contract, C. T. B. XXIII, Pt. 111 16,430; C. T. B. 
XXIV Pt. 119 170. 
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Another minor problem associated with naval 
supplies from the Baltic was the build of ship employed 
I 
to bring the imports to England. The contractors 
were-frequently under pressure to employ ships of 
foreign construction, thus contravening the Navigation 
Laws. This pressure might arise simply from the 
necessity of meeting delivery dates with no English 
ships available. This problem was usually met by a 
petition to the Treasury asking it to pass down to', the 
-1 
customs officials a request for leniency or to grant 
permission for a foreign ship to be used. 
(') More 
seriously the pressure came from the Baltic powerst, who 
themselves pursued a mercantilist policy for, their own 
products and ships. 
_ 
Imports in such ships were more 
secure from French-privateers and their use was 
frequently permitted. 
(2) 
The extension of this process 
whereby ships were built or bought abroad, for the import 
of naval stores, particularly masts, concerned parlia- 
ment when the English owners of these ships petitioned 
parliament for their ships to be, naturalised. 
(3) Generally 
parliament was reluctant to qualify any of its legislation 
and this reluctance was especially strong about the 
C. T. B. XIV, 182. 
(2) C. T. B. XIV, - 182* 
(3) For example, Johii Taylor's Mast ship C-J-XII, 662. 
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Navigation Laws relating to -ship building. - . -In 1708 two 
naval contractorsl Thomas and Henry Stiles, encountered 
opposition over the naturalisation of two mast ships. 
(l) 
In 1709 a similar, petition inspiredýcounterý--petitions 
from British ship builders, rope makers, blacksmithsq- 
(2) 
sail, rope and block makers, and the petition failed .2 
An attractive solution to the problems of timber -- 
supply from the Baltic was to encourage the growing of- 
English timber, a possibility, that had been-frequently and 
convincingly argued in print. In fact by 1688 English, 
woodlands were-quite inadequate to meetýtheýdemands of 
naval and mercAntile marine,, and even had a vigorous 
pblicy of encouragement been implemented inthe early- 
years of William's reign, it would have been irrelevant 
to the timber supply problem in the reign of-Anne thanks 
to the slow maturity of timber in general and, oak in 
particular. 
(3) 
The most unusual feature of, planB'tO 
increase England's timber supply in the reign of William 
is the initiative of the-Navy Board. In one sense the 
initiative is unsurprising in that it was the executive 
P-J-XV9 5209,542,580. 
C'., LT,. X; VI, -132,1'35,136t 148,1499 150,1569'158, 1599 1659 188. 
(3) R. G. Albion, Forests and Sea Power (1926) Ch*. III 
England's Diminishing WoodlandB 95-132. The 
Commons considered the preservation of timber once 
in 1690, C. J. Xj 480. 
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body most directly concerned with timber BUpply, but 
the authority and vigour with which this normally 
subservient and conservative Board prodded the 
Treasury into action, planned the legislation and 
criticised the effectiveness of Treasury speakers in 
the Commons, is remarkable. The Navy Board wanted to 
exploit the timber resources of the royal forests which 
were wasted because of inefficient administration. The 
New Forest particularly was admirably situated to supply 
the growing bases on the south coast. 
(') 
During 1692 the 
Navy Board recommended to the Treasury, which administered 
the royal forests, that a policy of preservation be 
started and that a bill be passed through parliament 
authorising their plan. In the eyes of the Navy Board, 
certainly, the Treasury speakers in the Commons bungled 
the presentation of this bill. 
(2) In February 1693 the 
Navy Board directed at the Treasury a letter and memorial 
which gave instruction in the vital importance of timber 
tO'-the navy, marshalled the arguments that could be u sed 
to support legislation, criticised the past efforts of 
the Treasuryl and 'humbly' advised, with great precisiong 
R. G. Albion o cit. 107-110; Ehrman 44. p- 
-1,1 
(2) C. J. Xj 8039 807. 
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hova new bill should be framed . 
(l) 
Navy Board criticism of the Treasury's presentation 
"6f the bill was perhaps rather unfair. The bill 
apparently encountered concerted and-vigorous opposition 
from a small group in the Commons. The Duke of Bolton 
(2) 
was Warden of the New Forest. Any scheme of enclosure 
for the preservation of naval timber would-limit his 
authority and perquisites, amongst which were included 
the deer of the Forest. His 'friends' in the Commons, 
including his son, the Marquis of Winchester and his 
local ally Paul Burrard, argued that the bill was an 
encroachment on the rights of common of the local 
(3) 
villagers. Their arguments and their votes must have 
coiitributed to the defeat of the bill. 
The advice of the Navy Board about a new bill was 
ignored although Treasury and Commons knew that the 
shortage of wood was delaying the construction of new 
Navy Board to the Lords of the Treasury, 22 Feb. 
1693, N. M. M. Sergison Ser/102 ff-536 -7; 
Memorial to the Lords of the Treasury on Oak 
Feb. 1693 N. M. M. Sergison Ser/lOO ff. 463-9; -cf- 
Navy Board to the Admiralty 20 Feb. 1693, ibid. 
-Ser/100-f. 289. 
(2) Charles "Powlett, lst, Duke of Bolton, was Warden 
of the New Forest, 1689-1699. - 
(3) N. Luttrell, 'An Abstract-of the Debates 1692-3 
f-337. "Charles Powlett, Marquis of Winchester 
and-later the second Duke, was M. P. for Hampshire' 
1689-98. Paul Burrard shared with the Duke of 
Bolton control of the two seats of Lymington 
(Hants. ) 
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ships. 
(') 
The financial crisis of-1696 was of greater' 
help to the Navy Board than memorials. By 1696 the, 
debts of the English naval timber contractors were so 
large that they refused to continue supplying the navy. 
The Navy Board, in desperation, sought and received 
permission to cut timber in the New rorest. 
(2) More of 
this timber was needed in 1697(3)and it, was in the-next 
session of parliament that legislation was considered 
to meet the demands irom the Navy Board. The bill 
that eventually passed both Houses ordered that 2,000 
acres of the New Forest should be set-aside and enclosed 
as a 'nursery' for naval timber and that each year forý 
the next twenty years another 200 acres should be 
similarly enclosed. There was opposition to the bill, 
from those parishes which adjoined the projected 
enclosures, and from the Duke of Bolton, whose deer 
would find their grazing restricted. 
(4) 
Both kinds of 
(1) Samuel Pepys's Naval Minutes, ed. J. R. Tanner, 
(N. R. S. 1926) 384- 
(2) C. T. P. It 557-8* 
(3) C. T. B. XII9 267, 
(4) 9 Wm- 111 033, An Ac t for the Increase and 
Preservation of Timber in the New Forest; 
C-J-XII, 15,44-5, 56,75,89 , 117,308; L. J. XVIj 254,261, 264,2729 276,281,282, 
286,291,293,298, 2999 3009 302; H. M. C. H. L. 
1111'174-80. 
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opposition apparently received sympathetic consideration 
from members-of parliament who were themselves mainly 
landowners but without damage to the act. 
(') It was the 
only long term legislative attempt to deal with the 
navy's problem of timber supply in the years between 
1688, and 1714. 
(2) 
: 1, The long delay between the Navy Board's recommenda- 
tions in 1693 and the legislation of 1698 can perhaps be 
explained by the increasing interest during William's 
reign in the potentialities of the North American colonies 
as, a source for naval stores, tar, pitch and resin as well 
as'timber. It was generally accepted by the English that 
the colonies 'are to be valued as they are more or less 
valuable to Englandgt(3)and they had long been recognised 
(4) 
as-a potential source of naval supplies. If the colonies 
could be encouraged to produce the naval supplies England 
needed the country would be released from a dangerous 
dependence on foreign powers and the effort of supplying 
these commodities would distract the colonists from 
(1) R. G. Albion op. cit. 114. 
(2) Ibid. -- 132o 
(3) Hedge s to Dudley, 1 Feb. 1706, C. S. P. Col. Amer. 
& W. I. 1706-8, - 33* 
(4) F. Bacon, Essays Civil and Moral XXXIII, Of 
Plantations (1924) 148-152. Bacon's views were 
quoted by Bellomont (see below p. 194 ) 28 Nov. 
1700, C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W. I. 17009 673. 
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developing industries that might compete with English 
manufacturers. 
(')A 
government circular letter to 
governors of colonies in 1691 asked for information about 
the likely quantities of naval stores that could be 
produced in North America. The answers were detailed 
(2) 
and optimistic. In the next three years the Lords of 
Trade and Plantation received proposals for exploiting 
the colonies in the production of naval stores from more 
than a dozen persons, who claimed to represent among 
them practically every colony on the North Atlantic 
seaboard. 
(3) 
The organisation of this supply was a 
C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W. I. 1708-9,57$ 259. The 
suggestion that American colonies should also 
construct ships for the navy was never seriously 
developed, ibid. 1706-8 257; ibid. 1708-9t 243. 
(2) C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W. I. 1689-92,528,529,535, '5739 
575,596. 
(3) For Massachusetts there were the powerful recommenda- 
tions of Sir Mathew Dudleyj C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W. I. 
1693-6,158,218,2425 253; P. R. O. Adm. 1/4080 f. 945; 
for Pennsylvania Richard Haynes and John Taylor$ 
C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W. I. 1693-61 220-11 254; ibid* 
nd 1699,630, P. R. O. Adm. 1/4080 f-1015; for New Engla 
Sir Henry Ashurst and Sir Stephen Evance, C. S-P-Col- 
Amer. & W. I. 1693-6,265-6; Acts of the Privy Council 
a Colonial Series II, op. cit. 268-9; C. S. P. Dom. W*M*: *i6969 309-10; P. R. O. Adm. 1/4080. f-1007; there 
were proposals from New Jersey, C. S. P. Col. Amer. & 
W. I. 1699,631,632; from New York, P. R. O. Adm. l/ 
3571,23 Jan. 1693; 1/4080 f. 903; from Boston, P. R. 0, 
Adm. 1/4080 f. 1071; from Maryland, C. S. P. Col. Amer. & 
W. I. 1693-61 243-49 265,619; P. R. O. Adm. 1/4080 
f. 10710 
191* 
laboriously slow process. The delays caused by the 
slow process of communication across the Atlantic were 
lengthened by the caution of government officials, who. 
feared the dangers of stockjobbing and the possible 
danger of monopoly should a charter be granted to in- 
corporate the suppliers of naval stores from a particular 
colony. 
(') The proposals themselves aroused bitter 
disputes among the colonies and even among representatives 
of the same colony. 
(2) 
The Navy Board was unenthusiastic 
about all the proposals, agreeing that they would be 
'beneficial' to the national interest but reporting, 
accurately, of them all that the prices quoted were higher 
(3) than those the navy paid for similar Baltic stores. 
The delays discouraged some 
(4)but in 1696 the interest 
in the possibility of naval stores from America increased 
sharply. - In May came the appointment Of COMMiBBioners to 
the newly formed Board of Trade and Plantations. The 
members-were particularly charged to consider the 
(1) C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W. I. 1693-61 253; ibid. 1699, 
633 .' 
(2) C. S. P. Col. Amer. & 
' 
W. I. 1693-69 253, 2669 297;, 
ibid. 1696-7,559 269, 627; ibid. 1699,633- 
(3) Ibid. 1693-69 244; P. R. O. Adm. 1/3571 f-319- 
(4) C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W. I. 1696-79 43, 69. 
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possibilities of naval stores from the colonies. 
(') 
Moreover, the cost of naval stores from the Baltic had 
sharply increased in recent years and our merchants had 
been, badly and unfairly treated, particularly by the 
Swedes. (2) In April 1696 the CommonB ordered that a bill 
be framed to encourage naval stores from the colonies and 
S-ir, Rowland Gwynne was instructed to prepare it -but work, 
began too late in the session for the bill to pass. 
(3) 
-, The 
most important contribution to the problem of naval supply 
was made by Sir Henry Ashurst and Sir Stephen Evancel who, 
imported into Deptford a quantity of mixed naval stores 
from. New England, acting, apparently. on the encouragement 
of the Commissioners of theýTreasury, and Admiralty. 
(4) The 
IbicL. 1696-7,1; C. S. P. 1? om. Wm. Y596ql`i6 Their first 
report to parliament emPhasised the importance of 
-this source 
C-J. XI, 595. 
(2) N. M. M. Southwell, Sou/4 f. 201; E. Randolph's 
Memorial, 24 July 1696. He wrote of the Baltic 
powers, 'of late they have set the dice upon us 
and forced us to pay higher prices, ' C. S. P. Col. 
Amer. & W. I. 1696-79 53-4. 
(3) C. J. XI, 559. A similar bill was considered in 
1699, P. R. O. Adm. 3/15,25-Nov. 1 Dec. 1699. 
(4), C. T. P., Iq 518; C. T. B. XII 61 26,102. Sir Henry 
Ashurst, M. P. for Truro and Wilton 1681_02ý had 
diverse and important trading interests,. see 
below P. 198. 'Sir'Stephen Evance had interests 
largely'as a financier in trade to America and 
Spain. 
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Navy Board seems to have been ignorant of the scheme and 
objected to methods of payment. The cost of the cargo 
, 
to the importers was F, 3,061- 15.0., although. their 
,. 
ýharges in-New England amounted to only a quarter of this 
, sum; the rest had 
been spent on commission, insurance, 
-., t, onnage, interest, CUBtOMB and freight, freight alone 
,, 
COBting 91,850. 
(') 
The cargo was inspected at Deptford by 
. representatives of the Navy ýoard and three shipwrights. 
-Most of the timber was found to. be unfit but the pitch, I 
tar and resin were declared serviceable. 
(2) 
As a result 
., of 
this disappointment four agents were appointed, two 
_nominated 
by the navy and two by Sir William Ashurst, to 
,, visit New England and investigate the possibilities of 
naval stores. 
(3) 
The cause of naval stores from the colonies received 
-in 1697 its most able and enthusiastic supporter with the 
P. R. O. Adin. 18/74 f-525; cf. Taylor's bill for 
Baltic Stores, ibid. 18/74 f. 148 and Journal 
ý. of the CO=iBsioners for Trade and Plantations 111 123-4. 
(2) C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W. I. 1696-7,10; C. T. P. I, 517; 
-P'R. O. Adm. 18/74 f-525- 
(3) C.;. P. Col. Amer. & W. I. 1696-7,52; ibid. 1697-8, 
235; Acts of the Privy Council .... Colonial Series II OP-cit. 303-4; C. T. B. XIII 210,272; C. S. P. Dom- 
Wm. 1696,309-10; R. G. Albion, op. cit. 243-4. 
Their reports were generally favourable, C. S. P. 'Jol. 
Amer. & W. I. 1699,91 449. 
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appointment of the-Earl of Bellomont as governor of New 
t6rk*(1) Once he was in office his reports to the Board 
of Trade and Plantations-constantly advocated a policy' 
of*encouragement for naval stores. He estimated that 
pitch-could be produced in the colonies and sold in 
England for F, 7.10. -0., a last, against the Swedish price 
of 916.0.0., in 1699. 
(2) 
He found that neither Admiralty 
nor Navy Board supported his activities and attributed 
their resistance to the bribes of the Baltic merchants 
who normally supplied the navy. 
(3) 
There was probably 
some truth in his accusation. The Navy Board attitude 
to*all these schemes was unchanging. 
(4) Bribery, encouraged 
by a partiality towards their accustomed suppliers, was 
probably a factor in their unenthusiastic attitude. The 
M Richard,. Lord, Coote, Baron of, Coloony, Earl of 
Bellomont. He became governor of Massachusetts 
in 1695 and governor of New York in 1697. 
(2) C. S. P. Col. Amer. '& W. I. 1699,107,150-4. A last 
wa's 14 barrels, 'about lYa tons, ibid. 151. 
(3) Ibid-,. 1r599,., 36O;, ibid. 1700*-360,579- 
(4) P. R. O. Adm. 1/3571,22 Feb. 1694; C. S. P. Dom. Wm. 
1696 , 248; PdIR. O; Adm. 1/3594,26 Oct. 1702 - 
although the Navy Board accepted timber willingly 
enough, P. R. O. Adm. 1/3595,18 March 1702. 
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Board was, however, acting responsibly in one sense: the 
American supplies must, by virtue of freight charges and 
American labour costs, be more expensive than comparable 
supplies from the Baltic. - 
The Navy Board was charged 
with keeping the cost of navy contracts to a minimum. 
(') 
Whenever financial subsidies to American contractors were 
considered as-a means of equalising charges and of 
encouragement, -the 
Board feared, and rightly,, that their 
already strained Wear and Tear fund would have to bear 
the cost of these subsidies. 
(2) 
(1) Sergison Papers, 62. 
(2) Even if the Navy Board was guilty of conservatism 
and accepting_bribes, their caution in believing 
the sound advice of John Taylor, in preference to 
some of the extravagant proposals that had plagued 
the Board since 1691, is understandable. He wrote 
in 1694, '1 was bred to the trade of importing 
naval stores and think I know more about it than 
the gentlemen who expect a charter ...... I would 
gladly see this kingdom independent of Sweden and, 
Denmark, but I must speak as a merchant who judges 
his trade only by the measure of profit; and then 
arises the difficulty how we shall bring bulky 
goods from a very remote part as cheaply as from 
a country near us. ' He adds that labour in the 
Baltic is one sixth and transport one fourth to 
one fifth the cost of the American equivalent. 
C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W. I. 1693-69 263-4. 
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It was probably this resistance that-led Bellomont 
to', propose that suppliers of naval stores from America 
should be encouraged by Act of Parliament 
(')and 
probably 
his'persistence and the'support of the Board of Trade and 
Plantations that led to a consideration- in the Commons in 
1699 of a scheme to encourage'American-naval supplies, 
but-with no effect. _(2) 
Both Bellomont and the Board of 
Trade and Plantations' continued their'advocacyo(3) In 
October 1700 the Board advised the Lords Justices that 
the manufacture of naval stores in America should be 
encouraged 'almost upon any conditions, ' and suggested 
that legislation by the English parliament was the only 
way to achieve this. 
(4) Bellomont's part in the campaign 
lasted little longer; the ship he dispatched with sample 
naval stores was wrecked on the Cornish coast, much of 
the timber he, -had ordere'd-to be cut in-the interior could 
not be floated down the falls, and in March 1701 he died, 
so impoverished by personal expenditure on naval stores 
that his-estate-was insufficient to provide for his 
funeral. 
(5) 
His enthusiasm-for American naval stores was 
Bellomont to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 
24 Aug. 1699, C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W. I. 16999 405- 
(2) P. R * 063/15,25 Nov. 1699,1 Dec. 1699; Luttrell IV, 
(3) C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W. I. 1699t 470-3; ibid. 1700, 
266,357-60,671; ibid. 1701,7; C. S. P. Dom. Wm. 
1700-02,83; C-J-XIII1301. 
(4) C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W. I. 1700,545-9- 
(5) Ibid. 1701 t 74,108,237. 
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matched in the next f ew years by the advocacy of Richard 
Haynes. (') His proposals of 1700 are of some interest as, in 
association with Thomas Byfield, John Rolfe and Richard 
Martin, he claimed to have the support of I some not 
accoun ted the meanest in the House of Commons. 1(2) The 
member for Aldeburgh (Suffolk), Sir Henry Johnson, a 
-Richard Haynes was a merchant with interests in the Newfoundland, Barbados and Pennsylvania 
trades and a naval contractor, ibid. 1700,126, 
128,1309 163; Acts of the Privy Council ...... Colonial Series II op. cit. 118,159,254. 
(2) Thomas Byfield was a trader to New England, New 
York, Carolina and Pennsylvania, H. M. C. H. L. 
VI, 93; C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W. I. 1699,59; ibid. 
1704-5,579. Richard Martin was a naval 
contractor and trader to America but nothing 
seems to be recorded of John Rolfe's status. The M. P. s who were supporting these merchants 
are not certainly identifiable. In 1691 
Byfield had owned ships in partnership with Gilbert Heatheote, who was certainly a well known member of the Commons, see below p. 230- Acts of the Privy Council ...... Colonial Series II 65ý' This joint ownership could have been no, more than a transient partnership. 
However Heathcote and his brother Caleb, who 
was 
, 
resident in New York, often worked together 
and Cal: eb. formulated proposals for American 
naval stores about this time, C. S. P. Col. Amer. 
& W. I. 1701,690; see below p. 205. The Navy 
Board favoured the proposals from Haynes, 
P. R. O. 1/3597t 14 Dec. 1703. 
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- famOUB ship builder, could have been interested in the 
project. Certainly his brother, Nathaniel, the 
Governor of Carolina, made proposals about American 
naval stores. 
(') Another persistent advocate of America 
as a source for naval stores was Sir Matthew Dudley who, 
later in Anne's reign, was to owe his seat in parliament 
to the help of Charles Montagu, first Baron Halifax. 
(2) 
Sir Henry Ashurst was another. 
(3) 
Whoever the members of 
the Commons were who supported schemes for an American 
supply of naval stores they found that the caution or 
suspicion of government officials continued to check any 
developments. The only concrete advance in the following 
years was an improvement in the quality of tar, pitch and 
resin from the colonies. 
(4) 
Luttrell V, 452; C. T. B. XX-Pt. 1119 629. Another 
influential merchant, Sir Batholemew Gracedieu, 
was also making plans to import naval stores from 
America in 1700. He was one of the leading 
Jamaican merchants and in these plans was in 
partnership with a Mr. Russell, C. S. P. Col. Amer. 
& W. I. 1700,425. 
(2) Dudley was M. P. for Northampton 1706-12. He was 
mainly interested in the trade to New England. 
(3) See above p. 192, 
(4) C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W. I. 17009 425* 
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International politics were to be far more 
effective-than enthusiasts or profiteers in promoting 
naval stores from America. Wars in the Baltic and the 
military and mercantilist policies of Charles XII of 
Sweden had already prejudiced the supply of hemp from 
I -- 
the Baltic. in 1701-(') There were more difficulties in, 
1702 (2 )but allof them were minor compared with. the 
troubles of 1? 03- In this year the. Swedish Tar 
Company inBtituted a policy by which SwediBh tar might 
besold only by Swedish nationals and exported only in 
Swedish-ships. (3) The price at which the tar and pitch 
were offered rose sharply. from the 1702 prices of 
911.15.0., and L10.10.0., for each last of tar and 
pitch to Z18.0.0., and L17.10.0., respectively. 
(4) 
A, supplywas obtained, with difficulty, from Holland and Iý- 
the southern Baltic states, but it was insufficient and 
expensive. Not all the naval stores bought by English 
t ", 
R. G. Albion op,. cit. 159-60. The best summary of 
Baltic-politics and the consequences on English 
naval supply is the Memoir of Robert Jackson, 
English charge d'affaires at Stockholm 1703-10 
and minister resident 1710-1717, 'Robert Jackson's 
Memoir on'- the Swedish'Tar Company, December 29, 
17099-1 ed., -, J. J. -, Murry, ' H. L. B. ýX, (1946-7) 419- 428. Information on the problems over hemp 
supply in 1701 can be found in P. R. O. Adm. 1/3591, 
25 July 1701*9 C. T. B. XVIt 47,52,55,212,219. 
(2) C. S. P. 'Dom. Anne 1,33; P. R. O. Adm. 1/3594,11 Sept, 
1702. 
(3) Robert Jackson's Memoir, 424-5. 
(4) P. R. O. Adm. 1/3598,5 Jan. 1704. 
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merchants reached England, much was sold to the Dutch, 
who offered higher prices than the English navy. 
(') 
Alternatives to the Baltic supply were discussed as 
early as July 1703 in the Prince's Council and Privy 
Council. (2) The Navy Board was asked for an opinion and 
it recommended the encouragement of American naval stores 
by act of parliament, but implied, that the bulk of naval 
tar and-pitch-would always come-from the Baltic, from 
Russia if not from Sweden. 
(3) 
Discussion and departmental 
interchange of letters continued throughout 1704 while 
the price of tar, rose, to F, 36.0.0., a last. 
(4) Two 
merchants, Gould and Hall, provided, on commission, as 
much of it as they could obtain for the use of the navy 
from the minor Baltic states. 
(5) 
It was left to the commissioners of the Board of 
Trade and Plantations to make definite proposals. By 
P. R. -O* Adm. 1/3596,7 July 1703. 
(2) C. S. P. Dom. Anne 11,409 53. 
(3) C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W. I. 1702-3,, 6939 766; P. R. O. 
Adm. 1/3597,23 Oct. 1703,14 Dec. 1703; P. R. O. 
Adm. 1/4089,30 Oct. 1703- 
(4) P. R. 0' Adm. 3/19,9 May 1704; P. R. O. Adm. 1/4089, 
30-0; t. 1703; P. R. O. Adm. 1/3597, 14 Dec. 1703; 
C. S. P. Dom. Anne 11,573; Acts of the Privy Council ... .... Colonial Series II, op. cit. 464-9. 
(5) C. S. P- Dom. Anne 11,539; P. R. O. Adm. 1/3599,9 
May, 1704. 
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May 1704 they-had decided that premiums would be 
necessary to subsidise the cost of colonial manufacture 
of naval stores. These premiums would make up for the 
cost of American labour and the Atlantic freight and 
enable the products to compete with Baltic stores, at 
their usual price. '(') The Board consulted with merchants 
to decide upon an economically sound 'and just value for 
the premium and decided to recommend a sum of Z3 for 
each ton of tar and pitch although the merchants wanted 
Z4 a ton. 
(2) It was finally decided in'December that it 
. would be necessary for parliament to allocate a fund for 
these premiums(3)but it was apparently only after- 
receiving a letter from Robinson forecasting even 
greater difficulty in supplying naval stores for 1705 
that the Board began serious consideration of a draft 
ý(4) bill. The bill was brought before parliament and 
passed both-Houses$ apparently without serious difficulty. 
C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W. I. 1704-5,129. 
(2) Ibid. 1704-5,177; Journal of the Commissioners for 
Trade and Plantations 1,21,30. 
(3) Acts of, the Privy Council Colonial Series IIt 
op. cit., 469. 
(4) Journal of-,, the Commissioners for Trade and 
Plantations. I,. '77.7-8. Rev. John Robinson was 
English! Envoy to-Sweden. 
(5) 3& 4- 
' -Anne.. ' cý9; -An Act-for. Encouraging the Importation of--Naval Stores from, Her Majesty's 
Plantations: 
-in. 
America; -C. J. XIV, 4639-497,547i 551; L. J. 
' 
XVII, --ý674,675. The only, opposition seems to have- ' come-, from the English, copper manufacturers, who. feared, -possible colonial competition *Copper and'ý. iron were therefore specifically exciuaed from 
the definition of naval stores, C-J-XIV, 506,516. 
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Sir Matthew Dudley and Sir Gilbert Heathcote both served 
on the committee appointed by the Commons to prepare the 
bill. (') Their arguments were perhaps responsible for 
I 
the bill's provisions of premiums of 94 a ton for tar and 
pitch, although resin and turpentine received the 93 
premium earlier suggested by the Board of Trade and 
Plantations. Another sign of compromise is that all these 
imports were to pay customs, although it had earlier been 
assumed that they would be free imports. 
(2) The act also 
11 1 
encouraged the growing of hemp and reserved for naval use 
certain types of timber and included clauses for the 
'7 
preservation of timber. The act was to be in force for 
(3) nine years from I January, 1705. 
The immediate effect of the act was good; Swedish 
prices dropped to about Z18 a last for tar and 912.10.0.1 
(4) 
for pitch, although it remained difficult to buy enough 
(1) For Dudley see above p. 198; for Heatheote see 
below p. Z30 and above P -197 
(2) C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W. I. 1704-5,177- 
(3) The Commons concerned themselves with colonial 
naval'supply; such interest as there was in the 
House of LordB in, the Problem seems to have been 
directed at, the possibilities of increasing supply 
from"Russia, H. M. C. ý-H. L. 111,293-6; ibid. VIII 
32ý-2; ibid. IX, 139 1249 343; N. M. M. Southwell, 
Sou/6 ff. 225,243; Luttrell V. 139. 
(4) Robert Jackson's Memoir, op. cit. 246-7; Journal 
of the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations I, 
521. Useful summaries of the changing prices of 
naval stores will be found in N. M. M. Sergison 
Ser/103 ff. 409-11; P. R. O. Adm. 7/336,7 Jan. 1704; 
ibid. 1/3598,5 Jan. 1704; ibid. 1/3599,2 June 
1704* 
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for the needs of the navy. 
(') 
Despite- the optimistic 
forecasts of the merchants and colonists, America did 
little to solve the immediate problem of supply. By 
29 November 1707 America had provided only 548 tons of 
tar and 643 tons of pitch of a quality good enough to 
gain a certificate of soundness, which was not easily 
granted despite Board of Trade requests that leniency be 
shown to the first imports under the act. 
(2) The quantity 
of naval stores exported from America was less in 1708 
than in 1706 because of the Navy Board's refusal to relax 
their standards. 
(3) The earlier naval suspicion of a 
subsidy scheme was justified; despite the act of parlia- 
ment it was expected that the premiums would be paid 
from the naval Wear and Tear fund. 
(4) 
The initial stages 
(1) Gould and Hall provided the tar and pitch on 
commission in 1705 and were given a revfard of 
F, 200 for their efforts in buying hemp from 
Courland, Russia, Hamburg, Denmark and Bergeng 
P. R. O. Adm. 1/3601,20 March. 1705; C. T. B. XX 
Pt. 119 278. 
(2) Journal of the Commissioners for Trade and 
Plantations 1,303-49 309; C. S. P. Col. Amer. 
.& 
W-I- 1706-89 275,321,338-9,3449 401,698. 
The navy needed about 3,000 lasts of tar and 
pitch, about 4,500 tons, ibid. 1710-119 340. 
(3) Ibid. 1706-89 274-59 704; H. M. C. H. L. IXI 123. 
(4) See above P. 195. 
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of colonial" manufacture were hindered by the technical 
ignorance of the colonists'about the manufacture of 
tar and pitch. This ignorance was partially remedied by 
the appointment of an instructor. 
(') L10,000 was granted 
by parliament to provide him with assistance and the 
colonists with equipment. 
(2) It was hard to maintain 
enthusiasm. By-1710 even those naval stores from the 
colonies that -passed the fitness tests were being paid 
for in navy bills that were at 3516 discount. 
(3) 
In 1710 the Swedes made another attempt to monopolise 
the supply of tar and pitch to England, even-going to the 
extent of stopping all communication between the two 
countries save that of their own messengers. 
(4) 
The new 
crisis led to much discussion, and a suggestion was made 
by. the Board of Trade and Plantations that, a. group of 
German refugees from the Palatinate, now in England, should 
be shipped to the colonies, where they, would be taught to 
manufacture naval stores. , The suggestioA that these and 
earlier refugees should be sent, to strengthen the colonies 
had been made before; some had indeed been sent, but in 
(1) C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W. I. 1704-51 464; Journal of 
the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations 1. 
123,156,183, -184. 
(2) 8 Anne c 14; An Act for continuing several 
impositions ....... Clause )CM. 
(3) C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W. I. 1710-11,48; Journal of 
the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations 11,124. 
(4) Ibid. 11 149-50; P. R. O. Adm. 3/24,27 March 1710; 
P. R. O. S. P. 42/8,4 April, 10 April, 1710. 
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February 1710 this idea was specifically linked to the 
naval supply problem. 
(') Plans were made to transport 
600 families of 2,300 people to New York. It was 
estimated that the 600 men could produce 7,000 tons of. 
tar and pitch a year. 
(2) Sunderland, as Secretary of 
State, was largely'responsible for transforming the idea 
into reality, and Robert Hunter, the Governor of New York, 
and the Heathcotes were largely respohsible for settling 
them. 
(3) 
The scheme failed and the misery of the PalatineB 
dUnothing to solve the supply of naval stores. 
(4) 
Another I initiative by the Board of Trade and 
Plantations had at least legislative BUCceBS. Bridgerg 
who had been appointed Surveyor General of the Woods in 
C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W. I. 1706-8,724-4; ibid. 
1710-11,45-7. 
(2) An Estimate of the sums necessary to settle the 
Germans at New York to raise naval stores, 
B. M. Harrey Loan 29/288; C. T. B. XXIV Pt. IIj 147-9. 
(3) I. K. Steele, The Board of Trade in Colonial 
Administration, 1696-1720 (London Ph. D. 1964) 2549 
and generally 243-54; Journal of the Commissioners 
for Trade and Plantations 11,81. Sir Gilbert and 
Caleb Heathcote, see above P. 197. 
(4) C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W. I. 1710-119 141; I. K. Steeleg 
op. cit. 244; H. M. C. H. L. IX9 120-1. A development 
of this policy was the suggestion in 1714 that 
disabled servicemen should be sent to the colonies 
to settle and produce naval stores, Journal of the 
Commissioners of Trade and Plantation 11,581. 
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America, frequently informed the Board of the waste of 
timber in the colonies, particularly of the white pine, 
so useful for masts. 
(') His advice, indluding his draft 
for the necessary legislation, was passed to Dartmouthq 
the Secretary of State, in November 1710(2)and a scheme 
for preserving American timber was considered in the 
Commons during the 1710-11 session, and passed. 
(3) By 
this act the Surveyor General or his deputies were 
empowered to reserve for naval use any free growing tree 
of more than twenty-four inch diameter by marking it with 
a broad arrow. In the same session of parliament the 
Co=ons passed_a bill the purpose of which was to encourage 
the production of naval-storeB in Scotland. 
(4) It failed 
in the Lords, adding to Scottish disillusion at Harley's 
government. A similar bill received more cursory 
treatment in 1712. (5) The Scots were at last lucky in 1713. 
C. S. F. Col. Amer. & W. I. 1708-99 259; R. G. Albion, 
op. cit. 248-9. 
(2) C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W. I. 1710-119 253; R. G. Albion 
op. cit. 249. 
(3) 9 Anne c 15, An Act for the Preservation of White 
and other Pine Trees growing in her Majesty's ' Colonies ..... for-ila Bting Her Majesty's Navy, C-J-XVIq 441,446,536,628-91 6579 659; Luttrell 
VIS 669; -L. J. XIX, 2939 300. 
(4) C-J--XVI, 5489 567,568,576,599,6149 659,68ý. 
(5) L. J. XIX, 285,2899 291,2969 303t 3069 307; C*J* 
XVII- 9 '181; H. M. C. Portland V, 81; P. W. J. Riley, The. English Ministers and Scotland 1707-1727 (1964) 
172-7--1, 
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The 1704 act encouraging the production of American naval 
stores was due to expire by 1714, and warning of the 
consequences of allowing the act to lapse was given by 
Bridger and the reduced quantities Of tar imported. 
(') The 
act was revived and extended for eleven years and in it 
the premium system was extended to Scotland. This 
encouragement to Scotland was generous; the motives for it 
(2) 
were as much political'as naval. 
Between 1688 and 1714 the executive and legislature 
had acted with wisdom and foresight in their attempts to 
end Britain's dependence on foreign sources of naval 
supplies. The greater credit must go to the statesmanlike 
ap, p roach of the executive, in particular, the Board of 
Trade and Plantations. The legislation was flawed, 
especially by the failure to appropriate money for the 
payment of premiums. The suspicion of the Navy Board 
and maladministration in the colonies did much to reduce 
the'effectiveness of the acts, -in this period and-later in- 
the-eigh teenth century, but in general terms the legislation 
was successful, both in the short term in that it reduced 
C. S*'P. Col. ý: Amer. & W. I. 1712-14%, 126. 
(2) 12 Anne c9,, An Act for continuing an Act made in 
the third and fourth years of the Reign of her- 
present Majesty .. -. * and for encouraging the Importation of Naval Stores from thatTart of 
Great'Britain called Scotland. C. J. XVII, 403, 
406,420,434,436,444; L. J. XIX, 592,593., 596; 
P. W. J. Riley" op. cit. '172-7, -' 
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swedish prices, and in the later years of the eighteenth 
century. 
(') 
There was another manufacture vital to the navy in 
which England was also at the mercy of a foreign seller. 
The best canvas for sails came from France and in time of 
war with-France, the Dutch supplied most of England's needs. 
(2) 
The growing - of f lax had been encouraged in England since the 
sixteenth century but the English canvas was considered to 
be of poor quality and was not in, quantity sufficient-.:. 
(3) 
War with France moreover meant greater demands for canvas 
because it involved more 'rough' weather cruising than the 
Dutch Wars, a fact that was recognised by the provision of 
higher establishment of'suits of sails' for men of war. 
(4) 
Schemes were current in the pamphlet literature'for the- 
encouragement of flax and hemp growing and the manufacture 
of. canvas but it was not until 1696 that parliament 
considered the problem. 
(5) 
Two acts with relevance to 
D. A. Baugh, British Naval Administration in the Age 
of Walpole (1965) 279- 
(2) Sergison Papers, 145; V. Barbour, Dutch and English 
Merchant Shipping in the Seventeenth Century, Econ. 
Hist. Rev. 11 (1930), 2, -reprinted in Essays in Economic History, ed. E. M. Carus Wilson (1961) It 
235. John Taylor (see above pL 182 ) was one of the 
principal contractors for 'Hollands Duck; ' in 1694 
he supplied 2,500 pieces, P. R. O. Adm. 1/3572 f. 19041# 
Sergison Papers, 145. 
(4) H. M. C- H. L. 1,125; Ministry of Defence Library (Navýl Section)Corbett MSS. XV f. 101. 
(5) W. Goffe,, How to'Advance the Trade of the Nation, 
Harleian Miscellany IV (1809) 387-8. 
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canvas were passed. "- In the first, an act which established 
duties on imports,,. one clause made it compulsory for the 
navy to pay 2d-, '- a yard Ir'ecompensel to ýany EngliBh 
manufacturer who supplied it with sail cloth of quality 
equal. t6ý`f oreign canvas. 
(', ) The second act contained 
clauses that allowed the free import of flax and hemp 
f rom Ir6land'and allowed all English sail. cloth that was 
exported to be free of, duty. 
(2) 
The motives behind these 
6ýcts were, generally economic and mercantilist rather than 
naval., ý It was a parliamentary session concerned with 
trade, one that saw the establishment-of the Board of 
Trade and Plantations and the passing-of a Navigation 
Act. 
(3) 
These acts were part of a deliberate attempt to 
increase'the manufacture of sail cloth 'in England and they 
appear to have'given appreciable encouragement by affording -1 
the Engli-sh-manufacturers sufficient financial advantage 
over their foreign competitors. 
(4) 
&8 Wm. 111 0 10, An Act for continuing several 
ýduties granted by former Acts upon Wine and 
Vinegar-and upon Tobacco and East India Goods and 
other-merchandise imported-for carrying on the War 
against France; clause XIV. 
(2) 7 &ý8 Wm. III c 39,, An Act for encouraging the Linen 
ManufactureýofýIreland and bringing Flax and Hemp 
in-to, and-the making of Sail Cloth in this Kingdom. 
(3) See'L. A. Harper, The English Navigation Laws (1939) 
'59-60 and for'. ihe Board of Trade and Plantations 
below pp. - 266-9. 
(4) English manufacturers of good quality sail cloth 
could now be confident of making a sale to the navy 
and a profit, C. T. P. 1,547; C. T. B. XI, 6; ibid. 
XIV, 249; Sir John Dalrvm Le Memoirs of 
areat 
Britain and Ireland (17M'Il, 175. 
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At the beginning of Anne's reign the Commons 
considered additional methods of encouragement. - The 
Marquis of Hartington and Mr. Topham were deputed to 
prepare a bill but it did not become law* 
MIn the -same 
year, 1702, there had been many complaints about English 
sail cloth by sea-going officers. 
(2) 
Navy Board'opinion 
was that much of-the English sail cloth, especially that 
made by Sir Owen Buckingham, was of excellent quality. 
(3) 
The numerous complaints of 1702 probably reflect-bad 
storage during the years of peace. Despite the-complaints 
and the failure to renew the acts encouraging English 
manufacture, the Navy Board-was ordered to go on buying 
English canvas and to'see that not more than half its 
supply came from abroad. 
(4) 
The zeal of the Navy Board in 
C. J. XIV, 46. William Cavendish, Marquis of 
Hartington and later 2nd Duke of Devonshire. In 
1702 he was M. P. for Yorkshire and described as 
a 'junior minister, ' G. Holmes, British Politics 
in the Age of Anne (1967) 179, fn. 107. Richard 
Topham, M. P. for Windsor, -was a, lawyer and often 
associated with government measures. 
(2) P. R. O. Adm. 7/336,29 May 1702; P. R. O* S*P. 42/6 
f. 256;, P. R. O. Adm. 1/3593,1 June 1702; C. S. P. 
Dom. Anne 1,92-3. 
(3) SergiBOn Papers, 155-6; P. R. O. Adm- 3/18,9 March 
1703; N. M. M. Sergison Ser/105 Memo No. 6,11 Oct. 
1702. Buckingham was M. P. for Reading 1698-17011 
1702-8. He employed some 200 men in sailmaking 
and was a leading City Whig. 
(4) P. R. d. Adm. 3/17,3 June, 8 Sept, 3 Oct, 1702; C. S. P. 
Dom. Anne 1.99. 
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supporting English canvas manufactures is, in great 
contrast to their attitude to colonial naval stores. 
The supply of canvas apparently caused neither 
major problems nor parliamentary interest for the rest 
of the war. Canvas manufacturers seem to have 
flourished: a William, Rayner supplied the Navy Board with 
4,000 bolts of sail cloth a year: .a Captain Smith wasý 
said to employ 5-6,000 canvas makers in-Berkshire, 
Warwickshire and Middlesex. 
(') 
A Treasury, proposal, - in, 
1711, that a-bill-should be passed compelling the navy 
to buy only English sail cloth was, successfully resisted 
by the navy on the grounds that this would reduce 
competition and make for dearer canvas. 
(2) 
In-1713 an act 
was passed which protected the English manufacturers against 
foreign competition and subsidised English exports. 
(3) 
From the evidence given during discussion of this act in 
the Commons, the navy, by the end of the war, was usingý 
(1) C. T. B-XIII Pt. II, 394; 'ibid. ')(XIV'Pt. Iq 112; ' 
P. R. O. Adm. 1/3614,21 Aug. 1710; N. M. M. Sergison 
Ser/57,15 Aug. 1707; C-S-P- Ool. ýAmer. & W. I. 
1704-5,330. 
(2) Queen Anne's'Navy 148-9. 
(3) 12 Anne 
'c 
12, An Act for the better encouragement 
of the Making of Sail Cloth in Great Britain, 
C-J-XVII, 3519 4402 445,463,464; L. j. XIXq 6099 
610. There were petitions against the bill from 
importers of canvas, C. J. XVII, 432,433,440* 
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English canvas for most of its needs. 
(') 
The exigencies 
of war,, the executive and parliament had transformed the 
English canvas industry, and England's dependence on 
foreign supply was ended. In the war of 1739-48 all 
naval canvas was English and-there were no serious 
complaints against it. 
(2)- 
In a more negative way parliament preserved naval 
stores by maintaining the laws against their embezzlement* 
The acts of Charles II and James II establishing penalties 
for the illegal possession of naval stores were revived in 
1692 for seven years. 
(3) 
There were sufficient examples of 
embezzlement in the next seven years(4)to ensure the 
renewal of the acts in 1698 with increased penaltieso(5) 
The bills were government inspired but naturally congenial 
to majority feeling in the Commons. They are however of 
little significance when compared with the constructive 
and generally successful legislative attempts to solve the 
problems of naval supply. 
Ibid. XVII, 351; The Autobiography of William Stout of Lancaster 1665-1752, ed. J. D. Marshall (1967) 94. 
(2) D. A. Baugh op. cit. 227. 
(3) 4 W. & M. - c 24, An Act for reviving, continuing and explaining several laws therein mentioned, which are 
expirdd or near expiring, cl. VIII. 
(4) P. R. O. Adm. 3/8,3 Feb. 1693; C-J-XI, 63,769 
168; Ehrman 595-6. 
(5) 9 Wm. III c 41, An Act for the better preventing Imbezzlement of his Majesty's Stores of War 
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Chapter IV 
Cruisers and Convoys 
214. 
Ci) 
1688-1702 
When war began with France in 1689 escort 
vessels, 'convoys' as contemporaries called them, were 
automatically provided for the foreign trade. The Dutch 
Wars had shown the necessity for such protection. 
(') The 
two French Wars that followed them rapidly demonstrated 
that convoys alone were insufficient. The fleets of 
merchant ships still needed their convoys but equally 
urgent was the need for 'cruisers'. Cruisers patrolled 
the home waters, safeguarding them for coastal trade and 
isolated merchant men. Their overall responsibility was 
territorial rather than the protection of a specific 
fleet although their duties included the convoying of 
coastal traders such as colliers. The realisation that 
both types of defence were necessary can be seen in the 
general use, from 1693, of the term 'Cruisers and Convoys' 
to describe the navy's responsibility for trade protection. 
For example, the list of convoys for 1673 in A 
Descriptive Catalogue of the Naval Manuscripts in 
the Pepysian Library, ed. J. R. Tanner, II (N. R. S. 
1904) 83, or the more elaborate 
, scheme, 
'A Listof 
His Majesty's Ships and present stations; March 10th 
1672,1 in the Foley NSS., Palfrey Scrapbooks, W. R. O. 
B. A. 3762/9. 
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The State accepted this growing responsibility 
without question and the merchants who benefited from 
the protection for their part assumed it, without 
gratitude. The relationship of State and merchants in 
the provision of naval protection was businesslike; its 
contractual basis was stated in the preamble to Subsidy 
Acts, such as that for 1660, whereby tonnage and poundage 
was granted for the purpose 'of defending the seas 
against all persons intending or that shall intend the 
disturbance of your said commons in the intercourse of 
tr ade. 
(2) 
From the merchants there are explicit state- 
ments to show that they regarded protection as a service 
a for which they paid. In 1707 Edward Gould, in evidence 
he was presenting to a committee of the House of Lords, 
referred specifically to the 1660 Act and showed that the 
State had failed to honour its side of the agreement in 
rec . ent years. 
(3) 
In 1704 merchants interested in the 
The merchants assumed state protection-with the 
proviso that it must be effective. State 
protection was still sufficiently an innovation for 
alternative plans for protection, organised by the 
merchants themselves, to be considered whenever 
naval protection fail ed as it did in 1689 (Grey IXI 
411), 1693 (Acts of t he Privy Council of England. 
Colonial-Series, Vol. II, ed. W. L. Grant and J. Munro 
. 1910,, 243) and 1694 (Luttrell 111,372). 
(2) 12 Car. II c 4. 
(3) 'Substance of what was deposed before a Committee of 
Lords on 2 Dec. 1701 (sic) by Ed. Gould - merchant, $ P. R. O. Adm. 1/3863. Edward Gould was a merchant of 
sufficient status to act as spokesman for Spanish and 
Portuguese trades. He also traded to Italy and the Levant. 
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Jamaican trade refused to contribute towards the 
fortification of Crookhaven in Ireland, although this 
anchorage had already saved many of their ships, because 
they maintained that they were already paying heavily 
enough for protection. 
(') 
The way in which convoys were 
allocated to particular trades in proportion to the 
customs these trades realised, eýnd lists of shipping 
losses calculated, not in terms of the number of ships 
lost but in the value of customs lost, are evidence that 
state officials understood their responsibilities and the 
(2) financial consequences of failure. Fembers of parlia- 
ment showed that they too saw protection'as a right and 
not a favour by their prosecution of Captain. \George 
Churchill and Commodore Kerr for demanding convoy money. 
(3) 
The state had in fact incurred a responsibility it 
could not fulfil. In the early years of the 1689-1697 
War English statesmen and naval administrators thought of 
Journal of the Commissioners for Trade and 
'Plantations 1,67-81 74; cf. C-J-Xj 285. 
(2) C. S. P. Co14 Amer. & W. I. 1689-92,153; Acts 
of the Privy Council, Colonial Series , II, op. cit. 148; P. R. O. S. P. 8/8 f. 30; Sir John 
DalrymPlej Memoirs of Great Britain and Ireland 
(1771) It Pt. 119 104. 
(3) Grey IX, 413,430-1; for Kerr see below pp. 284-5. 
217. 
trade protection in terms of their past experience 
during the Dutch Wars, although the situation had been 
transformed by the advent of France as the enemy and the 
expansion of English trade. In the summer of 1691 
Russell was one of the first to emphasise the splendid 
geographic opportunities the French coastline gave to 
her privateers. 
(') That this realisation did not come 
earlier can in part be explained by the natural priority 
of concern with Ireland and major fleet actions. In 
(I 
part it can be attribute& to the Revolution of 1688. 
James II, the Earl of Dartmouth and Pepys had been aware 
(2) 
of the dangers to trade that war with France would bring. 
This strategic awareness was lost'inýthe disruption of 
naval administration that followed the change of kings. 
Certainly the geographic dangers-to English trade in a 
French war were obvious enough; the great sweep of northern 
French coast line, with Dunkirk on one flank and St. Malo 
on the other, commanded the most crowded and vital of 
English shipping routes, that through the Channel. On 
the French Mediterranean coastline and in the French 
(1) Russell to Nottingham, 31 July, 1691, H. M. C. 
Finch 111,189. 
(2) Samuel Pepyds'Naval Minutes, ed. J. R. Tanner 
(N. R. S. 1926) 37; The Tangier Papers of Samuel 
Pepys,, ed. 'E. --Chappell (N. R. S. 1935) 16le 
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American and West Indian colonies there were other 
excellent bases for privateers. When France, in the 
Z 
middle years of the 1689-1697 War, adopted a naval 
strategy that aimed at the destruction of English 
merchant shipping, she was exploiting enormous geographic 
advantages. 
These privateer bases were incomparably placed for 
attacks on an English mercantile marine that had trebled 
in tonnage between 1629 and 1686. 
(2) 
Much of the increase 
occurred in the transatlantic trade (with re-export of 
1- 
sugar and tobacco to Europe) and in the Baltic, 
Mediterranean and East Indian trade, all of them vulnerable 
The most recent historian of this change in French 
policy sees 1695 as the decisive year but with 
increasing evidence of privateers from 1690; see 
J. S. Bromley, The French Privateering War in 
Historical Essays presented to David Ogg, ed. 
H. E. Bell and R. L. Ollard (1964) 206-9. 
Contemporary English realisation of the new strategy 
can be seen in Sir John Dalrymple op. cit. I Pt. II 
65; Galw. -ýy. to Shrewsbury 25 July 1695, H. M. C. 
Buccleuch and Queensberry II Ft. 1,206. 
(2) R. Davis, 'The Rise of the English Shipping Industry 
(1962) 7 fn, 15-19. Other sources for information 
on this expansion are R. Davis, English Foreign 
Trade 1660-1700, Econ. Hist. Rev. 2nd Series VII 
(1954) 21-reprinted in Essa s in Economic History 
ed. E. M. Carus Wilson (19625 111 257-273; P. Deane 
&, W. A. Cole, 
-British 
Economic Growth 1688-1959 
(1962) 86; L. A. Harper, The English Navigation Laws 
; -A. P. Usher, The Growth of English 
(1939) 321-360, 
Shipping 1572-1922, Quarterly Journal of Economics 
XLII (1928) 465-8. 
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to French attack. The expansion caused a volume of 
trade that was, from the naval viewpoint, incapable of 
rationalisation and thus defied any scheme of naval 
protection based on the available ships. Such a scheme 
would have had to comprehend climatic variables as diverse 
as the harvest times of tobacco and citrus fruits, 'the' ' 
seasonal winds of the Indian Ocean, the onset of ice in 
I `ý I- theýBaltic and the complications of the Newfoundland 
fisheries and their ancillary trades, apart from man- 
made complications. 
('), 
The most obvious of these man-made complications was 
the inability of some English merchant groups to agree on 
an annual routine for the sailing of their convoys. 
Efficient and economic protection of the tobacco fleets 
between 1702 and 1707 was prevented because the Virginia 
and Maryland merchants could not agree whether one or two 
fleets a. year, was necessary. The merchants argued on 
selfish and economic grounds; the wealthy merchants wanted 
two convoys a--, year, - as, this diffused the arrival-of the 
product-on the London market and kept prices low; the 
shippers, the-planters,. especially the-small planters, and 
The clearest picture of the seasonal complexities 
that governed English trade is found in R. Davis, 
The Rise of the English Shipping Industry (1962), 
in the chapters dealing with the trade of various 
regions, X-XIII. - 
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their agents-argued for one convoy a year., 
(') Other 
trades indulged in-similar wasteful dissension; the 
Leeward-Island, merchants regularly opposed a mutual 
convoy and rendezvous, with Barbados ships. 
(2) The - 
organisation of naval-defence for the Barbados trade 
was, itself prejudiced by argument similar to-that which 
divided Virginiaýand Maryland traders. 
(3) 
In'another way 
the short-sightedness of merchants complicatedýthe task 
The division of merchants was complicated by the 
-rivalries of London and Bristol but the fundamental 
reasons for disagreement were economic. Sir 
Richard Levett and Edward Haistwell, both London 
merchants, generally agreed with Yates, the spokes- 
man for Bristol. ' For the course of the argument 
see C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W. 1.1702-31 51-2 579 
'473,476; 
ibid. 1706-8,102,122-3; Journai of , 
the 
Commissioners for Trade and Plantations 1,226; 
C. S. P., Dom. Anne 1,446. For independent opinion on 
the problem see C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W. I. 1702,491- 
2; ibid. 1702-3,, 483-4; ibid. 1704-5,142-31 435; 
ibid. 1706-8,57-89 
P. R. O. -Adm. -. 3/199 18 March 1704,18 Nov. 1704; C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W. I. 1702-31 612. 
(3) Ibid. '1704-5,249-50. This disunity had deeper 
implications. It meant that the King's attempts 
to placate the merchants by appointing'some ok them 
as Commissioners of Admiralty or Trade and 
_-Plantations-would not necessarily gain him more-- friends than enemies. The animosity Houblon aroused 
in-1695 as a Commissioner of the Admiralty is a good 
example of this; see H. M. C. H. L. 11,307-313,350-2, 
362* 
* 
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of protecting their shipping. The war was an obvious 
and frequently justifiable explanation of a decline in 
trade, but, for some trades, the war coincided with 
what would-have been a period of stability or decline. 
Some decline would have been natural in the trade of the 
regulated companies for the'Eastland, Russian and Levant 
trades, and the decline of the Newfoundland trade was 
apparent before 1689. 
(') 
Some of the criticisms which 
representativeB of these trades made against the navy 
between 1689_and 1713 were irrelevant to the work of 
convoys and cruisers. 
The navy's task of affording protection was made 
more difficult because the ships at its disposal in the 
early years of the 1689-1697 War had been built in the 
belief that major fleet actions were the crucial function 
of a fleet. Smaller ships, of fourth, fifth and sixth 
rates, were necessary. They were needed for supporting 
fireships, intelligence duties, blockade, patrols against 
II smuggling and treasonable correspondence, to escort not 
(1)''-R. Davis op. cit. 22,29; R. W. K. Hinton, The Eastland 
Trade and the Common Weal in the Seventeenth Century (1959) 159-60; C. Ernest Fayle, Shipowning and Marine 
Insurance in The Trade Winds, ed. C. Northcote 
Parkinson (1948) 26-7; A. C. Wood, A History of the 
Levant Company (1935) 108; C. D'Avenant, Discourses 
on the Public Revenues and on the Trade of England (1698) in The Political and Commercial Works, ed. 
Sir Charles Whitworth 1,396-8. 
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only merchant ships but also recruits, packet boats and 
monarchs, to carry generals, ambassadors or even a 
nobleman's equipage. 
(') 
There were never enough of them 
for these duties and the increasing requirements of 
trade'protection. ' Yet even if there had been more of 
these small ships the merchants would still have had 
scope to complain of the convoys. The qualities of 
organisation, skill and patience required of a convoy 
commodore were immense. Leake was the best all round 
sailor of his age and exceptional in that he did not 
emphasise his difficulties in official correspondence yet 
his letters are nowhere more, full of strain than when he 
is guarding a convoy of, 
1180 sail and a great part of them leewardly 
Dutch fly boats, besides our storeships and 
transports which sail very heavily. t(2) 
The skill in organisation required to muster them, the 
seamanship necessary to keep them concentrated for weeks 
on end despite a rudimentary system of signalling, the 
indiscipline of merchant captains and the disruption of 
P. R. O. Adm. 3/20,11 July 1704o 
Leake to the Admiralty 16 Feb. 1708, H. M. C. H. Lo 
VIII, 58. 
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weather and enemy involyed qualities assumed by the 
merchants-and difficulties never appreciated by 
parliament. 
(')-A 
successful convoy could be ruined in 
its last stages by merchant captains outsailing the 
escorts to make an early and profitable homecoming but 
the convoy commodore had no power. to prevent this, as 
one was told by the Admiralty-, 
'The business of the convoy is to take care of 
her Majesty's subjects that will be taken 
care of, but not to force them. 1(2) 
For the naval captain convoy duty meant trial, tribulation 
and grave professional risks. Success was hardly won 
and generally unrecognised; 
(3)the 
consequence of losses, was 
Instances of the problems involved in convoying can 
be found in P. R. O. Adm. 1/2033,17 Jan. 1704; P. R. O. 
Adm. 3/20,14 Aug* 1704; P. R. O. Adm. 7/336,5 May 
1705; R. Gibson, Reflections on our Naval Strengthq 
Naval Miscellany. II (N. R. S., 1912) 163, N@M*Mo. 
Southwell Sou/lff-159-61. 
(2) idward Northey's Report 24 Nov. 1711, Documents 
relating to the Law and Custom of the Sea, ed. 
R. G. 'Marsden (N. R. S. 1916) 111 1649-1767,222 and 
generally-220-222 '; 
(3) There are few examples of merchants thanking a 
captain for convoy or asking for the services of a 
particular captain. Most of these few examples 
come from the later years of Anne's reigns e. g. the 
Mediterranean merchants thanking Leake, B. M. Addits 
-MSS.. -5443, 
Leake Papers IV 1708-12, f-138; the - Levant. 
-Company-asking 
for Capt. Cooper, 20 June 17109 
P. R. 0 Adm. 3/24; the Barbados merchants asking for 
Capt. Hamilton, -4 Jan. 1711 P. R,., O. Adm. 3/25- 
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complaint, certainly to-the Admiralty and possibly to 
parliament. 
It was when such complaints became numerous that 
parliament concerned itself with trade protection. The 
most natural leaders in any such debate, whether their 
contribution was criticism, explanation or proposal, 
would be in the Commons, those members who were themselves 
merchants. Merchants were, however, in this period 
always a small minority of the House. Of 513 members (558 
after 1707), 43 merchants were elected to the Commons in 
1701, (') 51 at the 1705 election(2) and 60 in 1710. 
(3) In 
the Lords very few were directly linked'to trade. 
(4) Such 
head counting seriously minimises the number of members 
who would be concerned with the efficiency of the convoy 
system. Members of parliament were expected to represent 
the interests of their locality and to enlist as much 
(1) R. Walcott, English Politics in the Early 
Eighteenth- Century (1956) 161-4* 
(2) E. Cunnington, The General Election of 1705 (M. A. 
thesis, 
_ 
University of London 1938) 253. 
(3) M. - Ransome, ' The General Election of 1710 (M. A. 
thesis, University of London 1938) 201 cf. M. 
McHattie, Mercantile Interests in the House of 
Commons (Manchester M. A. thesis 1949); G. Holmesq 
British Politics in the Age of Anne (1967) 164. 
(4) The peer most obviously concerned with trade was 
George, Lord Berkeley, 9th Baron and lst Earl, 'the 
first peer of the realm to collect directorships' 
(K. G. Davies, The Royal Africa Company (1960). 163) 
-with interests in the Levant, Hudson's Bay, East 
India and Africa Companies. 
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support as they could for any measure that concerned the 
constituency. 
('). Thus John Ellis, a completely non- 
maritime administrator, 
(2. ) found that his election at 
Harwich forced him to a concern for such new interests 
(3) Nor did the as navalýpromotion and fishery protection. 
circle of interest in trade protection end with such duty 
interest for it extended into a vague penumbra of 
unnumbered members to whom foreign trade gave profit in 
I 
some way. Few, if any ships represented the risk-of an 
individual. Ship ownership was generally shared, the 
qosts and eventual profits often-being divided into 
For example, a letter to the M. P. s of Evesham in 
1692 (E. Rudge and Sir James Rushout) telling them 
how to vote and requesting that 'you use your best 
interest in others, the members of the House of 
your acquantancel Corporation of Evesham to their 
M-P-S, 30 Nov. 1692, W-*R. O. BOA. 4221/6. Similar 
examples referring directly to trade can be found 
in the Letters and Papers of John Cary, B. M. Addit. 
MSS. 5,540, - e. g. f. 87. 
(2) John Ellis, an-, administrator with experience from 
1672 asýsecretary to, Secretaries of State, Under 
Secretary of, State,. Comptroller of Mint. M. P. 
Harwich 1702-5,1705-8. 
(3) B. M. Addit. MSS. 28,893 ff. 16,24$ 41,45, 
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sixty-four, -or sometimes as many as two hundred and 
fifty-six shares. 
(') 
Personal investment, financial 
links,, family alliance, particularly a concern for the 
trading interests of younger brothers, must have created 
in both-Houses a group interested in the care of. overseas 
trade which was far larger than the number of merchant 
members would suggest. 
(2) 
'The--power of this nebulous group to direct debate, 
much lessAnitiate legislation, was none the less small. 
They were linked by a common desire to have the seas 
protected for merchant shipping but separated by much 
R. Davis op. cit. 82-3,100; Lieut. Col. B. M. H. 
Rogers, Woodes Rogers Privateering Voyage of 
1708-119 M. M. XIX. (1933) 205. 
(2) Evidence of such interest is easily found for 
most of the leading politicians. Robert Harley 
had a younger brother, Nathaniel, who was a merchant. 
Sir Richard Onslow's solicitude for the merchants in 
1707 (see below, p. 294) could have contained an 
element of self interest; his son Thomas married 
Elizabeth Knight, the daughter of a rich Jamaica 
merchant. Sir Richard himself was interested in 
the Levant. and African trades. Robert Walpole had 
the trade of his family and constituency as a basis 
for his interest (J. H. Plumb, Sir Robert Walpole 
1956 1,104-5). In the House of Lords Ford, third 
Baron Tankerville's interest in trade increased 
when his brother, Ralph, became Governor of 
Barbados (Vernon Letters 1,247-8). 
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else, even in their definition of what seas should be 
protected. 
(') 
There was no common, linking organisation 
between trading groups, even the specific trades had not 
yet reached the stage of development where organization 
involved a recognised, speaker for the interests of the 
trade in the Commons. Such organisation came in the 
decades after 
. 
the Peace of Utrecht. 
(2)Before this the 
The most obvious rivalry-dividing the merchants was 
that between the London merchants and those of the 
outports, particularly Bristol. Many instances of 
this rivalry can be found in the Letters and Papers 
of John Cary, B. M. Addit. MSS. 5,540. These 
jealousies can however be exaggerated; some London 
and Bristol merchants co-operated in trading 
ventures. One force making for greater unity was 
the existence of a few great merchants who, because 
of their diverse trading interests, linked the 
regional groups. 
(2) E. Donnan, Eighteenth Century English Merchants: 
Micajah Perry, Journal of Economic and Business 
History IV (1931-2) 96,98; L. M. Penson, The London 
West India Interest in the Eighteenth Century, 
E. H. R. XXXVI (1921) 376-7; E. Cunnington op. cit. 255; 
M. Ransome op. cit. 201-2. The first London 
Directory was in 1734; see L. S. Sutherlandt A London 
Merchant 1695-1714 (1933) 4. 
The election of-an E. I. C. group in 1700-01 of between 
36 and 84 members seems to have been exceptional, 
both in that a specific, crucial issue caused-such 
effort and in that the E. I. C. was always an 
exceptionally strong and well organised trade. The 
divergance of numbers is a good example of the 
difficulty of'counting heads and of the 'penumbral 
of interested people linked to the hard core of those 
for whose concern there is ample documentary proof; 
R. Walcott, The East India Interest in the General 
Election of 1700-01, E. H. R. IM (1956) 223-239. 
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basis for such organisation existed in the coffee house 
rendezvous(l)and meetings to concert convoy petitions 
or evidence for parliamentary committees, but the 
expression of a particular trade's viewpoint in the 
Commons was the incidental responsibility of a 
conveniently elected merchant. 
The effectiveness of any expression of merchant 
opinion in the Commons was further limited because 
merchant voice would_automatically invoke a jealous 
'country' opposition. The jealousy was partly caused 
by the natural antagonism towards-the minoritywho appear 
to prosper in wartime. Bankruptcies were easily 
forgotten. The opposition owed more to the crude and 
well documented suspicion of the landed squirearchy 
towardsthe rich merchants, whosepresence in society 
and parliament was a constant irritant to their dominance. 
(2) 
The merchant reply to such opposition, that as they paid 
more taxes than the country gentlemen they had more right 
(3) A to a say in'matters of state worsened the situation. 
(1) Journal of the Commissioners for Trade and 
Plantations 11,607. 
(2) Britannia Languens (1680) in Early English Tracts 
on Commerce, ed. J. R. McCulloch (1952) 285; 
Character and Principles of the Present Set of 
Whigs (1711). 
(3) William Cowper, later Lord Chancellorlexpressed their 
attitude very well in the 1696-7 session, Vernon to 
Shrewsbury, 28 Nov. 1696, Vernon Letters It 86; so, 
naturally did Sir Gilbert Heathcote; see the 
Wentworth Papers, ed. J. J. Cartwright (1883) 110. 
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good example of exploitation of this antagonism in 
connection with trade defence came in November 1692 
when Priestman(')disrupted a debate on this subject by 
the statement thatlif one merchant ship in three escaped, 
the owners would stillLmake a profit. 
(2) In the bickering 
that ensued the direction of debate was lost and 
Priestman received strong support. Sympathy with the 
complaints of merchants was generally weakened in this 
and later sessions, of parliament by evidence given to 
both Houses of their lack of patriotism in smuggling and 
in collusive trading with the enemy, 
(3) 
The voice of the, merchants'in parliament may have 
been made even weaker by the existence of party divisions 
(1) Henry Priestman became a second lieutenant-'on 
H. M. S. Antelope. in 1671and after varied service 
was a Commissioner of Admiralty from 1689 to 1699 
and M. P. for Shoreham. He was a close professional 
and political confederate of Russell. (Charnock 11 
400-02; N. M. M. Sergison Ser/106; Ehrman 343)- 
(2) C., J. Xl 707; Grey X, 264,270-74; see above P-33. 
(3) The best description of collusive trade is, by 
G. N., Clark, Trading with the Enemy and the Corunna 
Packets, E. H. R., XXXVI (1921) 521 ff. Examples of 
such trade coming to parliamentary notice are the 
LuOstring Imports Scandal of 1698, C. j. XIIj 224-34 
and, before the Lords a general survey of such trade 
H. M. C. HýL. VII 210-221. 
2304o 
amongst themselves. It is possible to divide the 
merchants elected to the 1705 and 1710 parliaments into 
roughly equal groups of Whig and Tory. 
(') However such 
divisions are attended by many qualifications and it is 
probably correct to assume that most merchants were 
moderates and predisposed to support any secure 
administration. 
(2) Party propoganda, particularly that of 
the Tories between 1710 and 1712 and that of the Whigs 
from 1712 to 1714, exaggerated the correlation between 
merchant and Whig. 
(3) Such an identification waB given a 
semblance of truth for an earlier period because some of 
the most articulate.. merchants, particularly Gilbert Heathcote 
with his penchant for arousing 'country' animosity, were 
declared Whigs. 
(4) 
(1) E. Ciinnington op. cit. 254; M. Ransome op. cit. 201. 
(2) J. H. Plumb, The Mercantile Interest, The Rise of the 
British Merchant after 1689, History Today (Nov. 
1955) Vol. V No. 11,764; D. C. Coleman, Sir John 
Banks (1963) 100 and Qh. VIII, Business and Politics; 
W. A. Aiken ed., The Conduct of the Earl of Nottingham 
(1941) 55; G. Holmes, British'Politics in the Age of 
Anne (1967) 164-9. 
(3) ekbove. See loo-le-o- pG44. 
(4) Hooke to Torcy, 12 Dec. 1705, Correspondence. of Col. 
N. Hooke 1703-1707, ed. W. D. Macray (1810) 467; 
examples of Heathcote's verbal exacerbation of 
'country' jealousy can be found in The Wentworth 
Papers 1705-39 Op-cit- 110, and the Committee of the 
Whole House on Manning, 4 Dec. 1703, Queen Anne's 
Navy, 187, see below P-385. He was M. P. for London 
1701-10 and a leading banker, merchant and Whig. 
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For these reasons the effectiveness of merchant 
representations in parliament about. convoys and cruisers 
was weak. There were, however, other considerations 
which, given favourable circumstances, could, amplify the 
merchant voice and make it decisive in either House when 
trade protection was being-discussed. -The most important 
of these considerations was the interest felt by 
practically every member of both Houses in one aspect of 
trade protection. The emphasis so far-in this chapter 
has been on the provision of convoys. These were vital 
to. the merchant minority, but the movement of trade in 
coastal waters-affected nearly every member of parliament. 
This was-the trade protected. by cruisers. It was when 
the network--of protection theoretically established by 
t4psei-cruisers failed, that merchant and the majority of 
the Commons shared a rare unity of complaint. No 
important English town was many miles from a navigable 
river; thus when coastal trade was stopped, river trade 
suffered and with it practically every English 
constituency, no. -matter how inland. . Worcester's 
nationally famous cider reached London in'Anne's reign by 
river wherry and coaster. 
(') 
The coal and culm needed in 
*V-Owl (2) 
the county came up the Severn f-PoA South Wales. 
R. North, Lives of the Norths, ed. A. Jessup (1890) 
111'$ 223-4- 
(2) Account of the'coals and culm belonging to Sir John 
Pakingtong RussellLetters, W. R. O. B. A. 2309/55 (vi) 
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Thus even Sir John Pakington, county member from 1690 
to 17229 High Church and Tory, not a character likely at 
first sight, to be concerned with the defence of coastal 
shipping, had a direct interest in the efficiency of 
cruisers. 
(') It was the national concern that he 
personified which, when joined to the wider and more 
specific concerns of the merchant members, helped to 
produce the cruiser and convoy legislation. of 1694 and 
1708. 
Nor was a general, parliamentary interest in trade 
protection the product of purely parochial and economic 
concern; the English claim to the sovereignty of the seas 
was nowhere more frequently mocked than by the activities 
.1 
of French privateers within sight of the coast. 
(2) Such 
impudence touched a raw nerve in all Englishmen, to whom 
even the assistance of Dutch ships in protecting coastal 
waters was an affront. 
(3) 
The protection of the coastal 
waters gave merchant minority and squirearchical majbrity 
in the Commons a common interest. Nor were the members 
(1) His, concern for the sea-ways leading to the Bristol 
Channel would have given him a rare community of 
interest with the iron masters of the Birmingham 
area. Much of the Swedish bar iron used for the 
manufacture of steel came up the Severn, H. R. 
History of the BritishIron and, Steel 
Industry (1957) 326. 
(2) For the, importance of the English concept of the 
sovereignty of'the seas see above pp. 6-11. 
(3) Berkeley to Nottingham, 16 Oct. 1689, H. M. C. Finch 
1 .1- 111--499* 
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of the Commons corporately so-immune to common sense 
as not to realise that the losses of one section of 
the community meant harm to the country as a whole. 
Even the ships owned by merchants in foreign trade were 
property and property had high status in the eyes of any 
seventeenth century member of parliament. 
(') Clarges 
expressed this aspect of the community of interest between 
the merchants and the rest of the Co=ons when he said 
in 1693, 
'Land will be worth nothing if Trade be not 
supported .. By Trade London makes up 
your rents. 'ýý5 
W 
Patriotic and economic motives were not the only ones 
that might link merchants and country members. The 
discontent of merchant interests provided useful material 
for an attack on the ministry of the day. All the 
legislation of the period that concerns convoys and 
cruisers is partially a product of such an alliance of 
merchants and opposition. It was said of the Commons 
that, 
'those that have been used to hunt hares and 
deer know little how to chase privateers 
and rovers. t(3) 
(1) D. Ogg, England in the Reigns of James II and 
William 111 (1963) 127. 
(2) Grey X9 313 ,' 
(3) Present Condition of the English Navy (1702) 26. -- 
234. 
At least there were always members of the Commons 
ready to draw on the expert knowledge of the merchants. 
(') 
Merchant intelligence of French naval plans and movements 
was as good as that-of the Admiralty and the necessity of 
frequent petition and appearance before parliamentary 
committees; taught them-how to marshal evidence. Their 
knowledge gave edge-and direction to parliamentary attacks, 
which without factual assistance tended to be diffuse and 
sporadic, 
(2) 
Thus, it would seem that the effectiveness of the 
merchants in the Commons depended on the balance of forces 
working to make them at best a valued'ally-and at worst a 
contemptuously ignored minority. On balance their status 
improved during the period. The money that trade 
represented made successive ministries more prepared to 
deploy ships to help merchaýnts. 
(3) 
The jealousies between 
trades seem to have lessened. Above all they learnt to 
make their opinions better known in, and out of parliament. 
(4) 
From the beginning of the war in 1689 to the passing 
Clarges used information provided-by Newfoundland 
merchants in the naval debates of Nov. 1692, Grey 
X, 
_246. (2) Examples of merchant knowledge being used by the 
opposition. can be seen in C-J-XI, 714, ? 15 (19,20 
Feb. 1697), H. M. C. H. L. VII, 187 (William Dawsonne's 
evidence, 31--May 1707) and below p. 294; or more 
'gnerally 
expressed N. Tindal, History of England 
1? 45)., ITýI, 
ý3O9- (3) G. D. Ramsay, English Overseas Trade (1957) 233f 24? -8. 
(4) See above pp-54-7and below p. 295-8. 
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of the first convoy and cruiser legislation in 160.4 
merchant grievances counted for little. ' - The national 
emergency and the obvious need for a large fleet meant 
that the-protection of foreign and coastal'trades was a 
secondary consideration to all but those who suffered 
losse The implications of the national emergency for 
trade protection were unequivocally expressed in the 
1689 and 1690 sessions of parliament. ' In' November, 1689 
Sir Sam Dashwood(l)complained of the loss''of seven' ships 
from Barbados, to be answered by Papillon's declaration 
that , 
'I've heard it said the fleet did better 
1(2) saving Ireland than seven sugar ships. 
A year later, the same, attitude was expressed in more 
general terms; 
Illinterest du commerce estoit infinement 
moins de consequence que le salut due 
Royaume. '(3) -' 
It was as the sense of emergency faded, particularly after 
La Hogue, that merchants' opinion on convoys and cruisers 
received more sympathetic attention. They could with 
justification claim that the state had failed to protect 
(1) M. P. for the City of London and a wealthy Barbados 
merchant. 
(2) Grey IX, 414-5- 
(3) Bonnet Dispatchq 11/21 Nov. 1690, L. von Rankeq A 
History of England (1875) VI9 1554o 
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the nation's trade between 1689 and 1694, 
Convoys had certainly been provided as a matter of 
course from the outbreak of war but with very limited 
success, During 1689 merchants estimated they had 
lost 100 ships although one specific list of losses 
accounts for only 62. 
(l) 
For 1690 a list survives 
naming 59 lost ships 
(2)though in the Commons Clarges 
claimed 1,500 had been lost. 
(3) 
No estimates survive for 
1691, which seems to have been a relatively good year. 
(4) 
For 1692 parliament was told at various times that 
100,333 and 1,500 ships, had been lost in the year and 
3,000 in all since the commencement of war. 
(5) Pepys 
thought that merchant losses to the end of this year would 
have been 1,500 but St. Lo, whose estimates on other 
(1) C. J. Xj 285; Sir John Dalrymple, op. cit. I Pt. IIj 
104; C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W. I. 1689-929 153. 
(2) P. R. O. S. P. 8/8 f. 30. 
(3) Grey X, 264. 
(4) H. C. Foxroft ed., A Supplement to Burnet's History 
of W Own Time (1902) 361. The French navy was 
generally inactive and its crews weakened by 
sickness, D. Ogg, England in the Reigns of James II 
and William 111 (1963) 358- 
(5) Grey X, 264,2704o 
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topics seem trustworthy, put losses for the war so far 
at 600. 
(l) 
The discrepancy between the highest figures, 
usually ones quote d to the Commons, and the lowest is 
obvious. The highest figures represent an exaggeration 
which can have done the merchants little service in the 
Commons. Such exaggeration was perhaps a method of 
gaining the attention of an unsympathetic audience. In 
these years the navy was tryiPng to protect fewer than 
2,000 sea going ships. 
(2 ) 
The 'highest figures qu oted 
would imply the virtual, if not reiterated, extinction of 
Samuel Pepys's Naval Minutes, ed. J. R. Tanner 
-(N. 
R. S. 1926), 27. In none,; of these estimates, of 
losses is it clear whether ships taken and then 
ransomed are included. Although Pepys quotes 
St. Lo's estimate disparagingly, for St. Lo's 
reliability see below pp. 314-5. 
(2) A figure for the strength of the English mercantile 
marine is necessary to give some sense of proportion 
to the losses. The losses quoted aboverefer to the 
foreign trade and not to co , astal shipping and a 
. 
figure of not more than 2,000 ships seems a realistic 
one. It is not inconsistent with the numerous 
-contemporary 
figures for convoy strengths and the 
allocations of men and ships for various regional 
trades (see below P-333). It is consistent with 
th'e, fact that between '29'Sept'. 1691 and 29 Sept. 
1692 647 English ships engaged in foreign trade 
arrived at London, (B. M. Harley Loan 29/284 f. 46) 
-Professor R. Davis writes of a mercantile marine of $several thousands' in, the years after-1693, (OP-cit- 
318) but the period 1689-93 was a period of 
contraction and restricted sailings. The severity 
of this contraction may be judged by the low customs 
receipts for these years, (B. M. Harley Loan 29/45 
B f. 10). 
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the English mercantile-marine. There would be other 
evidence for this. The more modest figures quoted 
above, 62 for 1689,59 for 1690, fewer for 1691 and 
perhaps nearer 100 for 1692 are almost certainly 
underestimates of the total losses for every branch of 
foreign trade; they make St. Lo's estimate feasible. This 
represents a heavy loss but it is a loss spread over four 
years and spread unevenly. The western trades to the 
Americas s. eem to have been particularly unlucky. 
(') These 
were the trades whose captains were particularly tempted 
to break convoy near home, a criticism most frequently 
brought against the merchants in this period. 
The organisation of a rudimentary convoy system was 
simple by comparison wJ: th the provision of an adequate 
force of cruisers in home waters. The coastal trade was 
represented, by more numerous and individually less 
impo . rtant personages. - 
It lacked definition or tactical 
recognition and naturally earned the lowest priority in 
the-allocation of ships. Indeed cruisers are not 
mentioned in the earliest scheme for naval deployment. 
(2) 
(1) Of 59 ships listed as lost in 1690 29 were from the 
American trade and 21 from the ships serving Spain 
and the Straits, P. R. O. S. P. 8/8 f-30; sed also . C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W. I. 1689-92,153; Memoirs of 
Thomas, Earl of AileBbury (1890) 1,242. The trade 
to the eastern Mediterranean suffered losses but was 
most hardly hit by convoy delays, H. M. C. Portland 
119 2ý3- 
(2) P. R. O. Adm. 3/1,8 A,. pril 1689, 
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Their inadequacy'or absence is adequately demonstrated 
for the first phase-of the war. 
(') 
Even-*henýships'were 
allocated to'cruiser duties'the very nature of'these 
duties made the efficiency-of'these ships especially'-' 
dependent on the qualities, of the captain and his ship. 
The Admiralty, by insufficient, -supervision of the 
captainB, "lack'of provision for cleaning the ships used 
as crui'sers, -, and errors in their deployment, made the 
few ships", thus, employed morelneffedtiv6 than necessary* 
(2) 
Betweený1689'and, 1694 the interest-of the Commons in 
these failings changed from the cursory* I The first 
resolution touching trade protectioi2 came early in these 
years with the'declaration on 14-November 1689, , 
'That the want of a, guard-or convoys, ' for-the 
merchants, for the, last ear, hath been, an 
obstruction of trade., 
(35 
The resolution was the result of merchant initiative 
in a petition concerning their losses, and 'country' support$ 
(1) H. M. C. Finch 111,15-16; C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W. I. 
1689-92t 596; ýViscount Lydney to Nottinghamt'. 13 
Sept. 
_1692, 
C. S. P. Dom. Wm. 1695,204; The 
Autobiography of William Stout of Lancaster 1665- 
17ý2, ed. J. D. Marshall (1967) 949 98,108. 
(2) --kan'y'individual examples could be found to 
substantiate. these failings but the best anthology 
of cruiser-inefficiency is the pamphlet, 'Reasons to 
prove therehath been Negligence, Ignorance or 
Treachery (Oct.. 
-1693) 
N-MoM- CAD/D/20. 
(3) C. JoXj 285,286; "Grey IX, 4129 416; Sir John Dalrymple 
OP-cit. I Pt- 11,103-4. 
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with the proposal actually coming from'Clarges. The 
prescientý re4uest f rom- Elwill,, 
(')the 
only, merchant to 
speak in the debate, -that the'Commons should investigate 
the deployment of cruisers, was ignored. So was the 
resolution; 1690 saw no noticeable improvement in 
convoys, and trade protection achieved no significant 
exposition'in"the"debates in the Commons"in the session .B 
of 1690-91 or 169f-2. 
When parliament met on 4 November 1692 the ministry 
had small hopes of an easy session, either in general 
terms, or', despite týe"victory at La Hogue, in any 
consideration of n'aval'affairB. In effect the sea 
victory made criticis .m of the''government more likely; it 
had eýded the Bense'"of'emergency that restrained criticiSMB 
and this in turn- 'weakened C'armarthen"S grip on his 
collaborators in-government. - His relations-with- 
Nottingham were already strained. The removal of 
Marlborough early in 1692 ensured the opposition of his 
supporters, with little compensating, increase in 
parliamentary support when Rochester-and Seymour were 
(2)Their 
associates 'in opposition, led by promoted. 
(1) John Elwil-l. M. P. for Beeralston, who had interests 
in the. trade, to Holland and Newfoundland. 
(2) Laurence Hyde Earl of Rochester was re-admitted to 
the Privy Council in March'1692, Edward Seymour 
became a Lord of the Treasury in the same month. 
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Musgrave, Clarges., Foley and Harleyt remained as 
opposition leaders in the Commons, uninfluenced by their 
conversion. The Whigs also were more antagonistic 
towards what was now a more Tory Ministry. 
(') This 
opposition lacked any common or constructive principle 
but at least possessed, in the dilatory exploitation of 
I 
La Hogue the shipping losses of 1692, a common ground on 
which to attack the naval policy of the ministry. 
(2) 
Several of the leaders of these groups were concerned 
enough with trade to have made this a damaging feature of 
their attackl(3)but therewere too. many other possibilities 
open to them for any concentrated attention to be paid to 
trade protection. In a confused. session cruisers. and 
convoys. had sporadic attention but in a diffuse and badly 
co-ordinated series of attacks nothing positive was 
(1) A. Brownin , ThomaB. Osborne, Earl of Danby and Duke 
of Leeds 
%5l) 
1,497-501; S. B. Baxter, William 
111, (1966) 300-01; K. Feiling, History of the Tory 
-. 
Party 1640-1714,280,284-90. 
(2) N. Tindal, The History of England by Mr. Papin de 
Thoyras continued by N. Tindal, 1119 2206; - 
K. Feiling op. cit. 286; Ehrman 411, 
Clarges 
* 
had expressed his interest-in trade in. everY 
session of. parliament since 1689, Paul Foley's 
library and later activities reveal an int6rest 
Harley had a brother engaged in trade; of the CO'untrY 
members John Hampden had recently published a 
, pamphlet, 
'Some short considerations concerning the 
State'of the Nation. ' which was largely concerned with- 
trade (N. Tindal op. cit. 111 225 fn-226 fn), 
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achieved. The struggle between Russell and Nottingham 
and the quarrel between Lords and Commons gradually 
dominated the session. The ministry had an uncomfortable 
session and depended for its limited success on the 
support of changing groups of moderates; for the merchants 
the session was unproductive. 
(1) 
The initiative had once again been theirs with a 
petition presented to the Commons on 16 November which 
complained of pressing, plundering of recaptured ships 
by the navy and the loss of 1,500 ships. 
(2 ) The committee 
formed to consider this petition was strong in merchant 
(3)' 
representation and its chairman, Granville, reported 
to the House on 19 November after an examination of 
merchant witnesses and Admiralty papers. The committee 
found that there had been a lack of cruisers, 
'either westward or northward sufficient for 
securin the Bhips'outward and homeward 
bound. $&) 
This lack of cruisers was a recurring theme in all the 
naval debates of thiS session, the first time in William's 
(1) A. Browning op. cit. 1,498; S. B. Baxter op-cit. '308*s 
K. Feiling op. cit. 292-4. 
(2) C-J-X, 701- 
(3) For John Granville see below P- 346. 
(4) C. J. Xj 708; N. Luttrell$ Abstract of the Debates 
1692-3, ff. 50-1-ý 
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reign that cruisers achieved a parliamentary priority 
over convoys*(') The cumulative effect Of such comments 
was, however, 
_lost 
in the distractions of the session. 
Any coherenceýa consideration of trade defence might 
have had, was destroyed by the wrangling that followed 
Priestman's statement-that the. merchants deserved their 
losses and despite them were making profits. His 
attitude and the Admiralty Itself had many supporters. 
Waning interest in trade protection was revived in January 
1693 when it was revealed that one of the Commissioners of 
the Admiralty had shown an-appalling ignorance of his 
responsibilities. 
(3) 
When the Barbados merchants had 
requested protection for their ships they had been assured 
that the eseorts for the Virginia ships would safeguard 
both trades, although the routes of the two fleets 
diverged greatly once, out of the Channel. 
(4) This 
information provided the stimulus for another debate, which 
was as-inconclusive as those that had preceded it* 
Grey X0 269774,294-5 
(2) See above P-33 and Bonnet Dispatch 22 Nov/2 Dee 1692, 
L. von Ranke op. cit. 185- The belief that 
merchants were making such big profits that they 
could afford the loss of two ships in three seems 
to have been wide-spread, The Autobiography of 
William Stout of Lancaster ed. J. D. Marshall (1967) 
106; N. Luttrell, Ab, stract of the Debates 1692-3, 
ff. 62-4. 
(3) It was probably Sir Robert Rich. 
(4) N. Tindals op-cit. 111,230 fn; Grey X, 294-6. 
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There must have been some bitterness on the part of 
the merchants that yetýanother session had passed without 
sustained, consideration of-their losses. - Yet it was-, 
possiblyAn'this session that the first constructive step 
was taken toimprove the, protection of English shipping.. 
Two notebooks of, a dockyard commissioner-survive from this 
period. 
(')_They--probably 
belonged to Sir Richard Haddock 
and contain, ýIbesides routine letters for the years from 
1691, to 1694, some copied papers. One of these 
transcripts is entitled,, 'The, Proposals of Admiral, Russel'19 
Mr. -Foleyý, and-Col. Churchill for the defence of the 
coasting and homeward bound trade. ' Russell's contribution 
to such a series-, of proposals is natural enough; for much - 
of this period, he was an admiral,, and the most influentialý-- 
naval officer. 
(2) 
The Mr. Foley is undoubtedly Paul Foley, 
M. P. for: Hereford City, Commissioner of Accounts and 
political associate of Harley. His interest in naval and 
trading matters is well attested in parliamentary and- 
private-papers. 
(3) 
Colonel Churchill is certainly George' 
(1) Extracts from a Commissioner's Notebook 1691-1694, 
ed. Sir J. K. Laughton, The Naval Miscellany II 
(N. R*, S* 1912) 139-145. 
(2) Butý*he'was not-an admiral between 10 Jan. 1693 and 
?, Nov. 1693 and for imuch of 1694 he was in the 
Mediterranean. 
(3) See above p. 39. D. N. B. and some of his 
private papers W. R. O. B. A. 3762/1-9. A Thomas Foley 
entered the Commons in 1694 as M. P. for Stafford 
(later Baron Foley of Kidderminster) but he seems 
to have had no specific interest in naval affairs. 
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Churchill, brother to-the first Duke of Marlborough. 
He'had naval experience dating-from 1666"but withdrew 
from the service early"-in"1693 because of dissatisfaction 
-' M- over promotion. 
The combination'of'a civilian"-and'two naval officers 
in making'theBe proposals'is, beBt explained in a 
parliamentary context. The proposals mustýhave-been 
made before 1694-because early in that"year the Commons 
established theforce"to'be used'for trade protection. '- 
The mostlikely session before-'-1694'for'such proposals 
is'that of 1692-3* -In'earlier sessions-trade protection 
had hardlyýbeen considered and in'none"ofthem was the 
lavish deployment of-'ships'envisaged in'all three proposals, 
likely. In this'session the Commons appointed a committee 
on'16 November 1692'to consider, the petition of the 
(2) 
merchants and the whole business of trade protection. 
George Churchill as, M. P. for St. Albans was, the 
only Churchill in the Commons at-this time. There 
seems to have been confusion over his title. He 
was called Colonel Churchill as early as November 
1692 (Grey X, 273) and as late as January 1694 
(C. J. XII 66) but is recorded as a major in- 
November-1693 (C. J. XI, 14). There seems to be no 
juýtification for such a title in-either Army or 
Marine-commission lists. His. brother, Charlesq was- 
a Colonel in these years but not a member of 
parliament 
(2) C. J. X, -701; see above p. 242o 
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Foley and, -Churchill, were named, -for this committee and 
its membership-, -Iincluded, representatives of all seaports; 
Russell-i-, -as-ýa'representative of Portsmouth, could thus 
have joined-them-onýthe committee. The proposals, 
containedý-in the Commissioner's notebook may then have 
been one-aspect of the committee's work. 
('), The three 
schemeeý vary-in detail but agree in heavy protection for 
the-Irish"Seaýand, Chamnel. (2) All three are, in the. 
light of the war experience of later years, well considered. 
For,, Russell and Churchill their long naval experience-is 
sufficient explanation-of &valid scheme. That the 
eivilianl. s, 'Foley's scheme bears comparison with those of 
the two professionals is surprising. An interest such as 
he possessed, in the generalities and parliamentary 
implications of naval affairs, would not extend to the 
minutia'. of, ship disposition for trade protection. if, ý- 
The editor of the note books, Sir J. K. Laughton, 
suggests they were compiled in 1691 but it i's 
difficult toýsee how any civilian or naval officer 
would have allocatea-45-50 ships to trade 
protection before Laý"Hogue. 
Awimmary of the three proposals shows the general. I 
similarity and variation in detail: - 
IIiII 
Rates- 3 4 5 6 Total 
Russell! -'ý 3 11 16 20 50 
Foley 3 16 14 12 45 
Churchill 4 18 15 13 50 
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as. is almost certain., he had, assistance in compiling 
his scheme, it may have-come from the most skilled of 
naval professionalsý Pepys, whose advice Foley, and his 
colleague, Harley, were certainly receiving and usIng in 
this period. It was Foley's proposal that was to have 
significance in the next'session 0. f parliament. 
(')''- 
1693 was a disastrous I year for trade. The number 
of cruisers available 'Was -derisory,, at no time and nowhere 
approaching the strengths the Admiralty had itself'* 
(2) 
suggested in a plan of ship distribution for the year* 
See below p. 255-7. It would have been possible for these schemes to have been drawn up in the 
first, two, months-tof the 1693-4 session of, parlia- 
ment after Russell had been reappointed Admiral 
and all three were,, still members of the Commons. There was in the months of November and December 
much parliamentary interest in naval-affairs and trade protection. However there 
, 
does,, not seem to have been any relevant committee that contained all three. The most likely committee to have concerned itself with cruisers and convoys was the one formed 
on 22 November 1693 to consider the petition of the 
merchants, it contains none of them (C. j. XJq 8-9). Moreover the introduction of Foley's schemel after 
a proposal by Clarges, seems to have 1ý come as a 
surprise to, the Commons, a surprise that is 
understandable if the detailed preparation had been 
., completed during the 1692-3 session. 
(2) See Appendix VII±. Project for Ships to be employed 
16939 Admiralty'Office, 12 Nov. 16929 P. R. O. Adm. 8/3- 
For cruiser strengths in 1693 see N. M. M. PLA/P/5, , (Phillip 
,s 
USS. 88), which gives-a monthly account Of the cruisers,, e. g. 11 in May, 3 in June. For the 
general shortage see H. M. C. H. L. Iq 141; Acts of the, 
Privy Council of England, Colonial Series 11,235. 
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Against this weak defence beat, '- 
Ile fureur incroyable pour la Course 
les corgaires, malouins pullulent ... "kien 
ne l. es arrete. '(1) 
Letters from Harwiclj, Bristol and Scotland testify to 
the swarms of privateers. 
(2 ) Their activities menaced 
convoys, and complaints came from traders to the 
Canaries, the Baltic and the West Indies. 
(3) John Taylor, 
one of the Most important contractors for naval stores2 
informed. the Navy Board that their convoy arrangements 
were so deficient that Baltic traders were compelled to 
hire neutral BhipS, to bring their goods, safely home. 
(4) 
This diverse dissatisfaction was trivial compared with 
the shock-caused by the destruction of ninety two 
merchantmen; (many of them Dutch). of the Smyrna Convoy 
(1) C. de la Roncie"res Histoire-de-la Marine Francaise 
(1932) VI, 163* 
(2) C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W. I. 16'93-6. ) 181; P. R. O. Adm. 1/3569 f-879; Luttrell 111,122. 
(3) P. R. O. Adm. 3/8, -28 April, 2 June 1693; Edmund'to 
Nicholas Lechmere, 6 Oct. 1693, Lechmere Papers 
W. R. O. B. A. 1531/16* 
P. R. O. Adm. 1/3568 f, 415. Portuguese shipping was 
similarly increasing at the expense of English 
interests; see F. Prestage, The Anglo-Portuguese 
Alliance., 
_, 
Trans. R. Hist. S. XVII (1934) 91 fn., 
and C. D'Avenant, Discourses on the Public Revenues 
and on the Trade of England (1698), in Political 
and Commercial Works ed. Sir Charles 
Whitworth (1771) Is 396. 
249e 
In Jxine' 1693*' -'-A long delayed a nd numerous fleet of 
merchant ships bound for Spain and'thi; Mediterranean 
sailed'into-a týrilliantly or-ganised trap; the existence 
of -which; " the merchants*ý clainied, navýal, izitelligence 
should have suspected. 
(') 
The 16sse's 'were widely felt 
and in their financialý's6verity compared with those 
(2) This catastrophe, caused býy the Great Fire of 16ý6'. ý 
coming as it did'-'against'a"'backgr'ound of feeble defences, 
for trade and'the gene'ral"incomp'eten-c, e of the last four 
years-, "explains the bitterness of'Sir Jýames Houblohl 
writing to Pepys' about the"" losses; 
I will yet never f orgiVe durý'ministers 'f or 
this ignorance, malice or carelessness-, ý(3) 
The merchant. reaction Was swift, . better, organised. 
and more effective than any of their representations so 
(1) For ac 1, counts of-the disaster see A. C. Woodq History 
of the Levant-Company (1935) 111-12; Ehrman 500-02; 
H. M. C. H. L. Iq 172-5,197-251., 
(2) Diary of John Evelyn, ed. E. S. 'de Beer (1955) IV9 
148; Nathaniel to 
' 
Edward Harley 30 June 1694, H. M. C. 
Portland 11,244; R. North, op. cit. 111, -186. 
(3) Sir-JameB Houblon to Pepys, 17 July 1693, Private 
Correspondence and Miscellaneous Papers of Samuel, 
Pepys 1679ý-1703, ed'o J. R. Tanner (1926) Iq 69, 
Sir James Houblion was one of the most important 
traders-to Portugal, Spain, the Mediterranean and 
East Indies. He later became a Co=issione Ir of- 
Admiralty (Ehrinan 512). 
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far in the reign of William. 
- 
Petitions on the losses 
were soon forwarded to-the-Lord, Mayor and theQueeng, 
Lord Berkeley presenting,, the latter on behalf of the 
Turkey-merchantB. (') A-committee, of the Privy, Council 
considered, the complaints. and during July forwarded the 
requests of, various-trades to the.. Commissioners of 
Admiralty for their consideration. 
(2) In, reply they 
stated that it, was impossible. to, meet all the merchant, 
demands. (3) This unsatisfactory answer led to another 
exchange of, letters between-Trenchard, the Secretary of 
State, and.. the, - 
Admiralty.. with an., uncompromising, Admiralty 
reply that, both. convoys and,,, cruisers'were necessary to,, 
protect trade and., that. such, ships must be totally 
(4) reserved for protection duties. This correspondence is 
(1) Luttrell 111,141,146. 
(2) Ibid. 111,195. 
- (3) Memorial of the Commissioners of Admiralty to the Queen, 4 Sept. 1693, C. S. P. Dom. W. & M., 16939 311-12, 
(4) LordB'O f- Admiralty' to*Trenchard, 11 Sept. -'l6939'S_-P- 
Dom. W. & M. 1693,322. Thus it seems that it was from'the Admiralty that the idea of the total 
reservation of ships for trade protection first "- 
came, an idea that'later Convoy and Cruiser legislation made law. The Admiralty was not alone 
. in offering advice. , 
On 5 October Gibson, presented his very full Memorial'to the King, Private 
Correspondence of Samuel Pepys 1679-1703 OP-cit-Ii- 118-121. On 11 Oct. Perrot's scheme was forwarded to the Admiraltyj'a scheme notable for its recognition 
of the importance of clean ships and a squadron in the Soundings-, P. R. O. Adm. 1/4030 ff-751-756. Other 
schemes may be discerned in William Bridgeman's 
Notebook (? ), N. M. M. CAD/A/8, Sectionst and D. 
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an indication that'the government had realised the need 
for anýorganised and powerful defence for trade. On 
18 August Godolphin', 'in'a letter to the King, maintained 
that an excessively strong main fleet had ruined trade in 
the last two'years and,, *'when 
-all 
is done 'the war cannot 
be'supported unless trade is protected. $(')"It was'als'o'- 
realised, ' not only that trade mUst"be protected, but that 
parliament as well as the-merchants must see that efforts' 
were being'made. The dismissal of Nottingham on, 5 
November and Russell's appointment a'S'A: dmiral of the'Red 
on 7 Novemb-er were part of this process. 
(2) So was" 
Trenchard's'instruction'to the'Commidsioners I of Admiralty 
on 7 November that they-shou'ld consider what would be- 
the best method-for the organisation of'cruise'rs and 
convoys, 
(3) 
The knowledge that Barbados'and Turkey merchants 
were preparing-p-etitions for presentation to parliament was 
a spur to such-activity. 
(4)- 
(1) C. S. P. Dom. W. M. 1693,2? 5- 
(2) Killegrew. -Delavall and Shovell, the'three Admirals 
. -who , 
had served during the year as joint commandersq 
were dismissed on 6 November. 
(3) C. S. P. Dom. W. & M. 16939 393. In this letter he 
asked-whether an act of parliament would help to 
promote mpnning but made no mention of parliamentary 
action in connection with cruisers and convoys. 
This letter can also be-found in P. R. O. Adm. 1/4080 
f. 791. 
(4) Luttrell 111,2099 
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William's speech at the opening of parliament on 
7 November was a development of government policy. Some 
paragraphs of the speech were an attempt to associate 
himself with thenational, sense of grievance and to 
encourage-co-operation'from both Houses in the protection 
of, trade by the building of more ships and the establish- 
ment of new bases in the Bouth weBt. 
(l) 
William Must have 
been well aware of the cohesive effect that the, patriotic 
humiliation and devastating loss-of, property caused by the 
Smyrna Convoy might have on the opposition. Rumours 
about the establishment of a, parliamentary Board of'Trade 
with the authority to'deploy ships and, thus diminish his 
(2) 
own powers must have-been reported-to him. Certainly 
apparent-was the widespread dissatisfaction with his rule 
in England. (3) To counter-this he had won'the support of 
the-Whigs by thepromotion of some of their leaders and 
could count on Carmarthen organising them and the courtiers 
to the-best advantage in parliament. 
C4) 
Such support was 
sufficient to ensure an easy passage for finance bills and 
to win the 1693-4 session an historical reputation for, 
calm(5)that is perhapsýunjustified, 
(1) C. J. Xij 1. 
(2) Newsletter 12 Dec. 1693, C-S-P-Dom- W. & M- 1693, 
426. 
(3) D. Ogg OP-cit. 387-88. 
(4) A. Browning op. cit. I, 
(5) A. Srowning op. cit. I,, 
ý515-6. 
507-9. 
506-9; S. B. Baxter op. cit. 
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., Despite the studious caution with which the 
Court 
attempted to guide the debates on naval affairs some of 
them on trade protection,,, were as stormy as any in the 
reign of William. In the, Commons the consideration, of 
naval miscarriages developed-on customary lines. On 13 
November the House demanded documentary evidence on the ', 
whole course of the naval war in, 1693. This was , 
provided on 15 November and evidence from representatives 
of the Turkey Company heard. Debates continued through- I 
out November, their scope being enlarged to a consideration 
of merchant-losses throughout the war,, by a petition 
presented for the merchants by Pembroke, Gold and the 
Houblons,, towards the end of the month. 
(') The debates 
continued in December but by now, were concentrating on 
the failures of the Admirals, and their superiors, 
(2)a 
development, -of which the merchants had by now ample 
experience and which offered no obvious hope of improving 
the safety of their ships. The defeat of the motion , 
condemning the three Admirals, by 10 votes ended these, 
(1) C. J. XIj 2-9; Bonnet Dispatches 7/17 Nov, 12/27 Nov. 
1693, L. von Ranke op. cit. VI, 217,221-2; Samuel 
Pepys's Naval Minutes, ed. J. R. ' 
Tanner (N. R. S. 1926) 
331. Thomas, 8th Earl of Pembroke, a political 
moderate, who had been lst Lord of the Admiralty 
1689-92; -probably Sir Edward Gold, a Mediterranean 
trader and John and James Houblon. 
(2) C. J. XI, 21* 
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inconclusive debates. In the Lords the consideration 
of the Smyrna disaster was leisurely. A request for 
certain papers in the custody of the Commons led to a 
conference between the Houses and seems to have reminded 
the Commons of the issue early in January but their 
resolution to consider the matter again had no result. 
(') 
Once again it seemed, that the losses of the merchants had 
been buried in words and that to parliament these losses 
represented grievances for factional exploitation rather 
than for legislation. 
This situation was changed suddenly and de I vastatingly 
on 17 January 1694. The merchants were not alone in 
their frustration; the Country opposition, the Tory groups 
and other opponents of the Ministry, such as Jacobites, had 
likewise had an unrewarding session, their only legislative 
success so far having been a practically completed Place 
Bill. In mid January this opposition had concentrated its 
attention on the finance bill whereby the Land Tax was to 
be levied. Sir Thomas Clarges in particular had been 
leading the attack on a bill that hurt him doublyq in 
pocket and in seeing his money go to a government and war 
(2) that he detested. His attempts to amend the bill, had'been 
Ibid. XI q 46. 
(2) The rest of the paragraph is based on C. J. XI, 61-2 
and a Bonnet Dispatch 19/29 Jan. 1694, L. von Ranke 
op. cit. VI, 232-233; L'Hermitage Dispatch, 29 Jan. 
1694, B. M. Addit. MSS. l7t677,00,, 157-8- 
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defeated. In retaliation, on l7th January he proposed 
that a clause should be added to the bill. This clause 
would appropriate money for the upkeep of a number of 
ships whose sole duty would be to cruis6'for the 
protection of trade. ' -Convoys were not mentioned and 
the implication of his proposal was that the Admiralty 
should have no authority over the deployment of these 
ships. The debate was a long one, candles were brought 
in, and the courtiers argued lengthily against such an 
invasion of the Crown's prerogative. The proposal 
seems to have been-a surprise to them; the best they could 
do was to obtain-an amendment securing Admiralty control 
over the, deployment-of the ships 'in times of crisis. 
Another ýLmendment, on the number of third rates to be 
included in the force, they lost by 125 votes to 81, and 
finally the bill passed its second reading. 
That the opposition secured a majority on this issue 
after its earlier defeats implies. an accession of strength. 
These extra votes may well have come from those whose 
concern over-foreign-and coa8tal, trade had earlier been 
ignored; they may also have included the votes of the 
more repiiblican Whigs, to whom such a measure would have 
been attractive. The Commons had decided that the force to 
be employed-for trade protection should number 43 ships 
taken from the lowest-f6ur rates. The actual distribution 
r 
of the ships among these four rates was the subject of 
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debate and amendment but the final allocations agree 
closely with the scheme drawn up by Paul Foley. 
(') In 
Bonnet's account of the debate the impression is given 
that Clarges alone made the general and detailed proposals 
but Foley certainly contributed to the debate and was 
responsible for the detailed proposals of the numbers and 
kinds of ships to be used and for justifying these 
proposals to the House. 
(2) Even without documentary support 
the correspondence between the parliamentary scheme for 
trade protection and the one attributed to him in the 
Commissioner's Note Books'would be sufficient evidence of 
his contribution. 
(3) 
The co-operation between the group for 
(1) See above p. 246. 
(2) B. M. Harlean 1,898 ff. 34-5. 
(3) In the table below is summarised the way in which 
the Commons decided, in January 1694, that the 
ships for trade protection should be allocated from 
third to sixth rate warships. Beneath this Foley's 
allocation and those of Russell and Churchill are 
. 
included for comparison: - 
Rate- 
i 
3 4 5 6 Total 
'Parliament 4 16 13 10 43 
Foley 3 16 14 12 45 
Russell 3 11 16 20 50 
Churchill 4 18 15 13 50 
There is evidence of the debate that caused the amend- 
ment of Foley's scheme, particularly where it 
concerned the third rate ships, C. J. XII 62; B. M. 
Harlean 1898 f-5- 
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which Clarges spoke and the group led by Foley and 
Harley had begun in 1691 and become closer, with each 
succeeding session. 
(') The-cruiser and convoy proposals 
were one result of this co-operation. 
The Land Tax bill Btill required a third reading. 
Some measure of the bitterness aroused by the debate on- 
17 January may perhaps be deduced from the resolution, of 
the Commons, before the third reading on 22 Januaryq that 
debates should be, 'grave and orderly' . 
(2 ) The speakers 
for the Court were better prepared. 
(3) 
Naturallyýthey 
repeated the argument that such legislation restricted the 
rightful powers of the Crown. They'also developed an 
appeal to patriotism by showing how the House of Lords 
would naturally resent the tacking of such legislation to 
a money bill and how an embroilment of the two Houses 
would delay the granting-of money and thus-damage the 
prosecution of the war. '' It was implied, that, the 
pretensions-of the Commons in this matter were undermining 
the stability of the constitution. Russells rather 
ingenuously, suggested that ifthe Commons insisted on 
passing-the cruiser and convoy legislation they should 
(1) The g-rowing links between the two groups are 
clearly traced in K. Feiling, - op. cit. 288-91. 
(2) C. JOXI9,66. 
(3) Bonnet Dispatch, 19/29 Jan. 1694, L. von Ranke, op. 
cit. VI9 232-3; L'Hermitage Dispatch 2 Feb. 1694, 
B. M. Addit. MSS. 17,677 00 f. 161; Luttrell 111,256- 
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tack it to a money bill of less consequence and 
Trenchard suggested it should be a separate bill. The 
supporters of the proposals urged the importance of 
trade, that experience in recent years had shown that a 
contrivance such as this was necessary to secure action 
and with sound use of their growing knowledge of the navy 
that even with the deduction of 43 cruisers the main fleet 
would still be strong enough. The verbal, battle lasted 
five hours but the bill, was passed at 7 p. m. by 187 votes 
to 123. The only Court victories-were the addition of a 
clause that made it possible for the ships allocated as 
cruisers and convoys to revert to other duties in time of 
emergency and the abandonment of an idea of Clarges that 
the bill should stipulate how the ships would be deployed 
in five squadrons. 
The Privy Council considered the situation on the 
evening of 23 January but here, and in the debates in the 
Lords that followed, there was reluctant agreement that 
the bill must pass. 
(2) 
The money needed for the war had to 
Off Flamborough Head, the Downs, Guernseyq the mouth 
of the Channel-and off Cape Clear. Bonnet Dispatch 
19/29*Jan. 1694, L. von Ranke, op. cit. VI, 232-3; 
L'Hermitage Dispatch B. M. Addit. 10S. 17,677 00 f-157; 
Luttrell 111,256. 
(2) Bonnet Dispatch, 23 Jan. /2 Feb. 1694,, L.. von Ranke, op. 
cit. VI9,234-5; L'Hermitage Disptachg 5 Feb. 1694, j B. M. Addit. MSS. l7t677 00 f. 169; L. J. XV9 3489 350* 
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be bought with 43 ships and the Land Tax Bill became 
law. (') On 25 January William vetoed a Place Bill and 
the parliamentary tumult that followed this timely 
demonstration of hie power is perhaps one of the reasons 
why the crisis ovar cruisers and convoys has been 
neglected in accounts of this session. 
(2) Yet the measure 
was an important one. The Commons did not use the device 
of tacking lightly. That the members used this method 
in the interests of trade protection and that it involved 
a radical limitation of the royal authority shows the 
importance cruisers and convoys had attained by 1694. A 
precedent was established for'such parliamentary inter- 
vention on trade defence which, reinforced by the more 
famous legislation of 1708, influenced parliamentary usage 
(3) Admittedly the establishment in the eighteenth century. 
(1) 6&7W. & M- c 3, An Act for granting to His 
Majesty an' Aid of Four Shilling in the Pound for 
one year. Clause =I appropriates ships to 
trade protection; LXXIII allows them to be used for 
the line-of battle in time of emergency; LXXV 
stipulates that-the Commissioners of Admiralty shall 
provide an account of the cruisers and convoys used each 
year for parliament. 
(2) Another reason may well be the fact that the provisions 
concerning cruisers and convoys are three clauses in 
a money bill of eighty five clauses. 
(3) D. A. Baugh, British Naval Administration in the Age of 
Walpole (1965) 19* 
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of this force involved no strategic innovation(')- the 
Admiralty and government had recognised the need for 
convoys and cruisers before 1694 
(2) 
- but it is very doubt- 
ful whether so many ships would have been provided without 
the spur of legislation. 
(3) 
As it was, a law had been passed that was very 
difficult to check. At least the merchants were now 
confident enough of their rights to insist on compliance 
with the law. On 9 April the traders of London, in a 
petition to the Commons, informed the House that none of 
the 43 ships had so far been appointed. 
(4) The next day 
the Admiralty provided the House with lists of the cruisers 
and convoys ordered to sea since 25 January. The merchants 
were given a copy to study and told to return. 
(5) The lists 
were impressive but utterly misleading. 59 ships were 
named as cruisers but 13 were employed in duties outside 
the definition of the act. 
(6 ) 32 ships were named as convoys; 
of these 12 could more properly be described as convoying 
(1) Ehrman 509. 
(2) See above P. 247. 
(3) See C. J. XI, 61 18 Nov. 1693. The Admiralty 
estimated for the House that it would use 3,530 
men for cruisers and convoys in 1694, that is, men 
sufficient for about ten fourth rates and ten fifth 
rates. 
(4) C*J-XI, 154, 
(5) C-J-XI, 155-7; see also Newsletter, 10 April 1694, 
C. S. P. Dom. Wm. 1695,252. 
(6) Nine were being used to gather intelligence and four 
against French corn ships. 
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foreign rather than. coastal trade. 
(') 
The real number 
of ships on statutory duty was further limited because 
many-. of the ships were mentioned two or three times, once 
each time, -new orders transferred them to different 
(2) 
stations or duties. .A precise estimate of 
the ships - 
employed is made impossible by the failure to name some, 
ships, which makes it impossible to ascertain whether any 
given ship mentioned, by rate only is additional to those 
named or one that has been mentioned already. The-time 
lag between the dispatch of orders and the-actual 
appearance of the ships on duty would further reduce the 
real number of ships in service. The lists in fact , 
deceive; atýfirst glance it, would appear-that the Admiralty 
was employing more ships on cruiser and convoy duty than 
parliament had ordered; in reality there wereýprobablY-,, ;, 
fewer than 43- (3) If deception, was intended it wasýsuccess- 
ful. The merchants did not return. 
For troops (4), the Hamburg trade'(2) and Norway (4). 
(2) For example, H. M. S. SaudadoeB Prize appears twicel 
once as a convoy (13 Feb. ) once as a cruiser (20 
Feb. ), and possibly once as a 5th rate. The 
Rupert Prize, Newcastle, Pearleg Norwichl Play 
Prize and Dartmouth all appear at least twice in the 
lists of orders. 
(3) A paper critical of - 
the Admiralty liBtBwas prepareds 
probably by the Commissioners of Accduntst but 
there is no record of its use in parliament, 
B. M. Harlean 1,898 f. 42. 
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How seriously and in what ways the general 
activities of, the navy. sUffered through the demands for 
cruisers and convoys after this session of parliament is 
hard to calculate. ThereAs evidence that a shortage 
of small ships,, of, the rates required. for trade. protection, 
contributed towards the failure of the 1694 campaign when 
Berkeley's tour of bombardment against the coastal towns 
of northern France was certainly hampered by, a lack of 
small ships with which to support his bomb vessels and 
machine ships. 
(') 
A similar shortage hindered the 
effectiveness of bombarding squadrons, in-1695- 
(2) In, a 
more general-way the need, for. cruisers and convoys meant a 
reduction in the strength of, every squadron and every,, 
major convoy., There.,, is, pvidence of such reductions ., 
but 
the effects are inealculable. 
(3) The test of a major naval 
confrontation, was neverapplied to, the. parliamentaryl-,,,,,.., 
reservation of ships for-trade defence;. nor is. there any 
John, ý Baron Berkeley,, of'Stratton. He-entered, the 
navy in the reign of Charles II and became Admiral 
in 1693. C. S. P.. Dom- Wm.. 1694-5,176,1909 212; 
H. 'M. C. -Buce-leuch and 
4ueensberry II Pt*-Ij 122;. 
N. M. M. Southwell Sou/3 f-104. 
(2) Berkeley to the Lord Justices, 26 May 1695, C-S-P- 
Dom. W. & M. 1694-95,478. 
(3) Sir Francis Wheeler to Lords of Admiralty, 19 Jan. 
1694, ibid. 1694-59 43; P. R. O. S. P. 42/4 f-311; 
Trenchard to Blathwayt, 28 Aug. 1694, N. M. M. 
Southwell, Sou/3 ff. 321-2. 
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evidence that the quality of naval intelligence declined 
for lack of Small'6hips. Certainly týenecessity of 
providing'4ý', ships for'trade defence in home waters, 
whether the full quota was provided or not, increased 
the nervous wear and tear at every level of naval 
administration, 
(')but 
this 'of all effe'cts is the Most 
difficult to measure and in c. omparison with the numerous 
worries that'akflicted the navy in the middle years of 
the war,, was probably slight. 
Neither foreign nor coastal trades seem to have 
suf f ered badly in 1694, the f irst year -in which the new 
I 
system of trade protection operated. There were convoy 
delays, isolated losses, as when the East India Company 
lost a very rich ship, and sporadic petitions for cruisers, 
(2) but no general or heavy losses. 1695 was, however, 
another bad year. French successes affected the foreign 
trades unequally but traders to the East and West Indies, 
Lords of Admiralty to renchard, 14 June 16959 
C. S. P. Dom. W. & M. 
194-59 
178; P. C. Minutes, 
11 April 16979 H. M. C. Buccleuch and Queensberry 
II Pt. 119 458. 
(2) C. S. P. Dom. W. & M. 1694-59 1479 151; Diary of 
John Evelyn, op. cit. V, 174. 
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America and--Africa claimed they had lost among them, 84 
ships. 
(l) 
The losses, of Barbados merchants were largely 
due to an error-by Peregrine Osborne, Marquis of 
Carmarthenl(2)commander of the Soundings, squadron, who 
withdrew into Milford Haven on sightingtheir fleet in the 
belief that they were French. 
(3) Bristol merchants 
suffered with particular severity during the year and the 
coastal trade round Land's End was halted. 
TIAB-waB an exaggeration. A study of the evidence 
these traders submitted to the House of Lords 
shows that this total has been inf lated by 
including some ships lost in 1694 and by including 
some ships in more than one regional list of 
losses e-g- 7 Africa Company losses are also 
included in the Barbados' list, H. M. C. H. L. 11,75- 
82,87-89, See also C. S. P. Dom. Wm. 16959 53-4;. 
Report of Barbados Merchants July 1696, C. S. P. Col. 
Amer. & W. I. 1696-71 61-2; H. M. C. 
, 
H. L. 119 64; 
K. G. Davies, The Royal-Africa Company (1960) 
207; P. R. O. Adm. 7/333 f-75- 
Later the 2nd Duke of Leeds. A naval captain in 
1690 he became a Rear Admiral in 1697. 
W. Laird Clowes, The' Royal Navy (1898) 11 486-7; The 
P ortledge Papers 1687-1697, ed. R. J. Kerr and 
I. C. Duncan (1928) 209; Burnet 111,171-2; H. M. Co 
H. L. 11,69. 
(4) James Waller (Dept. Gov. of Kinsale) to Southwellq 
21 June 1695, N. M. M. Southwell Sou/16. 
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These losses gavej, 'great advantages to those who 
complained of the Administration. '(') A restless 
antagonism to all that the Court, attempted. in the Commons 
was to be the most-obvious feature of the 1695-6 session. 
Deep discontent with William's Dutch-preoccupations, 
growing worry over the succession, both of these' 
aggravated by the death of May, merged with more-recent 
troubles, like the refusal of I- the'Northern Crowns to 
salute our flag I in English . waters(3)and'the losses - of' 
the merchants, to produce a general dissatisfaction-which 
parliament reflected. Although-the election of 1695 had 
returneCto the Commons a majority who fav6ured the- 
continuation''of the'war, this`majority2 apart"froM"'votilig' 
money, was unstable'and-zerged frequently and readily with 
the"OppositiOn-to the Court'on the Treason'Billg the" 
Licensing Laws, the conside ration of Welsh'grant62 coinige 
(4), It and the Council of Trzide. - was'an opposition'with`ý' 
no outstanding'leaders, many of the''61d 'Country' leaders, 
such as' Clarges having died, "and"6ne without the definition 
-Burnet III, ), ý. 179780;, or,, for,, a. -similar, -opinion-ý, ibid. -l- 1119 172- 
(2) -'S. B. 'Baxter op. cits -333-4-, ''N. "' Tindal "'op' 10 , c: Lt, *-"III I -, 309-10#, 
(3) L'Hermitage DiBp4tchq 21/31, Jan. 16969 B. M. Addit. 
MSS. 179677 QQ f. 230o 
cit. I, (4) S. B. Baxter-op. cit. -334-6; Browning op. 527-329 
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that party discipline or the mutual experience of 
several sessions in parliament could give. In Tindal's 
words, it was the opposition of these who supposed, 
'that the character of a patriot was, without 
distinction of times or persons, to be ever 
against. the Court. 1 
(1) 
Before the session began-the government attempted- 
to reduceýthe_impact of the, merchantsl.. complaints on the 
Commons. The cruisers and, qonvoy legislation of 1694 - 
had showed, the danger-of an,, opposition interest in such 
matters. The outlines of. the government's plan. were 
considered in, the... Privy. pouncil on 12 November 1695. 
(2) 
The losses during the year were to-be. blamed on the, mprchants 
for slippingconvoys, -an, approach-that in the past had 
generally secured some, support in the Commons. More 
positively, a Council, of Trade was to be establishedýand it 
would-consider, the convoy needs of the merchants and, advise 
the Admiralty on the allocation of-ships. 
(3) The Council of 
Trade waB,, to be eBtablished by parliament and by initiating 
such. a measure, the. government w6uld, hope to limit anY 
encroachment on the powers of the executive. - As, part of 
(1) N. Tindal op. cit. 1111 303. 
(2) P. C.. Minutes 12 Nov. 1695, H. M. C. Buccleuch and 
Queensberry II Pt. It 255. 
(3) For the background to-the proposal for a Council of 
Trade see R. M. Lees, Parliament and the Proposal for 
a Council of Trade 1695-6, Eng. Hist. Rev. (1939)- LIV, 
38-47 and I. K. Steele The Board of Trade in Colonial 
Administration 1696-1ý20 (London Ph. D. Thesis 1964) 
32-3* 
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the attempt to show*the government's real concern, for. 
trade the King was, advised to make, public his own interest 
in these affairs,,. aB. thiB would help matters in the .- 
Commons, 
(')and, 
in his Bpeech-,. on 26 November, to parliament 
William asked'both Houses to consider, what laws, might-, be 
necessary to encourage trade. 
(2) 
-I 
In-the' seBsion. thatýfollowed the, Court waB succeBSfUl 
in maintaining-its concept of an advisory Council of Trade 
against an, opposition, that Wished to, give the Council_the 
authority to-control naval-ships. Because the opposition 
wished the Council to, control probably another 40, convOYS 
in addition to the 43 cruisers established, by the 1694 
legislation, (3)the, debates on the-Council of Tra'de-concern 
the navy,, but, the link between debates and navy is a 
tenuous one. At.. no, time in this . -, period. was -a, naval- 
matter discussed in parliament in a completely objective 
way without politics-or personalities distorting debates. 
The debates on the Council-of Trade concern the navy in 
much the same way as a battleground is relevant to the war 
Trumbull to Shrewsbury, 16 Nov. 16959 C. S. P. Dom. 
Wm. 1695,101* 
(2) C-J-XI9.339. 
(3) This must be the explanation of John Cary's 
reference to 80 ships for cruisers and convoysq 
BqM. Addit. MSS. 59540 f. 92* 
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aims over which the combatants are fighting. The navy 
in this session was incidentally the battleground between 
legislature and executive. The debates were bitte-'rt more 
so according to one writer thang 'in any parliament since 
that of 141.1(1) Throughout December and January in the 
Commons, arguments similar to those used in 1694 were. 
reiterated. 
(2) On one side it was maintained that trade 
had been so neglected in the past that it was now 
necessary to form a council, independent. of the Court, with 
full powers to deploy ships so that losses on the scale of 
past years would become impossible. The Court replies 
dwelt upon the dangers of such a council, how its powers - 
would growq reducing, the King to the r; tatus, of a 'Duke of 
Venice. #(3) No one, in any of these debates, seems to have 
(1) J. Harvey to Mr. Mercier 13 Dec. 1695, 
-H. 
M*C- 
Downshire I Pt. 111 597. - (2) C-J-XI9 335,422-4,440. The arguments are given 
in Burnet 111,180; Bonnet Dispatches, B. M. Addit. 
ASS. 30,000 Aq ff. 2-3,7-89 16; L'Hermitage 
00 Dispatches Addit. MSS. 17,677 QQ, ff- 1809 229v 
N. 
- 
Tindal OP-cit- 309-10: and generally considered 
in R. M. Leesgo'p. cit. 48-60. The House of Lords 
concentrated on an investigation of the Darien scheme 
and an elaborate consideration of the 1695 losses. 
Their investigations uncovered no obvious naval 
failure, H. M. C. H. L. 111 64-189. 
(3) Burke considered that such fears were justifieds 
Ehrman 570-71, 
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considered whether the 'navy was'strong enough or had the 
administrative-capacity to provide'enough-ships and work 
for two, ýmasters. -'- The' , issue was decided in the Court's 
favour 1ýLrgely by the revulsion of, feeling towards William 
caused by the well publicised news of the Fenwick 
assassination plotj(l)and a Council of Trade was established 
to'advise Xing,. -and, Admiralty on'the allocation of convoYs 
to foreign'trade. " 
Despite-the friction with the Admiralty the new 
Council'Worked-well. In'Co-operation with the merchants 
it'produced the first, over all scheme of convoy organiBa- 
tion and-thiB worked well in 1696 and 1697'. 
(2) 
The merchants 
had'in fact reinforced the generally accepted responsibility 
of the state that planned their convoys and a law that 
allocated cruisers to safeguard home waters. These 
successes had been achieved largely despite the state, 
and with the-help of parliament either directlyt as in 
the, 1694,.. legislation,, or-, indirectly, through fear of such 
7 
I. K. Steele op. cit. 42. 
(2) Report to the Lord Justices on Convoys, 30 Sept. 1696, 
P. R. O. C. O. 324/6 ff. 71-81* 
(3) This being so, it is to the Tories rather than, the 
Whigs that the merchants should have owed gratitude 
and political allegiance, because, if party names 
are to be used in the reign of William, Tory groups 
in opposition helped the merchants to both successes 
against the courtier opposition of Whig Ministries. 
legislation in 1696. 
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This conjunction of advice on 
I 
convoys and legislation on cruisers does seem to have 
protected trade succeBSfUlly. fOr_the rest of the war;, the 
1OBBeB Of 1695 and earlier years were not repeated. 
(') 
It would, however, be unwise to attribute more than a 
share in the credit for this success to either better 
organised convoys or statutory cruisers. At last 
Admirals and Admiralty_were cautiously accepting the fact 
that the menace of the main French fleet had lessened. 
Thus more ships were available for trade defence. The 
traders had been quicker in, adapting themselves to the 
guerre de course. Much American trade now returned 
Inorthabout', via, St. George's Channel2,, thus avoiding the 
main danger from St. Majo. 
(3) 
The Mediterranean trade, 
developed Irunners', fast ships, powered by sweeps as well 
as sails, that could sail independent. 1y,, of convoys and 
secure from privateers. 
(4) 
(1) Merret to Popple, 24 May 1709, Col. S. P. Col. Amer. 
& W. I. 1708-9,317.1 
(2) Ehrman 603; G. J. Marcus,, Naval History of England 
(1961) 1,210, records the fact with the wrong 
motives, 
(3) P. R. O. Adm. 3/12,7 Aug. '-1695; C&S. P. Dom. W. & M. 
1694-59,138-9- ibid " 1696,230 " 
(4) Tolson to Thomis Hammond, 26 Oct. 1704,11 find my 
ship to sail so that I fear none', if I have but sea 
room. I rowedher (at) two knots in a calm. " The 
Papers of Thomas Bowrey, ed. Lt. Col. Sir R. Carnac 
Temple', (Hakluit Society LVIII, 1925) 208-9; see also 
Edward Gould's evidence 29 Jan. 1708, H-M-C- H. L. VII9 
182. 
271* 
Despite the growing security with'which trade was 
managed after 1695 both Houses'had developed a concern 
for the efficiency of cruisers and convoys. On 4 February 
1695 the Commons had a clause added to the Land Tax Bill 
ordering that the Admiralty should present to the House 
each year an account of cruisers and convoysl apparently 
because the Admiralty had neglected to provide'the House 
with such an account for-the past year. The analysis of 
this list when it was eventually prepared was so difficult 
and took so long that the 
(2) this session. Accounts 
Admiralty escaped criticism in 
of cruisers and convoys were 
presented to parliament late in 1695 and in 1696. They 
formed the basis for searching interrogations of naval 
officials and officers by committees of the Commons and 
Lords. 
(3) 
These encounters are-notable-for the expert and, -,, - 
C. J. XIj 221, Such accounts were required by law 
6&7, W. & M. c 3'clauseq LXXV; see above p. 259 fn. 1 
(2) A very painstaking and shrewd criticism of thi ,s list was drawn up'by the Commissioners-of Accounts. 
It analysed trade protection on a day to day basis 
and'as well as more than fifty specific criticibms 
on'points of detail it proved that between 1 Oct. 
1693 and 1 Dec. 1694 10,413 days of cruiser and 
convoy protection were provided instead of the 
16,985 the law. required. There seems to be no 
record of the Commons using this analysisq B. M. 
Harlean 79474 ff. 1-5. 
(3) For the presentation of lists see C. J-XI, 5691619- 
Copies of these lists may be found in P. R. O. Adm. 
7/333 f-243; P. R. O. Adm. 7/334 f-56. The questions 
and answers based on the lists are scattered in both 
volumes but examples are P. R. O. Adm. 7/333 ff-57-63; 
P. R. 0, Adm- 7/334 ff. 495951-56. 
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confident way in which the interrogators are answerddtý-*,. 
either verbally or in writing. 
(') 
Reasoned and convincing 
attempts are made to show that such losses as the 
merchants have suffered are but a small proportion of 
the trade (2) and some of the Commons may have been made to 
realise for the first time that protecting trade was more 
than politics and paper work but involved men, ships and 
above all, vast expanses of sea. 
(3) Such contact seems to 
have been the first occasion in William's reign in which 
the naval views on trade protection were put to 
representatives of either House. Certain weaknesses in 
the system of trade protection were generally apparent. 
In the main they sprang from the weaknesses of men and 
material. The efficiency of a cruiser depended upon the 
(1) For exampleg P. R. O. 7/334 f-17- 
(2) 'The merchants do trade during this time of 
extraordinary action with almost as much freedom 
as in time of peace; ' P. R. O. Adm. 7/333 f-91- 
(3) As Berkeley wrote of the Soundings, 'A strong 
sq4adron in the Soundings looks well and pleases 
people on shore .... (but does not) secure 
our trade so much as is thought, for though the 
Soundings be a pass, it is a pass of mighty extent 
and our Ships are foul; ' Berkeley to Shrewsbury 
1 Aug. 1696, H. M. C. Buccleuch and Queensberry II 
Pt. 1: 376; the Admiralty said much the same to the 
House of Lords P. R. O. Adm. 7/333 f-91. 
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qualities of the captain and some lacked the skill and 
endurance required. 
(') A cruiser that had been at sea a 
month stood little chance of catching a privateer one week. 
out of St. Malo but there were no arrangements for the 
regular cleaning of the cruiser force. 
(2) Squadrons of 
cruisers, such as the Soundings squadron2 were subject 
to special difficulties. In 1696 and 1697 the defence 
of the, Soundings was largely abandoned because the 
squadrons ran short of food. 
(3) 
None the less these are 
merely'defects of a system that by 1697 did provide 
substantial protection for, the bulk of English trade and 
a. system. that was to act as a precedent for the wars of 
the. eighteenth century. -1 . 11 
With peace the navy reverted to more prosaic tasks, 
defending trade', still, but now against pirates, not only 
(1) An Essay towards Carrying, -on-the Present War, against 
France (16987), Harleian Miscellany X9 376; R. 
Gibson, Reflections on our Naval Strength, Naval 
Miscellany II OP-cit., 157; Luttrell 111,454. 
(2) Berkeley to Shrewsbury, 16 July 1696, H. M. C. 
Buccleuch and Queensberry II Pt. 1,369; Memorial 
'by Tobias Bowles-to Lord High Admiral, 24 July 1702, 
C. S. P. Dom. Anne 1,196. 
(3) C. S. P. Dpme-Wm-1696,392; ibid. 1697 200-9276ý 
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the traditional Algerine pirate but also the more modern 
western variety. 
(') 
The Kidd scandal and the reports of the 
Council of Trade brought piracy to the notice of parliament 
but the act which was passed as a result of this interest 
did nothing to compel the navy to greater efforts. 
(2) The 
activities of, smugglers and foreign ships encroaching on 
English trade, -or fisheries were likewise dealt with by the 
navy in the normal course, of its duties. one aspect of 
the smuggling did lead to parliamentary di: pection of the 
deployment of the, navy in the same way as it had legislated 
over cruisers. in 1694. ý 
By an act of 1698 the Lord High 
Admiral was instructed, to appoint, twelve small ships to 
stop the. export of wool. from Ireland to countries other 
than England, 
(3) 
G. N. Clark, The Barbary Corsairs in-the Seventeenth 
Centuryq Cambridge Historical Journal, Vol. VIII 
No. 1 (1944) 22-25; P. Grosse, Piracyt M-M-36 (1950) 
337-3451 The Rise and Progress of Piratesq Ministry 
of Defence Library'(Naval Section) Corbett MSS. VI 
ff. 9-10. 
(2) -11 Wm- III-c 7 (1700)-An Act for the, more effectual 
Suppnession of Piracy. 
(3) 10 Wm.! II c 16An Act to prevent the Exportation of 
, Wool., Clause XVI establishes two fifth rates, 
two 
sixth rates and eight sloops for these duties. 
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(ii) 
1702-1714 
When war came again in 1702 the lessons on trade 
protection afforded by the 1689-97 War were still 
sufficiently fresh for there to be a practically 
unanimous EngIish appreciation of the measures necessary., 
In May the House of Lords advised the Queen that the 
French_naval preparations showed the enemy, was., embarked 
on a 'piratical war' against our commerce and that it 
was necessary to consider means of defence. 
(') In June 
the Privy Council demanded a weekly statement of, cruisers 
from the Admiralty. (2) In July Marlborough, from the 
(3) Hague, was confirming the'need for such defence. 
George, Prince of Denmark, and as Lord High Admiral the 
titular head of the navy, and his Council, were receiving 
(4) -ýýis 6-- --- similar advice. ounci apparent appreciation 
(1) L,. 
_J. 
XVII_, 147, 
(2) Nottingham to Burchett,, 30 June 1702, C. S. P. Dom.., 
Anne 1,146. 
(3) Quoted J. H. Owen, War at Sea Under Queen Anne 
(1938) 34* 
(4) C. S. P. Dom. Anne 1,45,196. 
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of the needs of trade can be seen in the scheme for 
naval dispositions in 1703 that it forwarded to the 
Secretary of State, Nottingham, at the end of 1? 02. 
There were 167 fighting ships to be deployed; 110 Of them 
were allocated to trade defence; although the: scheme was 
obviously tentative because, as the Council pointed out, 
if this-numberýof ships were devoted-to trade defenceg the 
main fleet would be dangerously weak. 
(') The lavishness 
with which trade was to be protected is in great contrast 
to-the forces thus'employed between-1689 and 16939 although 
there was not-In reality such a great difference between 
the early years of the two wars,, for the 1702 scheme- 
remained a paper aspiration. -A Mediterranean fleet was 
(2)and 
commercial necessary for"strategic and economic reasons, 
and political pressures-at home soon disrupted the pattern 
of defence as. planned by the Prince's Couneil,, 
(, 3)and the, 
defence of English trade between 1702 and 1707 was badly 
managed. 
(1) Prince's Council to Nottingham, 2 Dec. 17029 C-S-P& 
Dom. Anne 1,325-7. 
(2) Merret to Council of Trade and Plantationsq 29 Jan. 
1702, C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W. I. 1702,52-3. 
(3) For example, losses from collier convoys and pressure 
from London merchants forced the Prince's Council to 
increase the strength of the convoys from four to 
six ships as early as 21 July 1703, P. R. O. Adm. 2/ 
3659 21 July 1703. 
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Majorfailures worthy'of public comment were 
infrequent, but cha'racteristic of this*period were 
frustrating convoy delays and hindevedý'coastal, communica- 
tions. Duringý1703 practicallyýevery foreign trading 
(1) 
groUP cOMPlained"at-least, once about convoy'delays. 
Even though'the"ierchants'-were themselves responsible- 
for some delays, 
(2) 
much blýLme must be attributed--to'the 
Prince's Council for its lack of organisation and fore-ý 
sight. 
(3) The other aspect ofýnaval, defenceq- the'deploy- 
ment of cruisers against the 'little pilfering privateers, 
was equally'faulty. ' The strength of the three main units 
of defence, in home . waters, the Soundings squadron, the 
Irish, Squadron and the'Collier'convoys, was generýly 
maintained but at the - cost ý of the 'screen'of cruisers that 
defended the rest of the coast, 'The number of these 
W C. S. P, ''Dom. " Anne II Barbados 'complaints' 368 352, -- 
Africa 352, Lisbon 367,368 (five in all) Maryland 
351o 
(2) - See above pp. 219-20* - 
(3) An indication of this is the list the Council sent 
to Nottingham in Dec. 1704 of the cruisers and ' 
convoys for 1705 (P. R. O. Adm. 2/3659 2. Dec. 1704). 
It is an impressive list though it has small 
relevance to the ships actually employed in 1705. 
It ist moreover, an exact copy of a list earlier 
submitted for 1702 (C. S. P. Dom. Anne It 326-7)- 
(4) N. M. M. Southwell Sou/7 f. l. 
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cruisers fell well below that maintained in the last 
years of the_1689-97 War and the Channel itself was 
particularly neglected. 
(') The anger at these varied 
failings and the consequent losses was more difficult 
to justify before parliament than a disaster of Smyrna 
Convoy dimensions, but they provoked a growing and wide- 
spread dissatisfaction. The first months of the war, 
1704, and the last months of 1705 seem to have been the 
worst periodB'for shipping losses before the mismanage" 
ment culminated in the disasters of 1707- 
(2) 
Parliamentary reaction to these failings is 
surprisingly slight after the sustained interest the 
Commons had shown in trade protection between 1693 and 
1697. One reason for this is once again the reluctance 
of a predominantly Tory Commons to criticise a ministry 
dominated by their own leaders or a Council for naval 
(1) See Appendix VIII* 
(2) Burnet IV, 75; -A. Boyer, History of the Life and Reign of Queen Anne (1722) 2129 309; N. Tindal 
Op-cit- IV Pt-, I2 6112 7152 Vol- IV Pt-II2 729-30; 
Luttrell Y, 453; T. S. Ashton, Economic Fluctuations 
in England 1700-1800 (1957) 58; T. C. Smout, Scottish 
Trade on the Eve of the Union 1660-1707 (1963) 256; 
W. R. Scott, The Constitution and Finance of English2 
Scottish and Irish Joint Stock Companies to 1720 
(1912) 12 372. 
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affairs controlled by the Queen's husband., , 
The nature 
of the grievances was not material for parliamentary 
interest; the grievance aroused by, delayed convoy or the 
temporary, disruption of,, trade along a stretch of coast 
faded with the arrival of convoy or cruisers. There was 
little patriotic incentive or factional profit in 
criticising one aspect of a navy which on'the big-lissues, 
at Vigo and Malaga, was obviously doing its duty. In 
the_House of Lords there were . proportionately, more, 
opponents of the ministry. , 
The Junto Whigs all held their 
I 
seatB here. They too realised the futility of attacking 
the management of. the navy., without amajor issue on which 
to rally. sympathy. By a series of investigations they 
soutSht to secure enough evidence for such an attack and-at 
the same time served notice of their strength and opposition. 
Thus parliamentary interest in cruisers and convoys between 
1702 and, 1707 was desultoryl with Lords rather than 
Commons taking the initiative. There was, however, in 
both Houses a-progressive increase in-concern that 
reached a climax in the session of 1707-8. 
The new tolerance in the Commons was present from the I 
very first weeks, of the 1702-3-session. On 26 October the 
Queen was thanked for her care of the tradeg(')the'first 
(1) C. J. Xivq 
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and only time between 1689 and 1713 that the state was 
thanked for this duty. The only other aspect of trade 
defence considered in this session was the protection of 
the collier convoys and this interest was soon directed 
towards the activities of merchants who monopolised 
coal. 
(') 
A resolution that more convoys should be provided 
for this trade was acted on by the Admiralty 
(2)but the 
difficulties of protecting the colliers led the House of 
Lords to-consider the matter again in-the 1703-4 session. 
(3) 
Towards the end of this session, in March 1704, the Lords 
investigated the strength of cruisers and convoys and 
asked for a greater force to be used. 
(4) The address was 
generally regarded as an oblique attack on the Lord High 
Admiral and his Council by the Whigs and-no action was taken 
on it. 
(5) 
The Lords returned to the same issue in the 1704-5 
session with similar effects. 
(6) 
(1) Luttrell V, 319,322; H. M. C. H. L. V, 227-239; 
R. Smith, Sea Coal for London (1961) 18,35-6; 
C. J. XIVI 19,63. 
(2) See above p., 276. The extra convoys were provided at 
the expense of the Russia trade, an indication of 
the hierarchy of priorities on which protection was 
allocated, P. R. O. Adm. 3/18,27 July, 1703. 
(3) L. J. XVII, 3919 395,461; H. M. C. H. L. V, 229-31. 
(4) L. J. XVII, 466,470; H. M. C. H. L. VI 469. 
(5) A. Boyer,, Life of Her Late Majesty Queen Anne (1721) 
Il 238-9. 
(6) Memoirs of the Late Rt. Hon. John, Lord Haversham (1711) '?;; A. Boyer, A History of the Life and Reign of 
Queen Anne (1722) 163-177; L. J. XVIII 584,622-41 627, 
643,6499 
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Merchant losses in 1705. were more serious and were 
concentrated in the late summer, and were thus a fresh 
and relevant topic for parliamentary consideration. The 
Commons ignored them but in the Lords Wharton and Somers 
started a debate on them at the opening of the session with 
a precipitancy that is tactically similar to their more 
effective campaign in 1707- 
(lITheir 
complaint was reinforced 
I 
by unexpected support from the Tories, Rochester and 
Guernsey, who were expressing this dissatisfaction with an 
increasingly moderate and Marlborough-dominated ministry in 
the guise of concern over trade. The opposites did not 
work well together and for the third successive year the 
Whig attack came to nothing. 
(2) In the same session the 
Commons took their first positive action in Anne's reign on 
I 
trade protection. The complaints of the Newfoundland trade 
were always sympathetically received in the Housel both 
because it was believed that this trade provided men for 
the navy and because the south west of Englandwhich 
dominated the trade, was heavily represented in the Commons. 
Petitions f rom several of the towns involved in the trade 
led to a Commons resolution blaming the poor organisation 
(1) L. J. XVIII, 7; see below p. 291. 
(2) N. Tindal op. cit, IV, 678-9; Memoirs of the Late 
Rt. Hon. Lord John Haversham, op. cit. 29. 
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of con_voyB for-the decline of-the trade, and a 
suggestion as to, the future, strength and departure times 
of-the convoys. 
(')., 
These were late again in 1706 and more 
petitions-from the south west caused the Commons to 
consider the matter. again in the 1706-7 session., 
(2). In 
this session the Portugal traders-also petitioned about 
delayed convoys. 
(3) 
The obvious reluctance of the Commons 
to investigate these repeated naval failures is-the, more 
remarkable because. by 1706 there was. general concern at the 
state of English trade, 
(4) 
Events in 1707 made parliamentaryconsideration of 
trade protection inevitable despite the, Lord High Admiral's 
marital status.., The shipping losses of 1707 lacked the 
dramatic impact of the Smyrna catastrophe in 1693 but, hardlY 
a month of the year went by without serious losses, 
involving many areas,, and hitting most-severely the most 
important branch of, English overseas trade, -that 
to the 
Iberian Peninsula, a branch that had so far been particularly 
fortunate in both wars. 
(5) 
In February a provision fleet for 
(1) C. J. XV, 118,121,124, 146-7. 
(2) C. -J. XV, 253-4* 
(3) C. J. XVI 284. 
(4) Memoire de Mareschal d e Noaill'es., Dec . 1706, Correspondence of Col. N. Hooke, ed. - W. D. Macray 
(Roxburghe Club 1870) 11,86-7. 
(5) J. 0., McLachlan, Trade and Peace with Old Spaini. 1667- 
1750 (1940) ix; V. M. Shillington & A. B. Wallis, The 
Commercial Relations of England and Portugal 254-5. 
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the forces in Spain was broken up by Du Quesne-Mosnier 
and some fourteen ships were taken. 
(') In May, off 
Beachy Head, de Forbin destroyed the two escorts in 
charge of a large fleet of Portuguese and West Indian 
merchantmen and captured over twenty of them. 
(2) In Julyq 
Captain Sir Thomas Hardy, as commodore in charge of 
several escort vessels incurred the displeasure of the 
Portuguese merchants by not attacking a force of French 
ships sighted from his convoy. 
(3) 
In October Du Guay 
Trouin and Forbin defekted the escort vessels in charge 
of a large convoy off Plymouth and captured about fifteen 
merchantmet.. 
(4) The destruction of this convoy was the 
greatest French privateering success of the war. The 
French dominance in the Channel that this victory ensured 
enabled them to capture ships returning from the 
Mediterranean, the West Indies and Newfoundlando(5) In the 
J. H. Owen op. cit. 61; H. M. C. H. L. VIII 188; Evidence 
of Wood, P. R. O. Adm. 1/5114; Luttrell VI, 147. 
(2) C. de-la Ronciere, op. cit. VI, 441-4; L'Hermitage 
Dispatch, 27 May 1707, B. M. Addit. MSS. 17,677 CCC 
ff-107-8; Evidence of W. Wood, P. R. O. Adm. 1/5114; 
Luttrell VI, 187* 
(3) J. H. Owen, op. cit. 209-13; Luttrell VI, 222; H. M. C. 
H. L.. VII9 105,1109 195-6,221-4. 
(4) C. de la Ronciere op. cit. VI, 450-454; Luttrell VII 
225-6; J. H. Owen, op. cit. 220; Addison to the Earl 
of Manchester, 28 Oct. 1707t The Letters of Joseph 
Addison, ed. W. Graham (1941) 79-81. 
(5) Evidence of Wood, T. Palmer and N. Winter, P. R. O. 
1/5114; H. M. C. H. L. VII9 181-183. 
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same month a fleet from Hamburg was scattered in the 
mouth of the Thames by a storm and the privateers profited 
by its dispersal. (') Earlier, in northern waters, the 
Russian traders suffered private catastrophe when sixteen 
of their ships were captured after their escorts had 
turned homewards. (2) The Africa Company with a very bad 
record of losses in the past two years, contributed one 
ship to the to,, of 1707. 
(3) In the West Indies another 
aspect of trade protection had caused trouble when the 
senior naval officer at Jamaica, Captain Kerr, had made 
such exorbitant demands for convoy money that he had been 
Addison to the Earl of Manchester, 28 Oct. 
1707, The Letters of Joseph Addison, op. cit. 
79- 
(2) J. H. Owen op. cit. 200; Luttrell VII 199; H. M. C. 
H. L. VII9 100-01 1059 111-13; The Byng Papersq 
ed. B. Tunstall 
ZN. R. S. 1930) 247-8; Dawson's 
evidence P. R. O. Adm. 1/5114. 
(3) K. G. Davies op. cit. 208; W. R. Scott op-cit. It 
374. 
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refused and three rich sloops, had been captured. 
(') Beside 
the well documented disasters to the foreign trades 
information about coastal trade is uneven but there is 
evidence of successful privateer pressure from Land's End 
to East Anglia. 
(2) 
Although 1707 is not associated with a 
major fleet action or major disaster, it deserves to rank 
with 1690 or 1941 as one of those rare and decisive years 
when the English people felt that their command of the 
Channel was lost* 
Kerr's activities were the subject of lengthy 
investigations by both Houses. The investigations 
took place at the same time as the more important 
naval debates of the 1707-8 session; L. J. XVIII9 348% 
393t 395,404,405,439,449-50; C-J-XV9 527,546-7; 
H. M. C. H. L. VIII 1009 103-10,168-709 181. 
Another consideration, that of trade from Jamaica to 
the Spanish West Indies, occupied the Lords especially 
during the 1707-8 session, in the same months as they 
considered trade protection. The traders to Jamaicaq 
ably led by Sir Gilbert Heatheote'and Sir Batholemew 
Gracedieu with Whig support, were successful in 
obtaining far greater freedom of tr'ade-by the Act for 
the Encouragement of the Trade to America (6 Anne c 
37). This act is considered below p. 412. For the 
considerations of trade involved see C. Nettelsq 
England and the Spanish African Trade 1680-17159 
Journal of Modern History III (Mar-Dee 1931) 1-29; 
Paper on W. Indies and Barbados, H M. C. Buccleuch and 
Queensberry I Pt. 11,739-42; JourLl of the 
Commissioners for Trade and Plantations 1,355-569 
394-96; I. K. Steele op. cit. 186-194. 
(2) C. de la Ronciere op. cit. VI', 456 ff; J. H. Owen op-cito 
57; H. M. C. ZeL. VII, 134-1?; evidence of Thomas RiPon, 
Thomas Palmer and others, P. R. O. Adm. 1/5114; La 
Clef du Cabinet des Princes de 1'Europe VII (1707) 
53-4,2969 399-4009 429; ibid. VIII (1708) 123-ro, 
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It was the immediate nature of the affront, almost 
as much as the'lOBses, that'seems to have struck merchants 
and members of parliament alike. Whatever the precise 
definition of the seas over which England'elaimed 
sovereignty, -no Englishman doubted that it included the 
Channel. -Stories of a French man of war at anchor in 
Torbay or of daily sightings of privateers from Eastbourne 
and Beachy Head figure in the later evidence presented to 
parliament-not Just aB-vivid detail but as expressions of 
patriotic humuliation that could count on a response. 
(l) 
If losses in English waters were such-aB to arouse parlia- 
mentary sympathy out of proportion to the intrinsic value 
of the captures, it is also true that losses in home 
waters were harder blOWB to the merchants than losses in 
far waters. Ransom'was a common means of-'saving the 
French privateer that-'captured an English vessel some, 
trouble--and the English merchant some of his profit, and 
was more common than an ordinary capture followed by the 
English ship being sailed to a French port. 
(2) 
But in home 
waters the ran om demanded was high; the harbours of 
France were so near that'the privateer could conduct its 
H. M. C. H. L. VII, 135,190; Evidence of Thomas 
Ripon, 2 Dec. 1707, P. R. O. Adm. 1/5114. 
Evidence of Thomas Ripon, ibid. 
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capture to port and be back on station within a day. 
The ransom demanded in the Channel was so high that it 
robbed the English merchant of his last chance of profit. 
(') 
Moreover, a loss in home waters aggravated the grievance 
felt by a merchant. Loss in far waters was CUBhioned by 
uncertainty, time and the knowledge that the over all 
financial loss would be smaller. The proximity of 
success followed by loss in the very waters that the 
merchants considered should be practically English 
territory made a loss here worse. As far as the merchants 
can be seen to have had any aim in the parliamentary 
session of 1707-8, it seems to have been to make public 
their grievances and by winning sympathy, compel the 
Prince's Council to make better provision for trade 
protection. In particular they wanted more cruisers in 
home waters and a more efficient organisation of convoys. 
(2) 
Tb: ere seems to'have been on-their'part no animosity towards 
the Prince's Council, or its acknowledged leader, 
Evidence of Thomas Ripon to the House of Lordst 
2 Dec. 1707, P. R. O. Adm. 1/5114. 
(2) Petition of 154 London Merchants, presented to 
the House of Lords, 19 Nov. 17_07, H. M. C. H. L. 
VII9 99, 
f 
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George Churchill; (')certainly there was none towards 
Prince George, 
The recent political past and the precarious 
balance in the government of Moderatest Whigs and Tories 
made it natural that the Whigs should champion the 
merchant complaints and that this sympathy should be most 
warmly demonstrated in the House of Lords. Anne's 
government-had come to rely increasingly on Whig support 
and Whig officials. The Whigs now wished for the reward 
for such support in the promotion to office of more Whigs, 
including some of the Junto leaders. 
(2) 
The sim of the- 
Junto was to exploit the naval failures of 1707, an issue 
on which it could expect patriotic support from the 
political neutrals, and by the threat of an adverse vote 
against the Admiralty, to gain further promotions 
preferably at the expense of, Churchill, whose place could 
The furthest merchants would go in outright 
condemnation of Churchill was to claim that 
they 'thought' he had made certain statements$ 
H. M. C. H. L.. VII, 105.,, 185,18576- 
, 
The only real 
sharpness of complaint against the Prince's 
Council seems to have been directed against, a plan 
to make even Mediterranean 'runners' galleys sail 
in convoy, H. M. C. H. L. VIII 190. 
(2) The political crisis of 1707-8 has received, very 
full historical consideration, see G. M. Trevelyan 
op-cit. 11,312-33; W. S. Churchill op. cit. 296-316; 
R-ý. -ýWalcott op. cit. 125-54; G. S. Holmes M W. A. Speck, 
The Fall of Harley in 1708 Reconsidered, E. H. R. 
L= No. 137 (Oct. 1965) 673-91. 
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be filled by Orford, (') The Tory attitude, in so far 
as one existed in Lords and Commons was analogous to 
the Whig; here was a political issue that could be used 
to embarrass the government and compel it to buy Tory, 
support by giving Tory leaders a greater part in the 
government. Tory exploitation of the issue would of 
necessity be restrained by the realisation, that their 
part in any attack must not lead to the Whigs benefiting, 
and as a party they-had no one with the experience and 
reputation of'Orford in naval matters. The governmentt 
at this period of Anne's reign made up largely of 
moderates, who worked well with Godolphin, was concerned 
to remain independent of both parties, and like the 
parties, viewed theýmerchantB' complaints in political 
terms, with defence of this independence and the Queen's 
husband, rather than shipping, as first priorities. An 
obvious and well tried method of dealing with such attacks 
was to blame the merchants for the losses by accusing them 
This is a simplification in that it represents 
the policy of the Junto; other Whig attitudes 
developed during the session. The Whigs. could 
also expect some support in the Lords because 
previous addresses of the House on naval matters 
had been ignored. The House was frequently 
reminded of this, L. J. XVIII, 3339 4269 4309 432-3, 
4439 466-72* 
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of Blipping convoy. 
(1) it, waB'ýsupported by determined 
efforts to win the support of moderate Whigs and Tories 
to the Court. (2) Against this severely political outlook 
of the three major political'groups who would hear their 
complaints'before parliament, the merchants-could count 
on one major"circumstance in their favour; the political 
balance in 1707, as in late'1693, did impose'on all 
political groups a consideration of their complaints and 
this was some guarantee that the parliamentary neglect 
of'1702 to 1707 wou . ld not be continued. 
(3) 
(1) What seems to be Harley's brief as a Court speaker 
shows that the Court planned toýuse this argument, 
B. M. Harley Loan 29/40. 
(2) A good example of such efforts 11 is the attempt made' 
to detach Lord Shaftesbury from-his allegiance to 
the Whig Junto. , Godolphin's scheme was described 
to him as a government of men, 'who have never 
been on the stage in either party; ' it was hinted 
that he might become a Secretary of State, Sir John 
Cropley to Lord Shaftesbury, 15 Dec. 1707, P. R. O. 
_30/24/20 
f. 136 (2). Sir John Cropley's letter of 30 
Dec. 1707 shows the success of this policy on 
moderate Whigs, ibid. f. 141 (2); see also ff-1379 
139,140. Attempts'to gain Inerchant support can be 
seen in The 
' 
Norris Papers, ed. T. Heywood, (Chetham 
Society IX, 1846) 161. The list of merchants to be 
considered, for places in the Council for Trade and 
Plantations is perhaps another sign of possible 
Court patronage, H. M. C. Buccleuch & Queensberry II 
Pt. IIt 738. 
(3) Edwin to Lord Manchester,, 6 Feb. 1708, Court an4, 
Society from Elizabeth-to Anne, ed. W. Montagu, 
Duke of"Manchester (1864) 111 276; Sir John Cropley 
to Lord Shaftesbury, 15 Dec. 1707, P. R. O. 30/24/20 
f-136; Bashet Trangeript, 28 Dec. 1707, P. R. O. 31/3/ 
194 ff. 130-35* 
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In this situation, the initiative politically was 
with the Whigs and in the House of Lords they seized this 
initiative with the directness and preconcerted 
aggression in debate that. was one of-their attributes 
as a party. After hearing the., Queen's, speech, that 
opened, the session on.. 6 November 1707,,. Wharton interposed 
and instead of proposing-the customary.. vote, of thanks, 
launched into, 'an elaborate harangue. ' on the mismanage 
ment of the navy. Somers supported him, as did the. Tories, 
Buckingham, Guernsey and Rochester. The attempt of, a 
placeman, peer, Stamford, to restore the debate to-its 
customary, lines, -was defeated, one comment being that 
addresses on the-navy had been frequently ignored in the 
past. 
(') 
The topic was-considered again on 12 November and 
then, on 19-November, Wharton-presented a petition from 
the merchants. Debates on_, both days were marked by heat 
r n'% 
rather than light-cJand-the only constructive result was 
the formation of two committees of identical-, membership, 
one to consider the petition, under the chairmanship of 
(1) L. J. XVIII9 333; A. Boyer, History of the Life and 
Reign of Queen Anne (1722) 309. For the neglect 
of earlier addresses see above p. 280. 
(2) L. J -XVIII, 338,341-2; A. Boyer op-cit. 309-11; W. Coxq, Memoirs of the Duke of Marlborough, (1848) 
11,185-88; Luttrell VI, 233,236. 
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the Duke of Bolton, the other, under Halifax, to 
consider the encouragement of privateering in the West 
Indies. 
Bolton's committee--demanded from the Admiralty and 
received from the merchants a great mass of evidence. 
(') 
The depositions of the merchants were-heard with a 
courtesy notably superior to their reception in, the 
Commons. (2) On 17 December a report was sent to the 
Admiralty setting out the failures of convoy tiMi1IgBj 
intelligence and deployment of ships, particularly the 
lack of cruisers in the Cbannel. 
(3) 
The answer was 
received on 9 January and was far, from apologetic. 
(4) The 
Admiralty claimed that a-large f leet in the Mediterranean, 
insufficient men, money and ships, and the chances'of 
weather were valid excuses for many of the so-called- 
mismanagements. This unrepentant answer led the Lords 
to reconsider theýevidence, recall merchant witnesses and 
address the Queen this time, on 25 February 17089 with a 
(1) L-J-XVIII, 351-2,357,3599 359-60,362. Much of 
this evidence is printed in H. M. C. H. L. VIIs 99- 
226 but these accounts can be supplemented by the 
depositions presented to the House of Lords on 2 
and 7 December in P. R. O. Adm. 1/5114 and P. R. O. Adm- 
1/3863. 
(2) Burnet IV, 173& 
(3) L. J. XVIII, 366-92. 
(4) Ibid. XVIII, 405-22; Burnet IV,, 174. 
w 
td 
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more strongly worded account of the mismanagement of 
her navy, but stressing that this was no reflection on 
the Lord High'Admiral. (') The address was answered by the 
Queen in the same sparse wording of earlier replies and 
apparently treated with the almost traditional neglect, 
a neglect that could be justified in that by now events 
in the Commons had made the activities of the Lords 
irrelevant to the'organisation of trade protection. 
It was to be expected that the Whig championship of 
the merchants would be less well organised in the Commons, 
where there were more Tories and where the Whigs lacked 
the leadership of a senior or Junto party leader. A 
petition of merchant complaint was read to the House on 15 
November which'emphaBised the disastrous results of so few 
(3)'A 
committee was cruisers in the Soundings-and Channel. 
formed to consider the petition and the House gave the 
(4) 
topic frequent attention--in November and-December. Sir- 
Robert Onslow was chairman of the committee that heard the 
(1) L. J. XVIII, 425j 429,466-! -72,482-3. 
(2) L. J. XVIII'; 491. 
(3) C. J. 
-XV, 
404-5; Luttrell VI, 234. 
(4) C. J. XV, 435-69 437,4389 4529 4659 
' 
4719 472. In the 
same months the House was also considering the 
collusive trade in French wine, not a study 
calculated to nourish sympathy for the merchants, 
ibid. XV, 435,437,439,4559 464. 
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evidence of the merchants and he won notice for the 
way in whichrhe defended them from heckling interruptions. 
(') 
Onslow waBtalWhig yet it waB Hampden rather than he'who 
constantly attempted to reach a conclusion critical-of 
(2) the Admiralty. Apart from Hampden the rest of-the House 
showed an obvious disinclination to do more than listen 
in a reasonably sympathetic-way to the complaints against 
the navy. 
(3) 
This apathy cannot be simply attributed to 
the-restraint-of the Tories through-fears for, Orford's 
promotion or the politicalLdangers of attacking Prince 
George's department. - There was great difficulty in 
proving conclusively that Churchill or the Prince's Council 
was actually-responsible for particular losses. The 
complications of doing this were-recognised by both 
merchants and the Commons. 
(4) 
Nor were the merchants - 
united or sure of, a remedy for thelosses they-hadsuffered. 
(1) A. Boyer, op-cit. 312o 
(2) Vernon Letters 111,293. Richard Hampden, M. P.. 
for Wendover, a kinsman and adherent of Wharton. 
(3) Vernon Letters 111,286,293,294; A. Boyer op-cit. 
312; Addison to Lord Manchester, 16 Dec. 17079- 
Letters of Joseph Addison op. cit. 83- 
(4) Vernon Letters 111,293; Bashet Transcript 28 Dec. 
1707 P. R. O. 31/3/194 f-134; Sir Ceg=ge? 'Cropley to 
Lord Shaftesbury, - 15 Dec. 1707, P. R. O. 30/24/20 
f-136 (2)9 
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The complaint of the Russian merchants over their 
losses was separately and convincingly answered. 
(') Sir 
Gilbert Heathcote, who had supported Dawson of the Russia 
Company, alienated some members by the extravagance of 
his speech and hardly strengthened the unity of the 
merchants by proposing a resolution restricted to the 
Jamaican trade, the one that most concerned. him. 
(2) 
Heathcote's vehement loyalty to the Whig cause was too 
partisan in that most of the merchants were perturbed at 
the political exploitation of their losses. Tory 
merchants, like the two Hernes(3)and, 
-more 
significantlyg 
moderates like the Heysham brothers, 
(4) 
made it very clear 
that the Prince's Council was not the object of their 
attack; they wanted protection, not revenge. 
(5) This 
divergence of aim amongst the merchants themselves is the 
best explanation of CritiCiBMS that they managed their-, 
(1) Vernon Letters 111,283; Lord High Admiral to Byng. ) 
28 Nov 1707 The Byng Papers, ed. B. Tunstall 
(N. R. S: 19305 247-8* 
(2) Vernon Letters III, 286o 
(3) Frederick and Nathaniel, cousins, M. P. s for Dartmoutho 
They were interested in trade to Newfoundland, East 
and West Indies and America.. They were both 
generally Tory but Nathaniel became Whimsical in 
1713* 
(4) Robert and William, M. P. s for Lancaster. They were 
interested in trade to Africa, Barbados and America. 
Of the two Robert seems to have been the more active 
and wealthier, thus he probably made the-significant 
proposal in this session, see below p., 297. 
(5) Vernon Letters III, 287o 
-------- 
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case badly. 
(') A poorly managed attack stood little 
chance against a determined and powerful defence, backed, 
according to Burnet, by bribery and promises of 
Court. (2 Ai promotion from the George Churchill himself 
defended the actions of the Prince's Council ably and 
aggressively, even telling the Commons that important 
naval work was hindered by the documentation required 
for their investigation. (ý) He was very well supported, 
and the Whig attack itself weakened, by the verbal 
assistance or neutrality of a group of Whigs represented 
by Robert Walpole, Sir Joseph Jekyll, and Sir Peter King. 
(4) 
These Whigs, from a mixture of motives - jealousy of the 
Junto , patriotism, the direction of their political 
masters, traditional 'Country' opposition, or concern for 
their own posts(5)- helped the Court in debate. Out of 
(1) Burnet IV, 1739 - 
(2) Ibid. IV, 173; see above p. 290. 
(3) Vernon to Shrewsbury 4 Sept. 6 Dec. and 13 Dec. 
Vernon Letters 111,283-49 287,293. 
(4) Ibid. 111,287,293; R. Walcott op. cit. 131-349 1409 
149-50; G. S. Holmes & W. A. Speck op. cit. 680. 
(5) The moderate and 'country' revulsion of Whigs from 
the Junto leaders is well expreSBed in a letter 
from Molesworth to Lord Shaftesbury 18 Dec. 1707 
P. R. O. 30/24/20 f-137. The transient opposition of 
the Whig inclined or Whig magnates, the Dukes of 
Newcastle, Somerset and Devonshire, is seen in Sir 
George Cropley to Lord Shaftesbury 30 Dec. 1707 
ibid. f. 141 (l)-141(2)9 
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the confused and bad-tempered debates came at the last 
a studiously innocuous resolution from Onslow's committee 
on 18 December, recommending that there should be a 
-1 1,1 ýFl 
'sufficient' number of cruisers to protect trade in home 
waters. 
(') 
The House accepted this resolution as part of 
an address on the navy. 
Thus ended the political attack, but on their own 
initiative, the merchants had gained a security for their 
trade far stronger than a mere resolution. In one of the 
more violent debates, on 6 December, one of the Heyshams 
had recommended that a number of cruisers be specifically 
allocated to trade-defence. 
(2) This was an excellent 
compromise suggestion; it was free from political 
accusation, it involved no more than an indirect reflection 
on the Lord High Admiral, and it was sanctioned and softened 
by the precedent of the 1694 legislation. A, small committee 
was formed to consider the suggestion and the proposed. 
(1) C. J. XV, 472s 
(2) Vernon'to Shrewsbury, 6 Dec. 1? 07, Vernon Letters., 
111,286. 
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legislation that emerged-passed both Houses without 
difficulty. (') 
The act was substantially the same as the cruiser 
and convoy-clauses in the 1694 Land Tax Bill. 
(2)'It 
was 
generally known as the Cruisers and Convoy Act, an 
accurate, enough title in the priority it awarded to the 
cruisers; indeed the emphasis on cruisers was so great 
that the Cruisers Act would be a better, title. - In this 
emphasis it reflected both an awareness of the deficiencies 
C. J. XVI'--485,4959 5179 5292 541 , 543; L. J. XVIII9 474,481. The committee consisted of nine 
members. Threb were merchants, Heysham (probably 
Robert), Sir Gilbert Heathcote and John Ward., a 
Hamburg merchant. Ward was politically moderate 
but had supported Heathcote's attack on the 
Admiralty (Vernon Letters 111,283). There were 
three government members, the Attorney General, 
Henry Paget and Walpole, the last two both being 
members of the Prince's Council. William Farr6r, 
a Junto Whig and lawyer, Francis Scobell, a 
kinsman of Seymour and Onslow were the remaining 
three members. ' 
6 Anne c 65, An Act for the-better securing the 
Trade of this Kingdom by Cruisers and Convoys. 
The most obvious similarities are the allocation 
of 43. ships and the reservation that in emergency- 
they might be withdrawn from such duties (Clause 
II) Clause I allocated the ships and-stipulated 
they should be careened; Clause III dealt with the 
appointment of a superintendent Clause IV with the 
annual parliamentary account; Clause V with the 
appointment, of ships. 
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revealed by the 1707 losses in home waters and'the 
general interest of the majority of both Houses in 
coastal trade. The main differences between the 
legislation of 1694 and 1708 were such as would make 
cruisers more effective and perhaps show the influence 
of the merchants on the committee that prepared the bill. 
Although the number of ships to be employed was the same 
as those appropriated in 1694 it was a more powerful 
force because it contained a larger proportion of ships 
of the higher rates, a reinforcement made necessary by the 
squadronal tactics of the French privateers in 1707- 
(1) 
It was-stipulated that an official of senior status should 
be appointed to be superintendent of cruisers, minor 
officials in harbours should record the sailing and arrival 
of cruisers, ships should be careened three times a year 
(without reduction of the number in service), and parlia- 
ment should be given an account of the ships employed early 
in each session. - The'first of these additions ensured that 
The table below summarises the ships appointed by 
the 1694 and 1708 legislation; 
Rate 3 4 5 6 Total 
1694 
1708 
4 
6 
16 
20 
13 
13 
10 
4 
43 
43 
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parliament would be able to find the man respon; ible 
if necessary, the last that parliament would be able to 
check that 43 cruisers were used, Twelve of the ships 
were specifically allocated to duties on the northern 
coasts of Great Britain which resulted in the Scottish 
coastal trade receiving more effective protection than 
ever before. If one merchant-can speak for them all.,. 
the act was popular; in February 1708 a Liverpool 
merchant wrote, 'It is-a good bill and I hope it will 
be of service. '(') Five years of war remained to test it. 
The act was speedily implemented by the navy. 
Officials to-supervise cruiser captains were appointed - 
and more ships employed in coastal-waters than ever before 
in the reigns of William and Anne. 
(2) Powerful squadrons 
in the Soundings and off Dunkirk and a thicker screen of 
cruisers round the English and Scottish coasts meant that 
from 1708 the navy generally provided nearly as many 
T. Johnson to R. Morris, 12 Feb. 17089 The Norris 
Papers, ed. T. Heywood (Chetham Society TX9 1846) 
167* 
(2) For'officials and ships see P. R. O., Adm. 3/239 31 Mar, 
22 May 1708. One clause of the act seems to have 
been ignored: no specific official was made 
responsible for cruisers and convoys. The 
tradition of the Admiralty and Navy Boards was one 
of collective responsibility. 
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ships for"these duties'as parliament required. ý(') ý 
Apparentlyl tool'these measures were effective* The 
complaintsýof the merchants became few and there is 
considerableq, -contemporary testimony to the freedom 
with which"British-trade operated after 1707, 
(2) The 
Cruisers-an&, Convoys'Act is not in itself, the'only 
reason for this:. --testimony. - Events in the Mediterranean, 
the destruction of the'French fleet at Toulon andýthe 
capture of Minorca, eased the strain on the navy. At- 
home Orford-at last-regained controllof the Admiralty 
after Prince George's death in 1? 08. - His determined 
attempt. to reintroduce method and plan into the provision, 
of convoys and Leakels efficiency at sea also helped trade 
'(3) protection, Modern historians 
See Appendix, VIII. The lists prepared-by the Navy--, 
Board usually-show more ships than the 43 ±equired 
by, law but achieve this by including ships that 
, are not strictly cruisers or convoys, see 
below 
PO 517. 
Du Guay Trouin,, 19 Nov. 1709, *quoted 0. de la 
Ronci6re op. cit. VI, 469; Admiral Vernon to the 
Admiralty, - 24 Nov. 1745, quoted H. W-* Richmond, The 
Navy in.. the War of 1739-48 (1920) 11,116 fn; 
N. Tindal op. cit. 11,117,143; S. Martin Leakeg 
Life of Sir John Leake (N. R. S. 1920) 2411ý 400; 
Burnet-IV,. 201-2.227. 
(3) P. R. O. Adm. 3/24 passim. 
I 
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have generally accepted these reasons and the supporting 
evidence as proof that British merchants had little , 
justification for complaint about losses after 1707-(, 
') 
The most convincing and important evidence to the 
I 
contrary is the work of Professor J. S. Bromley, who t from 
the, Records of. the High Court of Admiralty and,, especiallyg 
the French Prize Courts,, has provided the first reliable 
figures for allied shipping losses between 1702 and 1713. 
(2) 
These figures do not show any great lessening of merchant 
losses after 1707; indeed 1711 was the most disastrous. year 
of the war. 
(3). There. is no recorded parliamentary reaction 
J. A. Williamson, A Short History of English 
Expansion: The Old Colonial Empire (1930) 335; 
J. U. Nef, The Rise of, the British Coal Industry 
(1932) 111 385; Queen Anne's Navy 340; G. N. Clark, 
War Trade and Trade War 1701-1713, Econ. Hist. -Rev. 1 (1927-8) 264; R. Davis op-cit. 328; The Trade of 
Bristol-in the Eighteenth Century, ed. W. E. 
Minchinton, Bristol Record Society XX (1957) xfn. 
(2) J. S. Bromley, The French Privateering War 1702-13 in 
Historical, Essays 1600-1750 ed. H. E. Bell and R. L. 
Ollard (1964) 203-31* 
(3) In particular Professor Bromley writes of these 
figures, 'This argues only a very limited success 
for the new emphasis on trade defence in British 
naval policy which followed the Cruisers and Convoy 
Actýof March 1708,! ibid. 229; see also 215,219 
fn. This opinion is confirmed by the year 1711 
proving a very bad year for the export of Wool; see 
T. S. Ashton, Economic Fluctuations in England 1700- 
1800 (1957) 58. 
0, 
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to such losses; the debates* that preceded the, 1708 Act 
were the last in Anne's reign concerning-trade defence. 
(') 
The conflict of evidence and the lack of parliamentary 
response to, the losses of' 1711 are- susceptible of 
explanation. " It has been seen how on'the three occasions 
when merchant'grievane'es contributed, towards action on 
trade defence, iný'1694, -1696 and 1707-8, 'this was the' 
result'of parliamentary sponsorship'by a party or groups 
of the merchant case. , Such sponsorship would have been 
inexpedient in the 1711-12 session either for the Whigsq 
whose activities were concentrated against the Pea66ý or 
for ()xford's Ministry, --whose supporters had'been led"by 
St. John to attack merchant influence. 'Nor would the 
sympathy of the-non-merchant, politically'mOderate9 
member have been engaged by the losses of 1711-- This 
sympathy, the product of the inconvbAience'consequent 
on a disruption of the coastal-trade and some pdtriot: Lsms 
I 
an apparently decisive factor in-the legislation of 1694 
and 1708, would not-be'strong in 1711- In one way, at 
least, the Cruisers and 
. Convoy Act worked well - the 
coastal,, trade was protected -'and the link between_ 
There were merchant complaints in 1711 but they 
were not considered by parliament, Burnet IV, 
2734o 
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merchant and ordinary member of parliament waB not 
present. Most of the 1711 losses occurred in the 
Mediterranean. The privateering-ports thatýmost nearly 
concerned England, St. Malo, Brest, Dunkirk and the 
Breton harbours, had fewer successes after 1708-(l-) The 
contemporary evidence that is practically unaniMOUB on the 
success of the navy-in defending tra I de from-1708 to 1713 
reflects a satisfaction that the home waters were secure. 
In the years of war between 1688 and 1714 Britishý 
merchants had lost mo I re, than 10,00 .0 ships(2)y6t' the 
French'guerre'de course'failed in its strategic aims. 
This failure must in part be attributed to the parlia- 
mentary pressure of 1694 and 1? 08 that compelled the navy 
to employmore and more ships for the defence of trade. 
The motives that impelled parliamentary action'were, 
confused andfrequently selfish yet the parliamentary 
obsession with the protection of home waters was 
strategically- sound: '. In*'Mahan"s-'opinionq 
'The greatest strength, of British sea, power in 
the classical period had lain in the fact 
that it was able to compress all its; manifold 
J. S. Bromley Op. cit. 215- The ports of the 
Calais-Granville coastline increased their 
captures but mainly at the expense of the Dutchq 
ibid. 231* 
(2) Ibid. 213-6; R. Davis OP-cit. 315-8. This figure 
includes all sizes Of ships in both warB but 
excludes ships ransomed. 
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offensive and defensive functions into 
a single task of relatively limited 
dimensions, the establishment of the 
'command' of the Narrow Seas of Western 
Europe. '(') 
This rationalisation of the problems of the defence of 
British trade that had seemed impossible of solution in 
1668 was helped by parliament's Cruisers and Convoy 
legislation. The Western Squadron, which was the pivot 
of British naval power, has as its ancestor the Soundings 
Squadron, which emerges and increases in strength between 
1688 and 1714. Admittedly the Soundings Squadron 
established in these years was defensive in function(2) 
but one of the precedents upon which the sea power of the 
eighteenth century rested had been established. Also 
established by 1714, by right of frequent usage, was the 
right of the merchants to be heard in parliament. 
A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Seapower upon History (19579,1, st. Pub- 1890) 196* 
(2) one consequence of parliamentary interest in cruisers 
and convoys was a reluctance of naval officers 
employed on such duties to use initiative when a 
chance came to damage the enemy Sir Robert Sutton, 
12 Feb. 1711, The Dispatches of Sir Robert Sutton, 
1710-1714, ed. A. N. Kurat, Camden Soc. 3rd Series 
Vol. 78 (1953) 42; P. R. O. Adm. 3/25,26 Sept. 17109 
24 Oct. 1710.0. . 
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I 
Manning 
"1 
307o 
Ci) 
1688-1702 
In 1709 a sea cook, Barnaby Slush, wrote, 
'Good mariners grow not up like mushrooms, 
(1) 
at once, without any care or culture. ' 
Probably most members of parliament would have agreed 
with him. They would have-recognised, as Slush did, 
that the creation of such a class of men was a lengthy 
process and that there was little point in legislation 
that concerned the 'increase of seamen' during a war. 
The war would probably be over before such legislation 
could be effective. The members, as estate managers of 
the realm, had exercised their good husbandry in the 
years before 1688 by framing laws such as the Navigation 
Acts which encouraged the development of a sea-faring 
class. The fading memory of the Dutch Wars and a high 
opinion of their own work in creating seamen supported a 
parliamentary assumption that there were enough seamen 
for war and trade. Sir Thomas Clarges expressed this 
B. - Slush, Th Ie Navy Royal or a Sea Cook Turn'd 
Projector (1709) 44. 
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assumption in the Commons in November 1689(1)and the 
majority of speakers in debates on manning in 1703 
seem to have shared his belief. 
(2) Pamphlet expression 
of the same opinion is common between 1688 and 1714. 
(3) 
Three of the pamphleteers who expressed this opinion, 
St. Lo, Crosfeild and Defoe, were consulted by parlia- 
ment about manning the navy. 
Two other aspects of manning, the process whereby 
a proportion of the seamen were transferred from civilian 
to national-service, and their fair treatment in the navy 
so as to keep them contented and effective defenders of 
the realm, were the responsibilities of the Lords 
Commissioners of Admiralty. The first was obviously an 
administrative exercise not likely to concern parliament. 
Sir Robert Haddock recorded current opinion on the 
second aspect in 1690: 'Being asked what was proper to 
encourage seamen, he says that belongs to the Admiralty. 
(1) Grey IX, 412* 
(2) see below p. 382-. 
(3) R. Crosfeild, England's Glory Reviv1d (1693); 
G. Everett, Encouragement for Seamen and Mariners 
(1695). Harleian Miscellany (1810) X, 227; G. St. 
Lo. -England's Interest (1698) 26; A Letter to a 
Member of Parliament concerning Marines (1699), A 
Collection of State Tracts (1705) 111 680; An 
Inquiry into the Causes of our Naval Miscarriages- (1707) Harleian Miscellany (1810) XII 11; B. Slush 
op. cit. 18; D. Defoe, A Plan of the English Commerce 
(1728) 125-6* 
(4) H. M. C. H. L. USS. 1690-11 249* 
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Yet increasingly between 1688 and 1714, parliament 
found that it. did have to concern itself with all three 
aspects of manning. -'Increase of seamen, 
' Ithe. speedy 
and effective-manning of the fleet. ' and 'the encourage- 
ment of seamen' became unexpectedly not only subjects for 
debate but. the objects of legislation. 
. 
The. comforting belief that there were enough sailors 
Tý 
was based on no, Bure numericalfoundation. Statistics 
were in their infancy. -, 
There-was no generally accepted 
figure for the population of England. Gregory King . 
estimated it, in 1688 as 5,500,000, 
(')Houghton 
as 7,055,706 
in. 1696 
(2)and Petty at 6,000,000. 
(3)_Modern demographers 
have added their estimates but there can never be 
precision as to the number of people from which parlia- 
ment was to muster its navy. 
(4) 
A modern and authoritative 
source gives, the population of England in 1701 as 
5,8261000. 
(5) 
Irrespective of any demographic trend the 
Natural and Political Observations and Conclusions 
upon the State and Condition of England, quoted 
in English Historical Documents (1953) VIII 1660- 
1714., ed. - A. Browning, 515- - -- 
(2) E. -Chamberlayne$ Angliae Notitiae (1704) 48* 
(3) The'Petty Papers, ed. Marquis of Lansdowne (1927) Is 
208. - 
(4) These estimates of English population are 
considered in Population in History$, ed. D. V. Glass 
&, D. E. C. EverSley(196% Part II$ particularly 
papers, by D. V. Glass and H. J. Habakkuko 
(5) P. Deane and W. A. Cole, British Economic Growth 1688- 
1959, (1962) 60 
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population would have risen by about 110009000 in 1707 
at the Union with Scotland. 
(') 
There is wider variation in the estimates of the 
numbers of seamen, partly because contemporary accounts 
rarely define accurately what they mean by a sailor. 
Estimates can include all or some of the major classes 
of seamen, coastal, collier and overseas. King thought 
there were 50,000 common seamen in England, Dennis 
estimated 60,000 and Slush 40,000. 
(2) 
The best 
demonstration of contemporary uncertainty came in a 
CommOhs'debate in December 1703 in which estimates ranged 
from '25,000 to'80, '000. 
(3) 
Modern historians consider 
therd were about 50,000 English seamen and with one 
ex . ception, 
(4)would 
consider this number insufficient to 
man navy and merchant ships in time of war. 
(5) The wide- 
spread contemporary belief that there were enough sailors 
and the general modern belief that there were not enough 
makes it necessary to consider the main sources of 
sailors. 
(1) T. C. Smout, Scottish Trade on the Eve of the 
Union 1660-1707 (1963) 2. 
(2) English Historical Documents VIII, 517; J. Dennisq 
An Essay On the Navy (1702) 38; B. Slush op. cit. 18. 
(3) queen Anne's-Navy 184-7; see below pp. 381-6. 
(4) A. H. John, War and the Englibh Economy 1700-63, 
'Econ. RiBt. Rev*- 2nd Series VII (1954-5) 340-lo 
(5) D. Ogg, England in the Reigns of James II and 
William 111 (1955) 295; R. DaviBj The Rise of the 
English Shipping Industry (1962) 323; Sergison 
Papers, 164; Ehrman lll* 
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As a starting-point there exists for the London 
overseas trade a list which trade by trade, enumerates 
the numbers of English ships and men which left the port 
(1) 
between 1 December 1702 and 1 December 1703- 
Trade Ships Men 
East Count y - 67 960 
Portugali 175 21074- 
kfrica 
. 
48, 1,359 
Barbados and Leeward 85 1,691 
Virginia'and Maryland 125 2,489 
Mediterranean, 50 1,590 
. Holland 47 237 
Ireland and Scotland 28 311 
East India 21 19800 
Newfoundland- 7 125 
Total 653 129636 
A rather earlier list exists for the year 1701. This 
was compiled by the Commissioners of customs from the - 
reports of their London Surveyors, who visited ships to 
issue Algerine passes. This gives a total of 560 
English ships employing 10,605 men. 
(2) Professor R. Davis 
P. R. O. C. O. 388.9 Pt. I f. 19; B. M. Addit. - MSS- 
59439 f-104. 
(2) P. R. O. C. O. 388.9 Pt. I, f. 19& 
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has calculated that this figure would be an under- 
estimate'of total London overseas shipping by some 2469 
mainly because it did not include ships engaged in trade 
to'North-West-, Europe, which would not need Algerine 
passes'. -(') If to the total of men in the 1701 list were 
added the number of men from the 1702-3 list in trades 
unlikely'to need'Algerine passes, 
(2)the, 
overall total of 
(3) 
London sailors in the overseas trade would be 12,113. 
,, It would therefore seem from these two lists that the 
overseas trade out of London employed rather more than 
12,000, sailors. However,, before this figure can be 
accepted, certain qualifications must be made. Normally 
in lists suchýas, thesethe Commissioners'of Customs 
concerned, themselves only with-English seamen but by law 
each ship was allowed a quarter of foreign seamen amongst 
the'crew, 't In practicet however, it seems-that masters 
R. Davis op-cit. ' 4-02. 
(2) This would make a total of 1,508 men; 960 on East 
Country voyages, 237 to Holland and 311 to reland 
and Scotland. 
(3) The estimate is consistent with the figures for 
English ships, their tonnage and the men employed 
-in 
the Bondon overseas trade between 1695 and 
1701 which are given in a list-prepared for the 
Lord High Admiral by the Commissioners Of CUBtOMBI 
P. R. O. Adm. -1/3863,20 Jan. 1702*, 
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generally manned their ships with crews that were 9CP/b 
English. 
(') 
Any reduction of the 12,000 total to allow 
for foreigners would probably be balanced by the numbers 
of English seamen abroad during the entire year in which 
a list was compiled, on African or Indian voyages. 
Another factor that might inflate numbers in the 1702-3 
list is that it might contain ships, and therefore men, 
that made more than one journey a year. 
(2) These trades, 
however, are ones which employed small numbers of men 
and the general accuracy of the figures for these trades 
is confirmed by convoy lists during the war. 
(3) The 
agreement between the figures for the 1701 and 1702-3 
lists is surprising in that the first records traffic in 
time of peace and the second was compiled during a war. 
Despite these qualifications it does seem probable that 
the London overseas trade employed somewhere in the 
region of 12,000 sailors. 
The outport tonnage in 1686 is compared with that of 
(4) 
London by Professor Davis in the proporation of 71: 119. 
(1) L. A. Harper, The English Navigation Laws (1939) 322. 
Examples of this practice can be seen in the Acts 
of the Privy Council of England, Colonial Series, 
IIt 1680-1720 ed. W. L. Grant and J. Munro (1910) 
178 and in P. R. O. Adm. 3/4 paBBiM. 
(2) R. Davis OP-cit- 3980' 
(3) See above p, 181. 
(4) R. Davis op-cit. 3989 
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If this is taken as a basis for calculating the number 
of seamen employed in the outports it is necessary to 
find 71/119 of the London total of 12,000. This gives 
7,100 seamen. From these calculations it would appear 
that the overseas trade employed 19-20,000 sailors. 
Petty estimated the number of sailors in this branch of 
the trade as 20,000(1)but this figure is well above 
Merriman's estimate of 11-12,000. 
(2) 
The collier trade, particularly that between London 
and Newcastle, had long been recognised as a valuable 
source of sailors. 
(3) 
The ten voyages a year along a 
dangerous coast were a forcing school of maritime 
education and the 'Colliers' Nags, ' with their nostalgia 
for a diet of Newaastle Ale and salmon, were highly 
prized in the navy. 
(4) 
-Their value was unquestioned, their 
number is much more debatable. 
The most authoritative contemporary estimate of 
their number was made by Captain George St. Lo. 
(5) St. Lo 
became widely and rightly recognised as an expert on the 
(1) The-Petty Papers op. cit. 1,2389 
(2) Queen Anne's Navy 170. 
J. U. Nef, Rise of the British Coal Industry (1932) 
1,238. 
(4) Ibid. 1,396; R. Smith, Sea Coal for London . 
(1961) 
16-17; R. Davis OP-cit. 399; E. Ward, The Wooden 
World (1707) 97* 
(5) R. D. Merriman, Captain G. St. Log R. N. 1658-1718, 
M. M. XXXI (1945) 13-22* 
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problems of manning. He had the necessary qualifications- 
service as a naval officer between 1678 and 168% three 
years as a prisoner of war between 1689 and 1692 in which 
he was able to observe the French system of recruiting$ 
and experience in naval administration as a Commissioner 
of the navy from 1693 to 1712. He could write forcefully 
and coherently. His pamphlets, especially those on 
manning, are factual and obviously the result of careful 
and lengthy study. For collier numbers he drew on the 
experience of a friend, one Captain Banks, who had 
personally acted as convoy to the colliers and who 
declared that there were 470 colliers engaged in trade 
between London and Newcastle, and another 70 based on 
Sunderland. 
(') St. Lo considered that these represented' 
half the colliers of England. On average they were about 
200 tons burden and each could provide the navy with four 
men., Thus the 11080 colliers could provide 4,320 
seamen. ISt. 
Lo seems to be assuming that the navy could 
take half the collier seamen; a 400 ton collier required 
sixteen men, one of 200 tons, eight men and one of 100 
tons, four men. 
(2) He implies a collier force of 8,640 men, 
G. St. Lo, England's Safety (1693) Somers Tracts 
(1814) XI, 64.. 
(2) P. R. O. Adm. 3/1 f-694) 
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half of them operating along the English coast north of 
London. 
Several contemporary estimates of collier ship 
numbers are near St. Lo's figures. In 1702 a petition 
of the north-eastern ports claimed that they sustained 
600 ships. 
(') A shipping list of 1701 gives eight east 
(2) (3) 
coast Ports 568 ships, another gives 366 ships, and 
(4) 
a pamphlet credits the east coast with 600 ships. For 
I -* (5) the western coal trade there is an estimate of 400 ships. 
The best contemporary support for the accuracy of St. Lo's 
figures for men comes from the Admiralty belief that the 
colliers could provide between 4,000 and 6,000 men a year 
for the navya 
(6) 
Some detailed information on the subýect of collier 
numbers is to be found in the first book of Admiralty 
Minutes. 
(? ) 
Between 16 May and 5 August 1689(8)the Board of 
(1) C. S. P. Dom. Wm. 1700-02,495. 
(2) J. H. -Andrews, English Shipping in 1701, M. M. XLI (1955) 233. 
(3) E. Hughes, North Country Life in the Eighteenth 
Century (1952) 201. 
(4) Tack About (1703) 20* 
(5) J. U. Nef op. cit. 1,238* 
(6) H. M. C. H. L., VII, 522. 
(7) P. R. O. Adm. 3/1 ff. 69-181. 
(8) On 16 May 1689 detailed lists, naming ships, 
destination and men, first appear in the Minutes. 
At the beginning of August these lists are dis- 
continued and the practice of granting protections 
for six-months instead of specific voyages becomes 
common. 
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Admiralty granted protections for 2,610 seamen to the 
masters of 424 collier ships. The average crew 
strength was 6.2. Thirty-six of these ships or masters, 
involving 385 men, appear twice in the lists; thus the 
actual number of seamen involved would be 2,225. These 
figures are not estimates; they are the total of collier 
I 
seamen granted certificates of protection in a period when 
seamen in the Thames, area were at the mercy of the press 
without such protection. They are lower than St. Lo's 
estimate of collier seamen, být they are are calculated 
for a period of a year in which London's imports of coal 
were below average. 
(')"Moreover, French privateers 
disrupted the collier trade in this period and the 
Minute Books show that voyages along the coast were taking 
double the normal time. 
(2) Thus it would appear that St. 
Lo's estimate of collier sailors is not'incompatible with 
the figures calculated from the Admiralty Minute Book 
although his pstimate of*8,640 is perhaps rather generous. 
This varied evidence would justify a belief that English 
collier seamen numbered some 79500-(3) 
(1) 'J. U. Nef op. cit. 11,381; E. Hughes op,. cit. 160. 
(2) P. R. O. Adm. 3/1 f. 68. 
(3) Alternative methods of estimating the number of 
collier seamen based on the ratios of men to 
tonnage-or men to ships are unsatisfactory. 
Collier tonnage is generally underestimated, R. 
Davis op. cit. 404, while many estimates of the 
number of collier ships are too large, J. U. Nef 
OP-cit- Is 173; 11,95. 
318o 
Colliers were merely part of a coastal trade that 
by virtue of England's geography and poorly developed 
inland transport, was a flourishing industry that 
employed many men. 
(')-Generally 
in the term coastal 
trade can be included both the coasters that transported 
a host of co=odities round the coast and the fishing 
smacks. These fishermen did not provide a major source 
of naval seamen. There was general reluctance to draw 
men from an occupation that so obviously helped to feed 
the nation, 
(2)and 
except in times of crisis or severe 
local shortage of men, fishermen were spared the rigours 
of a full press. 
(3) 
More practically, as many of the 
fishing smacks were small and a deed of ownership served 
as a protection, they could spare few men. In part, they 
worked for their relative immunity by providing the navy 
with an auxiliary labour force that was seasonably 
(4) 
employed in the dockyards in fitting out the fleet. 
(1) See above pp. 231-2. ' 
(2) Descriptive Catalogue of the Naval-IMS in the 
Pepysian Library IV, ed. J. R. Tanner (N. R. S. 1923) 
xlvii; J. R. Hutchinson, The Press Gang Afloat and 
Ashore (1913) 95-7; P. R. O. Adm. 3/20,1? April 
1? 05* See below P- 320. 
(3) Ibid. 3/8,13 Feb. 1693. 
(4) C-J-XI, 97; P. R. O. Adm. 1/3595, ''i8'Jan. " 1703. 
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There is a list for 1709 giving the shipping 
tonnage of the outports. 
(l) Inaccurate though this list 
may be in detail, it does show that the east coast 
possessed two thirds of English coastal shipping. This 
I 
disproportion must reflect the collier trade of the 
eastern coast and probably the total collier trade 
represented less than half the coastal shipping. There 
are no estimates of men involved in the purely coastal 
trade but between 10,000 and 12,000 is in keeping with 
this proportion. This is at first sight a small number, 
but small ships and their ability to make many short 
journeys throughout the year make it a credible figure. 
From this patchwork of calculation it would seem that 
the seafaring population of England numbered about 40,000 
men: 20,000 from the overseas trade, 7t5OO colliers, and 
10-12,000 from the coastal trade. If this figure of 
40,000 be taken as a working estimate of the maritime man- 
power it still does not express the total manpower 
available to the navy* 
In the eyes of contemporaries one very important 
source of sailors would seem to be missing. The overseas 
fisheries, especially that associated with Newfoundland, 
B. M. Addit. MSS. 11,255, quoted in T. S. Willans 
The English Coasting Trade 1660-1750 (1938), 
Appendix 7. 
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were generally considered to be major sources and 
nurseries of sailors. They have in fact been included 
in the general totals for overseas trades. As a source 
of men they were, by 1688, of secondary importance. In 
1684 the Newfoundland fisheries involved 43 ships and 
1,489 men. 
(') During William's reign the trade was , 
(2) 
allowed 600 men but rarely seems to have needed so many* 
In Anne's reign there was an increase in numbers but 
generally French raids and convoy difficulties between 
1688 and 1? 14 seem to have accelerated the decline of 
what was already a wasting trade. 
(3) Yet there remained 
obstinately fixed in the minds of many Englishmen the 
conviction that, 
Ila peche est le veritable principe de 
commerce et 11unique moyen de devenir 
puissant sur mer, 1(4) 
and that the Newfoundland trade was the basis of a very 
large number of seamen. 
(5) 
(1) H. A. Innes, The Cod Fisheries (1940) 102. 
(2) Acts of the Privy Council of England. Colonial 
Series, Vol. II, ed. W. L. Grant and J. Munro 
(1910) 282; C. T. B. X Pt. 11,576; Pt- III, 1289o 
(3) C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W. I. 1710-11,284; H. A. Innes, 
op. cit. lll* 
(4) Correspondence of Col. N. Hooke, ed. W. D. Macray. 
(1816) 1,10. 
(5) W. Wood, -A Survey of Trade (1722) quoted H. A. Innes 
op. cit. xxi; Britannia Languens 
t1680) 311; The 
Trade with France Considered (1713) 89 
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Other semi-maritime soýrces seem to have been more 
important. The watermen of London were the most 
accessible and numerous of these auxiliaries. They 
were generally thought to number 6,000. 
(l) The maritime 
ability of these inland oarsmen might be debatable but. 
there iB no doubt that their own Company thought their 
occupation, 'one of the best seminaries for breeding up 
youth to the-'sea', 
(2) 
or that the Admiralty . wa I S" practically 
obsessed with the belief that a drastic conscription of 
watermen - would do much to solve the problem of naval 
manpower. -Watermen were certainly numerous and they 
were vulnerable to the press. As a result the Company of 
Watermen agreed to provide a quota of 1,000 men each year 
for the navy. ' 
(3) 
There were also the land bargees of the West the 
keelmen of"Newcastle, and the coal-heavers, bargemen and 
lightermen of the Thames. The Admiralty, On' the'basis 
of protections issued, calculated that there were in these 
categories another 3,000 potential'sailors. 
(4) Their 
geographic dispersion and absence"of company organisation 
(1) G. St. Lo, Enýlandls Safety (1693) 25* 
(2) The Waterman's Case (c. 1698). 
(3) Pý-R'*O. Adm., 7/336,24 Dec. 1695,30 Dec. 1696; 
Ibid. 18/749 f. 65- 
(4) P. R. O. Adm. 3/12,20 Jan. 1696; ibid 7/336t 21 
Jan. 1696. 
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made it more difficult'to demand a quota from these 
groups but they too represented a reserve of partly 
trained sailors. 
(') 
Another source, gthis-time of'trained seamen; 'was 
Scotland. - The'navy'had no right to press Scotsmen 
but Scotland, with a population of about one million, 
was a tempting source of additional-manpower'. It w 
became routine for the English monarch., to, request 11000 
men anually from the Privy Council of'Scotland. It was 
a large number from a country of few ships and small 
crews. In 1692 it apparently involved a-quarterýof all 
Scottish seamen, and another eighth'was demanded in 
(2) 1693. 
From these peripheral sources theýnavy could 
apparently obtain without difficulty some 2,500 men 
(11000'from the London Watermen, l-, 000 from Scotland, 
and perhaps 500, 'with less certainty, -from the others 
more scattered sources). The first two sources were 
also called upon to provide similar. annual leviesq 
though quality and quantity declined. 
R. Gibson's Memorial in J. Charnock, History of 
Marine Architecture (1800) 1, lxxvi; T. S. Willyam, 
Rivur Navigation in-England-1600-1750,110-14 
(2) The Old Scots Navy 1689-1710, ed. J. Grant. (N. R. S. 
1914) 114o 
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So far the sources, considered have had-in 
common a salt orýfreshwater provenance and thus, '"- 
recruits, had stbest, greatýexperience, at worst, a 
smattering of-knowledge likely to be relevant and 
useful-, in-naval service. - ý There-is,., one other major 
source of naval recruits, ý wimerically the most 
important,, landsmen., ýNo doubt the'navy would have 
likedý'to man its ships with experienced or semi- 
experienced crews. ' This Wasrecognised aI s'ýeing an 
impossibility. It would, have been possible only 
through the abandonment of much of the', overseas and 
coastal trade.,,,, It was,, accepted in-the, navy that 
during the expansion caused, by mobilization for war, 
at least a third, and possibly a half, of the crews 
would-be inexperienced landsmen. St. Lo defined as 
the necessary qualification, of a sailorg 
'that he. shall understand. the mechanic part 
of a sailor, which is to reef and furl, 
and-take, his trick at the helmq and, -be a- 
man at all callsq properly called haul- 
'boiling. '(') 
He considered that if half the crew had these esoteric 
abilities'it was sufficient. Gibson agreed with him. 
G. St. Lo, England's Safety (1693), Somers- 
Tracts (1814) XI, 56. 
(2) R. Gibson, Reflections on our Naval Strength (1692), The Naval Miscellany II ed. J. K., 
Laughton (N. R. S. 1912) 161. 
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The Royal Africa Company and privateers commonly 
manned their ships on the basis of half landsmen and 
half seamen. 
(') 
It would seem that naval ships were 
often manned on the same basis and that only when the 
proportion of landsmen exceeded a half did captains 
complain. 
(2) 
This was-the most effective way of breeding 
seamen. The navy itself manufactured, sailors, for 
'a cruising man of war in two. monthB time 
ploughs more sea, and wanders further 
between Heaven and Earth, than a merchant 
ship does in a year. # 
3) 
To the raw recruits there would have been added at the 
outbreak of war the unnumbered but veteran group of 
retired seamen who would have been given renewed economid' 
opportunity with the expansion of the navy. It wasý 
however, the influx of landsmen and the transformation 
of those that survived into able seamen that enabled the 
nation to sustain a war of long duration. 
(1) K. G. Davies, Royal Africa Company (1960) 209; 
Documents relating to the Law and Custom Of 
the Sea II, ed. R. G. Marsden (N. R. S. 1916) 172. 
(2) D. Hannay, Naval Courts Martial (1914) 74; J. Dennist 
An Essay on the Navy (1702) 2-3; C. S. P. Col. 
Amer & W. I. 1693-6,124. 
(3) G. St. Lo, England's Safety (1693) 25. 
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From the sources listed above the navy was 
mustered for war. There now appears to be some 
justification for the belief that there were enough 
men in the country to meet the navy's wartime demands; 
certainly there were for a war of short duration. 'By 
1690 the navy was employing about 30,000 men although 
parliament did not vote this number before 1692. 
(')'In 
theory such a force was readily available. If a figure 
of 5,000 is assumed as representing a normal peace-time 
strength,, this, would have meant the addition of 25,000 
men. 
(2) A third of these might have been landsmen, 
which leaves about 16,700,2,500 of whom might have 
been recruited from the semi-maritime sources. Therefore 
the navy would have been satisfactorily manned by an 
influx of some 14,000 sailors out of a sea-faring 
population of 40,000, which would have meant the navyý 
taking one trained seaman, in'every three. 
(3) The nation 
\\ 
See Appendix III. 
(2), The fleet before 1688 seems to have consisted of 
between 3,000 and 5,000 men although the Commons 
in 1689 assumed a peacetime strength of 7,040; 
Calendar of Pepysian Manuscripts II ed. ''J. R. 
Tanner (N. R. S. 1904) 7; C. J. X, 80. 
(3) There is justification in reducing this figure 
further. So far the discussion has been 
concerned with the availability of seamen and by 
,,, implication of the ordinary crew-member. 
Two or 
No three thousand of the 30,000 men employed in 1690 
would have been commissioned officers. The supply 
of officers is a separate problem (see below pp. 423-8, ' 
but in this context the presence of officers within 
a naval force of 309000 men would have further 
rpAiinaA -no-iml AamnnAq for ordinary seamen. -- -- 'a . a. 4aAv t 'a a ------ -- -- 
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was in fact capable of sending out even more powerful 
fleets. For fourteen of the years between 1688 and 
1714 parliament voted a force of 40,000 men for the 
navy, For fifteen of these years the navy actually 
signed on a force in excess of 40,000, in 1695 by as 
many as 8,514. 
(') 
Undoubtedly the naval force in these years strained 
the manpower resources of the nation. The casualties of 
two long wars and the necessity of meeting the challenge 
of the French threat to the mercantile marine with more 
ships could be partly met by the recruits from a new 
generation, by using a greater proportion of landsmens 
and by devices such as a relaxation of the Navigation 
Laws. (2) Yet there was no cause for alarm despite, 
v6xatious regional shortages of men. Certainly the 
government never seems to have abandoned an optimistic 
outlook on-the number of seamen. Such statistical 
investigations as it. initiated confirmed this Optimism- 
The most thorough investigation into the number of 
seamen at the beginning of Anne's reign led the government 
(1) See Appendix III. 
(2) See below PP- 337-8,340,386,392-3. 
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to assume 'that there was 65,, 000 seamen in England. 
(') 
This was the f igure given by the commissionersof 
Greenwich Hospital from work on their records of the 
monthly contributions of merchant seamen to the Chatham 
Che st(2)and the tonnage of merchant shipping. They 
considered that there were 50,000 sailors in the overseas, 
coastal and collier trades, 5,000 in the auxiliary trades 
such as watermen and fishermen, and 10,000 in the navy. 
As far as any figure represents government opinion in 
Anne's reign this seems to be the one. 
(3) 
Other govern- 
ment attempts to estimate the number of seamen in the 
realm were not always so encouraging and there were 
enough of them to give room for doubt. 
(4) 
None'the less 
the main government interest in legislation on manning 
the fleet was in making the process of manning more 
efficient or the life of the naval seaman happier and thus 
retaining his services. Both approaches assume that 
there are sufficient sailors. Innumerable memorials and 
(1) B. M. Addit. MSS. 59439 f. 164. 
(2) See below PP- 356-o 
(3) See below P- 382; Queen Anne's Navy 186. 
(4) P. R. O. Adm. 1/3863', 29 Jan. 1702,29 July 1702; 
B. M. Harley Loan 29/284 fo46. 
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representations from the flag officers imply a similar 
conviction. 
It was the gap between the body of potential sailors 
and their acceptance aboard a man of war that caused the 
feeling of insecurity in the government and among flag 
officers which led to much parliamentary activity and 
some of the confusion as to whether there were enough 
sailors. It was the responsibility of the navy to deal 
with the mechanics of manning the ships. It4s use of the 
press-gang and the embargo'made the manning of the fleet a 
national and parliamentary concern. 
The legal justification for pressing was uncertain 
but it was generally accepted. 
(') 
Few, though their 
number increased, saw it as a device so brutal and 
dangerous to individual freedom as to merit parliamentary 
attention. 
(2) 
There were certain accepted limitations; an 
aggrieved lieutenant, who was tried before the Lord Mayor 
of London, revealed some of them when he pleaded that the 
(1) Ministry of Defence Library (Naval Section),, Corbett 
MSS., X Raising Seamen; P. R. O. Adm. 7/334 f 143; 
English Historical Documents X 1714-17832. ed. 
D. B. -Horn and M. Ransome (19573 874. 
(2) Samuel Pepys's Naval Minutes, ed. J. R. Tanner 
(N. R. S. 1926) 267; R. Crosf&ild, England's Glory 
Revivld, (1693); Piracy Destroy'd (1701) 3; 
G. Everett, Encouragement for Seamen and'' 
(1695), Harleian Miscellany (1810) X, 222* 
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man he was prosecuted for pressing 'was neither house- 
keeper, freeman, apprentice, shopkeeper or a money'd 
man., '(') Other employees usually spared the press were 
husbandmen, fishermen, customs men, servants, and naval 
auxiliaries such as contractors' crews, ballastmen and 
chaulkers. For some, recognition of a calling was 
sufficient to give security from pressing; otlýers needed 
a paper certificate. Such protections were limited in 
number. They could be obtained at a cost of from 58.6d., 
to Ll. 11. Od., for each man needed by a reputable trader 
but they were exchanged, illegally, at prices higher than 
this* 
(2) 
The embargo theoretically immobilized trade and put 
the crews of merchant vessels at the mercy of the press 
gangs. As a means of manning the fleet it was capable 
of much variation, in that the embargo could be restricted, - 
or expanded to include all types of overseas trade as well 
as coastal trade. The embargo became parliamentary 
business because of its disruptive effect on trade. 
(1) P. R. O. Adm. 7/33ro, 27 Feb. 1705. 
(2) Ministry of Defence Library (Naval Section) Corbett 
MSS. XIII f. 186; P. R. O. Adm. 3/23 7 Jan- 1708; 
Papers of Thomas Bowrey ed. R. Carnac Temple 
(Hakluyt Soo. 1927) 171; D. E. W. Gibb, Lloyd's of 
London (1957) 15* 
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When England went to war on 7 May 1689 the manning 
of the fleet seemed to provide no problems. There was 
a rough and ready but effective system of manning the 
fleet; there were enough men for the kind of naval war 
that contemporaries could envisage; and between 1689 and 
1692 manning caused no difficulties. From this point 
of view these years have a unity in that there is not only 
an absence of naval complaint about manpower but also 
positive evidence that the fleet was well manned, in a 
series of letters. On 23 June 1690 the King was informed 
that 
'the fleet is now so well supplied with 
seamen that I hope they (the marines) 
would not be much missed on shipboard. 
In 1691 the fleet was satisfactorily manned by the first 
week of March 
(2) 
and on 30 April the press was suspended 
because the fleet was 'completely furnished with seam 
. 
en., 
(3) 
Perhaps an increased proportion of landsmen in 1692 is 
implied by a description of the fleet as being 'indifferently 
well manned' but there was obviously no shortageo(4) 
(1) A. Browning, Thomas OBborne, Earl of Danby and 
Duke of Leeds 1632-1712 (1944) 111 167- 
(2) Ibid. 111 199; C. S. P. Dom. W. & M. 1690-1,300. 
(3) Luttrell 111 218. 
(4) Memoirs Relating to Lord Torrington ed. J. K. 
Laughton (Camden Soc. 1889) 53, See Appendix III. 
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The members of the Navy Board were probably right in 
assuming that the number of experienced sailors had 
actually increased but this was a rather one-sided 
view. 
(') As events in the Commons were to show, the 
successful manning had been achieved at some cost to 
trade and in 1692 there were some delays in manning. 
None the less it presented no serious problems in 
the years from'1689 to 1692 and it was mainly the 
complaints of merchants that made manning a parliamentary 
issue in this period. In 1689'volunteers flocked to 
naval service and the embargo that had been enforced 
was greatly relaxed by the end of April. 
(2) 
Exceptionallyq 
parliament was in session throughout much of the manning 
season, which usually occupied from February to May, but 
it was only after it assembled for the winter session on 
23 October 1689 that there was discus sion about anything 
to do with naval manpower and this concerned a"relatively 
minor issue. Naval captains had been pressing the crews 
of, merchant. ships to such an extent thatýthe safety of the 
ships on the last stage of, their homeward journey was 
imperilled. Merchants could cite two culprits in this 
matter, Captains Avery and Nevill, and they were summoned 
(1-) The-Sergison Papers 172; cf. Samuel Pepys's N&val 
Minutes ed. J. R. Tanner (N. R. S. 1926) 268. 
(2) C. T. B. IX Pt. Iq 96-7; P. R. O. Adm. 3/1 ff-1071, 
128,138. -- 
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o the bar of the House of Commons and questioned, u 
suffered no further punishment. 
(') 
While parliament was debating, the navy was 
deciding that it needed 32,842 to man the 91 ships 
available for 1690. 
(2) 
To meet this greater demand for 
men,, Scotland was asked, for the first time in William's 
reign, to provide 1,000(3)and the activities of the press 
gangs were extended to inland counties. The Earl of 
Shrewsbury, as Secretary of State, appealed for the 
support of 'gentlemen of estates and authority' to make 
their work effective. 
(4) 
Despite this, merchants still 
found it easy enough to obtain seamen, especially if they 
had powerful friends. The Hudson's Bay Company was 
granted protection for 100 men thanks to the efforts of 
one of its governors, John Churchill. 
(5) 
After the battle of Beachy Head the navy utilized 
to the full every method of manning. 
(6) The contributions 
wrung from the collier fleets were to make the p*rice of 
C-J-Xj 2889 3139 336. 
(2)' H. M. C. Finch 11,263. 
(3) The Old Scots Navy, ed. J. Grant (N. R. S. 1914) 55- 
(4) C. S. P. Dom. W. & M. 1689-90s 500; ibid. 1689-90, 
516-7; H. M. C. Fleming 317-8. 
(5) E. E. Rich, Hudson's Bay Company, (1958) 1,280. 
John Churchill, later first Duke of Marlborough. 
(6) The Conduct of the Earl of Nottingham ed. W. A. Aiken (1941) 79-, - Luttrell 11,134; C. S. P. Col. Amer. 
W. I. 1699,612. 
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coal high in the. coming winter. 
(1) 
, This naval - priority 
in the supply of seamen could, not last unchecked. - Trade 
and the customs drawn from it were too important to be, 
permanently obstructed. The merchants had-to be 
allowed a share of the sailors and the realisation of the 
necessity ofthis led to a remarkable experiment in state 
control-of-the available maritime manpower. -In October 
, 1690, Nottingham, acting on the King's inBtrUCtions, 
attempted for the first time in this period to discover 
the number of, seamen in the kingdom. 
(2)Tarliament had 
voted 29,026-for, the, navy in 1691. , Once the navy had 
been manned to this strength the, remaining sailors-of 
England were to be. shared amongst the merchants. 
(3) The 
customs officials, in consultation with theýmerchants of 
London and the outports, *began to allocate-quotas, of sea- 
men to each-trade-, before. Nottinghamlr. investigation'*vias 
complete. 
(4) 
The number-al-located to-each trade and port 
was based upon the customs each trade-provided and theý 
number allowed, was. greatly below the needs-and 
expectations of, the merchants. 
(5. ) 
Not surprisingly the 
attempt to estimate the number-of seamen in-the kingdom" 
(1) The Portledge Papers, ed. R. J. Kerr and I. C. 
, Duncan (1928) 103-4; Luttrell 11,187* 
(2) C. S. P. Dom. V1. & M. 1690-11 143: C. T. P. 11 157- 
(3) C. S. P. Dom. W. & M. 1690-11 127. 
(4) C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W. I. 1699,612o 
(5) Ibid. 1689-92,320* 
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failed. The, customs officials, to whom the task was 
delegated, found the complications too great despite 
earlier experience of such, attempts. 
(') They failed too 
in their attempts to limit the overseas trades to the 
quotas of seamen that had been established. Slack 
supervision in the outportB, fluctuations in the volume 
ofltrade, ýand variations in the times of sailing in 
different trades made efficient national control 
impossible. (2) 
The parliament that assembled, on 2 October 1690 was 
primarily concerned with naval matters and the recovery 
of maritime dominance lost at Beachy Head. One reason 
for our failure was held to be our haphazard methods of 
manning., which enabled the French fleet to gain the 
initiative by being, at sea earlier than, the English. Our 
methods were contrasted with the French system of 
conscription, which was described as 'their exquisite 
method of enrolling mariners., 
(3), In the absence of such 
a system the majority of the Commons had no hepitation in 
awarding the navy precedence over the merchants in the 
(1) Ministry of Defence Library (Naval Section) Corbett 
USS. X f-59; P. R'. O. C. O. 388.9 Part I-f-19-- 
(2) See above-pp. 218-9. 
(3) Reasons for Settling Admiralty Jurisdiction Offered 
to H. M. and Parliament (1696), The Harleian 
Miscellany IX (1810) 467. 
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acquisition of sailors. The issue was debated on 11 
November, the-majority contending that, 
Illinterest due co=erce estoit infinement 
moins de consequence que le salut du 
Royaume, et que par cette raison il valoit 
mieux, qulaucun navire marchand ne se mit 
en mer et retenir tous, les matelots. l(l) 
Against this it was argued that trade was a necessity to 
the nation, that financial ruin and colonial disaster 
would follow a ban on trade. Montague drew up an address, 
expressing the views of the majority, which asked that not 
more than 500 English sailors be allowed abroad in trade, 
a derisory number. 
(2) 
The King in reply said that he had 
allowed only those ships vital to the nation to sails and 
trade by trade listed 718 sailors involved. 
(3) The 
dissatisfaction of the merchants at address and reply is 
understandable; it is not surprising that one of them, 
unnamed but important, according to Bonnet, expressed the 
dissatisfaction in these intransigent terms: 
lqueýsi le commerce ne peut pas compatir aVec la 
guerre, et quIon ne puisse pas faire l'un et 
l1autre ensemble, clen esf fait de l'Angleterre, 
et qulil faudra bien tost se resoudre a 
(1) Bonnet Dispatch 11/21 Nov. 1690, L. von Ranke, 
History of England (1875) VI, 155. 
(2) C. J. X, 467-8; C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W. I. 1689-92, 
367; ibid. 1699,617* 
(3) Bonnet Dispatch 5/15 Dec. 1690, L. von Ranke op. cit. 
VIi 157, 
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envoyer des Dgputgs en France, pour y 
demander la paix. $(') 
Merchant dissatisfaction was suPPorted by constructive 
proposals. They suggested that an effective way of 
obtaining more sailors would be to allow the crews of 
English ships to contain more than a quarter of foreign 
seamen allowed by the law. 
(2) A petition requesting such a 
change in the Navigation Acts had already been presented 
to the Commons on 31'October by the West 
* 
Indian, Baltic 
and Newcastle merchants. 
(3)--A 
committee was formed and a 
bill based on the proposal was read for the first time on 
the 14th of November and the second time on the 18th. 
(4) 
On this second reading the committee that had considered 
the amendment of the Navigation Acts was merged with 
another committee that had been set up. on 15 October to 
consider a bill for 'more speedy. and effectual furnishing 
of the Navy in time of war with seamen and for pressing. t(5) 
This earlier committee, which met under the chairmanship 
of Sir Robert Howard had prepared-& bill which had been 
(1) ' Ibid. " V'I Other'reasons for merchant 
dissatisfaction are dealt with above p. 240. 
(2) Ibid. VII 155. 
(3) C. J. Xj 457* 
(4) Ibid. X, 457,465,468,470,471,474. 
(5) Ibid. X, 442, 
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read for the first time on 29 October, and its second 
reading, on 18 November, coincided with the second reading 
of the bill to suspend part of the Navigation Act. 
(') The 
proximity of two bills, each of which sought to deal with 
some aspect of manning, presumably led to a reappraisal 
of aims and a merging of committees. As a result the 
proposals to amend the Navigation Acts gained precedence, 
presumably because it was simpler to amend a law than to 
initiate legislation on such a complicated issue as 
"been 
manning., The merit of simplicity would haveLenhanced if, 
as is likely, one of the reforms of the manning system 
discussed had been that of the introduction of some scheme 
of registration on the French model. 
(2) 
The combined 
committees, from now on described as the 'Committee for 
the suspension of the Navigation Acts, ' reported to the 
House on 5 December; their bill was ingrossed on 20 December, 
read for the third time on 23 December and passed to the Lords 
on that day. 
(3) 
There is no detailed account of debate at any 
stage in the development of this bill but a paper exists which 
summarises the arguments, used in the Commons against the 
(1) Ibid. Xj 455,467. Sir Robert Howard, Auditor 
of the Exchequer, was a leading member of the 
Commons and veteran intriguer. 
(2) See-above p. 33,4 and below pp, 355-6. 
(3) C. J. X9 495,514,523. 
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suspension. 
(') The main point made is that foreign , 
seamen, if they predominated in the merchant service, 
by their readiness to accept lower wages would drive out 
the English seamen, with all the-disastrous consequences 
to-the nation that the destruction of this class-wouldý,. 
entail. - Other arguments were'that the foreign seaman's 
diet of-stock-fish, groats and rice would not provide a 
stimulus to English husbandry and that he would impoverish 
the kingdom by taking his pay abroad. 
Sir Richard Haddock used the-same argument, that 
allowing more foreigners into merchant service would 
eventually destroy the strength of the English seamen, 
when he was consulted, about suspending the Navigation 
Acts. 
(2) Merchants, who also gave evidence to the Lords, 
declared that trade would be ruined unless they were 
allowed to employ more foreigners. They asked that three 
quarters of a-crew should be-foreignýand the Lords accepted 
this proportion. They also made other amendments to the 
bill from the Commons, reducing the duration of the 
suspension from the length of the war to 29 September 1691L 
and adding penalties for those who'concealed sailorsý3)- 
(1) C. S. P. Dom. W., & M. 1690-19 201*' 
(2) H. M. C. H. L. IMS. 1690-1t 248-9; Haddock was' 
Controller of the navy 1688-1714 and had vast 
and diverse naval experience, Queen Anne's Navy 6-7. 
(3) C-J-X, 534- 
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The Commons accepted these amendments with the exception 
of the nature of the penalties forconc'ealment. Disagree- 
ment on this issue led to two conferences between"the 
Houses, in which the Lords insisted 'on their penalty of 
a fine instead of the gaol sentence'proposed by the Commons 
for those who hid'sailors. The Lords maintained that 
gaol meant a waste of seamen, in that those who concealed 
sailors were themselves likely to be sailorsJl) The 
result of this squabble was that the chance of the bill's 
becoming law was lost-as'the'parliament was dissolved rather 
earli - er than usual, William being. anxious to set our for 
the Hague. 
(2) 
It would seem from the lack of urgency that William's 
ministers were not strongly in favour of it, presumably 
because they did not consider such legislation necessary. 
The casual approach of the House of Lords, the members of 
which were, at this time, inclined to'support the gdvern- 
ment against the more radical proposals from the Commons, 
confirms this impression. 
(3) It seems likely that the bill 
was a produdt of merchant initiative and country support. 
The sense of crisis when parliament, met for the first-time - 
(1) Ibid. X, 535-6. 
(2) S. B. Baxter, William 111 (1966) 292. 
(3) See above pp. 64-9. 
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after Beachy Head, particularly the -feeling that the 
fleet waB not getting to Bea early enough in the 
campaigning season, would make manning 'a useful issue 
for the discontented politicians who - tried*every way 
"Cariarthen's'ministrye(l) The-arguments possible to attack 
detailed in the government paperý menti'oned above are the 
kind of argument that would be used to sway uncertain 
country members whose support both court and opposition 
(2) 
politicians'needed. 
Despite the failure of this bill parliament did 
achieve one measure''that should have helped manning. ' The 
price of coal inLondonwas' high'andý-cdusing concern. As 
a-result, an act passed both Ho , uses which suspended any 
restriction on the proportion-of foreign sailors employed 
in the collie: ý trade. ' The-adt r--e-ceived, the King's assent 
on 20 December(3)and the naval authorities seem to have 
acted on the assumption"that the crews' of colliers were, 
(4) 
immediately liable for pressing. A belief that the use 
of'these collier seamen I would solve problems of manning 
may well have'- contýýibuiý6&'to- the I: ack. 'b-f '"urgency shown "in 
(1) A. Browning op. cit. 1,481-5; see above p. 44. 
(2) There-were other attempts in William's reign to 
modify the restrictions. of the Navigation Acts on 
the employment of foreign seamen, C. J. XI, 283t 291; 
L. J-XV, 520; see below P- 343. 
(3) C. J. Xt 514; 2 W. & M. Sess. 2c7. 
(4) See below PP- 341-2* 
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dealing with other bills on manning. There was also 
in this session theýfirst indication that both: Houses 
realised that the care and morale of seamen had some 
relevance to manning. The Commons suggested to the 
King that volunteers might be encouraged by a bountyý 
system and the Lords. inquired what measures would-be 
necessary to encourage sailors generally*(') 
Even before the parliamentary session ended the 
race to muster the English fleet as early, in the year 
as possible had begun. All the usual methods were 
used, the press, for the first time in William's reign, 
being used so ruthlessly as to excite opposition. 
(2 ) Two 
regiments of marines were formed. The formation of such 
units was a direct aid to naval manning. These troops 
reinforced the numbers and the feeble musketry of English 
seamen. They also provided a disciplined force that 
could be used to suppress disorders amongst the sailors. 
(3) 
But the process of manning received a severe set back in 
April. The price of coal had remained high and in 
(1) C-J-X9 533; H. M. C. H. L. MSS. 1690-11 249. 
(2) M. Beloff, Public Order and Popular Disturbances (1928) 127. - 
(3) P. R. O. Adm. 1/4080,16 Feb. -1691; -H. M. C. Finch III 20; C. S. P. Dom. W. & M. 1690-1,211-2; 
_Descriptive Catalogue of Naval Documents in the Pepysian 
Library, IV, ed. J. R. Tanner (N. R. S. 1923) xix. 
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February the Lord Mayor had complained of this. 
(') On 23 
April there was a proclamation forbidding pressing from 
colliers until 20 July 1691. Apparently the recent act 
opening the collier trade to foreigners had not yet become 
effective. This protection of collier Beamen not only 
deprived the navy of a major source of men but also en- 
couraged desertion. Russell wrote bitterly to Nottingham 
on 6 May, 
'The late proclamation, forbidding all pressing 
men out out of colliers, proves already fatal 
to the fleet, for no men that have been put 
sick on shore ever return, but so soon as they 
can crawl from their sick,, quarters get up to 
London, and the profit of one voyage to 
Newcastle answers the loss of five months pay 
in their Majesty's service ....... and if some 
means be not found to stop this,. we must either 
let the men die miserably on board ship or 
absolutely disable the fleet. 1(2) 
By the end of the year the discrepancy between numbers borne 
and numbers mustered, much of it due to desertion, was 
higher than ever before. 
(3) Yet the usual methods, in- 
particular a severe press of the. homeward bound merchant 
(4) 
fleets, manned the navy though there was little action. 
(1) Luttrell 11,187; E. Hughes, North Country Life in 
the Eighteenth Century (1952) 160. - 
(2) H. M. C. Finch 111,50- 
(3) P. R. O. Adm. 1/3564 f-527- 
(4) Luttrell 11,243* 
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The lack of action greatly perturbed parliament 
after it met on 22 October 1691. In a debate on 9 
November the inactivity was criticised and Clarges asked 
whether it was necessary for all men in the navy to be 
sailors. He also asked for an examination of this 
point and mann - ing problems generally. 
(') In this s'ession', 
however, it was naval finance and naval inactivity in the 
last campaigning season that dominated parliamentary 
attention. 
(2) 
A bill specifically for the registration of 
(3) 
seamen was considered then abandoned. On 29 January 
1692 West Indian merchants petitioned again for the 
suspension of the Navigation Acts. A bill was' drafted 
to this effect which quickly passed through all its 
(4) 
stages in the Co=ons. It was defeated in the Lords, 
presumably for the same reasons as had led the Lords to 
talk out a- bill in . the previous session. 
(5)-In'the 
mean- 
time the navy was attempting to solve the growing problems 
of manpower and manningg by the revolutionary innovation 
of keeping the men in permanent pay and service all 
(1) Grey X, 1680 ' 
(2) See above P. 82. 
(3) C-J-x, 542,635. 
(4) Ibid. X, 649-50,653,657,661,671. 
(5) L. J. XV9 520. See above pp. 338-9. 
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through the winter. 
('-) 
Men were becoming more important 
than money. The obvious advantage of this system was 
offset by a general loss of morale amongst seamen, who 
were deprived of leave and the opportunity to take a 
winter job. Desertion doubled as a result. 
(2) 
Obtaining men for the navy in 1692 was more difficult 
than it had been since the outbreak of war. The 
expedients used are evidence of this. 8,100 men were 
demanded from the inland counties. 
0) 
Merchant ships were 
allowed to leave England only after their masters had 
delivered to the navy one man for every seaman they 
carried overseas. 
(4) 
Scottish seamen were illegally pressed 
and the complaints of the Privy Council of Scotland 
answered with the declaration that the war concerned 
'almost all Christendom' and a request for another 1,000 
men. 
(5_) 
Pressing and the embargo so disrupted the corn 
trade to Ireland that there was fear of famine there. 
(6) 
On 30 April the press was ordered to operate regardless of 
protections; watermen and crews of coasters were specifically 
mentioned 
- 
as a profitable target. 
(7) 
Russell blamed for the 
(1) Sergison Papers, 1651 172. 
(2) N. M. M. Sergison Ser/100 ff. 579-582; ibid. Ser/102 
ff. 30-2. 
(3) Ibid Ser/100 ff. 127-41. 
(4) E. E. Rich Hudson's Bay Company, Letters Outward, 
1688-96 Z1957) xxiii* 
(5) C. S. P. Dom. W. & M. 1691-2,105. 
(6) Ibid. 1695,181-2; ibid. 1691-29 233. 
(7) Ibid. 1691-2,263; P. R. O. Adm. 1/4080 f-135; H-M-Ce 
H. L. MSS. 1692-39_224-6, 
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necessity of this desperate step over generous grants of 
protections and the lacIt of co-operation of the civil 
authorities. 
('), 
IAsl, 
a result of all these measures, for 
the first time in William's reign more than 40,000 men 
signed on for naval service. 
(2) The naval authorities 
were not yet satisfied. They could and did claim that 
the fleet that fought at La Hogue was short of men, but 
they calculated deficiencies from the highest possible 
establishment of men. 
(3) By now the very intensity with 
which the navy had applied the traditional methods of 
manning over a period of four years had made a very wide 
public conscious of the defects of the system, and naval 
officials themselves were dissatisfied with the enormous 
adminiBtrative-effort necessaryýto fill the men of war. 
(4) 
The advantages of an alternative system were becoming 
increasingly widely-known'* The French system of naval 
conscription had been favourably described in pamphlets 
in the first years of W, illiam's reign. 
(5) One Englishman 
(1) 'ibid. 1692739,2'261"-231-- 
(2) See Appendix III.., 
(3) H. M. C. H. L. MS. 1692-3,227-30. There were 5,119 
men short, about one man in six below highest 
complement. The actual discrepancy was 5,632 but 
some ships had more than their proper complement, 
the total number in excess of this being 513.. 
(4) P. R'. 'O. Adm- 3/8,5 Dec. 1692; C. S. P. Dom. W. & M. 
169172,, 4329 480; Sir John Dalrymple, Memoirs of 
Great-Britain and Ireland (1771 11, Pt. 111,10. 
(5) See above P. 334. 
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who. had the chance of seeing it in operation whilst 
recovering from wounds in captivity was Captain George 
St. Lo. In August 1692 he presented to the Privy- 
Council his proposals, for1raising 201000, seamen without 
need of pressing. -, 
His scheme was not a direct imitation 
of the-French model but,, involved each merchant registering 
his. ship and surrendering one man for each 50 tons, or 
Z5 in lieu. (') He printed similar proposals in 1693 in 
pamphlet form. 
(2) The scheme, was sufficiently attractive 
for the. Privy Council to recommend that it should go before 
the-Commons. 
(3) 
On 2 December 1692 Major Vincent presented a bill to 
the House of, Commons, 
,,. _'for 
more speedy-and effectual furnishing- 
their Majesties' Navy and Merchant Ships 
with Seame n. 1 
(4) 
On 6 December Granville presented a bill for 
'the more speedy raising of Seamen for their 
Majesties' Service. "(5) 
Both bills were read for a second time on 8 December and - 
(1) Luttrell 11,576. 
(2) G. St. Lo, England's Safety (1693). 
(3) Luttrell 11,576. 
(4) Henry Vincent, M. P. Truro 1685-7.1689-1713, - 
laterýCommissioner of Victualling C. J. Xj 731. 
(5) John Granville, younger son of the Earl of Bath. 
He represented Cornwall in parliament and the 
South West generally in debate, Grey Xt 295. He 
was frequently associated with the policies of 
Clarges and Musgravet K. Feiling op. cit. 291; C-J-X, 734. 
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together committed to-'a large committee headed by, 
Russell, (') Of the, two the one initiated-by Vincent is 
the, more likelyto have been based on, St. -Lo's scheme. 
h 'ýý The wording. of both implies that it was., still. the 1; -ý 
mechanics of manning about which parliament was concerned 
and-not the.. supply of men. No, more is heard of either 
(2) 
bill* 
It. wasIto become, increasingly difficult for parlia- 
ment to ignore problems of manning. , Although England 
had. begun the war with sufficiený. sailors to maintain a 
large fleet,, -the-manpower situation-had 
been in some ways 
changed by the events of the first four'years of war. 
At the same time as-the navy expanded to meet the double 
threat posed by French seapower - invasion and the destruction 
of'commerce other factors were limiting the supply of 
English sailors. -_The first of 
these was mortality: 
firstly, the straightforward, persistent, normal mortality 
of shipwreck, accident and storm; secondlyq the destruction 
of'disease; and. thirdly, the casualties of war. Instances 
of all these causes of death are to be fou4a in the period 
1689-92. -600 men were lost when the ships Coronation and 
Ibid. X, -735;, N. -Luttrell, 
An Abstract of the 
Debates 1692-3 f -160- 
(2) In a more traditional way parliament in this 
session did something to increase the supply of* 
sailors in an act to encourage the trade to 
Greenland, 4 W. & M. c 17* 
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Harwich were lost in, 1691. 
(') Disease caused the 
greatest loss of manpower; 
lit, 
has been maintained that, 
'the na-val manning problem arose principally through 
losses, from disease. 1, (2) In, 1689 Torrington lost 553 men 
through. death and 2,558 through sickness. 
(3) The French 
were the least effective killers. Another source of 
wastage was, the loss of. morale which made men increasingly 
reluctant to serve in the navy. They could still follow 
their occupation in security from the press by serving 
(4) 
abroad, where the English sailor was highly regarded. 
_ 
In less security they'could join the growing number of 
privateers. 
(5) 
The erosion of the manpower available to the navy 
was partly balanced by the contraction of trade. Some 
branches of the overseas trade declined directly because 
of the war; others were already in decline and war 
(1) 'Diary of. John Evelyn, ed. E. S. de Beer V (1955) 69 
(2) J. J. Keevil, Medicine and the Navy 1200-1900 (1958) 
11', 209. 
(3) W. Laird Clowes, The Royal Navy (1898) 11,362. 
(4) W. Hodges, Humble Proposals (1695) 4; J. R. - Hutchinson, The Press Gang Afloat and Ashore (1913) 
48-9. 
(5) G. N. Clark, The Dutch Allianceand the War against 
, French Trade 1688-97 
(1923) 205; J. Le Pelley, The 
'Privateers of the Channel Islands 1688-1713, M. M. 
X4 (1944), 34* 
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accentuated this process*(') Theor'etically, sailors for 
whom the Baltic or French trade could no longer find 
employment would be available for naval service. 
(2) 
Also, 
with each new summer campaign another age group ofý--". 
youngsters would be. available and perhaps eager to join 
the navy. The accession of strength represented by this 
young group would be partly balanced by the smaller number 
of aged leaving the service. There is much vividly 
worded evidence that could be used to show that the 
available numbers of English seamen declined in the last 
years of the war 'and created a problem'of supply. Navy 
Board figures show that such'a picture would be false. 
(3) 
-The number of men signing on for naval service increased 
steadily and attained in 1695, with the figure of 48514, 
the highest level betwee ,n 1688 and 1714. There appears to 
have been no problem of'supply but'naval authorities were too 
cautious and too ambitious ever to declare that they were 
satisfied. Manning each year involved'a struggle for men, 
This struggle was so obvious to-naval officials and'"to the 
(1) R. Davis op. cit. 22; R. Davis, English Foreign Trade 
1700-44, Econ. Hist. *Rev. 2nd Series, XV (1962-3) 
295. 
(2) W. S. Unger, Trade Through the Sound in the Seventeenth 
and Eighteenth Centuries ibid. XII (1959-60) 212; 
P. R. O. Adm. 1/3568, f. 415* 
(3) See Appendix III. 
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public that it became generally recognised that the 
f 
process whereby men were mustered aboard ship needed 
reform. The close connection between this administrative 
procedure and the basic number of seamen made it easy to 
confuse the two issues and easy for members of parlia- 
ment and writers to assume that the real problem was 
shortage of seamen. Neither the government nor the navy 
seems to have been guilty of this confusion. 
At the end of 1693 a series of letters and meetings 
shows that the government realised the problems of 
manning. It recognised that the naval priority in 
demands for manpower above the needs of the merchants, 
however justifiable this had been in times of crisis, was 
no longer possible. Trade paid for war. 
('L), 
Men were 
necessary for both. On 7 November 1693 Trenchard, a 
Secretary of State, asked the Lords Commissioners of 
Admiralty to consider not only a scheme of trade protection 
but also means of obtaining sailors, "and whether it may be 
requisite to have a Bill prepmýed for the parliament in 
order thereunto. 1(2) In. the process of consultation that 
(1) C. S. P. Dom. W. & M; -1693, 275; see above p. 233. 
(2) Ibid. W. & M. 1693, 390; P. R. O. Adm. 1/4080 f. 791. 
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followed, the Navy Board, after listing the number of 
times it had given advice on this topic, went on to list 
the traditional ways of obtaining, sailors. The Board, 
concluded that the vigorous prosecution of all these 
methods, reinforced by greater concern for the welfare 
of the sailor, would be sufficient to man the fleet. 
(') 
A meeting of flag officers and captains agreed in principle 
with this opinion. The problem of manning, in their eyesq 
was not a shortage of men; it was caused by desertion, 
insufficient co-operation from the civil authorities, and 
too many protectionse(2) Thus the 6Lnswer to Trenchard was 
a plea for greater powers for the press gang. These 
powers were to include the right to press Thames watermen 
and mercantile experts such as surgeons and gunners. Money 
left at the residence of a sailor was to make him liable 
for service. The dangers of this provision were to be met 
by the help of parish officers. The one mitigating 
feature of this stringent press was that all who volunteered 
(3) 
were to be exempt after a number of years' service. In 
effect the three major bodies of naval experts, Lords 
(1) Ibid. 1/3573 ff. 901-7. 
(2) H. M. C. H. L. Is 146-7,150-1. It was the advice 
of-flagýofficers, that-probably led to the disuse-- 
of embargo as a means of getting seamen. They 
seem to have condemned the embargo as an 
ineffective means to this end, B. M. Addit. MSS. 
341-3501 . 3. 
(3) C. S. P. Dom. W. & M. 1693,440. 
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Commissioners of the Admiralty - Navy Board and a group 
of senior serving officers - saw no reason for legislation; 
there were men enough - all that was necessary war. a'-" 
lessening of the restrictions in obtaining them. 
The result of Trenchard's initiative in the 1693-4 
session of parliament would seem to have. been a govern- 
ment-sponsored bill that attempted to establish a,, register 
of Thames fishermen. As representatives of-these fisher- 
men claimed that there, were 10,000 of them government 
control of such a large source of skilled seamen would 
have been most valuable to the navy. Although this 
number is almost certainly exaggerated, the fishermen 
offered to provide the navy with 1,000 men a year if they 
were granted similar powers of organisation to the Thames 
Watermen. The idea of such a compulsory registration 
excited considerable opposition, some of-it from groups 
such as the Kentish fishermen who feared the loss of their 
independence, some of it probably from members who disliked 
any form of compulsory registration. 
(') 
The dangers, of 
such registration were well described in sevqr6l 
(2) 
pamphlets. -1 
The opposition was strong enough to prevent 
the bill becoming law. 
(1) C. J. Xll 22,45-6,59,879 97,125,139,145. 
See above p. 62# 
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In the next two campaigning seasons, those of 1694 
and 1695, manning continued to cause difficulties. 
(') 
The complaints of the flag officers become numerous(2) 
but need to be treated with some caution. Frequent 
complaints about a shortage of men were a convenient 
excuse for inactivity and future failure. 
(3) 
Frequently 
it was not so much a shortage of men as a concern about 
their quality that prompted the naval officers. Such 
concern might'be a reflection of the increasing proportion 
of landsmen on the ships. Rooke was the most articulate 
grouser in this-vein and 'mob' the word he used most 
frequently to describe his crews. 
(4) 
The press that did 
much to provide this 'mob' was becoming increasingly 
unpopular. Many were wrongfully pressed, many were 
stupidly pressed, and if the more obviously physically 
incapable had not been senthome before embarking, Rooke's 
For example, the delays over manning and Berkeley's 
shortage of men in 1694, C. S. P. Dom. W. & M. 
1694-5, -194,240; ibid. Wm. 1695,241; P. R. O. 
S. P. 42/3,22 April, 9 June 1694. Some of these 
shortages can be attributed to the increased 
demands made by trade protection; see above p. 262. 
(2) H. M. C. -Buccleuch and Queensberry, II Pt. '111 154, 
2189 236-7; C. S. P. Dom. Wm. 1695,59 20,41,52.. 
(3) D. Hannay-, Naval Courts Martial (1914) 19; D. A. 
Baugh, op. cit. 166. Kirkby, attempted to explain 
his desertion of Benbow in action by lack of men, 
C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W. I. 1702,578. 
(4) H. M. C Buccleuch and Queensberry II Pt. 11,218, 
301; H. M. C. Portland 11,109. 
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letters could have become frenetic. 
(') Unrest, even 
pitched battles, too often attended the press gangs in 
(2) 
their progressions. Corruption and disrupted trade 
(3) 
were the normal concomitants of the press. Increasingly 
the press was condemned as something that 'will not do in 
this age. Other methods were just as suspect. In 
1695 the cost of paying bounties to volunteers was 
F, 109825.1. Od., and, as the Navy Board pointed out, 
many of these men might have joined or been pressed 
(5) - into the navy irrespective of reward. Keeping ships 
in pay all winter as a means of retaining men was 
(6) 
generally recognised as uneconb, mic and inefficient. 
It was against this background of dissatisfaction, 
at the annual struggle to man the fleet and at the 
cumbersome methods of obtaining men, that government and 
navy combined to obtain legislation that would solve the 
(1) P. R. O. Adm. 3/12 passim. 
(2) M. Beloff, Public Order and Popular Disturbances 
1660-1714 (1938) 127; Luttrell 111,52. 
(3) H. M. C. H. L. 11,315; C. S. P. Dom. W. & M. 1694-5, 
281; P. R. O. Adm. 1/3574 f-341. 
(4) R. Crosfeild, England's Glory Reviv1d (1693) 
preface; cf. P. R. O. Adm. 7/334 f. 143- 
(5) P. R. O. Adm. 1/3580 f. 89. 
(6) Luttrell IV, 110; see above PP* 343-4. 
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multiple problems of manning. The solution was the 
'Act for the Increase and Encouragement of Seamen, ' or, 
as it was commonly to be called, 'The Registry Act. '(') 
The act had French ancestry. Their scheme of 
maritime conscription had greatly impressed the English; 
its advantages had been well described by several 
pamphleteers, 
(2)two 
of whom, Captains George St. Lo and 
John-Perry, had seen the system working while prisoners 
M' 
of war. Great emphasis was placed in the pamphlets 
on the money that would be saved and the benefits to 
merchant and sailor that the system would bring. Some of 
them had been circularised to members of parliament and 
certainly some members, including Russell, favoured 
legislation on the French model. 
(4) 
The Commissioners of 
Admiralty and the Navy Board had discussed manning during 
1695, sometimes with Sir Charles Hedges, as Judge of 
(5) 
Admiralty, in attendance. In December the Navy Board 
submitted a report on the outline of a register scheme to 
(1) 7, ý &8 Wm. III c 21,1696o 
(2) See above p. 60. 
(3) G. St. Lo, England's Safety (1693); J. Perry, A 
Regulation for Seamen (1695). 
(4) G. Everett., Encouragement for Seamen (1695) 8; 
B. M. Lansdowne, 1,152 B, -f. 272. 
(5) P. R. O. Adm. 3/12, ' 15 Sept. 1695. 
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the Admiralty, which forwarded it to the Council. 
(') 
A bill drawn up on the basis of this report and Sir 
Richard Onslow (2)and Sir Rowland Gwynne, (3)both Whigs 
with some standing amongst country members, were able to 
pilot the bill through the Commons for the government. 
The aims of the bill were declared in debate to be 
twofold: it was designed to create a list of sailors and 
to assure for those maimed in service or too old to 
serve longer some form of security. 
(4) The threat of 
French invasion was sufficiently strong to make the 
Commons alive to the necessity of a strong and loyal 
force of sailors. Hardly any issue connected with the 
navy had been the subject of more pamphlets or, thanks 
to the activities of the press-gangs, been broughýto the 
attention of individual members so vividly. Presumably 
for these reasons the passing of the bill has left no 
record of sharp debate. 
Clause IV was the basis of the act. By this 
clause it was established that seamen between the ages 
of 18 and 50 years might register without charge at the 
Navy Office or offices to be established. These 
(1) P. R. O. Adm. 2/363 ff. 120-6. 
(2) Sir Richard Onslow, M. P. Surrey. He had been 
Commissioner for Admiralty 1691-3, see below p. ý86. 
(3) M. P., for Brecknockshire. 
(4) L'Hermitage Dispatch, 3', 1 Jan. 1696, B. M. Addit. 
MSS. 17,677 QQ f. 232. 
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registered seamen were to receive C2 a year as a bounty 
and were to be further encouraged by favourable treatment 
in promotion and in acceptance at Greenwich Hospital of 
themselves or their dependants. They were to be allowed 
the privilege of assigning two out of each six months' pay 
to their dependants while serving abroad'. They were also 
to receive a double share of prizes and to be exempt from 
minor civil offices. Participation in these privileges 
was limited to 'capable' seamen, a definition that 
included Iwatermen, fishermen, lightermen, bargemen*and 
keelmen. " The wording of the'act implied that'the 
privileges were being extended to an elite group whose-' 
service was Vital'to the nation. " Another indication of 
this attitude was the limitation on number: the registration 
was to be 'in-course' and was limited to 30,000- In the 
event of war the n: avir-would draw from this force as many 
seamen as it needed, The number-was of some-significance. 
It implied that the authorities assumed'a force of English 
sailors in"'exc-ess"of'this and as'sumed'also that 30,000 
trained sailors'would"be enough'or more than enough for the 
navy, Since 1694 -parliament had regularly voted 40,000 
men; there, was still to be a place for landsmene 
The act included penalties for evasion but the main 
tenor was of encouragement. As well as the benefits 
mentioned above, any one who wished to learn the trade of 
the, sea was granted two years' freedom from the press, a 
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lucrative priyilege-if one went to school-on a collierjý., _ 
provided the seaman apprentice could-. produce two, ý 
responsible, people to swear he was a, landsman and no, t-, a 
sailor. Any personwho recruited two seamen and caused-. 
them to register was to be given freedom from., the press 
himself., It was also ordered that all. Imerchant seamen 
should-contribute sixpence a-month from-their wages 
towards the-cost of Greenwich. Hospital.. ý In return-the 
facilities of-the hospital, were to be available to-them. 
(') 
The act was an impressive and, generous piece of-- 
legislation., It did much to remove the grievances that 
had antagonised the-professional sailor in naval, service. 
It would save time and money by giving the government 
control, over a large body of sailors and make the press-4ý 
largely irrelevant. Merchants with theremainder-ofýýthe- 
seamen, and their money, -would 
be able to organise their 
trade without the-disruption of press or-embargo. _On 
paper it did provide a solution. to all, the problems of 
manning that had. plagued nation and navy, 
A brisk-attempt, was, m, ade to-make. the, act effective. 
The Lords Justices ensured that the Commissioners of 
Admiralty were aware of their responsibility and of the 
, (2) 
need for prompt action. While a: ýRegister Office and a 
See below 
C. S. P. Dom. 
P. - 384. 
Wm. 1696,212-3,261. 
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staff'to operate the new law were being organised Customs 
House officers were to be held responsible for any, 
immediate action. 
(') Four commissioners wereappointed in 
May to organise the work of the Registry and by the end of 
July their administrat ive'plans were complete. 
(2) 
Preparations for'the return of the fleet in the autumn of 
1696 were well organised. Proclamations and summaries of 
the act were printed and posted, and captains of all ships 
returning to-port were ordered to read one of these 
(3) 
summaries to their crews. The act required that each 
seaman who registered should present two certificates of 
his place of abode signed by a J. P. Stamped letters of 
attorney had been prepared so that seamen who wished to 
register could be freely supplied with two of these forms 
and-quantities of them'distributed to the homecoming ships. 
(4) Despite great administrative difficulties, especially 
over the collection of the monthly sixpences from merchant 
sailors, and doubts about the meaning of the act, even to 
the extent of queries as to whether commissioned and 
warrant officers were permitted to registerl(5)the 
(1) Ibid. 1696,299. 
(2) Mathew Aylmer, George Byng, John Hill and Thomas 
Baker. P. R. O. Adm. 1/3997,8 May 1696; C. S. P. 
Dom. Wm. 1696,303. 
(3) P. R. O. Adm. 1/3997, -8 Aug. 14 Aug. -1696. 
(4) Memoirs relating to Lord Torrington, ed. J. K.. 
Laughton (1889) 79. 
(5) P. R. O. Adm. 1/3997,23 July, 14 Oct. 1696. 
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Commissioners for the Registry Office had worked 
efficiently. , 
Moreover, they were optimistic; one of 
their worries had been that by registering warrant 
officers wrongfully they might deprive a seaman of his 
place in the fortunate 30,000. 
(') 
By 17 November they 
had registered 3,801. 
(2) 
Now difficulties began to multiply. Officials of 
the Cinque Ports claimed that any attempt to register 
seamen within'their jurisdiction was 'a' breach of their 
ancient privileges, and prevented officers of the 
(3) Registry Office from working. More seriously, the 
favour with which some sailors had viewed the scheme was 
seriously prejudiced when they discovered that registration 
did not protect them from the injustices of naval service, 
(4) 
particularly-turnovers. Captain Henry Robinson of 
H. M. S. Hampton Court wrote a long letter of complaint to 
the Commissioners of the Registry Office. Firstlyq he 
complained that only fifty stamped forms of attorney had 
been supplied to his ship when he could have used two 
hundred. Secondly, he report ed that now some of the 
(1) Ibid. 1/3997,14 Oct 1696. 
(2) Ibid. 1/3997, '17 Nov. 1696, 
(3) P. R. O. Adm. 1/3579,26 Oct. 1696; C. S. P. Dom. Wm. 
1697,28-. 
(4) For turnovers see below pp. 457-60* 
361. 
registered seamen had been turned over and the-result of 
this on the rest of his crew was for, themIto declare, 
'they'll be damned before they will be 
registered and others that is registered 
swears they'll burn their certificates. '(')--' 
One marginally literate gro'uP of registered seamen was so 
moved by the injustice of being turned 'Over that they 
composed'their own letter of complaint, a labour that to 
judge from the appearance of the letter must have annoyed 
them almost as - much as being turned over. 
(2) Another' 
weakness became apparent on 23 January 1697. On that day 
was reported the first instance of the abuse"of a Register 
certificate to escape the press gang. A'registered sailor 
in hospital had loaned his certificate to a friend'and there 
was no penalty clause in the act that might be' used to 
(3) 
punish him. Other instances soon followed. 
On 2 December 1696'the House of Lords demanded from 
the Lords Commissioners of Admiralty''an-account of the 
working of the Registry Act. 
(4) 
The reply came on 10 
December and the Lords were told that 4,656 men had 
registered, but that 911 of them were commissioned or 
warrant officers. 
(5), Included,, in the-reply.. was-a list-of- 
(1) P. R. O. Adm. 1/3997,18 Dec. 1696. '-, ' 
(2) Ibid. 1/3997,15 Jan. 1697. 
(3) Ibid. 1/3997,23 Jan. 8 Feb. 1697. 
(4) L. J. XVI, 28-9. 
(5) H. M. C. H. L. 1695-7,341. 
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obstructions that were hindering, the working of the act: 
they included doubts over the provisionýof hospital 
treatment, difficultiesAn the collection of sixpences 
from merchant seameni-the necessity of two certificates of 
abode from each seaman, and difficulties over the age 
limit and rank of, those who wished, to, ýregister. An act 
I 
was passed clarifying-the doubtful points and including 
a penalty for all who-loaned or sold--their certificate 
of registration. 
(') 
The offender was to havehiB, name 
struck from the register. -e 
Z- 
Even with this reinforcing legislation tli&, Registry-, -, 
failed. The reasons-are many. ýThe need to solve a 
problem decided the timing of-the act but to--inaugurate a 
major reform after seven years of war had'-done much to 
alienate the sailor from naval service, was not favourable 
to its success. ý Far more important than timing-was the 
ineffectiveness-, of the act. , Most'important, ' and-- -I 
fundamentally damningi the bounty for registration was 
not-paid. 
(2) 
-Regular and continued payment over a long 
period might have created confidence. As it was, payment-- 
(1) 8 &-9 Wm. III c, 23. - 
(2) C. J. XIII 131; The Case of the Registered'Seamen 
(c. 17005; J. Dennis, An Essay on the Navy (1702) 
37; An, Historical and Political Treatise of the 
Navy (1703) 9* 
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was irregular and for some, non-existent. The 
'encouraging' reforms of the act - the assigning of 
'at' money, prompt pay for dependants, favourable tre ment 
at Greenwich, at turnovers, 
carried out. 
(') 
in promotion were never 
The responsibility for the failure of the act is 
widely diffused. Some of it belonged to paL, 61iament in 
that it did not specifically allocate I money for the 
upkeep of the scheme. Although the House'o'f-Commons 
was - definitely i- nformed of this weakness, the financing of 
the Registry was left to the Treasurer of the Navy and the 
(2) 4 Navy Board. The'latter had many pressing claims on the 
mone Iy. at its disposal, and all these claims were for 
services much more obviously the'responsibility of the 
Navy Board. The reluctance of a hard'pie'ssed orga'nisation 
to spare'money for a new, unwanted'dnd unsupported spending 
unit is understandable; so is the Board's'determination to 
(3) 
avoid the work and responsibility involved. Yet it 
alone had the experience, organisation and"recordS' 
necessary to make the Register work efficiently. . With the 
(1) - J. Dennis, op. '6it. '37; "'Tack AbOut'-'(1703) 5-6; ' 
Inquiry into, -the Causes of our Naval Miscarriages 
(1707), Harleian Miscellany-(1810) XI, 19. 
- 
(2) C-, J*XIII, 131. 
(3) H. M. C., Buccleuch-and Queensberry II Pt. Is 291; 
N. M. M. Sergison Ser/102 ff. 275-6. 
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economy necessary to a peacetime establishment, the 
merging of the responsibilities of Sick and Wounded and 
Registry Offices into, one authority weakened the status 
and efficiency of the new Registry. 
(') No authority 
superior to the Navy Board or Registry Office applied the 
consistent administrative pressure that might have over- 
come the difficulties. Administratively the Registry 
officials faced many problems. Few of týe sailors were 
(2) householders. To keep a check on. the whereabouts of a 
largely mobile group, which was the essence of the act, 
was beyond the administrative capacity of'the time. 
As well as these difficulties of finance, lack of 
co-operation from the Navy Board, and administration, the 
Registry faced some positive hostility. The Watermen of 
(3) London had consistently opposed the scheme. It was too 
likely to cause a curtailment of their own Company's 
privileges and lead to a tighter contro3lof all seamen. 
Despite the voiuntary nature'of the act, the King ordered 
all those employed on the Thames, including his own oars- 
menjýto register. They disobeyed and fought a wordy war 
against, the Registry. 
(1) C-J-XIII, 1314P 
(2) G. St. Lo, England's Safety (1693), Somers Tracts 
(1814) XI, 59. 
(3) C-J-XI, 387,392; LIHermitage Dispatch, B. M. 
Addit. MSS. 17,677 QQ, f. 219* 
365. 
'His Majesty's Watermen upon meeting with 
any others who have registered themselves 
do commonly call them slavish dogs with 
diverse other reproachful words not only 
to the great discouragement of them but 
preventing others to register themselves. '(') 
The Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports encouraged 
resistance to officials of the Register Office within his 
jurisdiction despite the wording of the Register Act and 
the opinion of the Solicitor General. 
(2) 
In the maritime 
parishes registered sailors who legally claimed their 
right to exemption from minor parish office were not 
popular with other parishioners or the local J. P. 
Despite their legal justification several registered sea- 
men were successfully prosecuted for their refusal: -to 
stand their turn of 'watch and ward., 
(3) 
Merchants were 
unlikely to support a scheme which by increasing govern- 
ment control over seamen lessened their own chance of 
securing the men they needed. 
(4) 
To some the restriction of 
individual freed - om and the French ancestry of -- the scheme 
(1) P. R. O. Adm. 7/334 f. 64- 
(2) Ibid. 1/39979 29 April 1698; 7/333 f 253. 
(3) Ibid. 7/334,21 Oct. -1698. 
(4) The Norris Papers, edo T. Heywood, ' (Cheth6m- 
Society IX, 1846) 147. 
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were sufficlent grounds for opposition but it is likely 
that more*selfish motives are hidden behind the frequent 
(1) 
attacks on the Register ostensibly for these reasons. 
By 1699 some were convinced that the act was a 
failure. (2) Parliamentl however, retained its faith in it 
for several more years. In December 1697, when the 
Commons had been considering the expenses of the navy in 
order to economise as much as was possible, the Register 
Office had been retained and a vote on its continuation 
passed by a good majority. 
(3) 
Realisation that the act 
was ineffective was gradual and reluctant. Sporadic 
interest in the accounts and the numbers'of men registered 
(4) 
demonstrated the failure, as did the immediate manning 
problem at the outbreak of-the War of Spanish Succession. 
It was not until 1710 that parliament could bring itself 
to repeal an act that had failed, and produced not sailors 
but $much charge, vexation and trouble., 
(5) 
Samuel Pepys's Naval Minutes ed. *J. R. Tanner (N. R. S. 
1926) 360; Tack About (170351; An Inquiry into the 
Causes of our Naval Miscarriages, (1707), Harleian 
Miscellany (1810) XI, 19; C. S. P. Dom. Vim. 1698,129. 
(2) P. R. O. Adm. 1/3997,2 Jan. 1699. 
(3) C. S. P. Dom. Wm. 1698,129. 
(4) C-J-XIII, 369; ibid. XIV, 102; ibid., XVI, 28,96. ý 
(5) 9 Anne c 15, Clause lxiv; see above p. 16I. 
367o 
Peace solved the problem of manning. The number of 
men to retain in service might have become, an issue in, 
an economy-minded parliament but the security represented 
by a strong navy seems to have checked debate on this 
issue in 1697. ' On 17 December the House of Commons 
I 
accepted the number of 10,000men, for the peacetime 
navy. 
(') This was enough for sixty men of war and 
considerably stronger than the. navy-in peace before 1683. 
(2) 
Parliament would apparently have been ready to accept a 
navy of. 12,000 men. 
(3) The memory, of past emergencies-- 
that made the need for a strong navy-acceptable in 
1697 faded in the faction fights of the next two sessions 
of parliament. The Whig leaders, of the ministry-were 
divided amongst themselves and unable to control their 
followers in the Commons, much less the ordinary members, 
who in peace had no external threat to check-their 
country animosity against William's,, government. 
(4) This 
animosity was exploited by the political opponents of the 
government. In 1698, when the provision of two. marine 
(1) C-J-XII, 13; Luttrell IV, 320; C. S. P. Dom. Wm- 
1697,516,518. 
(2) See above P- 325- 
(3) C-S-P, Dom. wm. 1697,5169 518; - Luttrell IV, 
(4) S. B. Baxter, William 111 (1966) 360-4; 374--ý7; 
D. Ogg, England in the Reigns of James II and 
William 111 (1963) 440-4. 
320. 
368o 
regiments was debated, these opponents and the Country 
members claimed that they represented an indirect means 
of increasing the number of men already voted and that 
they were a threat to the liberty of the nation because 
they were as much soldiers as sailors. The contribution 
marines made to the navy was vigorously described by 
Sir Robert Rich, Colonel Churchill and Sir Richard Onslow, 
with such efficiency that the marines were accepted by the 
Commons. (l) 
Yet the marines could be used as soldiers or sailors: 
and as such appeared to many to represent a threat to 
English liberty. In 1699 the international situation was 
threatening enough for the Commons to debate whether 
12,000 or 15,000 men were necessary for the navy and to 
decide by 189 to 184 on the higher figure. 
(2) Then, by a 
debate on whether to include the words 'for the sea 
service' in this-provision, a proposal that was defeated by 
nine votes, they confined the 15,000 to seamen and allowed 
no marines. 
(3) The tactical efficiency of the navy was 
sacrificed to political fears. Annoying though this 
defeat was to the government, the number of men voted was 
C. S. P. Dom. Wm. 1698,129. Rich is considered above 
P. 56 Churchill above p. 245 and Onslow below 
P. 386. 
(2) Vernon Letters 11,246-8; C -J. XII, 517-8; Luttrell IV, 484. 
(3) C-J-XII, 518; Letters of Wi lliam II I and Louis XIV, 
1697-1700, ed. P. Grimblot (1848) 11,291; Luttrell 
IV, 485 479; Ministry of Defence Library (Naval) 
Sectioný Corbett MSS. XVI f-18- 
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generous, and daunting to the French. 
(') By the end of 
1699 the international situation, that is, the health of 
the King of Spain, had improved. The government hoped 
for a navy of 10,000 men: it obtained 7,000. 
(2) 
Two other aspects of the peacetime years are worthy 
of note. Parliament continued its. traditional methods 
of 'breeding' seamen. By 'An Act to encourage trade with- 
Newfoundland' one man in every five on a Newfoundland ship 
had to be a landsman, who would by experience become a 
seaman. 
'(3) There were also acts encouraging the Africa 
trade and one improving the administration of Thames water- 
men and lightermen. The other interesting aspect of 
parliamentary activity in the years of peace is the frequent 
demands made by the Commons for information about the navy. 
Several factors must have contributed to this thirst for 
statistical details but the threatening international 
situation, and a desire for assurance about the navy's state 
of readiness, and a hope that such returns would provide 
material for political attacks on the government, must have 
been amongst the most important. There is no other period 
between 1688 and 1714 in which the Commons received more 
C. S. P. Dom. Wm. 1699-1700,67; Letters of William III 
and Louis XIV, 1697-1700, op. cit. 11,299. Burnet 
111,244. 
(2) Vernon Letters 11,390. 
(3) 10 & 11 Wm. III c 14& 
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detailed information about the structure, cost, deployment 
and strength of the navy. 
(') 
War nearly came in 1701. In February 30,000 men 
were voted for the navy. Lists of the ships and men 
available were quickly compiled for both Houses of 
Parliament. (2) A detailed and anxious check was kept on 
the slow increase of men. The King was provided with 
weekly lists showing the inerease. 
(3) 
By May it was, 
obvious that the French were not preparing for war and 
many men were disbanded, most of them without pay. 
(4) The 
crisis had revived, in some, concern for the supply of 
sailors. Burchett, as Secretary for the Navy, apparently 
on his own initiative, secured the co-operation of-the', 
customs, officials in an attempt to-find out the number 
of English sailors. 
(5) 
The investigation was not 
sufficiently advanced to survive when war came again; 
(1) C-J-XII, 369-73; ibid. XII9 381-5; ibid. XIII, 114-6; 
ibid. XIII, 339-343; ibid. XIII, 348-9; ibid. XIII, 
368-72; ibid. XIII, 671-6; Luttrell IV, 594. 
(2) C. S. P. Dom. Wm. 1700-29 296, 299-302; H. M. C. H. L. 
IVj 160. .1ýý 
(3) C. S. P. Dom. Wm. 1700-21 2399 240,242,267,270, 
273,277,283,291-2,294. 
(4) Luttrell V, 46. 
(5) P. R. O. Adm. 1/3863,9 Feb. 1702. 
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(ii) 
1702-1714 
War had been likely in 1701; it was imminent at the 
beginning of 1702. Parliament showed its appreciation 
of the, situation by voting 40,000 men for sea service on 
9 January 1702. (') The routine proclamation asking for 
seamen had been issued a day earlier. 
(2) 
Magistrates and 
others in the inland counties and Ireland were 
circularised in February. 
(3) 
But the men were slow in 
mustering. Experience of the last war. was too fresh in 
the minds of officials, officers and men. Benbow- 
expressed this feeling in a letter to Vernon as he worked 
to fill 389 vacancies in his squadron against the apathy 
or obstruction of the civilian authorities. 
(4) 
On 2 May 1702 came the formal declaration of war and 
'(5) an immediate embargo, Cargoes rotted'while the press 
gangs hunted for sailors, -, respecting neither privilege 
Luttrell V, 
(2) C. S. P. Dom. 
(3) Ibid. 1700- 
(4) C. S. P. Dom. 
(5) Acts-of the 
Series ed. 
'J. XIII, 665. 128; C. 
Wm. 1700-2,485. 
2,259; P* R. O. Adm. 7/336,11 Feb. 1702. 
Wm, 1700-2,263. 
Privy Council of England, Colonial 
W. L. Grant and J. Munro (1910) 111 394. 
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nor protection. 
(') 
Aggre'ssive groups of po 
I tential naval 
seamen fought off the press gangs; some were spared the 
necessity of fighting by the protection, of the very 
officials who should have helped the press. 
(2)'The 
unfortunates and the weak - Worcester provided two lepers 
and 'other aged and infirml(3)- trudged under guard to 
the ports. There were not enough even with such second 
rate recruits. 
(4) Once the squadrons had been dispatchedi 
one to Cadiz and the Mediterranean, one under Leake to 
Newfoundland, one to, the West, Indies, 
(5)there 
were ships . 
left that could have been used to defend the coast but not 
enough, men to fill them. 
(6) 
The difficulties of the press gangs rather than the 
complaints of the merchants seem to have brought an end 
to the embargo. On 9 June the Lord High Admiral petitioned 
that it be lifted as it was driving sailors into hiding. 
(7) 
C-S. P. ' Dom. Anne I, 51 54,81; -P. 
R. O.. Adm. -.,, 
1/3593, 
29 May 1702. 
(2) Ibid. 2/365,12 June 1702; P. R. O. S. P. 42/6, f. 248. 
(3) C. S. P. Dom. Anne 1,199-200* 
(4) See Appendix III, 
(5) J. H. Owen, War at Sea, under Queen Anne (1938) 72-3; 
C. S. P. Dom. Anne 1,49. 
(6) Ibid. Anne 1,151; P. R. O. Adm. 2/365; 12 June 1702. 
(7) P. R. 0 . S. P. 42/6 f. 276a 
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Lowther gave the reasons for the failure of-, embargo: 
'the high wages offered in war time, always 
bring out men whom neither the press gang 
masters nor the civil magistrates can find. 
When I was in the Admiralty we always thought 
that the best way to get men was-to keep the 
coast-trade o3 en and get men as they came to 
the ports. '(' ' 
The Prince's Council was already considering ways of 
manning the fleet in 1703. It was calculated that if 
the fleet were manned to the highest complement, there 
would be a need for 53,806 men. 
(2) 
The meaningless nature 
of such a figure is proved by the way in which the 
Council, undeterred by the vast discrepancy between it 
and the 30,973 men mustered for 1702, 
(3)proceeded to 
advise the Queen on how to man the navy for 1703- The 
series of long memorials the Council presented neither 
contain any new ideas nor doubt that the navy will find 
eno ugh men. 
(4) 
(1) C. S. P. Dom. Anne 1,89; cf. B. M. Addit. NSS. 34, 
350 f-3* 
(2) C. S. P. Dom. Anne 1,406. 
(3) See Ap pendix III. 
(4) P. R. O. Adm. 7/336,9 Dec. 12 Dec, 24 Dec. 1702s 5 
Feb. 1703; ibid. 3/17, 12 Dec. 1702; ibid. 'S. P. 
42/6 f. 4801 42/7 f. 12; The Journal of Sir John 
Rooke, ed. 0. Browning (N. R. S. 1897) 252* 
374. 
While these matters were being discussed parliament 
had assembled on 20 October 1702. It rapidly resolved 
on 409000 men for naval service in 1703(1)but not before 
it had discussed the high price of coals in the London 
area. The reasons for such prices we're high wages, 
agreements between colliery owners and Loiidon lightermen, 
and the embargo. The Commons resolved that it was 
necessary 'to allot a competent number of seamen to the 
colliers, press free, and to have a competent number of 
ships appointed for convoys and cruisers. 1(2) The 
resolution was incorporated as a bill, which happily for 
the navy did not go beyond the first reading and thus a 
major source of recruits wasý"preserved. 
(3) Another 
provision had some bearing on the pro"blem of manning. In 
this session and for the next few years the Commons made 
financial provision for Regiments for the Sea Service which 
were to be maintained on army funds. These regiments were 
apparently to provide a striking force for any descent on 
enemy territory. 
(4) 
Such a policy would have been 
C. J. XIV, 11; Luttrell V, 255o 
(2) C. J. XIVJ lg* 
(3) Ibid. XIV, 63. 
(4) Luttrell V, 487* 
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congenial to, and was possibly inspired by, the leading 
Tory statesmen of Anne's first Ministry, particularly 
Rochester and Nottingham. 
(') 
These troops could have 
provided cheap and unskilled labour aboard naval ships 
but in practice they became garrison troops, especially 
in the West Indies.. Here they were lavishly used to 
supplement ships' creWB weakened by disease. 
(2) 
1703'was not an easy year for manning. An attempt 
to make merchants in the overseas trades provide men for 
the navy before their ships could obtain clearance from 
English ports failed. 
(3) Moreover the navy lost many men 
'discharged dead' although no major fleet action was 
fought. Some died from the cramped conditions. that came 
from using men of war as troop. transports and allowed 
disease to flourish. (4) Mart . in reported 1,500 deaths in 
the Mediterranean squadron(5)'(as opposed to 614 in 1702) . 
(6) 
Whetstone lost 844 in the West Indies from death or 
desertion. ('? ) The Great Storm cost the nation 1,519 naval 
(1) See above p. 24s 
(2) C. T. B. XX Pt. 11 7 fn. 9 fn. 
(3) P. R. O. Adm. 3/18,, 6 March, 18 March, 1703; ibid. 
7/336,19 March 1703. 
(4) C. S. P. Dom. Anne 1,532. 
(5) J. J. Keevil , Medi cine and the Navy 1200-1900 (1958Y 111 213. 
(6) P. R. O. Adm. 1/3595,22 Jan. 1703. 
(7) C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W. I. 1702-3,169. 
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seamen. 
(') 
The very abilities of the English seamen were 
further weakening manpower resources; in Russia Czar Peter 
was conscripting one man in nine of English crews for 
service in his own ships. 
(2) Worst of all in some ways, 
the desertion rate appears to have been high, although 
this can only be tentatively deduced from the variation 
between the numbers of men borne and, mustered. 
(3), At the 
end of the year there came the usual consideration of the 
manning-situatioii. When-consulted, the members of the 
Navy Board returned what was, for them, a stock answer. 
Any problems were in their opinion a direct result of an 
unhappy departure from the 'ancient rules' of the navy and 
they cited twenty earlier letters that elaborated this 
conclusion. 
(4) 
The result'of the deliberations. between 
the Navy Board and the Prince's Council was a pessimistic 
memorial to the Queen blaming the high wages offered by 
merchants for the difficulties but offering no 
constructive or original suggestions for their solution. 
(5) 
(1) Life of Captain Stephen Martin, ed. -C. R. Markham, 
(N. R. S. 1895)-73 fn. 
(2) P. R. O. Admi. 1/1436, -11 Aug. --1703., - 
(3) See Appendix III. 
(4) P. R. O. Adm. 1/3579,4 Nov. 19 Nov. 1703; ibid. 3/19s 
16 Nov. 1703. 
(5) P. R. O. Adm. 7/336,20 Nov. 1703. 
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Parliamentýmet on 9 November 1703 and, the Queen's 
spe ec Ih contained'ýthe-wordsý 
'I heartily wish some easy, and"less----,,. 
, -, _. _chargeable method could, be, found. for- 
the speedy and effectual manning of the 
fleet. '(') 
The naval authorities had offered no suggestions; the 
Register Act had failed; in effect the government was 
asking for the advice of both Houses of Parliament. At 
the same time as this advice was requested the government 
was considering methods of manning that it could itself 
recommend to parliament during the session. 
The 'chargeable' nature of manning, as far as it had 
penalised trade, had been evident, if incalculableg for 
many years. On a lower level the cost of obtaining men 
for the navy was high in terms of money. In 1698 St. Lo 
had calculated that the total cost of manning in a war 
-(2 
year Was F, 36 %003.10. Odo This sum was spent in paying 
Vice Admirals of counties for their contribution in men, 
p4ying captains a fixed sum according to the rate of their 
ship, and'for, the'130 strong fleet, of, pressing, tenders. 
(1) C. J., XIV, 211o 
(2) G. St. Lo, Eng'land's'Interest, (1698) 12-15o - 
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The rest of the sum was spent on bounties, on 
reimbursing the Watermen of London for transporting their 
quota of men, and on various smaller accounts. The 
number of pressing tenders was probably rather 
exaggerated. 
(') Otherwise the estimate seems to have 
been accurate and St. Lo's statement was certainly the 
one most readily available to the public. The best 
confirmation of his estimate was given in a Navy Board 
letter. to the Prince's Council in July 1706. 
(2) The 
average cost of manning over the three years 1703-5 was 
about C25,000. In December 1707 some aspects of manning 
costs were given in greater detail in a Navy Board letter 
to Burchett. 
(3) The letter showed that in 1702,1703 and 
1705 the navy had received 308 men from the Lord Lieutenants 
and Vice Admirals of the counties. 
(4) The average cost of 
the men obtained from this source, usually amongst the 
worst obtained, was U. 13. Od. Such men were expensive, 
and in general the Queen's epithet 'chargeable' was well 
chosen. 
(1) P. R. O. Adm. 1/3604,6 April 1706. 
(2) Ibid. 1/3605,27 July 1706. 
(3) Ibid. 1/3608,24 Dec. 1707. 
(4) Cf. C. T. B. XXI Pt. 11 342; P. R. O. Adm. 1/3604, 
6 Jan. 1706. 
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The Commons considered manning as a result of the 
Queen's speech and a commitýee was formed under Conyers. 
(') 
The deliberations of this committee on 27 November and 
4 December 1703 are of very great interest for any 
consideration of naval matters in Anne's reign because 
notes of these discussions survive in the Sergison 
Papers at Greenwich. 
(2) 
They are important not only 
because of the information they contain but also because 
they reveal an understanding and knowledge of the problems 
of naval manning far greater than could be assumed from 
other sources. They show too the way in which party 
attitudes coloured even such an apparently neutral topic 
as manning. The way in which the government, particularly 
in the person of Harley, shaped the discussion and 
directed it towards legislation would in its own right 
make these notes of value. 
C. J. XIV, 240; Luttrell V, 363. Thomas Conyers, 
, M. P. for Durham and equerry to Prince George, the 
Lord High Admiral. 
(2) The notes are printed in Queen Anne's Navy, 184-8. 
However, the transcripts here printed are neither 
complete nor always accurate and the account of 
the discussions given in the following pages is 
based on the original source, N. M. M. Sergison, 
Ser/103 ff. 450-6. 
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Twenty-one members of the committee were recorded 
as speaking on these two days. One, John Smith, spoke 
four times and five of them twice. 
(') 
Most of the 
speakers can be identified with a political party or 
occupational group. 
The five members of the Court group contributed ten 
speeches-. Obviously they attempted to direct the 
discussion and among them they suggested various 
solutions to the problems of manning. Smith, who 
opened the debate on both days, was a Whig, but a Whig 
who was already closely associated with the government in 
the person of Godolphin. 
(2) 
As. one of a group who earned 
the title of 'Lord Treasurer's Whigs', he was later to 
become Speaker and Chancellor of the Exchequer. His 
obvious task of directing discussion, suggesting issues 
and defining the problems, was the sort of parliamentary 
exercise that was to qualify him for this later promotion. 
He was supported by two speec4es-from James Brydges, another 
Whig who had close associations with Godolphin. 
(3) Court 
(1) Brydges, Harley, Heathcoteg Manley and Moore spoke 
twice. 
(2) John Smith, M. P. for Andover, 
(3) James Brydges, M. P. for Hereford, later first Duke of 
Chandos. He was a member of the Prince's Councill 
G. F. James and J. J. Sutherland Shaw, Admiralty 
Administration and Personnel 1619-1714, B. I. H. R. XIV 
(1936-7) 23. He frequently left meetings of the 
Prince's Council at this time in order to attend 
parliament, P. R. O. Adm. 3/19,24 Nov. 1703. 
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opinion was expressed most cogently by Robert Harley, 
the Speaker of the House. He it was who most tersely 
summarised the issues before the House as being concern 
for manning in the future, efficient manning of the fleet 
in the present, and the retention of the good will of 
the sailors by fair treatment. Lowndes, the Secretary to 
(2) 
the Treasury, and Sir Charles Hedges, Secretary of State, 
(3) 
also spoke. Another member, 'Clerke', is also recorded 
as speaking. As there was no member of the House with 
this name it was probably George Clarke, Secretary to 
Prince George and Joint Secretary to the Prince's Council. 
No details are given of his speech. 
The impression given by the Court speakers is that 
they were attempting to assess the opinion of the House. 
Smith, in the first speech, suggested that the chief obdect 
of the debate was to provide, information and that there need 
not be a resolution. The first three Court speakers 
M. P. for Radnor, later first Earl of Oxford. He, 
a moderate Tory, was working in close concert 
with Godolphin.. 
(2) William Lowndes, M. P. for Seaford, 
(3) 'Sir Charles Hedges, M. P. for Malmesbury. 
(4) George Clarke, M. P., for, W. inchelsea. 
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emphasised how much had already been done to encourage 
sailors, an emphasis that was presumably necessary because 
any incautious comment on naval matters might be 
interPreted as criticism of the Lord High Admiral. The 
tentative nature of the discussion, particularly on the 
first day, can be seen in the way in which Court speakers 
suggested possible methods of solving manning problems - 
amendment of the Navigation Acts to allow the employment 
of more-foreign sailors, better pay for naval seamen, 
limitation of the pay of merchant sailors, use of parish 
poor, use of informers to'procure seamen. The Court 
speakers did not act in complete concert. They disagreed 
amongst themselves even on the question of whether or not 
there were enough sailor's. 
(l) 
Smith's statement in his 
opening speech on the second day recommending the greater 
use of foreign seamen was opposed in the next speech by 
Harley. The Court had made no attempt to brief or 
employ those flag officers, like Rooke or Churchill, who 
were members of the House. 
Onslow. 
(2) 
Their absence was noted by 
Six of the speakers Were Torieb, 'all of whom were 
associated with the person and policies of Sir Edward 
Brydges maintained there were enough sailors for 
navy and mercantile marine; Lowndes disagreed. 
(2) see below P. 386. 
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Seymour. Technically Seymour was a Court member; he 
held office as Comptroller of the Household and he was 
at this time the senior Tory member in the Commons. - His 
status in the House came from long political experiences 
strongly expressed Tory principles, and considerable 
electoral influence'in South West England. His contacts 
in this area and with-'mer"Chants, -, -and'his affectation of 
nautical manners, made*his contribution to discussion a 
potentially valuable one. 
(') One'of his associates', Sir 
(2) Jacob Bankes, was the only member with experience as a 
naval officer to speak during the two days of'debat'eý--' The 
other Tories, all of whom frequently supported'Seymour in 
the Commons, were Sir Christopher Musgrave, Jack Howe, 
John Manley an'd Francis Scobell. 
(3) 
Although Seymour was an, office holder. he was by-- --, 
November 1703'already identified, -by his violent speeches 
in the Commons, as a leader of opposition, to. some of the 
members of Anne's government. It was a-government, in. 
his opinion, insufficiently Tory in its policies and 
excessively dominated by moderates and. Godolphin and 
G. Holmes, British Politics in the Age of Anne (1967) 
169,271,275. He was M. P. for Exeter. 
(2) Sir Jacob Bankes, M. P. for Minehead, Charnock II, 306o 
(3) Musgrave was M. P. for Totnes. John Grubham Howe, 
M. P. for Gloucestershire, was usually known as 'Jack' 
Howe. There were four Howes in the 1702 parliament. 
Jack was the most vocal and an extreme Tory. The 
speech of the Howe in the debate on manning is in keeping with such a character. Manley was M. P. for 
Bossiney and Scobell M. F. for Grampound. 
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Marlborough. 
(') 
Certainly there is little evidence in 
his speech-or the speeches of his associates on 27 
November and 4 December 1703 of any statesmanship or 
co-operation with the Court. The two most sensible 
suggestions to come from them were one by Seymour that 
ways, of encouraging sailors should concentrate more on 
care for their families, and Musgrave's suggestion that 
it would be-possible to work out the number of merchant 
seamen from the monthly contributions of sixpense they 
(2) 
were required by law to make to Greenwich Hospital. 
Much of the rest of these Tory speeches consisted of cheap 
party invective that contained nothing constructive. 
Seymour himself stated that there was no real shortage 
of seamen but that where there were apparent shortages 
G. Holmes OP-cit. 73,90,195-6,275-6; K. Feiling 
op-cit. 369-70. 
(2) By the Registry Act; see7above P. 358. Musgrave 
was unduly optimistic in thinking that either the 
compliance of merchant seamen with the law or the 
administrative capabilities of the officials at 
Greenwich would have made it possible to deduce 
the numbers of merchant seamen. There has been 
a modern attempt to use the figures of monthly 
contributions as a measure of trade, R. Davis, 
Seamen's Sixpences: An Index of Commercial Activity 
1697-1828, Economica N. S. XXIII (1956) 328-339* 
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this was because merchants monopolised the supply. Bankes 
supported him. 
(') Almost inevitably it was Heatheote who 
answered this charge* 
(2) Howe suggested that means should 
be devised whereby gamesters and servants could be mustered. 
This and several of the points made in-other Tory speeches 
were calculated to appeal to Country members. 
(3) 
Seven merchants spoke in the debates, a very high 
proportion of the merchants in the House. 
(4) Their 
speeches taken together are an impressive-example of the 
articulate and informed contribution they aB a group - 
could make to-parliamentary debate. . The'Beven were Sir 
Francis Child,, Sir, Robert Clayton, Sir Thomas Davall, Sir 
Gilbert Heathcote,, Arthur Mooreq John Pery and Sir Charles 
Turner. 
(5) 
Among them they represented-very considerable 
(1) There is slight evidence that merchants did conceal 
seamen for their own use, P. R. O. Adm. 1/3615,29 
Jan. 1711; Hudson's Bay Record Society, Letters 
Outward 1688-1696, ed. E. E. Rich et al. (1957) xxiii- 
(2) See above P. 230. 
(3) 'J. J. Hecht, The Domestic Servant Class in Eighteenth 
Century England (1956) 2-5. 
(4) See above p. 224. 
(5) Child was--M. P. for-London, a-banker and, -one of, the 
biggest buyers of Navy Bills, B. M. Harley Loan 
29/40,, 6 Sept. 1708. Clayton, M. P. for Blitchingly, 
had diverse industrial and commercial interests. 
There was another Clayton in the Commons, Williamt 
M. P. for Liverpool. It was probably Sir Robert who 
spoke. Davall was a London merchant with trading 
links with the United Provinces. He was M. P. for 
Harwich. For Sir Gilbert Heathcote, see above p-? 30. 
Arthur Moore, M. P. for Grimsby, had interests in the 
East Indian and coastal trade. John Pery, M. P. for 
New Shoreham, traded with the E. Indies and Russia. 
Turner, M. P. for Lynn, brother-in-law to Robert 
Walpole, had interests in the Baltic trade. 
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trading experience and their various opinions have a 
coherence lacking in the other groups. In their 
opinion there were not enough seamen and the mostuseful, 
remedy for this would be to allow more foreigners. to serve 
in English ships. Moore condemned the use of parish 
poor as seamen. Several of them spoke intelligently and 
accurately on the reforms necessary to make seamen 
readier to serve in the navy. 
Only two speakers do not fall. conveniently into the 
three groups of Court, Tory and merchant. -, One was 
Sir 
Richard Onslow, a Whig with trading interests and 
experience as a Commissioner of the Adriiralty. 
(') His 
speech was mainly, and rightly, concerned with the evils 
of turnovers as a deterrent to naval service.. The other, 
speaker was Sir Thomas Crosse, a London brewer, who seems 
(2) 
to have been Tory in outlook. 
As well as discussing manning the committee 
consulted expert opinion. Customs officials were asked 
to provide an accurate estimate of the number of seamen in 
the country. 
(3) Two members of the committee attended the 
He was M. P. for Surrey; see above P. 356. 
(2) He was M. P. for Westminster and was later to be 
a director of the South Sea Company. 
(3) P. R. O. C. O. 388.9 Pt. I f-19. Merchants too were 
consulted, C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W-1.1702-31 861. 1 
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Prince's Council and the Co=issiofi6rs for the Navy were 
ordered to produce proposals for the 'increase and the 
encouragement of sailorsG(l)'The members of the'Navy 
Board were reluctant to, c6mply, insisting that such 
proposals were properly"the responsibility of the 
Prince's Council. 
(2), 'None the less they provided the 
committee with numerous and detailed'suggestions for the 
improvement 'Of-manning. 
(-3) Their paper on mannin -g was to 
become the basis of I two acts of parliame nt'. 
(4) The'most 
important recommendat - ions we I re that parish children should 
be apprenticed to the sea-'and that adults who volunteered 
as seamen in merchant or coastal trade should be protected 
from the press. The suggestion'that parish children 
should be used as naval I sailors had never been made before 
by the Navy Board and appears to be totally opposed to 
their past policy. Numerous suggestions from the Board 
since early in William's reign had generally recommended 
a-return to-the old and-successful--usage-of the navy,, - 
particularly annual, payment of crews. It seems likely 
that the suggestions had come from the government by way 
(1) P. R. O. Adm. 3/19,9 Dec. 1703; N. M. M. Sergison 
Ser/103 f-444- 
(2) Ibid. Ser/103 f-445* 
(3) Ibid. 'Ser/103 ff-445-9- 
(4) 2&3 Anne c6 and 4&5 Anne 0 6* 
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of the Prince's Council(l)but there is no evidence in 
any of the numerous meetings on manning-in 1703 that 
the Prince's Council had taken the initiative in 
suggesting parish children as a source of supply. 
Harley had been the first to suggest this scheme, in 
parliament on 27 November. 
(3) It was an idea that had 
long been current in pamphlet literature and one likely 
to be attractive to-'country gentlemen. 
(4) It was an even 
more attractive idea when Lowndes and Howe, in the 
discussions of 27 November and 4 December, 
(5)inereased 
the potential scope-of this non-maritime source by 
suggesting that 'troublesome men in the parishes' and 
idlers should also serve. However, it was Harley who 
gave the idea of exploiting the parishes for the benefit 
of the navy its clearest definition in these discussions. 
The-idea-, elaborated by the Navy Board, came before 
the Commons again on 16 December 1703 among twenty-two 
The suggestions might have been put to the Navy 
Board on 16 November 1703 at one of the rare 
meetings of Prince's Council and Navy Board. The 
Prince himself attended this meeting, P. R. O. Adm. 
3/19,16 Nov. 1703* 
(2) See above- p. 376. 
(3) Queen Anne's Navy, 185. 
(4) Hz, Maydman, Naval Speculations and Maritime Politics 
691) 242-89' 
(5) Queen Anne's Navy 186-7. 
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resolutions from the committee on manning. 
(') 
Anthony 
Hammond, who reported the findings of the committee, was 
himself a Commissioner for the Navy. 
(2) These resolutions 
were referred to a new committee, under the chairmanship 
of Hammond, which consisted of fifty-two named members 
and all who represented seaports or were merchantB. 
(3) 
A 
bill, based on the resolutions, passed both Houses rapidly 
and with no recorded difficulties. 
(4) 
The basic idea'of the act was that boys should be 
apprenticed to the sea. One of Hammond's resolutions 
proposed that boys who were an expense to their parish 
should be apprenticed to the sea from 10 to 21 years of 
age. Demographically this was a sensible proposal. A 
great proportion, probably nearly a half, of the 
population of England in the late seventeenth century was 
under nineteen years of age. 
(5) Any legislation based on 
the age groups from 10 to 21, years of age stood a good 
(1) C-J-XIV, 249-50. 
(2) Hammond was M. P. for Huntingdon and a Commissioner 
for the Navy 1702-8. 
(3) C-J. XIVj 284. 
(4) 2&3 Anne c 6; An Act for the Increase of Seamen. 
C. J. XIV, 282,299-300,310,353,354; L. J. XVII,, 
392,431,433,434,455,457. 
(5) P. Laslett, The World We Have Lost (1965)103o, 
4 
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chance of success. The apprentices were to be liable 
to pressing only from the age of 17 years and free of 
payment to Greenwich until that age. All ships were to 
carry a quota of these boys accoraing to tonnage. A 
recording and administrative system was to be created to 
control these recruits and to ensure their eventual entry 
into the navy. One of, the resolutions was a recommendation 
that instruction in navigation should be encouraged. 
-, , 
The act followed the pattern of the twenty-two 
resolutions closely. The main amendment had been to 
raise the age of Greenwich payments and liability to 
pressing from 17 to 18 years. Ship masters were also to 
be encouraged in their task of training the boys by being 
given the right to take the wages of boys taken for naval 
service if these boys were capable of acting as able 
seamen. There was an addition to the resolutions. In 
order to keep the price of coal in London low, it was 
decided that colliers should be allowed free of the press 
a master, a mate, a carpenter and one seaman for every 
. 
hundred tons-' burden. This meant practical immunity to 
the collier of 200 tons. Anyone who pressed a protected 
member of a collier's crew was to be fined Z10. The Lord 
Mayor of London and the Alderman had attended parliament 
to complain of collier'convoys and pressing in November 
1703. 
(') As a result of this complaint the protection of 
(1) Luttrell V, 360. - 
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collier crews became an ironic addition to the bill on 
manning. A Newcastle sailor was more valuable to the 
navy than a parish lad or a vagabond, however sturdy. 
No mention was made in the act of the need to 
encourage education in navigation. This matter had 
earned separate treatment as the result of a petition 
by a Lewis Maidwell on 18 December. 
(') He asked for 
permission to found a School of Navigation. A committee 
was formed to consider his scheme and a bill to establish 
such a school presented by Lowndes on 2 March 1? 04. The 
session ended before the bill could be read a second 
time, (2) 
This act for the 'increase' of seamen represents a 
change of government policy and the change is a puzzling 
one. The act attempted a long term administrative reform 
which aimed at creating or 'breeding' sailors in the best 
parliamentary tradition. It was irrelevant to the 
immediate needs of the navy and to the request in the 
Queen's speechýat the beginning of the session, which was 
for a more efficient way of manning. The act-did not 
(1) C. J. XIV, 254* 
(2) Ibid. XIV, 365; H. T. A. Basonquet, The Maritime 
School at Chelsea, M. M. VII (1921) 323; seebelow 
P. 398. 
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provide this; the bq; 
, 
ys to be apprenticed were debarred 
from naval service until they reached the age of 18 
years. The legislation is puzzling because it does not 
meet the problem and it represents a break with the 
manning policy under William, when the emphasis was on 
encouragement rather than the increase of sailors. There 
does not appear to be any sudden government conviction 
that there were not enough sailors to man the navy and 
mercantile marine which would explain the change of policy. 
The inappropriateness of the act to the needs of the navy 
is probably best explained by the government's misunder- 
standing of these needs. The act seems to have owed 
more to the government than the navy in its inception. 
(') 
The act becomes more understandable mýhen it is seen 
as merely a part of the parliamentary legislation on 
manning in this session. At the same time as Hammond's 
co=ittee was working on the bill for the increase of 
seamen, the first committee on manning, that with Conyers 
as chairman, had been working on the problems of manning* 
(2) 
In the discussions of 27 November and 4 December six 
speakers had suggested that the merchants should be 
allowed to employ a greater proportion of foreign 
(1) See above P. 3769 
See above p. 37ý90 
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seamen than the law allowed. 
(') A bill suggesting that 
half the crew of an English ship should be foreigners 
instead of the quarter hitherto allowed was introduced 
into the Commons on 27 January 1704. 
(2) Doubtless the 
arguments used on both sides were similar to those 
employed in 1690.0) There is some evidence that there 
was still opposition to increased use of foreigners and 
that the merchants had hoped for the legal right to 
more than half a foreign crew, 
(4)but 
no detailed evidence 
of the debates remains. The bill had passed both Houses 
by PI March. 
(5) 
The act f6r the 'Increase of Seamen' was to become 
effective on 25 March 1704. On 31 March the Prince's 
Council met to consider the new act and decided that 
orders must be given to every captain 'strictly to comply# 
with the protection of collier seamen. 
(6) The next day 
the Council considered the opinion of its legal adviser, 
(1) Heathcote, Howe, Lowndes, Manhy, Moore and Smith. 
(2) C-J-XIV, 309. 
(3) See above P. 338. 
(4) C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W. I. 1702-3,206. 
(5) C-J-XIV, 316,318,334,352,370,387; L-J-XVII, 
478,481,503; 2&3 Anne e 13. 
(6) P. R. O. Adm. 3/19,31 March 1704. The Prince's Council 
had met during December 1703 and January 1704 to 
consider the practical difficulties of manning. for 
the coming year. No new approaches were suggested, 
P. R. O. Adm. 7/336,10 Dec. 1703,1 Jan. 1704; ibid. 
7/550A, 3 Jan. 1703. 
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Mr. Eltrick, the Councillor for the Admiralty, as to 
whether the new law protected an experienced sailor who 
bound himself as an apprentice. Mr. Eltrick-was of 
the opinion that such an evasion of the purpose of the 
law would not give protection. 
(') 
His learned opinion was 
almost undoubtedly technically correct but the Prince's 
Council, in asking for his advice, had shrewdly discovered 
a practical weakness of the law. Clause XV stated that 
anyone who apprenticed himself as a sailor was to be free 
of the press for three years* The aims behind this 
clause were to encourage landsmen to learn the trade of the 
sea and to protect youngsters one or two years younger than 
eighteen who were sent to a ship as apprentices. At 
eighteen they would have become liable to pressing before 
their training was complete. By virtue of this clause an 
experienced sailor claiming ignorance of the sea would on 
registration as apprentice receive a free protection from 
the Lord High Admiral. On 14 January 1706 the House of 
Lords was told of the effect of this on the navy: 
'Old men used to manage the colliery, but since 
the last act they take our best men and not 
cripples and boys that used to serve them. 
They, by that act, are empowered to take 
apprentices for three years. They abuse the 
(1) P. R. O. Adm. 1/3667 f-27- 
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power given them by taking seamen of 30 
years of age, and they lend them to 
merchants and we cannot meddle with them. 
The colliery used to breed seamen, but 
now breeds none, and is no nursery to the 
fleet. '(') 
Thus an act intended, to improve manning had some 
serious adverse effects, not only, in terms of men lost 
but perhaps more seriously in the unfairness that enabled 
some sailors to flaunt security and high wages in the 
faces of their less astute comrades. On the positive 
side the act. did. ", 
send. an unknown number of boysý into 
service with the navy. The legislative attempt to set 
an age limit to these recruits was administratively 
unworkable in the early eighteenth, century. Boys, must 
have represented an incalculable. proportion of the_growing 
number who signed on for naval service in the later years 
of Anne. Theirpresence is vividly but unstatistically 
recorded', by one seaman, who lamented, 
'the pestilential inconvenience of pestering 
up a ship with such swarms of nasty, 
stinking, blackguard boys. j(2) 
The acts considered ab-ove'w6re not the only 
contribution parliament made to manning in the 1703-4 
session. 'An act was passed which'enabled debtors to be 
H. M. C. H. L. VI, 387. 
B. Slush, The Navy Royal or a Sea Cook Turn'd 
Projector (1709) 39. 
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freed from prison if they consented to enlist in army 
or navy. 
(') 
This act was apparently of little use to 
the navy;, most of the debtors chose the army. 
(2) 
In the 
House of Lords a far more radical measure was considered. 
Here a bill for a general and compulsory register of all 
seamen was discussed. Granted the failure. of the 
existing scheme of registration this-, was the only logical 
way in which the state could. -. I -have controlled the seamen of 
England. Compulsory registration. could have provided the 
basis for an organised allocation-of sailors to navy and 
mercantile marine. Theoretically, with such an 
organisation, it would have been possible for each man to 
serve a fixed period in the, navy before being released, to 
enjoy the more, lucrative service of merchants-or collier 
owners. The justice-of such a scheme would have gone 
far towards ending the unrest in the navy and the 
difficulties of manning. In all probability the 
administration of such a scheme would have been beyond 
the capacity of any early eighteenth century government 
but the administrative problem never arose because 
although the bill passed the Lords it was ignored by the 
Commons. 
(3) 
There would certainly have been opposition to 
(1) 2&3 Anne c-10. 
(2) Letters of Capt. W. Aston, P. R. O. 1/1436,, 
_23 
May 
1704; ibid. 7/336t 2 Feb. 1706. 
(3) L. J. XVII, 421,434,535. 
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such'a radical proposal implying, as it did, sweeping 
government powers over seamen and an infringement of the 
right of merchants to hire men as they pleased. There is 
no doubt that the bill was associated with the Whig Junto 
in the Lords and it was probably initiated by them. Whig 
flag officers, such as Byng and Jennings, and Burchett, 
the Secretary to the Admiralty, supported the scheme. 
(l) 
In the early years of Anne's reign the Whigs used their 
strength in the House of Lords to launch a series of attacks 
on the government, particularly its handling of naval 
affairs. 
(2) The vulnerability of the Prince's Council to 
political attack, both because of its failings and because 
of the association of Prince George with its policies, was 
enhanced because, in Orford, the Whig-party had a leader in 
the Lords of great experience and national reputation in 
naval matters. In the Lords the Whigs could threaten the 
government and demonstrate their own political strength by 
(3) 
an-interest in naval matters. .. The political significance 
of this interest was limited by the presence of a 
H. M. C1 H. L. V, 535-44; J. Burchett, A Complete 
History of the Most Remarkable Transactions at 
Sea (1720); see below pp. 431-2. 
(2) See above P. 68, 
(3) See above P-131. 
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predominantly Tory House of Commons. Thus the bill for 
a compulsory register was not considered by the Commons in 
1704 and when the Bords addressed the Queen on 2 March 
about a shortage of 6,000 men in the navy, she could afford 
to return a 'dry' answer and take no action. 
(') Her reply 
was the last reference to manning in a session of parliament 
that was more concerned with manning than any other between 
1688 and 1714. 
In the parliamentary session of, 1704-5 neither House 
pbLid much attention to manning. The Commons voted the 
usual 40,000 men. Another attempt to establish a School 
of-Navigation failed. 
(2) 
A select committee of the Lords 
considered manning but only as one aspect amongst several 
naval matters. Defoe was questioned by this committee 
about the scheme for manning he had published in the 
Review and the House of Lords requested an accoýint of men 
actually mustered, but naval finance dominated the attention 
of the House. 
(3) 
(1) 
. 
L. J. XVII, -466; 
E. Timberland History and Proceedings. 
of the House of Lords (17425 11,71. The address was 
an expression of party opposition and the figure of 
6,000 men short, on which it was based, was meaning- 
less. Any authority 'on naval matters, such as-Orford, 
would know that many men who had been paid off would 
soon remuster of. the-figure of 1703, C. S. P. Dom. 
Anne 11,288-92. 
(2) Proposals Reviv1d, of Establishing, and Supporting a 
Public School, designed, amongst other Improvements, 
for the Sea Service (1705) - See above P- 391. . 
(3) L. J. XVII, 584,672; R. M. C. H. L. VI, 1169 223-6; see 
above pp. 131-3. 
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The recommendations of the senior naval officers 
for manning in 1705 contained no new suggestions, if their 
advice that Ireland be exploited for recruits and the army 
be forced to-give up seamen is excepted. 
(') 
A harder 
attitudd-is also noticeable. Shovell suggested the ending 
of the clemency'shown to deserters at courts martial. 
( 2) 
A pamphlet by the Marquis of Carmarthen advocated very 
severe legislative measures. 
(3) Apprenticeship to colliers, 
marriage to obtain the protection of the title of house- 
hold er, the holding of minor civil office, the pretended 
ownership of vessels based upon forged papers - all such 
devices to evade naval service would have been stopped on 
his advice. The privileges of the Cinque-Portst the Mint 
and the Savoy would have been suspended and J. P. s would'. ýhave 
been fined for non-co-operation with the naval authorities. 
There is evidence that the traditional methods of obtaining 
men were pursued with great vigour and increased efficiency 
(4) in this year. Implicit in the actions and suggestions to 
(1) P. R. O. Adm. 7/336,10 Dec. 1704. 
(2)- Byng Papers, ed. B. Tunstallý(N. -R. S. 1930) It 65. 
(3) K. Osbourne (sic), A Copy of the Marquis of 
Carmarthen's Method for the Speedy Manning (1705). 
Peregrine Osborne, later 2nd Duke of Leeds, served 
in the navy. He became a Rear Admiral in 1697. 
See above p. 264. 
(4) P. R. P. Adm. 1/3608, '24 Dec. 1707; ibid. 20/98 Pt. 2. 
No.. 486-9. 
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do with manning there was still the belief that there 
were enough sailors; the only reform necessary was to 
devise a method, that would bring them into the navy more 
efficiently. 
This belief seems to have inspired the main item of 
legislation on manning-An the 1705-6 session of parliamentq 
'An Act for the Encouragempnt, and-Increase, of Seamen. '(') 
This act seems to. havp been initiated by the naval 
authorities and to. have been presented, -to the Commons with 
government backing. 
(2) 
The number of men actually employed 
in the, navy between 7 1703 and 1705 had remained obstinately 
below the numbers forthe last war years. in William's 
reign. 
(3) 
The. act sought to, remedy those grievances that 
deterred seamen from remaining in naval service and thus 
reduce desertion. 
(4) 
Before the bill was considered the 
Commons. gave evidence, of their-increasing knowledge of the 
problems-of naval manpower by demanding the number of men 
employed-by the navy from'November 1704 to November 1705. 
The figures they received were for crews at highest 
complements. 
(. 5) The House was, sufficiently aware of the 
(1) 4&5 Anne c 6. 
(2) P. R. O. S. P. 42/7,5 Jan. 1? 06. 
(3) See Appendix III. 
(4) The best indication of desertion rates is the 
discrepancy between numbers of men borne and 
mustered; see Appendix III. 
(5) C-J-XV, 17,18-20. 
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inaccuracy of-such figures to ask for and get another 
series of monthly figures, extending this time from 
January 1702 to December-1704, showing numbers of men 
borne. (') On 23 January 1706 the House, of Commons gave 
permission for a bill to be prepared that was not only to 
encourage seamen but was also to be 'for the better and 
speedier manning of Her Majesty's Fleet, and for making 
provision for the widows and. orphans of all such and for 
the support of all-such. 
(2) Seven men were deputed to draft 
a bill and together they, made, up-the most professional and 
expert group that had, yet been appointed in Annels, reign to 
draft naval, -legislation. Six of them were flag. officers, 
the seventh, Henry Paget, was a4member of the Prince's 
Council. 
(3) They. were also to consider the repeal of any 
acts that were ineffectual, presumably a recognition that 
_the. 
Register Act had failed. The bill became popularly 
known as 'Shovell's Bill' and he presented it to the. 
Commons on 17 February 1706. 
(4) The House needed to be 
constantly reminded of the existence of the bill. 
(5) 
This 
(1) Ibid. XV, 112, 
(2) Ibid. XV, 107* 
(3) The flag officers were Alymer, Byng, Churchill, 
Jennings, Shovell and Stafford Fairborn. Paget, 
M. P. for Staffordshire, and three of the officers 
were of the Prince's Councill Queen Anne's Navy, 
11,355-6. 
(4) C. J. XVj 132; Luttrell VI, 23. 
(5) C-J-XV, 149,157,162,168,177,193,194-5. 
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reluctance may be attributed to the fact that it contained 
suggestions for a general and compulsory registration of 
all, sailors. One merchant at least reported back to his 
constituency that everything must be done to prevent 
legislation on these lines by postponing discussion. 
(') 
Luttrell reported that'the billvould probably be post- 
poned until the next session. 
(2) Parliament's interest in 
manning was regained by a speech by Shovell on 11 March. 
In this he told the Commons that the navy was 17,000 short 
of its target of 40,000 men, that 61000 of these were 
protected butthat the navy needed most of the remaining 
11,000.0) These were, the most frightening figures recorded 
as having been spoken in the Commons on manning in the 
reigns of William. and Anne. - Although Shovell, regained the 
interest of the House, legislation came only at the cost of 
(1) Thomas Johnson, -M. P. for Liverpool anda-West Indies 
trader, The Norris Papers, ed. T. Heywood (Chetham 
Society IX 1846) 147. 
(2) Luttrell VI, 23* 
(3) Ibid. VI, 25. It is likely that several thousand_ 
seamen were protected. The Navy Board, the 
Commissioners of Customsq Trinity House and 
Ordnance issued several hundreds of protections 
each, irrespective of those protected by act of 
parliament or for the overseas trade, P. R. O. Adm. 
1/3604,6 April, 1706; ibid. 1/3607,8 May 1707; 
ibid. 3/11f 25;, C. S. P. Dom. Wm. 111 16972 167; 
Ministry of Defence Library (Naval Section) Corbett 
MSS. X ff. 46-7* 
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abandoning the scheme of compulsory registration. By the 
time the outline of a bill was reported to the House on 14 
March 1706 it was an 'encouraging' bill that contained no 
reference to a registration. 
(') 
This bill was passed to 
the Lords on 18 March. 
The Lords had themselves been considering naval 
manning. With the permission of the House of Commons 
Byng, Churchill, Jennings, Shovell and Stafford Fairborne 
had attended the House of Lords on 14 January. 
(2) They 
explained the mechanics of manning to the Lords, complained 
of the high wages offered by merchants and suggested as 
their remedy that 'the seamen ought to be encouraged. ' 
The protection granted to colliers was also criticised. 
(3) 
Byng described the benefits of a compulsory register. The 
House of Lords considered manning again, with Torrington in 
the chair, when he placed before the committee of the whole 
House some proposals he and the Prince's Council had 
considered for improving the 1703 Act for the Increase of 
Seamen. 
(4) 
The Lords did not take up the subject again until 
they were called upon to deal with the bill to encourage 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(Li) 
C. J. XV, 194-5. 
L. J. XVIII, 61. 
H. M. C. H. L. VIs 
H. M. C. H. L. VII 
386-7; L. J. XVIII, 55. 
3871, 
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seamen which came from the Commons a-few days before 
parliament was dissolved. The bill was passed but the 
Lords showed dissatisfaction with it and perhaps at the 
haste with which they were compelled to consider it, by 
appointing a committee. This committee was to draw up an 
address requesting the Queen to appoint people 
'to consider of the most effectual means for. 
manning the fleet, for the encouragement 
and increase of the number-of seamen, and 
for the restoring and preserving the 
discipline of the navy. '(') 
The committee that drew up this address was pre- 
dominantly Whig and represents another of their attempts 
to criticise the government through the navy. The Queen's 
answer was shortly formal. 
(2) 
The address and answer are 
similar to those that closed the session 1703-4. 
(3) 
Orford, 
in returning to the Lords from presenting the address, made 
a speech in which he commented upon the haste with which the 
act had been passed, and implied a failure on the part of 
the government and naval administration because it had been 
necessary 
'so late in the year ...... of having resort 
to the extraordinary assistance of parlia- 
ment for that purpose. j(4) 
(1) -, L. J. XVIII, 160. 
(2) Ibid. XVIIII 160. 
(3) See above p. 398e 
(4) L. J. XVIII, 1619 
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Shovell's Bill became law with effect from 25 March 
1706. The main reform, contained in clause X, was a 
declaration that all naval seamen turned over from one 
ship to serve on another should be paid their wages from 
the first ship within a month. The rest of the bill is 
strangely unimpressive, presumably because the main reform, 
a compulsory register, had been lost in the Commons. The 
committee of naval officers responsible for drafting the 
bill had accurately identified turnovers as a major 
grievance. of the s. eamen but to assume that the reform of 
this grievance would be sufficient to improve naval 
recruiting seems to be unduly optimistic. 
(') 
The other 
reforms were comparatively minor: the 1703 act for the 
Increase of Seamen was modified by forbidding experienced 
seamen to apprentice themselves to the collier trade, and 
masters of ships could now refuse to take parish boys as 
(2) 
apprentices below the age of 13 years. Severer penalties 
were introduced for Watermen who hid to evade the press, a 
measure that reflects the obsession of the naval authorities 
with this source of men. T he procedure whereby men were 
recruited in the inland counties was improved and an 
attempt made to win the co-operation of the parish 
(1) See below pp. 458-9* 
See abbve PP. 393-4. 
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constables by paying them El for each man secured. 
(') 
Such 
provisions reflect the annual recommendations of the flag 
officers on manning. They assume there were sufficient 
English sailors to man the navy and that changes in the 
procedure of manning would quickly fill the ships of the 
fleet. 
For 1706, if the ships were to be manned to their 
highest complement, the navy required more than 50,000 men. 
(2) 
The usual difficulties, complaints and failures attended 
attempts to attain even the middle complement. 
(3) Against 
this, by now common, background George, Prince of Denmark 
and Lord High Admiral, acted on the address of the Lords 
suggesting that a bill be prepared that would give some 
'extraordinary assistance' to manning. 
(4) 
In April the 
experts, serving flag officers, Torrington and Orfordq were 
summoned to give George their advice. 
(5) They met to 
consider how to man the fleet, how to increase seamen and 
to consider how their suggestions should be presented to 
parliament. To do this the experts asked for the 
(1) This provision was ineffective. Men from the 
inland counties were few and expensive, P. R. O. 
Adm. 1/3610,10 Dec. 1708. 
(2) C. J. XVI 227. 
(3) P. R. O. Adm. 7/336,19 Feb. 1706; P. R. O. S. P. 42/7', 
5 Jan. 1706. 
(4) Luttrell VI, 29; see above p. 403. 
(5) P. R. O., Adm. 2/365,30 April, 1706. 
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information that had been requested in the past. They 
asked for the numbers of 'seamen, fishermen, watermen, 
bargemen, lightermen, coalmen and others employing them- 
selves upon water, ' also for the tonnage and number of 
ships. 
(') E7 29 October the draft of a bill was ready, 
(2) 
It was, on paper, an answer to all the associated 
problems of manning and in theory the only logical 
answer. There was to be a compulsory register of sea- 
men, as had been proposed earlier in Anne's reign. 
(3) 
The conditions and privileges of registration were to be 
made so attractive that every seaman, and landman too, 
would accept enrolment gladly. The men were to be paid 
a bounty and the Lord High Admiral was to decide what 
proportion would serve each year in the navy. The 
administration, documentation and mechanics of the scheme 
were minutely detailed. 
The government made no use of this preparation in the 
1706-7 session of parliament. Neither House displayed 
any interest in manning and apparently the government was 
not sufficiently worried about it to take the initiative 
and use the draft bill that was ready, It was not-until 
(1) Ibid. 7/336,17 May 1706; C. T. B. XX Pt. 111,675. 
(2) P. R. O. Adm- 7/336,29 Oct. 1706; -H. M. C. H. L. VII 52-4-69 
(3) See above p. 401 and p. 402, 
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the session of 1707-8 that the House of Lords again 
took up the problems of manning but it did this in such 
a way as to imply. that it had forgotten the earlier 
address. 
(') The House called for papers on the numbers 
of ships, and of men mustered and turned over, and'on 22 
December formed a select committee to consider ways of 
manning the fleet. 
(2) The committee was specifically 
required to consider how far the protection of collier 
crews had hindered manning. This committee met on 29 
December with Townshend in the chair and called for Byng 
and Jennings to give evidence. It was an interesting 
selection of-flag, officers; both, like Townshend, were 
Whigs: both of them were supporters of Orford and 
apparently highly regarded by merchants. 
(3) 
The proceed- 
ings when they attended the coiýmittee were opened by. a 
reading of those paragraphs from the 1703 Act for the 
Increase of Seamen which protected collier seamen. 
(4) 
Byng and Jennings then explained the disastrous effect of 
these clauses on the navy - how by them the best sailors 
in England now worked on the colliers, that these colliers, 
(1) See above p. 403. 
(2) L. J. XVIII, 351-2,359,362,399# 
(3) B. M. Addit. IISS. 311 958 ff. 45-9; the evidence of 
W. Wood, P. R. O. Adm. 1/5114; see below pp. 431-2. 
(4) H. M. C. H. L. VII, 522* 
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which once provided 4-6,000 men, now only provided the 
navy with 300 men a year, Their criticisms widened in 
scope when they complained of various authorities 
protecting 5,000 seamen and that the practice of turn- 
overs frightened foreigners away from naval service and 
our own sailors into Dutch employ. The result of these 
abuses was, in their opinion, that the navy had only 
15,000 skilled seamen, and unless matters improved it 
would only be able to operate effectively for another two 
years. 
(') The two of them were told to consider a bill 
(2) 
that would improve the manning situation. On 5 January 
1708 Jennings presented thirteen proposals to the House 
of Lords. 
(3) 
On 7 January Townshend and the committee 
accep ted six of these proposals'as-the basis of a bill. 
(4) 
Three of the proposals, dealing with excessive protections, 
the active support of Lord Lieutenants in'securing sailors, 
and a bounty, were not considered worthy of legislation but 
were to be the subject of an address. Four of them were 
rejected. Three of these called for an immediate embargo, 
an act of parliament which would fine anyone who concealed 
(1) There is evidence that the proportion of boys and 
marines amongst crews was causing concern, Memoirs 
Relating to Lord Torrington, ed. J. K. Laughton 
(Camden Soc. 1889) 171. 
(2) E. M. C. H. L. VII2.522. 
(3) H. M. C. H. L. VII, 518,522-3. 
(4) L. J. XVIII, 403. 
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a sailor, and a discontinuation of the practice whereby 
captains were allowed servants. The fourth of the 
rejected proposals is the most interesting and one that 
might have done much to solve the problems of manning. 
It proposed that the wages given by merchants should be 
limited to thi rty shillings a month and an increase in 
naval'wages to twenty-six shillings a month, with-twenty- 
eight shillings to every quarter gunner, the number of 
whom was to be greatly increased. This is one of the 
few occasions between 1688 and 1714 when the possibility 
of making manning easier by raising the wages of the sea- 
man was suggested. Higher wages and a general registry 
were probably the only two reforms that individually or 
together would have made the manning troubles of the 
entire eighteenth century very much fewer. 
The bill based on the six remaining proposals was 
considered by the Lords in January 1708. It was another 
of the bills based on the assumptions that some encourage- 
ment and fewer protections would solve the problems of 
manning. Protections for collier seamen and watermen 
were to be restricted, permanent convoys were to be provided 
for the collier trade, and no volunteer or foreign seaman 
was to be turned over. 
(') The bill was considered several 
(1), L. J. XVIII, 426,4279 
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times in committee and read for the third_time on 24 
January. (') During the course of the debates reference was 
made to theearlier address about, manning and the draft 
bill for a general registry, was considered and then 
abandoned. 
(2) 
In the Commons the bill that had come from the 
proposals of Byng and Jennings was read for the first, 
-, 
time on 26 January and it was agreed by 132 votes to 107 
that it should be read a second, time. 
(3), On the second 
reading it was defeated. 
(4) The reason for the defeat, 
according, to Vernon, was that it repealed an act made to 
protect collier seamen. _(5) 
Certainly the Commons, were 
reluctant to admit faults in their legislation; the 
maintenance of the Registry. Act,, despite its admitted. 
failure, is evidence of this. There must, howeverl have 
been other reasons for the defeat of this bill although 
many members representing the East coast ports and London 
must have been opposed to any measure that might have 
disrupted the collier trade. The bill was one. of the 
f6w on naval matters in which. the Lords had-taken the 
Ibid. XVIII, 426,4272 430$ 432$ 434,435; H. M. C. 
H. L. VII, 518-23,524-64, - 
(2) L. J. XVIIII 432. 
(3) C-J-XV, 515. 
(4) Ibid. XV, 520. 
(5) Vernon Letters 111,327. Presumably this was a 
reference to the act of 1704; see above P. 390. 
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initiative but antagonism to it for this reason was 
probably slight. The bill may have seemed to many 
members of the Commons to be the product of party 
ambition rather than a considered attempt to solve the 
problems of naval manning. In this session of parlia- 
ment the Whig party-had made a great effort to win a 
larger share of the government and this effort involved 
an attack on the government's conduct. of naval affairs, 
particularly its failure to, protect trade. 
(') This bill 
appears to have been part of the Whig attack. It was 
drafted by a committee which had as chairman one of the 
Whig leaders, Townshend. It was based on the advice of 
Whig f lag of f icers , and no attempt had been made to secure 
the opinion of any of the Prince's Council. Indeed Byng 
and Jennings had refused to be members of this Council. 
(2) 
Their proposals contained no suggestion for a general 
registry although they had advocated such a scheme in 
1706. 
(3) 
This might represent either a change of opinion 
or political calculation that such a reform was unpopular 
and therefore inexpedient. The identification of the 
Prince's Council with such a reform during the debates was 
See above pp. 288-97. 
(2) See below pp. 431-2* 
(3) See above p. 402. 
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possibly a political move to discredit the Council. 
The failure of the bill from the Lords was not the 
only damage naval manning was to sustain in the 1707-8 
session of parliament. The London and East Coast 
colliers had retained their protected position and the 
American merchants were to improve their trade at the 
expense of the navy. Sickness in the Americas could 
gravely weaken naval squadrons and single ships. In 
order to remain effective or to be sufficiently well 
manned to manage the return journey to England, men of 
war frequently had to press men from the colonies they 
guarded or the merchant ships they were to convoy. They 
were-allowed to press the inhabitants of colonies with the 
governor's permission although this was rarely and 
reluctantly given. The alternative, pressing from 
merchant ships, was allowed in moderation. 
(') 
By the 
'Act for the Encouragement of the Trade to America' 
pressing was forbidden in Americaii waters from 20 January 
1708. 
(2) This act too was initiated in the House of Lords 
and was drafted, organised in both Houses and supported by 
Whigs. In the Lords Halifax seems to have been the manager 
(1) C. S. P. Dom. Anne 1,720. 
(2) 6 Anne c. 64, 
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of the bill with help from Jennings and Dolben. 
(l) In the 
Commons the committed formed to consider the bill consisted 
entirely of Whigs but for one neutral merchant. 
(2) In an 
emergency the act ordered merchant ships to give up one 
(3) fifth of their crews to the navy. It also laid down 
that twenty foreign ships should be allowed to act as 
privateers in the Americas, that in American waters 
English privateers might carry up to three quarters 
foreign seamen, and that any foreigner who had served two 
years in a British merchant or naval ship might become 
a naturalised British subject. The, practical ban on 
pressing reduced, the navy in the Americas to impotency. 
Ships had to return to England as soon as sickness and 
desertion reduced their crews to near the level necessary 
to manage the ship homewards. 
(4)Not 
even -colonial 
governors had power to mitigate the effects of the act. 
(5) 
See above p. 2W; H. M. C. H. L. VII 227-8. Dolben was 
M. P. for Liskeard and a devoted Whig, The Wentworth 
Papers ed. J. J. Cartwright (1883) 73- 
(2) C. J. XVj 454. Alymer,, Byng, Dolben, Jennings, Sir 
Gilbert Heathcote. and Sir Richard Onslow were the 
Whig members of the committee. Heysham was the 
merchant; see above p. 295. 
(3) 6 Anne c. 64, clause XIII cf. P. R. O. Adm. 3/23,21 
April, 1708. 
(4) C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W. I. 1708-9, '67. 
(5) Ibid. 1708-91 473* 
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Between 1708 and 1713 the act crippled the operations of 
the navy in American waters and also, by the immunity 
conferred upon merchant seamen, made this trade a popular 
refuge from the press for skilled seamen. 
(') 
Thus the act' 
not only. limited the manpower available to the navy but, 
like the collier trade with its high wages and security, 
also providedanother glaring example of injustice to 
annoy the naval sailor. 
The 'Act for the Encouragement of Trade to America' 
was parliament's last specific contribution to the 
problem of manning the fleet. The navy was left to cope 
with the problem, the recent legislation and the French 
for the remaining five years of war. The greatest crisis 
for manning came when the French threatened an invasion of 
Scotland in 1708. A powerful squadron was quickly 
mustered to defeat them. The manning was successful, 
thanks to the popularity and efficiency of Leake and Byng 
and the opportune arrival of merchant fleets whose crews 
could be pressed. 
(2) 
There was no originality about naval manning in the 
years that followed; the best and considered advice of the 
Ibid---1711-12,102; The Walker Exped 
l'? li, ed. G. S., Graham (N. R. S. 1953) 
S. P. 42/89 24 March 1710; R. Pares, 
the Navy in the West Indiesq in The 
Business and other Essays, ed. R. H. 
(1961) 190-140 - 
(2) Burnet IV, 184-5; P. R. O. Adm. 7/336, 
ition to Quebec 
316,357; P. R. O. 
The Manning of 
Historian's 
and E. Humphreys 
27 Feb. 1708, 
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flag officers was that manning should be conducted 'as 
hath been done some years since. "(') Thus the traditional 
methods were followed and apparently with success. Flag 
officersstill complained 
(2)but 
the numbers of men entering 
the navy increased, and remained steadily well above 
409000. (3) The ease with which the navy maintained these 
satisfactory figures is in some ways surprising, as they 
were achieved after '; years of war, each one of which had 
taken its toll of seamen. The contribution parliamentary 
legislation made to this achievement must be debatable. 
By allowing more foreigners to serve in English ships and 
by organising the supply of parish boys parliament had 
provided the navy with additional sources of seamen. The 
benefits this legislation conferred were in part balanced by 
the restrictions parliament placed on recruiting by 
protecting collier seamen and merchant crews in American 
waters. The effect of parliamentary legislation would seem 
to have been that it made available for naval use large 
numbers of recruits but that many of these Were not the 
able seamen the navy would have liked. The calibre of 
these recruits, perhaps luckily for Britain, was never 
tested by main fleet action. 
(1) Ibid. 2/366 f. 133. 
(2) S. Martin Leake, Life of Sir John Leake, ed. 
G. Callender (N. R. S. 1920) 169t 318-9. 
(3) See Appendix III. 
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Although parliamentary legislation helped the navy, 
the satisfactory manning situation between 1708 and 1713 
must have owed as much if not more to the bad harvests and 
economic exhaustion of the country. -When 
jobs were short 
the navy-did not suffer from shortages of men. 
(')-Between 
1709 and 1711 particularly, Britain suffered one of the 
worst periods of economic crisis it was to know in the 
eighteenth century. There had been unemployment. troubles 
in the country as early as 1707 
(2)but bad harvests in 1703 
and 1709 and a severe contraction of trade after 1709 
created an economic crisis that must have helped naval, 
manning. 
(3) Between 1709 and 1711 the numbers of men who 
signed on for naval service were very high indeed. 
(4) The 
similar rise in numbers towards the end of the war in 
William's reign must be attributableto a similar 
combination of legislation. and economic crisis. 
The manning problem between 1688 and 1714 wasa problem 
of manning rather than manpower, It was the merchants and 
the complaints of flag officers that did most to bring these 
(1) Ministry of Defence Library (Naval Section) Corbett 
LOS. X f. 9. 
(2) La Clef du Cabinet des Princes de 1'Europe VII (1707) 
200. 
ý 
(3) Ibid. XI (1711) 341; T. S. Ashton, Economic 
Fluctuations in England 1700-1800 (1957) 16-7,57-8. 
(4) Ibid. 187; see Appendix III. 
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problems to the notice of parliament and government. The 
government's attempts to put the whole system on a good 
basis - the Register and apprentice systems - failed. 
Both were administratively difficult to organise and both 
encountered opposition. Opposition to the one measure 
that might have solved the problem, a compulsory Register, 
was sufficiently powerful to prevent any legislation on 
these lines. The two bodies advocating reform were 
divided in attitude and aims. The senior naval officials 
believed there were enough English sailors to man the 
navy but wanted a more efficient means than the press to 
muster them. They also wanted sweeping powers that would 
enable them fully to exploit the various classes of sea- 
farer and watermen. The merchants were not convinced 
England had enough sailors to man navy and mercantile 
marine but were naturally suspicious of any reform that 
wouId give the navy a priority over the nation's resources 
of men. Neither group had sufficient evidence to. 
convince parliament to support one or other approach and 
there was never a crisis of manning sufficiently acute to 
convince parliament of the need for radical reform. 
418s 
The 
Encouragement 
of 
Seamen 
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The naval service for which the English seaman 
volunteered or for which he- was pressed was a hard one. 
King calculated an annual peacetime mortality rate of 
6.25'/o. 
(') 
The great storm of 1703, or the faulty 
navigation of 1707 that set Shovell's squadron sailing on 
to the Scillies, reach the history books because many men, 
including great names, died. The story of Captain 
Martin's Atlantic voyage of 1703-4, in which his ship 
encountered a water spout, extraordinary thunder and 
lightning and an 'ordinary' gale, just survives in the 
historical record, as did his ship. 
(2) 
Nearly as many 
naval ships were lost through storm or accident between 
1702 and 1713 as by enemy action. 
(3) 
This was normality. 
So it was when disease decimated a ship's crew. Storms- 
and disease, shipwre. ck, accidents caused by men and 
faulty equipment, these provided the continual-background, 
of strain to naval life. 
War did not increase the incidence of such hazards 
G. King, Natural 
G. Chalmers, An 
of Great Britaii 
(2) Life of Capt. S. 
1895) 84-5- 
(3) R. C. Anderson, A 
and Political Observations, in 
Estimate of the Comparative Strength 
n (1802) 418. 
Martin ed. C. R. Markham (N. R. S. 
Note, M. M. 22 (1936) 240. 
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though it subjected many more thousands of men to such 
risks and, in some ways, aggravated them. The increasing 
claims of trade defence meant more ships at sea later into 
the winter season and the time of storms. English warships 
were notoriously overgunn 
. 
ed. 
(l) This led to cramped mess- 
decks, with attendant discomfort and danger to health for 
the men, and women, who sailed'in them. 
(2) Crowding was 
frequently made worse by the use of men of war as transports, 
and the soldiers brought with them fresh and therefore 
virulent land-bred disease. 
(3) 
On crowded ships status- 
conscious captains found space for their train of servants 
at the expense of the seamen. 
(4) 
Nor would normal shipboard 
life be sweetened by the sullen sweepings of the press. 
(5) 
Longer voyages to foreign stations became more frequent and 
- 
this as well aggravated the accepted dangers of sea life. 
The increasing number of new ships that joined the navy 
(1) P. R. O. Adm. 3/17,7 Dec. 1702. 
(2) There were women aboard most ships, Thd'Byng Papers, 
ed. B., Tunstall (N. R. S. 1930) Is 17-18; P. R. O. Adm. 
1/3601,12 Feb., 20 Feb. 1704; ibid. 1/3603,5 Sept. 
1705. 
(3) H. M. C. Buccleuch and Queensberry II Pt. 111 269; 
C. S. P.. Dom. Anne 1,532. 
(4) Mr. Gibson's Account,, in J. Charnock, History of 
Marine Architecture 1 (1800) lxxxix. 
(5) J. R. Hutchinson, The Press Gang (1913) 312-3. 
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between 1688 and 1714 brought with them new hazards; the 
incidence of sickness was always higher in new as compared 
with older ships. 
(') 
Such hardships were generally accepted by the sailors 
and were of no interest to parliament. It was manifestly 
a parliamentary responsibility to pass laws that would 
'increase' the number of seamen in the kingdom but to 
legislate for the conditions of naval service was to take 
over the duties of the Commissioners for the Admiralty and 
Navy. -None the less parliament did have to pass laws 
whose declared aim was to "encourage' the seaman. Compassion 
or a desire to control the navy played little or no part in 
such legislation. Encouragement was found to be necessary, 
as the grievances of the seamen increased after 16889 if the 
navy was to be fully manned. The basic-motive of all such 
reforming legislation was the need for efficient national 
defence. A subsidiary motive in much of this legislation 
was political. The role of the seaman as the country's 
defender and the many grievances under which he suffered 
made legislation ostensibly for his benefit a convenient and 
effective method of attacking any administration. 
Augustus Harvey's Journalq ed. D. Erskine (1953) 
45. 
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Whenever parliament was led to consider the conditions 
of naval service it generally interested itself in one or 
other of the two classes of seamen, either the commissioned 
officers or the majority, made up of warrant officers, able 
seamen, ordinary seamen, marines and boys. Commissioned 
officers provided 5-6% of the crew in most rates of ship. 
Another 15% was provided by officers' servants and warrant 
officers; 4(Y16 of the crew would be able seamen and the 
remaining 40% were ordinary seamen, marines and boys. 
(') 
The 
years between 1688 and 1714 saw most important developments 
in the status and composition of the officer class in the 
navy. 
These developments and the reforms and regulations 
associated with them created the professional officer who 
was to be the backbone of the English navy. The reforms 
of pay, training, promotion and superannuation were almost 
entirely the work of naval administrators. 
(2) Parliament's 
contribution to such executive reforms was negligible and 
such interest as was bestowed upon officers was mainly 
financial or political. 
N. M. M. Southwell Sou/16 f-45; Dennis, An Essay on 
the Navy (1702) 2-3ý. -Ehrman 459. 
(2) M. Lewis, 
_ 
England's'Sea Officers (1939) 55-7t 78-84t 
122-6,194-207; Ehrman 452-61; J. S. Bromley, a 
review of Queen Anne's Navy ed. R. D. Merriman 
(N. R. S. 1961) in E. H. R. LXXIX No- 312 (July 1964) 
561-2. 
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One of the most far-reaching reforms of the period 
was the establishment of half pay for officers in time 
of peace. ' This was achieved by doubling the wartime 
pay in 1694 and assuring' officers by proclamation on 22 
'February'1694 that the navy would retain'the services of 
those who served competently, when peace came, at half 
their wartime'pay rate. 
(') 
The reasons given for this 
generosity were-that the pay'of English officers before 
1694 was lower than that of officers in most European 
navies and that a higher wage would make it-unnecessary 
for them-to resort to such devices as the carrying of 
(2) 
merchants'-goods to augment their wages. More 
practlically, the increase and the promise of security when 
the, war was over was a recruiting device. 
(3) 
The'navy was 
finding--it difficult to find enough officers for its ' 
increasing-, number of ships. - The initiative for the reform 
came from the-Admiralty and the continuity of service it 
made possible did much to make a profession of service as 
a-commissioned officer in the navy. 
(4) It was calculated 
(1) Sergison Papers 265-7; M. Lewis op. cit. 66-70; 
N. M. M. Sergison Ser/100 ff 423-449. 
(2) Ministry of Defence Library (Naval Section) Corbett 
MSS. XI, ff. 4-8. ' 
(3) J. J. Keevil, Medicine and the Navy 1200-1900 (1958) 
111 279- 
(4) Sergison Papers 267-9; Queen Anne's Navy 317,327. 
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that the -new wage -rates would cost L601938 a year in time 
of war, and as one of the navy commissioners, Sir Edward 
Gregory, wrote in- 1697, it would require Ia very kind and 
good humoured parliament' to vote money for officers who 
w. ere technically unemployed in time of peace. 
(') 
The 
Commons did consider half-pay in 1699 and 1700 as part of 
their investigation of ways in which the cost of the navy 
might be reduced. Naval, arguments that it was essential 
for the security of the kingdom to retain the services of 
competent naval-officers had limited success. The navy 
was.. allowed-Zl8,113 for half pay, enough to retain the 
services of 180 officers. 
(2 ) Despite this restriction of 
half pay to a small number, such payments became an 
accepted feature of-naval service in Anne's reign. 
(3) 
Undoubtedly parliament accepted the increase in wages more 
easily because it was a charge on the Ordinary of the navy, 
a branch of, naval. finance that mýny members must still have 
assumed was a charge on the monarch's revenue rather than a 
parliamentary responsibility. 
(4) 
(1) Ehrian 458-9; Sergison. Papers, 27ý- 
(2) C. J. XIII, 75,317. 
(3) D. A. Baugh, . British Naval Administration in the Age 
of Walpole (1965) 104-6. 
(4) See - above pp. 88-90. 
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There is much evidence for the shortage of officers 
between 1689 and 1694 that provided the major justification 
for an increase in pay. Associated with this evidence and 
with the measures to improve officer supply there is 
frequent expression in letters and pamphlets and in parlia- 
ment of suspicions about the loyalty, efficiency and honesty 
of the officer corps. 
(') 
Some such suspicion was natural 
enough in the crisis atmosphere of these years. National 
security very obviously depended on a navy that was 
controlled by able officers untainted with Jacobitism and 
it was patriotically proper to voice any doubts or fears. 
Yet, when every allowance has been made for the sense of 
emergency, naval officers as a class are, subjecte d to such 
scathing criticism in these years and later that it is 
difficult to believethat exaggeration or political and 
class jealousies are satisfactory explanations for the 
attacks. In actual fact there does appear to be much 
justification for criticism. One little remarked aspect 
of the naval expansion of these years is the recruitment 
Grey IX, 335-ro; Luttrell 11,74,3249 335,354; H. M. C. 
Portland 111,449; H. M. C. Fleming 306,317; H. M. C. 
Buccleuch and Queensberry II Pt. I1ý889 218,227; 
The Portledge Papers 1687-1697 ed. R. J. Kerr and I. C. 
Duncan (1528) 76; -Memoirs of Thomas Earl of Ailesbury (1890) Is 291; Samuel Pepys's Naval Minutes ed. 
J. R. Tanner (N. R. S, * 1926) 339; C. S. P. Dom. Vlm., & M. 1694-5,132. G. Savile, first Marquis of Halifax, 
A Rough Draft of a New Model at Sea (1694), Complete 
Works ed. W. Raleigh (1912) 168-179. 
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of many officers, some of them young, some of them with 
little maritime experiencel and most of them with no 
appreciation of the regulations of the navy, much less 
with any of the professional attitudes that the naval 
administrators and some flag officers were seeking to 
inculcate. Between 1689 and 1694 the officer class of the 
navy underwent a reform and an expansion that almost 
totally changed its membership. The reform was the 
result of an attempt to purge the fleet of all. officers who 
might still be loyal to James II. Of the 60 captains 
commanding ships in the fleet James II assembled underthe 
command of Lord Dartmouth in 1688 to'meet the threat of 
William's invasion, 39 did not serve in the war of William's 
reign. Of the remaining officers 9 had received promotion 
to post rank under Charles II and 8 were in command of 
ships of less than the sixth rate. 
(') The impact of the 
expansion can be assessed from a list presented to the 
Commons on 2 February 1699 which named the commanders of 
every ship of the first four rates employed-during-the war 
(2) 
and gave the date of each commander's first commission. 
This shows that W/o of the officers named were first 
This analysis is based on the list of captains 
given in E. B. Powley, The English Navy in the 
Revolution of 168 
'8 
(1928) 57-9. George Legge, 
first Baron Dartmouthq, has been added to the 
list. 
(2) C. J. XII, 478-9. 
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commissioned between 5 November 1688 and 31 December 
1692.23Y6 of them had been first appointed to naval 
service in the reigns of Charles II and James II. The 
most articulate critics of naval officers in the reigns 
of William and Mary were the governors of the American 
colonies. The badly defined administrative relationship 
between governor and naval officer was not calculated to 
make for friendly co-operation(l)but the reiterated 
complaints about the corruption, cowardice and lack of 
breeding of the naval officer become credible in the 
context of a rapid and unselective recruitment. 
(2) The 
widespread concern over the calibre of the naval officer 
class had apparently much justification. This means 
that some at least of the parliamentary interest in the 
reputed failures or failings of individual naval officers 
was not, as can so easily be assumed, merely the expression 
of political animosity. Politicians who mounted a party 
The relationship would be made worse by the 
emancipating effect the Atlantic had on anyonel 
whether he was a naval captain or a merchant, 
who wished to break the law, C. S. P. Col. Amer. & 
W. I. 1699,212-3; ibid. 1700,512. Moreovers the 
captains sent to the colonies were often men with 
little influence at home and with small hopes of 
promotion. 
(2) C. S. P. Col. Amer. & W. I. 1689-92,504; ibid. 1693- 
6,666; ibid. 16999 212; ibid. 1700,, 19-20; ibid. 
1712-149 146-7. 
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attack on an issue involving naval officers-or naval 
operations could, count on a sympathetic response from a 
parliament that was, rightly convinced that there was much 
scope, for, investigation, reform and even punishment amongst 
the officers of the navy. 
(1) 
Inevitably naval officers became_involved in the party 
struggle of the, times. Many of them were the products of 
the aristocratic and county families which dominated 
parliament,, and were of a class and status, that made it 
practically impossible for them to remain aloof. from 
political partisanship. 
(2) 
Not all of them were as devoted 
The dissatisfaction with this new breed of officers 
helps to explain two very common themes in 
contemporary writing - the repeated assertions 
, 
firstly, that the-discipline of the navy declined-- 
after 1688, and secondly, that the Puritan outlook 
and morality that had once been a feature of the 
navy also disappeared in William's reign. There 
is rather more to such complaints than an unreal 
hankering after 'good old days'; P. R. O. Shaftesbury 
MSS. 30/24/20, f.. 99; 'Vernon Letters 11,180; - 
E. Ward, The Wooden World (1707) 15-25; J. Woodward 
An'Address to the Officers and Seamen ....... 
(1704); 
B. Slush, The Navy Royal or a Sea Cook Turn'd 
'Projector (1709) A. 3. 
(2) S. Martin Leake, L ife of Sir John Leake, ed. 
G. Callender (N. R. S. 1920) 11,352,400; History of 
-- England by Mr. Rapin de Thoyras, continued by 
N. Tindal (1747) 111,332. 
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to. the cause of a party as Aylmer, who in 1710 took the 
squadron under his command, into Weymouth harbour, in order 
to influence an election-in favour of a Whig colleague, 
(') 
but the conditions of their. service, as well as the tension 
of the times, inclined Most naval officers, towards political 
allegiance. Senior officers knew that in battle their 
success and safety depended on the devoted support of their 
subordinate officers in the line of battle., Benbow is the 
most obvious example-of an officer who suffered, fatally, 
because of weak support from his fellow officers. Before 
his death he-had time to write a letter in which he 
deduced as a lesson from his own experience that no naval 
captain should go-Anto, action unless the supporting ships 
werp-directed by blood relations;, only in-this way might he 
be, sure of helý. 
(2) A more common method for a flag officer 
to ensure support in battle and around the council table 
was for him to build., 7. up in the navy a following of able 
young officers whose-interests he promoted. Such groups 
commonly developed a political-bias, on principle, as a 
reaction to the reward or lack of reward accorded by the 
administration to the leader of the group, or simply in the 
C-J-Y-VI9 558. 
(2) C S. P. "Coldo Amer. & W. I*' 1702-3,86 cf. D. Hannay, kavaL-Courts Martial (1914) xvii. 
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ho , pe of reward and promotion. 
The political infiltration of the navy is clearly 
seen by a study of the career of Russell. This tubby, 
red-cheeked man was a member of a powerful and influential 
family, and within the navy he secured immense prestige by 
his excellent seamanship and his victory at La Hogue. 
He was a leading member of the Whig party, an excellent 
patron and implacable enemy who saw most clearly the need 
for a senior naval officer to secure a devoted following 
amongst his junior officers. One of the factors that 
prevented his accepting command of the navy in 1690 after 
Torrington's defeat at Beachy Head was a belief that he 
did not yet possess such a following. ' 
(2) 
He rapidly and 
successfully rectified this weakness in his position. An 
incomplete list exists of the captains of the navy for 
March 1692 with an entry beside each name showing by whom 
they had been recommended for command. 
(3) 
Russell had been 
responsible for twenty-three promotions although his 
The most perceptive descriptions of Russell are in 
Ehrman 270-2; The Conduct of the Earl of Nottingham, 
ed. W. A. Aiken (1941) 66 fn.; Burnet 111,216; 
W. Coxe, Memoirs of the Duke of Marlborough (1847) 
1,259-60; B. M. Harlean 6,760 f. 20; H. M. C. Buccleuch 
and Queensberry II Pt. It-327-. 
(2) A. Browning, Thomas Osborne, Ear1l of Danby and Duke of 
Leeds 1632-1714 (1944) 11,176; Sir John Dalrymple, 
Memoirs of Great Britain and Ireland (1771) 11,1471 
173; H. M. C. Fleming, 306,317. 
, 
(3) P. R. O. Adm. 8/2,24 March 1692. 
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influence in the navy had become dominant only since 
1690. His nearest rival as patron, Torrington, 
responsible for eighteen promotions in the list, was now 
in disgrace.. In the years that followed his victory at 
La Hogue he consolidated his position to such an extent 
tI 
that almost every aspect of the naval'service was controlled 
by his followers. Their power was so great and at times so 
selfishly exercised that in 1699 parliamentary pressure 
forced Orford's resignation. 
(') 
There is'evidence that 
William himself had begun to resent Orford's domination of 
the navy. 
(2) 
Orford was to be in administrative control of the navy 
for only a period of twelve months in the reign of Anne, 
between November 1709 and October 1710- Yet he had worked 
so well between 1692 and 1699 that his influence on the 
navy was still immense. He had gained a following which 
included many of the most able of the new generation of 
captains, men like Aylmer, Byng and Jennings. Aylmer 
suffered unemployment for ten years because of his devotion 
to Orford. Byng twice and Jennings once, refused 
(1) See above pp. 92-6. 
(2) M. A. Lower, Some Notices of Charles Sergison, Esq., 
Sussex Archaeological Collection XXV (1873) 65-9; 
Vernon Letters 1,291,299. 
(3) Memoirs Relating to Lord Torrington ed. John Knox 
Laughton (Camden Soc. 1889) 65-6; The Byng Papers 
ed. B. Tunstall (N. R. S. 1931) 11,189o 
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promotions out of loyalty to Orford. The Whig domination 
of the navy by Orford and his followers lasted throughout 
Anne's reign. In August 1711 an expert on naval 
affairs, 
(1)probably - 
acting on the instructions of Oxford, 
using a printed list of the captains of the navy, entered 
beside each name a symbol showing the political sympathies 
of each officer. 
(2) 
There were 185 names on the -list: 
91 
were described as Whig, 69 as Tory, 
(3)and 
this Was, at a 
time when Tories had, dominated the naval administration for 
eight of the last nine years* 
Orford's dominance of the navy meant that for. many 
members of parliament any consideration of naval affairs 
would be in terms of*party politics rather than an 
objective consideration of what was best for navy and nation. 
Naval finance excited most attention in parliament when 
investigation promised proof, of the corruption of a party 
member. The attack on Orford's management of the navy in 
1699 was a political attack. -The interest shown by the 
House of Lords between. 1702 and 1703 in naval failings in 
finance, trade defence and manning were party manoeuvres in 
Sergison was writing to Oxford about this time-and had 
the necessary knowledge. The writing on the list is 
similar to his. 
(2) B. M. Harley Loan 29/40 f. 98. 
(3) Eighteen of the captains were described as being 'of 
no'consequencel, three were on half pay, and four 
were in retirement. 
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which the Whigs were using their power in that House and 
Orford's name against the government of the time, 
In similar political manoeuvrings which concerned the 
navy the Tories were at a disadvantage. They had no party 
member who possessed anything like the ability, political 
astuteness or national'-prestige of Orford. Rooke was the 
most prominent Tory sympathiser amongst-the senior officers, 
and although the Tories attempted to exploit his victory at 
Vigo as party propoganda, against the Whigs and Marlborough, 
he had neither the reputation1nor the devotion to politics 
and his party of Orford. 
(') 
George Churchill, who managed 
the navy for George, Prince of Denmark between 1702 and 1708 
was an enthusiastic Tory and on occasions an effective 
(2 
speaker in the House of Commonse Despite his power and the 
opportunities it gave him, he-lacked Orford's ability to 
attract a following., As a result the Tory party, -. in naval 
matters, represented-a minority-group for a change, and 
their political outlook, except when Whig failings iný 
administration gave them an, opportunity, was primarily 
defensive. 
(1) H. 'M. C. Portland IV, 137; A. Boyer, A History of the 
Life and Reign of Queen Anne'(1722) 36; J. Macky, 
Memoirs of the Secret Services (1733) 119-121; 
Letters of Daniel Defoe, ed. G. H. Healey (1955) 59- 
61; P. ILO. Bashet Transcripts 3/191 f . 3. 
(2) See above p. 296. 
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The 1711 list of captains and the description-of 
the political infil tra I tion of the senior ranks of the 
navy are inaccurate' in that both imply that practically 
every naval'officer had a political and party bias. 
There-were naval officers, as in the political world 
generally, who resolutely refused to adapt to'the world 
of party politics. Two of the most able officers, 
Shovell and Leake, were studiously neutral in politics. 
Their ýLbilities were sufficient to'secure promotion for 
themselves bgt such neutrality was a hindrance to most 
careers. Orford had ensured that politics and promotion 
were tIo be' I linked together in the navy of the eighteenth 
century. 
Thus it'would seem that parliament's attitude towards 
the officers of the navy'contained but a small element of 
encouragement. ' The grant of half pay was balanced by a 
suspicion, of'officers as a class, and the importance of 
politics'in deciding the chances"of promotion complicated 
the life of a naval officer. They suffered too from the 
nature of"the"serVice'. When things went wro I ng in any 
branch-of national affairs and parliament was interested" I 
Se'cre lemoirs of the Life of Sir Cloudbley Shovel (1708) 129; The Conduct of the Earl of Nottingham 
op. cit 120; S.. Martin Leake., Life of Sir John 
Leake. (N. R. S. 1920) 352,370* 
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both. Houses wished to identify the culprit. It was 
difficult to. convince either House that the vagaries. of 
wind,, and weather, men and ships were legitimate excuses 
for, failure., Such defence was made more difficult 
because few ministries went to great lengths to defend a 
mere naval, officer. - 
One man's, career was a small, price 
to pay if it diverted the attention of an irate House from 
the politicians themselves. 
('). 
Although Whetstone 
exceeded, his instructions in convoying the trade to Russia 
beyond. the Shetlands in 1707 this conscientiousness was of 
little service-to him, when the merchants. sailed on-without 
him and. were. at. tacked by French privateers-, He was 
(2) 
courtmartialled and not employed again. Complaints from 
merchants and in the House of Commons. contributed to this 
disgrace., Sir Thomas Hardy suffered in a similar way and 
for similar reasons, although. hel thanks to Leake's 
generosity, was, employed again. 
(3) 
Once the shortage of officers had, been, s-olved in the 
early years of William's-reign, it was the majority of 
the seamen who provided national. problems. , 
The problems 
concerning the mass of able and, ordinary seamen, became. so 
(l)-- The Byng Papers, ed. B. Tum tall. (N. R. S. - 1930) I X-xi. 
(2) Ibid. 'Ig 247-248; see'above. p. 284. 
(3) S. Martin Leake, Life of Sir John Leake (N. R. S. 
1920) 155-8. 
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great that parliament was compelled to take action over 
them. Although they stemmed almost entirely from the 
grievances of the seamen, parliament tackled them with 
little sense of compassion or humanity. When it took 
action to 'encourage' the seaman, parliament did so from 
one of two motives or a combination of the two. Either 
legislation was passed as a means by-which to make the task 
of manning easier and more efficient, or it was initiated 
by-an opposition group-in order to embarass the ministry 
in power. Although there was recognition by individuals 
of the sufferings of naval sailors, as when Herbert asked 
for more effective medical services in 1689, 
(')or in the 
(2) 
manning debates of late 1703, parliament showed no 
corporate compassion. There were many difficulties bi 
I 
making the life of the seaman a better one. These 
difficulties and the fundamentally inhumane attitude 
towards them that parliament as an institution displayed, 
meant that much of the legislation planned to improve the 
life of the sailor was ineffective. 
There was no lack of readily available information 
from which a member of parliament could learn of naval 
life. Apart from personal knowledge a series of pamphlets 
(1) C. J. Xj 142,218-20. Arthur Herbert, later Earl of' 
Torrington; see below pp. 460-1. 
(2) See above PP- 384-6* 
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was published between 1688 and 1714 which vividly and 
accurately described those features of naval life that 
made the press necessary and volunteers reluctant to 
join the navy. Sober administrative reports, the 
evidence of officers and seamen before both Houses of 
Parliament, petitions, even the ballads of the time 
substantiated the statements of the pamphlets. 
(') The 
grievances of the seamen can most conveniently be divided 
into four groups: those which arose from his life aboard 
his ship; those which arose from his pay and the manner 
of its payment; those that concerned him in adversity, 
especially when he was wounded, sick, or a prisoner of 
war; and those which struck at his dependents. 
The hazards of ordinary maritime life did not rank as 
11 
a grievance in the opinion of most seamen. What did 
become a grievance in William's reign was the officer 
class, especially their failure in what the modern 
services would call man management. Monson, in the time 
of James I. had noted that 
'The seamen are stubborn or perverse when they 
perceive their commander is ignorant of the-, 
discipline of the sea and cannot speak to them 
in their own language. 1(2) 
A list of the'most useful pamphlets and reports is 
given in Appendix IX. These sources are the basis 
for the generalisations in the following pages. 
(2) Naval Tracts of Sir William Monson, ed. M. Oppenheim 
(N. R. S. 1912) 1119 437. 
438e 
The led, or the taught, expect to be led from superior 
knowledge;, a reversal of this natural order is subversive 
of discipline and, in war, dangerous. There is 
evidence enough of professional incompetence, 
(')nor is 
this evidence surprising with the great influx of new 
officers into the navy between 1688 and 1693. The 
blustering ignorance of officers who could shout 'Haul 
(2) 
up that whicham thereP did not make for good morale. 
Over the centuries the conduct necessary for an 
officer has become a generally recognised code of 
behaviour. 
(3) 
The late seventeenth century was a period 
of nascent professionalism as far as the navy was 
concerned. Officers still broke even the commonsense 
rules that gain respect and make leaders. There were 
cowards, and officers who fought publicly one against 
another on the ships of this period. 
(4) Many captains 
cheated-their crews of their meagre share in prize money. 
The possibilities of gaining money from the seamen's pay 
(1) D. Hannay,, Naval Courts Martial (1914) 12; Samuel 
Pepys's Naval Minutes, ed. J. R. Tanner (N. R. S. 
1926) 339. 
(2) 'Tangier Papers of Samuel Pepys, ''ed. E. 'Chappell 
(N. R. S. 1935) 225. 
(3) Debate on Clause 64 of the Army Bill (1955) Hansard 
V01.536, No 29,1997-2020. 
(4) Barlow's Journal, transcribed by B. Lubbock (1934) 11$ 
548; B. M. Harlean, 6,806 f-33- 
(5) Vernon Letters 11 180- there are many instances of 
such fraud in the letters of the Prize Commissioners 
, to the Admiralty, 
P. R. O. Adm. 1/3661-2* 
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tickets were numerous and widely exploited. Most 
seamen accepted discipline as necessary but it was 
expected to be-a just discipline. There was enough 
despotically administered and cruel punishment awarded 
for it to constitute a grievance. 
(') 
Rather surprisingly, swearing figures more than 
cruelty as a grievance, in the pamphlets. It is difficult 
to believe that it shocked many. It was probably the 
contempt in-the voice that-rankled rather than the words 
themselves, the contempt that a new breed of officers did 
not attempt to disguise. This, attitude, joined to 
professional and moral. failings, made for a powerful and 
emotive sense of grievance, a mixture of fear, contempt 
and hatred. 
Another grievance was food. The navy sailed on its 
stomach. Naval rations were adequate and the naval 
administrators recognised its importance by consistently - 
allowing the Victuallers to spend more than their 
allocation of money. 
(2) 
Unfortunately the, sailor did not' 
always receive the rations to which he was entitled. The 
governments habit of ordering the deployment of squadrons 
(1) P. R. O. Adm. 1/5256,16 Sept. 1695oo - 
(2) R. C. Holmes, Sea Fare M. M., 35 (1949) 140; Ehrman, 
121; N. M. M. Seigison Ser/100 f. 402; R. Davisq 
The Rise of the English Shipping Industry (1962) 
144t 366. 
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at short notice and expecting'their prOmptývictualling 
at seasons when some types of food were unobtainable -' 
was-one cause of this'. 
(')-The financing of victualling 
was peculiarly sensitive to the recurrent'shortages'of 
money, 'and neither the financial system of the-Victualling 
Board nor the humble status"of many of Its'suppliers 
encouraged a stable system of credit sqch as tided the 9- 
Navy Board over many-ýcrises. 
(2) 
These-were minor and 
administrative difficulties when compared with the basic' 
and practically insoluble problem that faced the Victuallers, 
I 
that of preserving masses of perishable foodstuffs in the 
period before refrigeration. The Vicýuallers started 
their war in 1689 with appalling blunders. They issued 
food so bad that dogs died of eating it,, 
(3) 
This was a 
failing spectacular enough to concern parliament, and the 
Commons sent the Victuallers to'the Tower. 
(4) 
'This wa's not 
an extravagant reaction; the bad victuals had affected the 
morale of the fleet, and the high sickness rate of the 
summer must have been, in part, a consequence of them. 
(5) 
(1) C, 9 S. P. Dom. Wm. 1697,235. 
(2) Ehrman 144-8. 
(3) Grey IX, 441; H. M. C. Finch II, 232t 235,241. 
(4) C. J. Xl 282-3,305,333; Grey IX, 276,441-6. 
(5) T. Van C. Min Heer's Answer (1690) Somers Tracts 
X9 316. 
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Complaints of victualling continued but rarely 
with the same vehemence as in 1689. There were enough 
of them'in 1693 for the House of-Lords to investigate, the 
methods of the Victuallers. 
(1) The third occasion. when 
parliament interested itself in victualling, in 1703, was 
more obviously an interest springing from political 
considerations, in that it was initiated-by the Whigs of 
the House, of Lords, ýand as such'. formed one of their many 
attacks on the Tory administration of the navy in the early 
(2) 
years, of Anne's reign. None of the parliamentary 
investigations achieved'any reform that was'of benefit to 
the -sailor except in so f ar as they frightened', the 
Victuallers intogreater efficiency. -'- 
Dissatisfaction caused by bad officers and badýfood 
was oVrelatively minorImportandeýwhen compared with the 
long list of'grievances associated'withýa-seaman's-ýpay. - 
The English able seaman was paid-twenty-four shillings 
every-four'weeks and the ordinary Beaman'nineteen shillings. 
As food was provided'freelyg-these wages compared 
favourably with'thelsý'to ls., 4d. "ý a day'of, the rural, 
labourer or, the eightpence, a day of-the footsoldierg, who 
H. M. C. -H. L. Is 157-165,251-41 265-77; C. S. P. Dom. Wm- & M. 1693$. 287. 
(2) Ibid. 'Anne 11,204; H. M. C. H. L. V, 269-274; B. M. 
Addit. MSS. 9331 f. 162; P. R. O. Adm. 3/19,1 Nov. 
1703. 
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had deductions made from his, wages for food. 
(') 
Merchant 
seamen received about 24s. Od., by the calendar month and 
the French ordinary seaman in naval service about 138.10d., 
a month. 
(2) 
What made the English seaman's-wage rate unfair 
in time of war was that, the scarcity of, men compelled 
merchants-and collier o, wne 
, 
rs to raise their monthly rates 
as high as 55S. Od. 
(3), 
-V? ages of more-than, L6.0. Od.,. were- 
not unknown in the.. collier, trade when the press was 
(4) 
particularly active in, the Thames., 
-,. The discrepancy between naval wages and the wartime 
wages offered by merchants was soobvious and, so-pernicious 
to recruiting, -that-measures for redressing it were 
considered-by parliament. In William's, reign a committee 
of the Commons., considered a scheme by St. -Lo for restrict- 
ing the wages of all seamen to 308. a month. 
(5) 
A. more 
- comprehensive scheme by Defoe was considered by the Lords, 
in 1704. This proposed a general mobilisation of all 
seamen, who, as public servants,, would then be allocated 
to public or civilian service, The seamen's support for, 
this nationalisation was to. be gained, by prompt and equal 
(1) T. S. Willan, Some Bedfordshire and Huntingdonshire 
Wage Rates 1697-1730, E. H. R. LXI (1946) 249; R. E. 
Scouller, The Armies of Queen Anne (1966) 128-9. 
(2) C. S. P. Dom. Anne Ilt 256. 
(3) R. Davis, op. cit. 134-6. 
(4) R. Crosfeildt England's Glory RevivId (1693) 
(5) G. St. Lo, Reasons Humbly Offered (c. 1693) 
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pay, -half pay during unemployment and financial support 
for the wounded. 
(') A project a year later by the, Marquis 
of Carmarthen contained proposals similar to St., Lo's for 
limiting the wages of merchant. seamen. 
_ 
(2) No records 
remain of the-parliamentary discussions of these proposals 
but the main reasons, for their, rejection are clear: : 
expense, -. the, insuperable administrative difficulties and 
the-degree ofstate control. -, I 
The major grievance associated with pay was the 
irregularity with which-payment was made. In the earlier 
naval wars of the seventeenth century, with the smaller 
fleets and summer campaigns, there had been delays in pay, 
but now, -because war, had grown 
in time, space and the 
numbers involved, the delays were longer and involved more 
men. It was generally accepted that wages should be paid 
at-leaBt once'a, year.. In William's reignýmost ships were 
paid off once ayear but there were-for many ships very 
considerable delays before payment-, by--no means all of-them, 
caused by service in distant waters. The crews of-H. M. S. --- 
Greenwich and H. M. S. Ruby were paid on 1 October 1694 and 
Letters of Daniel Defoe ed. G. H. Healey (1955) 
73-7* 
(2) T. Osbourne,, A Copy of the Marquis of Carmarthen's 
Method for the Speedy Manning (1705); H. M. C. H. L. 
VI, 223-6; see above p. 399. 
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not-again until 10 January 1699. 
(') 
Peace made it possible 
to pay off; most of the arrears but by 30 September 1710 
the pay of most'ships was more than two years overdue. 
One, H. M. S.. Dunkirk, had been paid last on 1 January 
1704. (2) Delays in payment of naval seamen were common 
knowledge. - Sullen crowds of seamen on Tower Hill, their 
wives mobbing Whitehall, and pamphlets and petitions to 
parliament would ensure that many members of both houses 
knew of the problemo(3) 
Two petitions to the Commons, in February and March 
1709, complaining of delays in seamen's pay, provoked 
parliamentary action. 
' (4) In March and April the Commons 
debated a bill for Regulating Seamen's Wages. 
(5) There is 
little indication from the records of the debates on the 
proposals made by the bill but it is possible to reconstruct 
its main outlines from the writings of Sergison. 
(6) Fublic 
notice was to be given of when ships were to sail and of 
the fact that money was available for payment. The seamen 
(1) ýEhrman 132; P. R. O. Adm. 1/3591,24 Sept. 1700; 
P. R. O. Adm. 1/3592,4 March 1702. 
(2) P. R. O. Adm. 1/3594,10 Oct. 1702; P. R. O. Adm. 
1/3597,10 Dec. 1703; P. R. O. Adm. 1/3615,6 Nov. 
1710. 
(3) C. J. Xj 47; C-J-XIII, 563-4; -H. M. C. Portland 111,505; 
Luttrell 111,174; Luttrell IV, 418. 
(4) C. J. XVI9,869 116,156. 
(5) C-J-XVI9 159,162-31 187. 
(6) M. A. Lower, Some Notices of Charles Sergisong Esq., 
Sussex Archaeological Collections XXV (1873)'72-4; 
C. J. XVIj 27-8; Queen Anne's Navyj 13. 
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were to be paid some of their money bef ore 'Sailing so 
that they could, if they wished, provide 'for their ' 
dependents. The chance of payment for those who missed- 
the major paying off on the ship's return was to be widely 
publicised. The bill was probably drafted by Dolben, a 
Whig, who had played a major part in the-framing of theý 
bill to Encourage Trade to America. (') The proposals for 
4 
regulating seamen's pay were poor, ones. The administrative 
difficulties would be greatq particularly the correlation 
between the available money and the departure of ships, 
and some seamen would certainly desert on receiving'the 
first instalment of their pay. In Sergison's opinion 
the proposals were unintelligent'and intended as an insult 
-(2) to and attack upon the officials bf the Navy Board, 'The 
bill did not become law. 
Wages were only ýart of the earnings in-any 
seventeenth century occupation and often not'the'most", 
profitable part. For perquisites the labourer-had his- 
feasts'and the merchant seaman the right to bring home 
some cargo. For the naval seaman there were the bounty, 
if he volunteered, promotion, rewards and, prizes. It-was. 
(1) See above-pp. 412-4. 
M. A. Lower op-cit., 73-4. 
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an impressive list on papers so much so that a good 
case could be made out for preferring naval to merchant 
(1) * service. The bounty could mean an additional 92.0. Od. 9 
a year to anyone who volunteered early in the year. The 
chances of promotion to commissioned rank for a sailor 
were becoming smaller but it was the Possibility of reward 
or prize money that theoretically represented a. -. major 
I 
inducement to ei3: ter naval service. 
Rewards were of two sorts - those paid out after a 
great victory and those for smaller, tactical successes 
on a squadron basis. The two wars started well for fleet 
rewards. It was necessary for William to encourage the 
navy on which he depended and which had'enjoyed much 
attention from James II. The battle at Bantry Bay was 
(2) 
generously rewarded. In 1692 La Hogue was, from every 
point of view, worth generosity and the seamen received a 
month's pay for-their part in it. Sailors who succeeded 
in the dangerous business of burning the grounded French 
(3) 
ships shared another L355. After this the change in 
French strategy meant the lessening of chances of rewards 
(1) R. Elton Proposal for the Encouragement of Seamen 
(C-17055 4; Barlow's Journal Op. cit. IIt 423t 426; 
G. Everett, Encouragement of Seamen and Marines 
(1695)t The Harleian Miscellany X. 227-8. 
(2) H. M. C. Fleming, 242. 
(3) P. R. O. Adm. 20/60 f-714. ý 
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for fleet action. In a year's expenditure by naval 
officers from 1 April 1693 to 31 March 1694 the total 
for all rewards was F, 385- 17- 7d. 
(') The sack of the 
treasure fleet at_Vigo provided many seamen with great 
rewards but all of them illegal, and for Malaga, the 
last chance offleet reward, the sailors thought them- 
selves shabbily treated. 
(2) 
Every admiral or commander of a squadron had a 
contingent account from which to meet miscellaneous 
emergency expen§es., From this petty cash reserve, and 
it was seldom more than this, the squadron commander could 
provide extra. money for his surgeons or fresh food, 
entertain or meet small emergencies, for instance replace 
the slops a boat crew had lost in action. 
(3) It was also 
the source from which officers and men could be rewarded. 
Berkeley-in 1694 considered that this reward fund was 
(4) 
necessary to create bravery. Some officers, Benbow 
amongst them, donated h4a share of prize money as an 
encouragement to h" men, but there were few officers as 
generous*(5) In practice the contingency account came very 
P. R. O. Adm. 20/60, Abstract of Russell's Ledger. 
(2), H. M. C. Port land, IVI 142; B. Slush, The Navy Royal or 
a Sea Cook Turn'd Projector (1709) 23. 
(3) C. T. B. XIVI 175,198; P. R. O. Adm. 1/3583,9 Feb. 1698. 
(4) C. S. P. Dom. Wm. & M. 1694-5,176. 
(5) P. R. O. Adm. 1/3662,2 May, 1695. 
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near-to-being the-commander's expense account. Certainly 
there was never enough money to make rewards aývital and 
effective factor in improving the morale of the seaman. 
Prize money, was. the-greatest'lure. It was a lure 
becauseý-the-value of a lucky capture could be enormous. 
One intelligent aspect of legislation was the recognition 
of this and,, an-attempt to improve-the seaman's share of a 
prize. 
(') In 1692, -ixx"An Act for Continuing-the Act for. 
prohibiting'allýTrade and Co=erce with France-and for the 
encouragement, of Privateers, ' a third-, of'the value of each 
prize was-allocated to the crew,, a third to their 
dependents and a third to the King. 
(2) 
This improved the- 
seaman's share and-the initiative for, the improvement,,, I, -- 
came from-theýgovernment, _though 
in parliament-it'owed, 
something-to the support of-those members who were doing 
what they could to improve the-profits of'-privateering. 
Byw-arguing-that sailors'deserved, greater-rewardsýthey, --,,. 
(3) 
strengthened-their own case in-favour--of,, the privateers.. 
To-encourage the capture of. -Iess valuable, and more heavily 
defended enemy men of-war,. prize money was to be increased'.., 
(1) Ministry of Defence Library'(Naval Section) Corbett 
MSS. VI ff. ý 88-92. 
(2) 4 W. & M. e 25. 
(3) H. M. C. H. L. It 384-9; N. M. M. Sergison Ser/101, 
14 May 1692. 
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by an, award of L10.0. Od. I for every gun , they, carried. 
At.. the'beginning of Anne's reign,, sailors were further 
encouraged when she allowed. her,,. share of all captured 
vessels to-go towards the prize money, -and, at the same 
time the. captors were allowed, the right of.. pillage, from the 
gun deck upwards, 
(')which 
made, custom legal. 
Such increases in, prize money, might have, led Queen 
and parliament to believe that the-sailor was being 
generously, treated. . 
This was untrue, 
-The 
seaman's. 
share, of-prize money was very small, and he, was. often. 
swindled out of it. 
(2) 
The money, eroded by legal. charges, 
was paid to the captain for distribution amongst his men, 
(3) 
By the time the money, reached-. the,, captain the. complement of 
his ship had probably changed. One seaman pamphleteer 
claimed that seamen received-a share of a few shillings 
each from prizes worth many thousands, of pounds. 
(4) The 
record of the. Prize Office show he-was not exaggerating. 
One captain received as his, share of a prize L60., 1. Od. t 
and Z40.14. Od., to share-among. his crew. 
(5) The obvious 
(1) Corbett MSS, VI op. cit. f. 92. 
(2) B. M. Harlean 6,287 ff 108-9- 
(3) Legal charges of L593.15. Od., were paid on a 
prize worth L3,253.5.10d. 9 P. R. O. Adm. 1/36629 30 Oct. 1705* 
(4) B. Slush op. cit. 23* 
(5) P. R. O. Adm. 1/3661,30 May 1698. 
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and well reported unfairness led to the addition of 
clauses to the Cruisers and Convoys bill of 17080(' 1) 
By these the prizes became the sole property of the 
captors and in additionthe Treasurer of the Navy was 
to pay into the prize fund L5- 0.0., for every man 
aboard a captured ship. The clausesmere suggested by a 
merchant and parliament had apparently, sufficient I 
sympathy with the sailor to incorporate them in the bill. 
(2) They were modelled on the Dutch practice. Even this 
encouragement was of small benefit to the seamen; the - 
flag officers successfully, argued for an interpretation of 
the clauses which was in practice most favourable to their 
own interests., and the legislation did, relatively little 
t, o increase the sailors I share. '(3? 
A sailor's chance of reward and prize money was 
uncertain but there was certainty that the pay he 
eventually received would be less than the just rate. it 
would have been reduced by a variety of deductions. He 
could be compelled to provide himself with clothes, slops 
(1) 6 Anne c 65 clauses vi-xiii; see above pp. 298-300. 
(2) John Ward, M. P. for Bletchingley and. ia trader to the East Indies and Hamburg, Vernon Letters 111,3269 
338-ge 
(3) B. M. Addit. - MSS. 5t443 f-19 cf. H. W. Richmond, The 
Navy, in Johnson's England ed. A. S. Turberville (1933) Is 39. 
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as they were called, from contractors who held a monopoly 
of their provision. 
(') His officers were required to see 
that clothing was purchased only from these men, at 
(2) 
prices higher than those usual for clothing. The Cost 
would be entered in a slop book which was checked by 
three officers, the contractor would be paid, and the 
amount be deducted from the seaman's wages. 
(3-) There would 
also be-deductions of twopence a month towards the pay of 
surgeons and for medical comforts and of fourpence for 
what spiritual comfort the chaplain might provide. On 
smaller ships which did not carry surgeon or minister 
sixpence was still levied and went into the Chatham Chest. 
All seamen paid another sixpence towards this fund for 
wounded and dependents. This meant that automatically 
each seaman forfeited one shilling a month. 
It was general too for each sailor to allow the 
purser sixpence a month 'necessary' money for him to 
provide equipment such as wooden dishes, candles and 
lanthorns. 
(4) Th-e's'eaman could also obtain his tobacco 
(1) The Treasurer of the Navy deducted poundage from the 
contractors' accounts. These defalcations were 
stopped after-parliamentary investigation in 1699- 
1701, C. J. XIIIt 1679 265-6,343,369-72. 
(2) W. G. Perrin, Seamen's Clothes, M. M. 4 (1914) 148-9; 
P. R. O. Adm. -1/3583,16 Feb. - 1693;, B. M. Additý-MSS. 
5-9439 f-93 
(3) P-R, 0 O. Adm. 1/35P3,16 Feb. 1698. 
(4) Naval Tracts- , of Sir William Monson ed. M. 
Oppenheim 
IV (N. R. S. 1913) 141* 
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from the purser and its Cost would be automatically 
deducted from hisýpaye' - He was allowed a, maximiim of two 
pounds in weight each month at a price'that, waB not to 
exceed ls. 8d. - a lb. 
(l) He could also equip himself with 
second-hand clothes when illness or-action depleted aý 
ship's-complement, and again no money passed butýthe'sum 
was debited to himAn the 'Deadman's Clothes' column of 
the pay book. It was also possibIe'to pay, for"hired 
'beds' in the same way. 
(2) 
Thus, of the able seaman's twenty four shillings one 
would go for Chatham-Chest, surgeon-and chaplain. Several 
of the other deductions could further reduce his pay, and 
for misconduct he could be fined by, his captain. ,A good 
example-of what these deductions could"mean is the account 
of one William Chalk, an ordinary seaman. 
OYFor 
service 
during the years 1695,1696-and 1697 at the usual rate of 
nineteen shillings a month he-earned 931.,. -3. Od. He 
actually received Z19.3- lld-*,, ''The deductions which 
reduced his pay were: - 
Iaf ine 1. 0. 0' 
slops 5. 9. 0: Deadmen's clothes, " 1 4 6. 
tobacco 1. 16: 8. 
Purser 2* 6, 
Chatham Chest 1. 11. 9. 
Greenwich Hospital 14. 11. (4) 
(1) P. R. O. Adm. 20/60, No- 3. 
(2) Ibid. 20/60, No. 3. 
(3) P. R. O. Adm. 30/4 f-29, No. 496. 
(4) As Chalk was not present when hi s ship was paid off he 
finally received the money on 2 April 1706. 
U 
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This is an-interesting but rather extreme example of 
deductions. There-were few fines,, only about, a third. 
of the sailors seem, to.. have bought slops,, and only about 
a fifth, tobacco,, but none could escape the loss of,, wages 
to the Chatham Chest, thesurgeon and the chaplain,, and 
for many of them their real wages were further eroded by 
the mechanism of payment. 
In theory the ship to be paid, off was. met by a 
COMMiBBioner. of, the Navy and four or five clerkBt. who, 
over a-table, paid to the men the, sums due against their 
names in the ship's books. The theory also assumed a 
supply of ready money, for the pay table: in practice, this 
became increasingly rare.. The seaman was paid by ýicket. 
This was in effect a promise, to pay him his wage at some 
future date, usually in London. It was, a poor substitute 
for, hard cash. Naturally the sailor, sought,. to convert 
the ticket into money but as government credit deteriorated, 
he found the gap between the nominal value of. his ticket- 
and what he was offered by the ticket buyer increasing. 
In 1695 a discount of three shillings-in the pound was. 
common; seven to eight shillings was known. 
(') Tickets were 
(1) W. Hodges, Humble Proposals (1695) 16,52. 
, 
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paid in the process of time by the clerks of the pay office 
in London. Here one could: always ensure prompt payment by 
paying the, clerk poundage. It was possible here and 
aboard ship that the clerk would deduct from the pay at 
source, the debts of the seaman's dependents and receive 
poundage for his trouble from the creditors. 
(') Some 
sailors granted the pay clerks power of attorney to draw 
their wages, thus ensuring quick payment and perhaps 
saving themselves a Journey to London. Not surprisingly, 
many of these clerks advanced themselves 'to great estates' 
at the expense of the seaman. 
(2) 
In the middle years of William's reign the Treasuryq 
using the knowledge of Richard Gibson, tried to reduce the 
delays and fraud associated with naval pay. 
(3) In 1698 
parliament, increased the penalties for anyone found guilty 
of forgery in connection with sailors' pay and made it 
cheaper for widows to obtain the pay of their naval 
husbands. It is possible that a series of petitions from 
seamen about pay and its delays inspired this reform. 
(4) 
In March 1702 a proposal for the reform of pay procedure was 
(1) Sergison Papers 
(2) Account of Many 
(3) N. M. M. Sergison 
P. R. O. Adm. 1/ý 
(4) 9 W1. III c 41, 
199,273,274. 
52. 
Frauds (c. 1699). 
Ser/101 ff. 204-225,231-619 263; 
3566 ff-932-6. 
clause iii; C. J. XIIq 469 969 1259 
z 
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drafted. as, a bill and passed to the Navy Board for 
criticism. - It was proposed to set up a Society for 
Discounting Seamen's Tickets. The Society was to take 
up anytickets offered to it and pay them at a lower rate 
of discount than on the open market, on the understanding 
that. the goyernment would refund the money for these 
tickets to the Society. The Navy Board, rightly, 
condemned the proposals. If the money was available to 
pay the Society, why should it not be paid directly to the 
sailor? Moreover, they pointed out, no civilian body had 
the knowledge to assess the validity of the demands for 
payment and it would give many opportunities of defrauding 
the, navy to unscrupulous officers. 
(') 
Nothing came of this 
bill and, at no time between 1683 and 1714 does parliament 
seem-to have debated with legislative intent the normal 
delays of seamen's pay. Lack of money would over much of 
the period have barred the way to constructive reform, and 
granted money, the traditional methods of pay would have 
worked. Such logic would have been of little comfort to 
the sailor. 
Two devices by which pay was delayed became notorious. 
They were Q and Rs and turnovers. Each is particularly 
N. M. M. Sergison Ser/103 ff. 181-89 213-224; B. M. Addit. 
MSS- 59439 ff 123-5; P. R. O. Adm. 1/3592,25 March 
1702. Other proposals for improving the method of 
payment were made; Bee C. S. P. Dom. Wm. 16979 24; 
ibid. Anne 11,255-6. 
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characteristic of one war, Q and Rs of the Augsburg War, 
turnovers of the Spanish Succession War. 
R was an abbreviation for 'run' and it was placed 
beside'the name of any man missing from a sequence of 
three musters. 
(') It usually signified desertion and was 
an old and accepted naval custom. On 23 March 1691, on 
the advice of the flag officers at Chatham, an Admiralty 
order instituted Q, an abbreviation for 'query'. It was 
meant to give the seaman the benefit of any doubt as to 
his-absence from musters, particularly the many sick who 
had been landed during the campaigns of 1689-90. 
(2) 
In 
practice aQ or R. once placed against a seaman's name, 
however valid his excuse for absence, became permanent 
and'a justification for not paying him or his dependents. 
(3) 
A'spate of pamphlets and petitions instructed parliament 
in--the grievances associated with these 'two fatal ruiners 
of'the poor seaman's pay. 1(4) The Lords considered the 
problem in April 1699 and the Commons in February 1700. 
(5) 
(1) H. M. C. H. L. 111,4219 
(2) Sergison Papers 199-201. 
(3) Ibid. 321o 
(4) C. J. XIII, 729 163,739; Great Britain's Groans 
(1695) 1; W. Eccles, Reasons for taking off the 
Qs and Rs (1699); J. Dennis, Reasons Humbly 
Offerld (1699); Some Further Reasons Humbly offered 
by the Sailors (c. 1699). 
(5) C-J-XIII, 165; H. M. C. H. L. 111,421* 
Ad 
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They found that the device was administratively essential 
if the navy was to keep a check on its men and not be 
defrauded. (') The letters did not again interest either 
House and ceased in Anne's reign to be a major grievanceg 
largely because naval officers refused to apply the 
system according to the letter of Navy Board instructions. 
(2) 
,, 
While Q, and R faded as a major grievance another 
device attracted to itself as much, if not more, 
dissatisfaction. Turnovers were a useful and sometimes 
indispensable method of partially solving two common 
problems, shortages of men and money. The practice was 
simply one of transferring men from a home-coming ship to 
one needing to be manned for fresh service. Their 
payment could thus be deferred to the next home-coming. 
It was an administrative god-send but it bore terribly 
hard on the men. Navy Board, officers and pamphleteers 
were united in condemning the practice. 
(3) It was a 
grievance in five separate and individually disastrous 
ways. It added to the delays of being paid. It deprived 
the seaman of leave and contact with families or, if he was 
single, of the chance to spend his hard-earned pay. 
(4) 
(1) P. R. O. Adm. 3/15,25 Jan. 1700. 
(2) P. R. O. Adm. 1/3604,14 Feb. 1706,5 April, 
(3) P. R. O. Adm- 7/336,7 March, 1706. 
(4) P. R. O. Adm. 1/35929 13 Feb. 1702. 
1706. 
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It deprived hii of his chance of bounty money by making 
it impossible'for him to rejoin in the January or 
Feýiuý, ary afte ,r, he had been paid off. 
(') It destroyed the 
relationship between officer and men by delivering them 
to a new mastero 
(2) 
This hit at the most useful element 
in the navy, the veteran volunteers who at worst knew the 
ways of a given captain but at best had volunteered to 
serve with him out of knowledge and respect. Lastly, 
and worst, the-uncertainty of his term of service hung 
naggingly over every seaman. Homecoming meant, not pay 
and'leave, but a quick turn round and another voyage, and 
perhaps even another. It was described as $the Perpetuity 
of the service with regard to the Common Crew., 
(3) 
Yet turnovers., of necessity, soon had a hold. They 
were common by 1693 and admirals were already warning the 
Admiralty of their ill effects. 
(4) At the beginning of 
Anne's reign, when manning was particularly difficult, they 
W4 ere'more common than ever before. 
(5) Parliament saw the 
P. M. Adm- 7/336,21 Nov. 1702. 
(2)- 'ýP. R. O. Adm. 1/35979 4 Nov. 1703; Ramblin' Jackq The 
Journal of Capt. John Cra mer, transcribed by 
- - R. Reynell Bellamy (1936) 55. 
(3) B. Slushq The Navy Royal o ra Sea Cook Turn'd 
Projector (1709) 79-80. 
(4) C. S. P. Dom. W. & M. 16939 330; N. M. M. Sergison Ser/ 
lOO ff. 579-82. 
(5) P. R. O. Adm. 1/3594,5 Nov. 17029 31 Dec. 1792; 
C. S. P. Dom . Anne 1,65. 
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problem, -or-some aspects of it, 
(l)and in the 1705 act 
for the 'Encouragement and Increase of Seamen' it was 
stated that every man turned over 
'shall be paid his Wages which shall appear 
due to him in the Ship from which he was 
turned over, before such Ship to which he 
shall be turned over do go to Sea, either 
inýMoney or by Ticket, -. which shall entitle 
him or his Assigns to payment within one 
month after the said Ticket shall be 
presented to the Commissioners of the 
., Navy at their Office. 
' (2) 
Turnovers were-not declared illegal - that would, have been 
impracticable -. but at least a great grievance associated 
with them-had been recognised and purposeful legislation 
applied, to its redress. This clause is one of the very 
few examples of legislation seeking to encourage the 
sailor which combines humanity and intelligence. 
The Navy Board attempted to perform this statutory. 
duty. In 1709 L419567.7.5YA-d-. was paid out to men 
turned over. 
(3) Sailings were delayed because of the legal 
(4) 
necessity to pay these men. From June 1710 it became 
common for a specific sum of money to be included in 
Turnovers were condemned at the Manning Committee 
meetings of late 17039 Queen Anne's Navy 184-8. 
(2) 4&5 Anne c 6. 
(3) P. R. O. Adm. 20/98 Pt. 3. 
(4) Byng Papers, ed. B. Tunstall, (N. R. S. 1931) 119 289; 
P. R. O. Adm. 113614,6 Sept. 1710. 
lir, 
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weekly issues to the, Treasurer of the, Navy-for these 
payments. 
(') The effort was great-but the difficulties 
many and naturally, the demands of-war took, priority, and 
the succesB-of the legislation was limited.., -Turnovers 
without, pay became illegaý ýon, 25, March ý, 1706. On 6 June 
1706 theSavy Board-rqpqrted that men turned -over -from 
H. M. S. -Barfleur to H. M. S. Dreadnought had not been, paid 
before the-lattership sailed. 
(2) 
The non--financial dis- 
advantages of turnovers remained, and until theý, end, of the 
war the practice was a major, perhaps the worst,. gri 
' 
evance 
of the naval-sailor. 
(3) The afflictions so far described 
are numerous but they were inflicted on a tough breed-of. 
men serving-their country in time of crisis. - Something,, 
may be excused in such circumstances. The deficiencies of 
the system take on far more bitter connotations when 
related to men no longer hale and hearty but maimed or old 
through. naval service or prisoners of war because of it. 
Like victuals, 'the treatment of sick and wounde4. made 
an early impact on the House of Co=ons. On 18 May 1689 
the House passed a vote of thanks to Herbert and the fleet. 
(1) C. T. B. XXIV Pt. 1,27* 
4 (2) P. R. O. Adm. 1/3605,6 June 1706. 
(3) Life of Capt. Stephen Martin ed. C. R. Markham (N. R. S. 
1895) 110; S. Martin Leake, Life of Sir John Leake 
(N. R. S. 1920) IIs 361; Queen Anne's Navy 185; B. M. 
Harlean 6,287 ff. 104-6. 
(4) C-J-X, 138e 
- 
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He replied on 21 May and asked that attention should be 
given to the care of the wounded. 
(') A committee was 
appointed to consider the problem on the same day and 
Papillon reported from it on 15 July. 
(2 ) The committee 
had concentrated its attention on the resources and 
activities of the Chatham Chest, set up in the time of 
Elizabeth. Rents from lands and contributions from 
sailors enabled the officials responsible for managing 
the fund to PaY 650 maimed or aged pensioners sums of 
money towards their maintenance. Papillon reported the 
financial and administrative inadequacies of the fund. 
The House resolved that more money should be allocated to 
the relief of the sick and wounded and that an imposition 
on documents used by merchants should be used to augment 
the funds. Another committee of the Commons considered 
the matter in the next session but nothing really 
effective was done. 
(3) 
In the years that followed the plight of the sick or 
I 
wounded sailor became more acute. The wounded from Beachy 
Head were appallingly treated. Many died in the streetB. 
(4) 
C-. J. Xj 142. 
(2) C. J. X, 218-20* 
(3) C. J. Xt 308* 
(4) C. S. P. Dom. W. & M. 1690-91,170; H. M. C- H. L. It 
l'? 2* 
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The body charged with their care proved inefficient. 
The Board for Sick and Wounded was starved of money and 
weakly directed and supported by its nominal superior, 
the Navy Board. (') A. the navy expanded and the number's of 
sick in need of treatment increasedt the employment of 
squadrons in distant waters, particularly in the West 
Indies, aggravated the difficulties of the Commissioners 
of S ick and'Wound ed. 
(2) It is against this background that 
the foundation of the hospital at Greenwich in 1694 can be 
seen, not as unnecessary luxury, but as a necessity that 
would at once help to solve the problem of-the sick and 
wounded and demonstrate the concern of the nation and the 
government at their plight. The hospital was as much a 
device to bolster morale and aid manning as any act for 
the increase and encouragement of seameno(3) Although 
parliament passed legislation that provided money for the 
upkeep of the hospital and to increase provision for 
aged ex-servicemen and their dependents, there was no 
urgency and little interest in such matters. 
(4) The work 
of the naval administration in providing a fleet of 
I (1) Queen Annes Navyq 217- 
(2) J. J. Keevil, Medicine and the Navy (1958) 111 180. 
(3) Cf. Ehrman 137. 
(4) 7&8 Wm.. III c 21; 8&9 Wm. III c 23; 10 Anne 
c 2?. Greenwich provided few places for'seamen 
before 1714, J. J. Keevil op. cit. 111 199-200. 
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hospital ships, was a more effective reform and one that 
did, more than'Greenwich to prevent a repetition of the 
mass - desertion that'had been one crew's reaction to the 
news'-that it was to be employed in the West Indies. 
(') 
ý: Being-a. prison*er of war was to be condemned to a 
kind of living, death. Pay ceased from the'day of capture, 
which drove at least some of the wives of prisoners to 
petition parliament, unsuccessfully, for relief. 
(2) 
In 
periods'-when'the system of exchanging prisoners was working 
well-, that is, 'when the navy needed men badly, the stay in 
a French prison was short. 
(3) The prisoners who were 
released, quickly were lucky: their treatment in France was 
harsh. 'The conditions, involving vile food, Irish warders 
and forced. marches, were designed to save money and compel 
as"many of the prisoners as possible to volunteer for the 
French navy. 
(4) 
-Knowledge of these conditions was a 
real deterrent to recruiting. 
(5) 
(1) 'I-J. J. Sutherland Shaw, The Hospital Ship 1603-1740, 
M. M. 22 (1936) 422-6; Ehrman 3729 444-5; The Old 
._ -,.,. 
Scots Navyl, ed. J. Grant (N. R. S. 1914) 375* 
(2)_ C. J. XV, 495. 
(3) 0. inderson, The Establishment of British Supremacy 
at Sea and the Exchange of Naval Prisoners of War 
1689-17839 E. H. R. LXXV (1960) 77-89. 
(4) H. M. C. H. L. VII, 150-3; C. S. P. Dom. Anne 1,266-9; 
R. lyde, A True and Exact Account of the Retaking 
of the Ship called the Friend's Adventure (1693) in 
Stuart Tracts 1603-1693 ed. C. H. Firth, 479; G. St. 
Log England's Safety (1693) 51-5. 
(5) P. R. O. Adm. 1/3573 f-9071 C. J. XVt 532. 
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For the married man who cared for wife and family 
many-of the grievances described above were harshly 
magnified. Credit buying, at inflated prices, was a 
commonplace in those towns or districts where seamen's 
wives were concentrated. The Manning Co=ittee's 
discussions in late 1703 show that there were members of 
parliament aware of the problems of naval families. 
M 
The practice of turning men over delayed their pay reaching 
their families, and the legislation passed to ensure that 
they were paid at turn over did nothing to solve this 
problem. The shopkeepers and creditors of naval families 
themselves petitioned the Commons about their hardships in 
March 1709- (2) This petition and the financial pressure 
behind it probably contributed towards the bill that was 
considered in this session for a reform of the, methods of 
payment(3)but nothing was achieved. Nothing could have 
added more to the fund of human misery aboard ship and in 
the sailor's home than these long and uncertain separations, 
and the denial to the married seamang and in some measure 
(1)- Queen Anne's Navy 186-7; see above pp. 384-6* 
(2) C. J. XVI, 156. 
(3) See above pp. 444-5-Other reforms had been suggested: - G. Everett, Encouragement for Seamen (1695) Harleian 
Miscellany X, 226; Tangier Papers of Samuel Pepys 
ed. E. Chappell (N. R. S. 1935) 227; H. M. C. H. L. 119 
219. A measure of relief in the Registry Let was 
never implemented; see above P. 357. 
-r%. # 4 55. 6 
the'bachelors, too, of the right 'to taste the sweets of 
liberty on'shore. I(l) 
Uncertainty must have been co=onplace to the wife 
of a serving sailor. News of ship losses came slowly and 
many wives cannot have known with certainty on which ship 
their husband was serving. His death would end 
une'ertainty but create another series of problems, notably, 
obtaining his back pay. One important advantage naval 
had over merchant service was the grant to a dependent of a 
man killed in action of a sum equivalent to eleven months 
of his pay with an additional 
child. 
(2) 
This was generous. 
third of this for each 
In 1709 the widow of an 
n*k 
able seaman drew f, 35.4. Od.; of this 913.4. Od., was in 
her own right,, and she received Vý. 8., bd., for each of her 
(3) five children. The delay between death and payment seems 
to have been about two years and surprisingly few seem to 
have claimed this money. 
(4) 
With grievances such as have been described it is 
surprising the naval seaman remained so docile. There 
were mutinies but they remained scattered in time and place; 
The Petitions of the Seamen to the House of Commons 
and the Board of Admiralty, 18 April 17979 English 
Historical Documents XII No- 545, p. 878. 
(2) C. J. Xq 128. There was also money in the Chatham 
Chest for widowsq P. R. O. Adm. 18/74 f-154. 
(3) P. R. O. Adm. 20/98 No- 3,493. 
(4) P. R. O. Adm. 20/60 No. 665, 
. 
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poor communication and wide-spread illiteracy would help 
to isolate sedition. 
(') 
There were rumours of successful 
Jacobite infiltration of a discontented fleet but they 
came to nothing. 
(2) 
The most serious consequences for the 
navy of all the ills of the seaman were the difficulties 
of,, manning and the high desertion rate. The naval 
administration initiated many and valuable reforms. Lack. 
of money prevented their greater effectiveness. Parlia- 
ment generally ignored the grievances of-the seamen. it 
could afford to; the seaman. was to endure the miseries of 
naval life until the Mutiny on the Nore in 1797. Yet 
there, were members of parliament who showed knowledge and 
sympathy, even compassion for the sailor. 
(3) 
The legislation 
on turnovers must have owed something to this feeling as 
well as to a desire to facilitate manning, but if one is 
to generalise about a parliamentary attitude towards the 
life of the ordinary and individual sailor, the best 
description of that attitude would be that corporately 
parliament did not comprehend the life that was described 
to it in ways written and verbal. 
(4) 
When Haddock wrote to 
(1) D. Hannay, Naval Courts Martial (1914) 23-5,115-128; 
P. R. O. Adm. 7/334 f. 86 C. S. P. Dom. Anne Is 593; 
'Vernon Letters 1.286; B. M. Addit. MSS. 5,443 f. 183. 
(2) Byng Papers ed. B. Tunstall (N. R. S. 1932) 111, xxxiii; 
B. M. Addit. MSS. 5,443 f-183. 
(3) See the accounts of the committee on manning-in late 
1703, Queen Anne's Navy 184-8. 
(4) Parliament and naval officials seem to have believed 
from about 1706 that their actions had affected great 
and effective reform, C. J. XIV, 102; P. R. O. S. P. 42/7t 5 Jan-1706; P. R. O. Adm. 7/336,7 Jan. 1706. 
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the Navy Board in 1692 about 'the poor dogs' who had 
been fighting so bravely, the Board in reply remonstrated 
with him about the noun he used. It could not comprehend 
the sympathy and comradeship implied in the rough wording. 
(') 
Over a hundred years later a naval chaplain watched and 
later described how a seaman fell overboard and was 
rescued from the brink of drowning. He pondered in his 
diary on the 'insensibility' of this man and of the lower 
classes of society generally. 
(2) His own upper class lack 
of sensitiveness towards the lower class was similar to 
the coporate attitude of parliament towards the naval 
seaman between 1688 and 1714. 
(1) Sergison Papers 37,39. 
Edward Mangin's Journal in Five Naval Journals 
(N. R. S. 1951) 274ý 
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The Navy and 
Parliament 
LLr-9" rw 
Between 1688 and 1714 the British navy became the 
most1powerful in the world. The connection between, this 
achievement and the parliamentary investigation and 
legislation that affected the navy is obscure. The role 
of government, naval officials and naval officers in 
promoting, the rise to power was in some ways surprisingly 
small. -Frequently the navy seems to be no more than--the 
passive recipient of parliamentary decisions. - 
One reason,, 
for this was that naval interests were not effectively 
represented in parliament. The ways in which parliamentary 
legislation that concerned the navy was initiated 
illustrates this. 
The government's record in planning and carrying., 
through naval legislation was bad. In naval matters the 
main efforts of the Court speakers in the Commons were 
... 
directed to securing a favourable vote of supply. Apart 
from this their efforts were more defensive than 
constructive. Legislation on manning and on the supply of 
timber for the navy suffered badly because of poor co- 
ordination and lack of persistence from the Court 
representatives. 
(') 
The skill with which Harley piloted' 
the bill for the Encouragement and Increase of Seaman 
(1) See above pp. 185-7,402-9. 
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through ýthe Commons in 1703 was noteworthy but it was the 
exception. 
(') The drafting of many bills, for example, the 
; Iegistry Act of 1696(2) or the Seamen's Pay Bill of 17099(3) 
shows insufficient appreciation of the problems involved 
and is a consequence of insufficient liaison with 
subordinate officials. Navy Board officials had a very 
poor impression of the legislation produced in an attempt 
to-solve some of their problems. 
(4) 
Conversely, officials 
at this level rarely had the confidence or incentive to 
worry the government into taking action. The Navy Board's 
most consistent contribution when asked for advice was a 
lament for the 'good old days' of naval administration 
before 1688. Only over the dangerous shortage of naval 
supply in timber, tar and hemp did the Navy Board and the 
Board of Trade and Plantations take the initiative and worry 
the government into legislation. 
(5) 
The suggestions for 
legislation that came from the Admiralty were usually too 
(1) See above Pp. 379-89. 
(2) See above pp. 358-64@ 
(3) This bill was inspired by the opposition but the 
government did not at first appreciate its 
administrative flaws, see above pp. 444-5. 
(4) Sergison to Harley, 15 May 1711, B. M. Harlean- 6,287 
ff. 95-108. 
(5) See kbdva pp. 185-91 200-2. 
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sweeping and 
I 
politically unrealistic. 
(') Despite the 
disadvantages under which Court speakers laboured in the 
Commons (2) there is no doubt that better use could have 
been made of naval officers to push naval legislation, if 
they had been given a lead from above. Both Russell for 
(3) much of William's reign, and Shovell, under Anne, 
despite their contrasting styles of speech, could win 
sympathetic audiences for their views on the navy. 
It follows from this negative attitude on the part, of 
the Court that a surprising proportion of naval legislation 
began its parliamentary career as. recommendations from 
Opposition politicians. This proportion included most of 
the important acts connected with naval finance and trade 
protection. In William's time it was the Commons who 
displayed the initiative in criticism and legislation; in 
Anne's reign it was the Lords who took over this role 
though with rather less constructive legislation to show 
for their opposition. Legislation of this sort, that was 
initiated in the ranks of aggrieved politicians, had to be 
attuned to the prevailing mood of parliament and this'acted' 
For example, their request for sweeping powers of 
conscription, C. S. P. Dom. W. & M. 1693,440. 
(2) See above Pp. 31-2. 
(3) Shovell was M. P. for Rochester 1698-1701t 1705-7. 
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as a restraint. The moderation of many in either - 
House of parliament, joined to the undeniable defensive 
skill--of most Court groups in their policies of amendment 
and delay, acted-as a check on extreme legislation. The 
passing of-the 1694-clause establishing cruisers and ', 
convoys or-the establishment of the Board of Trade and 
Plantations shows-how this clash of-opposition and Court 
created acts of parliament. 
(') 
The, printed sources from which members, of parliament 
could learn of-the navy made smalldirect contributionýtoý, 
legislation, although they did create a background of 
knowledge. None ofthe pamphlets that advocated a 
registry provided a plan for the 1696 act that established 
the registration of seamen. Most of the pamphleteers- 
envisaged a compulsory register, of men or-ships, not the-, 
voluntary register that was established,, and only oneýgave 
any detailed consideration to the benefits for sailors who 
' (2) registered. Many of the pamphlets dealing with naval 
affairs contained little more than a reiteration of the 
- 
(1) See above pp. 254-8,267-9. 
Reasons for Settling the Admiralty Jurisdiction, 
Harleian Miscellany IX (1810) 465-475; see below 
p. 473* 
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wrongs the, seamen suffered and the wrongs naval officials 
and officers_, perpetrated. All this could do was to 
provide a. background to legislation such as the registry, 
pamphlets provided. An exception to this generalisation 
was the anonymous pamphletg published in 1690, entitledg'' 
'Reasons for Settling the Admiralty Jurisdiction'. 
Several of the recommendations in this pamphlet became 
fact, amongst them a registration scheme, freedom of those 
registered from parish office, a more equitable sharing of 
prize money, the prohibition of English seamen from. serving 
abroad, and better provision for the Chatham Chest. No 
other pamphlet was so successful in forecasting, and 
perhaps moulding parliamentary action. 
4 
'Presumably fewer of the handwritten memorials on naval 
problems survive than the more numerous pamphlets. 
'On-the 
evidence of those extant 
-they 
were more effective than the 
pamphlets in establishing a basis for legislation. This, 
is natural enough in that the most important of them were, 
produced by experts outside the administration for ministers 
with specific naval problems in mind. The dividing-, line 
between these memorials and the reports drawn up bynaval,,, 
officials and officers is a vague one. Gibson's memorial 
for Trenchard(")contained suggestions for the civil trial of 
(1) See above p. 63. 
Ad 
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naval-officers, for the employment of merchants as 
Lords Commissioners of Admiralty, for an increased share 
in prize money-for ordinary seamen, for reform of methods 
of-paying off, and for a more lavish provision of 
medicine chests in the fleet. All these suggestions were 
acted upon by the navy at parliament's direction or on the 
initiative of the administration. 
-Inevitably parliament's growing knowledge of the navy 
and the more frequent naval legislation initiated by 
politicians-who were not members of the government'led to 
changes in the relationship of monarch, parliament, 
Admiralty and Navy Boards. Between 1660 and 1688 the 
navy had enjoyed the particular interest and generally 
able direction of two monarchs. From 1688 to 1714, at a 
time when it increased greatly in size, the two monarchs who 
ruled England were not specially interested in the problems 
that faced the navy. In these years, particularly between 
1689 and 1693, events forced on parliament an awareness of 
naval problems even in aspects of naval business, sUch as 
manning, which had not traditionally been parliament's 
concern. The very. size of the navy by the middle years of 
William ensured that even when the pressure of national 
crisis slackened, it should remain a major parliamentary- 
concern. Every naval failure, administrative or 
operational, served to keep the interest alive. Insensibly 
knowledge, concern and repeated attention to naval matters 
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combined-to give parliament a heightened authority over 
the navy. --' 
There, were some members of parliament, in both Lords 
and Commons, who hoped for a state in which'parliament 
would be predominant. There were even 'republicans' in 
both houses, whose nominal allegiance'to-the Whigs-was 
more'a source of weakness to the party than of strength. 
In the naval context operational failure, maladministration 
and the dissatisfaction of the sailors did"lead to appeals 
to parliament to take over the direction of the navy: ' 
'God bless our noble Parliament 
And give them the whole government 
That they may see we're worse than ever 
And us from lawless rule deliver, 
For England's sinking unless they 
Do take the helm and better sway. '(') 
The greatest obstacle to the acquisition of such control 
as was envisaged by a minority was, the disinclination of 
themajority in parliament or nation to consider anything 
so radical.. Court speakers knew the strength of this 
conservative deference to the Xing's powers and prerogatives 
and on occasion exploited it most effectively. 
(2) 
This 
conservatism was erodedg not by radical philosophy but by 
(1) The Sea Martyrs (1691), Naval Songs and Ballads, ed. 
C. R. Firth (N. R. S. 1907) 143; cf. Present Condition 
of the English Navy in a Dialogue ... (1702) 29. 
(2) See Above P. 268e 
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a 'Country' determination to correct faults, to, ensure 
that they should not reappear, and to find the person 
responsible for the failure. The navy, with an 
U navoidable plethora of faults and failures, contributed 
notably to the erosion. 
The real precedents for parliamentary intervention in 
I naval-affairs came in the early years of WilliaA reign. 
Naval failure and national crisis enabled the enemies of 
William as a monarch to combine with the enemies of his 
government with the probability of general parliamentary 
support. The King's right to-choose his own executive 
officers was challenged in 1691 because of Russell's 
ineffective use of the fleet in the summer of that year. 
One of the things that prevented the Commons pressing for 
the-right to appoint admirals was a speech by Guise(l)in 
which he informed the House that although it had the 
liberty to question the King's servants, it had no right 
to prejudice his right to name them. 
(2) 
Presumably this 
was close enough to the. constitutional truth as many of the 
Commons saw it for the attack to fail. A more serious 
attack developed in the next seSBion of parliaments again 
(1) Sir John Guise was M. P. for Gloucestershire. 
(2) Bonnet Dispatch,, 6 Nov. 1691, Z. von Ranke op. cit,, 
VI, 162; S. B. Baxter, William 111 (1966) 492. 
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out of a naval failure, this time the failure of 
Admiralty or Admiral Russell to achieve a damaging blow 
against the French in the months after the victory at 
La Hogue. Diverse political dissatisfactions contributed 
to I the attack(l)and it was this diversity that did much to 
help William, the Tories blaming Russellthe Whigs blaming 
Nottingham, and this quarrel being complicated by each 
House championing its respective member. All that came 
out of the early demands that the Commons should have the 
satisfaction of replacing either Nottingham as Secretary of 
State or Russell as Admiral was an address in which the 
King was 'humbly advised' to create an Admiralty of 
(2) 
experienced and expert naval administrators which was 
defeated by 135 to 112 votes. Robert Harley lamented 
that only seven or eight speakers were prepared to question 
the King's powers and they were opposed by the whole weight 
of the Court speakers. 
(3) There were no more assaults as 
direct as this on the King's right to nominate his 
piincipal'executive officers. The Commons learnt to 
achieve the removal of-an unpopular naval official or- 
administrator by harrying. In this way Orford was 
See above pp. 102-3. 
(2) C-J-X9 775; G. F. James, Some Further Aspects of 
Admiralty Administration 1689-1714, B. I. H. R. XVII 
(1939-40) 21* 
-(3) 
H. M. C. Portland 111,509* 
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compelled"tq resign in 1699. 
(') The possibility that the 
Co=gns would conduct the war on land and sea faded with 
(2) the sense, of crisis. Yet events continued to provide 
reasons for. parliament to acquire new knowledge and 
powers.,, 
-.,, 
The parliamentary conviction that although the 
nation, was paying for the war it had no insight intog and 
implicitly no controlLover, the spending of its money, led 
to the institution of commissioners of account. 
(3) A- 
similar conviction that the protection of English trade was 
badly managed led to the King's losing control of one fifth 
of his fleet. 
(4) 
Ko one acquisition of authority was,,, 
decisive, far less revolutionary, but in the department of 
the navy-, as in other departmentBS parliament was establish- 
ing a, new-relationship with the agents of the executive. 
'The exercise of authority, particularly by the Commons, was 
insensibly changing the status of parliament in the minds 
of its members and of government officials. Frequent and 
close contact marked on the parliamentary side by a 
decreasing deference towards the administrators and the 
monarch was changing the balance of political power in 
favour of parliament. 
(1),, See above pp. 95-6- 
(2) C. S. P. Dom. W. & M. 1690-1,465. 
(3) See above pp. 111-2. 
(4) See above p. 259. 
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- There were stil-1 very real limitations to parlia- 
ment's--power over the navy. The tradition of initiative 
was-with-ýthe government. The 'mysteries' of government 
and-administration-were still obstacles to effective 
parliamentary participation especially in is. sues that 
involved the armed forces or foreign policy. In-these 
matters officials, had the advantages of knowledge, 
continuity--of office and the widespread recognition that 
it-was-the-right of government to act decisively in a 
crisis-without waiting to, refer to parliament. 
(') Parlia- 
ment's-ability to influence, guide or direct government, 
action was limited by the nature of its membership and 
existence. -The 
long periods of a year in which parlia- 
ment was not in session reduced the effectiveness of-its, 
interventions, inevitably many of its prouncements were -,. 
retrospective. Changes in the personnel of the Commons., 4t 
an election made more difficult the transmission of new, 
attitudes. There were few leaders, particularly in the 
early years of William, who possessed sufficient. authority, 
courage, knowledge and ability to lead the Commons. -in-an 
effective way against the government. When the Commons met 
on 7, November 1691 to consider the failings of the navy Russell 
(1) See above p. 166. 
LLQO* Tl. j 
announced that'he was prepared to answer any question 
about-his management of the fleet. 
(') 
There was silence for 
half an hour. Then Clarges entered the Chamber. He 
expressed amazement that no one had found anything to 
criticise and launched a very specific and detailed' 
attack on the management of the fleet in the summer of 
1691. Inspired by his example an attack on Russell 
developed but in the absence of men like Clarges it would 
seem that the authority of the government was secure. 
Increasingly party groups, by providing support, 
organisation and knowledge, made criticism in the Commons 
effective. Even with such organisation an emotional 
incentives such as would be provided by an operational or 
administrative failurej was usually necessary to stir the 
House. Danger provided the strongest emotional incentive 
and it is in the years of national crisis between 1688 and 
1693 that most of the precedents for the intervention in 
naval business occur. 
.,, Despite these limitations parliament's power over the . 
navy grew between 1688 and 1714. This ac. quisition of 
power was made easier by the weakness of the Board of 
Admiralty. In, part this was caused by the King's need to 
N. Luttrell,, An Abstract of the Debates 6 Nov. 1691-4 Nov. 
1692t ff. 4-5* 
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gain political support by the allocation of offices, and 
the Admiralty in commission provided seven places. The 
King was the more ready to award Admiralty posts as 
payment for political services because increasingly from 
1688, the Secretary of State directed the navy 
strategicallyMand the Navy Board directed it administra- 
tively. William himself accelerated the decline of the 
Admiralty, the members of which alienated him in the early 
years of hiS'reign by their inefficiency and lack of 
secrecy and the arrogance with which the members disputed 
with Mary over the appointment of an admiral in 1690. 
(2) 
By the middle years of his reign the Lords Commissioners of 
Admiralty had little real power and in the opinion of 
Pepys were treated contemptuously by the Icabinet'. 
0) 
This contempt was not confined to the council chamber but 
widely expressed in attacks on the, 'fresh water Lords', 
who made up what was 'a nursery for young, and an asylum for 
, 
ýon, The Secretaries of State 1681- (1) M. A. Thom'-'N 
2 1782 (19 2) 78-88* 
(2) Schomberg to the King, 27 July 1689, C. S. P. Dom. 
W. & M. 1689-909 201; S. B. Baxter op-cit. 306-7; 
Ehrman 354-60; D. 099 OP-cit- 335-6; G. F. James 
op-cit. 22-5. 
(3) Samuel Pepys's Naval Minutes op-cit. 319-20; C. S. P. 
Dom. W. & M. 1694-59 478; ibid. 16979 253. 
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old politicians'. '(') By, the nature''of their-lappointment 
, the Lords'Commissioners brought to the Admiralty their 
political allegiances and, intrigues', which made them 
vulnerable toparl: iamentary criticiSm. 'ý They were 
difficult'masters to,: *-th'e hard-working professionals of 
the-Navy B66rd. 7ý-The relationship between the two , 
boards, on which the efficiency of the--navy depended, 
was-at times practically hostile. In 1699 one member---, '- 
of the Admiralty, Lord-Haversham, gave up attending'Joint 
meetings of the two boards because of'a quarrel with a '" 
member of the Navy Board; eventually William, had to order 
him to attend-meetings. 
(2) The incompetence ., weakness and 
B. Slush, The Navy Royal, or a Sea Cook Turnd 
Projector (1709) 21; Memoirs of Thomas Earl of 
Ailesbury, (1890) 1,242; Sir John Dalrymple, 
Memoirs of Great Britain and Ireland (1771) 111 175; 
The Seaman's Opinion of a Standing Army (1689), 
Collection of State Tracts Published ....... (1705) 111 687; S. Martin Leake, Life of Sir John Leake, ed. 
G. Callender (N. R. S. 1920) 111 400; G. F. James and 
J. J. Sutherland Shawl Admiralty Administration and 
Personnel 1619-171-49 B. -I. H. R. XIV (1936-7) 12* 
(2) Haversham, was made a Lord Commissioner of Admiralty in 
June 1699. The details of his quarrel with 
Lyddellg Commissioner of the Navy, can be found in 
P. R. O.; Adm. 3/15,239 25,31 Oct. 1699,2.5,29,30 March. 
1700; P. R. O. Adm. 7/335,27 Feb. 1700* Haversham. had 
used or encouraged a clerk in Isyddell's office to make 
what other Navy Board officials described as 
'f rivolous accusations I against Lyddell 9 Sergison Papers 56-7 Haversham. described Lyddell's counter- 
accusations as 'brutish'. The working togetherof the 
two boards was naturally disrupted by the quarrel and 
the King ordered Haversham, to attend, N. M. M. Ser/103 
f. 147t 22 May 1700. 
- LLJQ T%. j 
factiousness of the!, Admiralty administration could not 
be a secret in the close political society of late 
seventeenth century England. Parliament constantly 
wished to identify the men responsible for a failure; too 
frequently the Admiralty provided an obvious and static 
target. The state of the Admiralty led to parliament's 
by-passing, this Board on a number of occasions and 
demanding from the Navy Board the answers to various naval 
questions. In this way they received expert and detailed 
ansWers and. incidentally impressed their authority on yet 
another branch of the executive. 
(') j 
A by-product of all this parliamentary interest in, 
the navy was a great increase in paper work. At Navy 
Board level it, involved much Bearching, Bummary and 
transcription by a staff that was already overworked. 
(2) 
At Admiralty level the awareness of parliament encouraged 
the preparation of defensive lines of memorials and 
returns. As Vernon described their activitiesq 
'the way they are running into of making 
memorials on all occasions ....., this is 
one of the faults of our Winter Esquires 
which have set people upon turning all 
(1) See above pp. 1389 167,386-8. 
(2) Sergison Pap4rsj 48-9; H. M. C. Buccleuch and' 
Queensberry II Pt. 1 291; C. S. P. Dom. W. & M. - 1694-59 22; P. R. O. Adm. 1/3573 f. 7479; P. R. O. 
Adm. 1/350 f 227; H. M. C. Portland 111,503. 
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their thoughts how they shall JUBtify 
themselves if they are attacked and 
upon whose shoulders they will put the 
burden. '(') 
On another level again it led to a cramped clerk to the 
Commons petitioning for more space so that he could 
exist with the growing accumulation 'of records. 
(2) 
The awareness of parliament's interest went downwards 
from the administrative to the operational ranks of the 
navy. Every flag officer and captain realised that 
added to the dangers of war and sea was the danger that 
failure or political emnity might bring a parliamentary 
investigation which'could be as professionally fatal as 
any of the more traditional hazards. Shovell, who 
despite his rough professionalism had some gift with 
words, siimmed up the danger: 
'there is no storm as bad-as one from 
the House of Commons., 
(3) 
Leake was practically the only-senior flag officer to 
(4) 
escape damage at the hands of parliament. Even victory 
was not necessarily a safeguard; parliament could always 
envisage a victory more decisive', as Russell found after 
La Hogue or Byng after foiling the invasion attempt of 
1708. 
(1) Vernon to Blathwaytq 25 June 1697t B. M. Addit. MSS. 
34t 348 f-51 cf. Vernon Letters 1,110. 
(2) C. J. XVIIt 250. 
(3) Vernon Letters 1,146. 
(4) The Byng Papers, ed. B. Tunstall (N. R. S. 1930) It X-xi- 
-r%j 4145. 
. To silmmarise the impact of parliament on the 
personnel of the navy between 1688 and 1714, 
(')it 
would 
seemýthat, by 1714 naval officials and officers recognised 
parliament's power, though parliament itself had not fully 
realised, the-authority and status it had won by this 
infiltration intoýevery aspect of naval activity. The, 
naval officials particularly must have been uneasilyf .. ý 
conscious of two masters, and the decision on how to. - 
allocate-loyalty must at times have called for nice judge- 
ment, 
(2)but 
parliament had secured at least an equality 
of status-with., the monarch. Such duality of, control did 
not impede-, efficiency; generally parliamentary interestý 
must have-made-,, for greater naval efficiency. - Parlia- 
mentary attacks on the conduct of naval affairs were- 
frequent, sometimes savage, and occasionally quite unjust. 
In this as in all aspects of 
p arliament and the navy the 
slower in the years between 
-George, Prince of Denmark, 
At his death the impetus of 
resume d unabated. 
the relationship between 
pace of development-was 
1702 and 1708, when 
was Lord High Admiral, 
the interventions 
(2) As in 1704, -when the Whig Lords in the House of Lords tried to outflank the Prince's Council by summoning' 
the Navy Board to give them information. The Navy 
Board kept faith with its superiors in the executive 
and blocked the Whig interrogation; see above PP-131-2. 
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Savagery and injustice, moderately applied, are 
probably greater spurs to efficiency than moderation and 
fairness. 
Yet such incentives to greater naval efficiency can 
have made only a marginal contribution towards Britain's 
rise to naval dominance between 1688 and 1714, and it is 
, this dominance which is the most important naval develop- 
ment of the period. It was to last for two centuries 
and provide the basis of industrial and imperial 
supremacy. Many explanations have been given for it. 
Some historians have seen British naval supremacy as 
an undirected and spontaneous exploitation of geographic 
and economic advantages. 
(') Other historians have seen 
the explanation in the activities of the state; this view- 
point is most tersely expressed by Professor G. S. Graham: 
'Britannia's sceptre was the product of 
Whitehall and Westminster. 1(2) 
If there iS Bubstance in the latter explanation parlia- 
ment's legislation for and interest in the navy between 
(1) 'The English and the Dutch were alike in this, that 
their naval development was instinctivet" A. D. Innes, 
The Maritime and Colonial Expansion of England under 
the Stuarts 1603-1714 (1931) 247. This is an 
extreme statement of this deterministic theory but, 
expressed in more cautious terms it has many 
adherents cf. A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Seapower 
upon History 1660-1783 (1957 edn. ) 25; Ehrman, 175', 
(2) G. S. Graham, Empire of the North Atlantic (1950) ix- 
4T, 
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1688, and, 1714 should be of significance. There are, 
however, other developments in seventeenth century 
England and Europe that need consideration before the 
contribution of parliament to British naval supremacy 
can be assessed. 
Between 1688 and 1714 both the French and Dutch, our 
str6ngest naval rivals, failed to match British expansion 
i3i terms of ships. The French failed because they 
adopted the strategy of attacking merchant shipping rather 
than British fleets; the Dutch because their major effort 
was devoted to the creation of armies that would secure 
their land frontiers. ' Both remained powerful at sea and 
British naval dominance was still a matter for vigilance 
and struggle, not yet a cause of national complacen&Lt 
by 1714 Britain was clearly the strongest sea-power. 
Geographic and economic factors must have played an 
importqnt part in this acquisition of power. The 
geographic advantages of good harbours and mercantile 
experience provided the foundations of British sea-power. 
Yet such foundations had been present before the seventeenth 
century and only towards the end of that century did they 
C. R. Boxer, Dutch Seaborne Empire 1600-1800 (1965) 
105,275; C. H. Wilson, The Economic Decline of the 
Netherlands, Econ. Hist. Rev. IX (1939) 2. reprinted 
in Essays in Economic History I. ed. E. M. CarUB 
Wilson (1961) 254-5; G. M. Trevelyan, England under 
Queen Anne (1948) Iq 248; G. J. Marcus, A Naval 
History of Englandq I, The Formative Centuries (1961) 196; C. Lloyd, The Nation and the Navy (1954) 
88* 
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support a naval force that dominated the seas. - Commercial 
developments based on these natural resources, provided 
an economic basis from which this naval force could grow. 
The fishing fleets, the mercantile marine and the coastal 
trade had always provided England with a supply of trained 
seamen. 
(') 
The development-of a coastal trade for the 
transport of coal during the sixteenth and seventeenth, 
centuries greatly reinforced this supply 
(2) 
and the-great 
expansion of English overseas trade between 1660 and 1688 
increased the-numbers of seamen and ships and the 
dependence of the nation on mercantile profits. 
(3) 
These 
developments were not entirely 'instinctive'; parliament 
contributed to them by legislation, particularly by the 
series of Navigation ActB. 
(4) 
The influence of English 
merchants on government policy grew at the same time. The 
peculiar importance of London to English trade and the 
proximity of the City of London, the centre of trade to 
Westminster, the centre of government, favoured their 
(1) T. S. Will&n,,, The English Coasting Trade 1600-1750 
(1938) 1; A. P. Usher, The Growth of English 
Shipping 1572-19229 quarterly Journal of Economics 
(1928). 
-XLII9 
467- 
(2) J. U. Nefg The Rise of the British Coal Industry (1932) 
Il 124,1 240. 
(3) R. Davis, English Foreign Trade 1660-1700, EconeHiste 
Rev. 2nd. Ser. VII (1954) 2, reprinted in Essays in 
Economic Historyq II op. cit. 257-72- H. Richmondq 
Sea Power in the Modern World (19345 33. 
(4) L. A. Harper, The English Navigation Laws (1939) 366-9- 
489o 
growing power, 
(1) 
so too did the dependence of the govern- 
ment in wartime on the short-term loan as a means of 
finance. (2) A great and vulnerable mercantile marine and 
the. French attack on-it in the years after 1693 was to 
produce the most decisive parliamentary legislation 
effecting British Naval dominance. 
(3) 
That such naval dominance did develop in the years 
between 1688 and 1714 can, in the last analysis, be 
attributed. to menj who by their ability to grasp the 
chances of war made the British navy supreme. Certainly 
in this period Britain was fortunate in her sea captains. 
The abilities of Leake, RuBsellq Shovell, Byng and Rooke 
have been overshadowed by the legend of Nelson but they, 
and many of their subordinates, were brave and skilful-1. 
seamen. The duration of the naval dominance they 
achieved, implies however, that the reasons for such 
dominance lie deeper than the skills of individuals, 
(1) G. D. Ramsey, English Overseas Trade (1957) 248; 
L. Stone, Social Mobility in England 1500-1700, 
Past and Present No. 33, April 1966,28-29; 
E. A. Wrigley, London's Importance 1650-1750, 
ibid. No- 37 July 1967,44,58-70- 
(2) See above p. 790 
(3) See below p. 492# 
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however gifted. 
(') 
At least one contemporary considered 
that the toughness and courage of the ordinary. English 
seaman was an important element in this dominance and 
attributed these qualities to a hardy physique and good 
food, (2) A weakness of this explanation, as of others, is 
that it does not show why it is that British dominance 
should have been won in the years between 1688 and 1714. 
Since there is no economic development in England 
that can satisfactorily explain the decisive change in 
naval power in these years and since the relative decline 
of French and Dutch naval power does not of itself explain 
the expansion of the English navy it would seem that the 
explanation must be sought in the government's reaction to* 
the wars of these years. No member of the executive seems 
to have formulated a considered policy of naval expansion. 
Only two men, William III and the Duke of Marlborough, 
seem to have had the authority and understanding to direct 
the activities of the fleet with strategic shrewdness. In 
The contrary view, that such skill was fundamental, 
-is expressed in W. M. Jamesj Influence of Sea Power 
in the History of the British People (1948) 22; J. B. 
Wolf, The Emergence of the Great Powers 1685-1715 
(1951) 14; G. M. Trevelyant England under-Queen Anne 
(1948) 1 248* 
Ministry of Defence Library (Naval Section) Corbett 
MSS. X, f. 127- Until the diet of the Englishman has 
been more intensively studied this assertion, and 
the implied superiority of the English to Continental 
diet, must remain doubtful. 
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all other aspects of naval activity control was frequently 
indecisi-ii -and unco-ordinated. Such policy as is 
discernible seem s to have been the product of 
circumstance. 
(') 
The naval legislation initiated by the 
executi, ie between 1688 and 1714 shows this. Nearly all 
this legislation concerned the problems of providing 
materials such as timber and tar for the navy, manning the 
fleet and 'encouraging' or improving the conditions of 
seamen' 
(2)- 
E .- 3xpert opinion was practically unanimous in 
condemning I this. -legislation as ineffective. 
(3) Although 
some of these acts were well considered and far-seeing 
none of them'can have contributed in any but a minor way 
to the gaining of naval dominance. 
It was in securing the money necessary for the 
expansion of the English fleet that the executive made its 
greatest contribution to this dominance; but the credit 
for this decisive generosity rests as much with the 
legislative as with the executive. Ministers of state 
and the majority of the Commons, divided though they-might 
often be over political issues, were at least united in a 
Cf. P. Mackesy, The War in the Mediterranean (1957) 
(2), See above, particularly pp. 207-9,354-6,400-5. 
(3) Sergison to Oxford 15 May 1711, B. M. HarlehLn'-- 6287, 
`ff- 95-109; Sergison to Oxford, 8 April 1712, B. M. 
Harley Loan 29/40, No. 11; Samuel Pepys Naval 
Minutes, ed. J. R. Tanner, (N. R. S. 1926) 2679-300; 
B. Slushq The Navy Royal or a Sea Cook Turn'd 
Projector (1709) 211. 
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consciousness of England's vulnerability. It was as 
much the money requested by the executive and regularly 
voted by'the Commons as geographic and economic factors 
that created naval dominance. The naval legislation 
initiated by members of the Commons seems to have been 
of little value to the navy, with one exception. This, 
the cruisers andconvoy legislation of 1694 which was 
repeated in 1708, established a large force of forty-five 
men of war which was to be devoted to the protection of 
trade. 
(') 
The need to meet this statutory imposition and 
to maintain a main fleet provided incentives that created 
a fleet stronger than that of any rival. It was 
England's vulnerability as a nation and trading centre 
that explains her rise to naval dominance. Fear for 
country, religion and trade, dangers that united 
conservative squire and wealthy merchant, made the latent 
factors of geography and economy decisive between 1688 
and 1714. 
(2) 
Fear made an English and then a British 
parliament persistently concerned with naval matters. One 
of the earliest and one of the most lucid analysts of sea- 
power, A. T. Mahan, considered that six conditions were 
(1) For the reasons for such legislation see abovepp. 247-55. 
(2) H. Richmond,, Statesmen and Sea Power (1946) 59; 
E. Robson, The Armed Forces and the Art of War, New 
Cambridge Modern History VIII The Old Regime 
1713-63 (1957) 173# 
1 
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necessary f or the acquisition of naval supremacy. They 
were geographical position, physical conformation, extent 
of territory, number of populationg character of the 
people and character of the government. 
M 
Of these he 
considered the last to be of greatest importance. In 
hiB wordBq 
'the conduct of the government corresponds 
to the exercise of intelligent will power, 
which according as it is wise, energetic 
and perseveringg or the reverse, causes 
success or failure in a man's life or a 
j(2) nation's history. 
Between 1688 and 1714 parliaments which was an increasingly 
active participant in goverment, provided energy and 
perseverance. There was less wisdom and such as appears 
in the legislative record is frequently a by-product of 
faction, but the perseverance is undoubted. Feeling, in 
particular fear, inspired the persistent concern but by 
the later years of Anne emotion was giving place to a 
conscious recognition of the importance of sea-power to 
Britain. Events towards the end-of Anne's reign, the 
debate between maritime and military policies, made vivid 
by the person of Marlboroughithe activities of the Whigs 
(1) A. T. Mahan op. cit. 25. 
(2) Ibid. 50-lo 
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and the writings of Swift and Addison helped the nation 
and parliament to accept as part of the national outlook 
a belief in the primacy of sea-power. 
(') 
Characteristically 
Anne expressed the new outlook, 
'Our situation points out to us our true 
interest; for this country can flourish 
only by trade; and will be most 
formidable by the right application of 
our naval force. j(2) 
With its concern and with its guineas parliament had 
helped to make the British navy dominant. Conversely 
the navy had in the same period helped parliament, 
particularly the House of Commons, to assume greater 
authority in the government of the country. A year 
before Anne spoke the words quoted above she had said 
something as significant and revealing in that it records 
a major advance in parliamentary power. In April 1713, in 
a speech in which she was commenting on the peace her 
ministers had secured, she said, 
'What force may be necessary for securing our 
commerce by sea, and for guards and 'risons, I 
leave entirely to may parliament, 1(35al 
Such abandonment of power would have been inconceivable 
from William III or any earlier monarch. Parliament's 
new status, illustrated here by their power to decide 
E. Robson op-cit. 173; A. T. Mahan OP-Cit- 51,53. 
(2) C. J. XVII9 474. 
(3) Ibid. XVII, 278. 
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military strength, had developed between 1683 and 1714 
as a result of intervention in every branch of govern- 
ment activity. The navy had been in 1688 not only one 
of the largest government departments but also one 
particularly in the control of the monarch. From a 
variety of motives parliament had acquired knowledge of 
and power over the department of the navy. Two other 
great areas of executive authority, the army and foreign 
policy, remained very much in the power of the executive 
but the members of parliament considered that they, as 
true born Englishmeng had a natural understanding of naval 
matters. 
(') Events, particularly the threat of invasion 
and failures of trade protection and naval credit', made 
it impossible for parliament to neglect consideration of 
naval affairs. Such consideration was an education in 
the techniques of power. Parliament's growing control 
over finance, over the agents of the executive and over 
national policy owes much to'the specifically naval 
aspects of these advances. 
(2) 
Britain's dominance at sea 
and parliament's dominance in Britain were intimately 
connected. 
C. DIAvenant, Discourses on the Pablie Revenues and 
on the Trade of England (1698), The Political and 
Commercial Workst ed. Sir. C. Whitworth (1771) Is 
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(2) B. Kemp, King and Commons (1957) 5e 
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Appendix I 
The Principal Acts of Parliament that affected the 
navy 1688-1714. 
(') 
2 W. & M. Sess. 2c2 (1690) An Act concerning 
. the Commissioners oflAdmiralty. ' 
2.2 W. & M. Sess. 207 (1690) An Act for 
reviving a former Act regulating the 
Measures and Prices of Coals. ( 340 
3.2 W. & M. Sess. 2e 11 (1690) An Act for 
Appointing and Enabling Commissioners to 
Examine and State the Public Accounts of 
the Kingdom. ( 111-3 ) 
4.4 W. & M. e 24 (1692) An Act for revising, 
continuing and explaining several Laws 
therein mentioned, 'which are expired or 
near expiring. ( 21ý 
5.4 W. & M. 'c 25'(1692) An Act for continuing 
the Act prýhibiti: ng'all Trade and Commerce 
with France, and for the Encouragement of 
Privateers. (67-7-8, ) 
6.5 W. & M. c-'24 (1694) An Act for building 
good and defensible Ships. (177-8) 
5 W. &'M. 'c 25"(1694) An Act for the better 
Discipline of'their Majesties Navy Royal. 
( 41-2 ). 
The references`aýd'. 'descriptions given a, re-those from 
Statutes of the Realml printed by order of the House 
of Commons under the direction of J. Raithby. The 
figuresAn'brackets indicate those pages in the text 
where the acts are considered. 
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8.6 &7 W- & M- a 18 (1694) An Act for 
granting to his Majesty certain duties 
...... , clause xix appoints cruisers and 
convoys. ( 254-63) 
9.7 &8 Wm. III c 10 (1696) An Act for 
continuing several duties. ( 209) 
10.7 &8 Wm. III c 21 (1696) An Act for the 
Increase and Encouragement of Seamen. ( 354-60) 
11.7 &8 Wm. III c 39 (1696) An Act for 
encouraging the Linen Manufacture of 
Ireland ..... and the making of Sail Cloth 
in this Kingdom. ( 209) 
12.8 &9 Wm. III c 23 (1697) An Act to enforce 
the Act for the Increase and Encouragement 
of Seamen. ( 361-2) 
13- 9 Wm- III c 33 (1698) An Act for the Increase 
and Preservation of Timber in the New Forest 
in the County of Southampton. ( 188-9) 
14.9 Wm. III c 41 (1698) An Act for the better 
preventing thelmbezzlement of his Majesty's 
Stores. ( 212) 
15.11 Wm- III c 13 (1699) An Act for continuing 
several laws. (L2) 
16.2 &3 Anne 06 (1703) An Act for the Increase: 
of Seamen, and the better Encouragement of 
Navigation, and the Security of the Coal 
Trade. ( 379-92) 
17.2 &3 Anne c 13 (17o3) An Act for raising 
ReCrUitB ... and for dispensing with Part of 
the Act for the Encouragement and IncreaBe of 
Shipping and Navigation during the present 
War. ( 392-3) 
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18* ý& 4 Anne c9 (1704) An Act for 
encouraging the Importation of Naval 
Stores from her Majesty's Plantations in 
America. ( 200-2) 
19.4 &5 Anne c6 (1705). An Act for the 
Encouragement and Increase of Seamen, 
and for the speedier Manning of her 
Majesty's Fleet. ( 399-4029 459-60) 
20.6 Anne c 64 (1707) An Act for the 
Encouragement of the Trade to America. 
(412-4) 
21.6 Anne c 65 (1707) An Act for the better 
securing the Trade of this Kingdom by 
Cruisers and Convoys. ( 297-300) 
22.9 Anne c 15 (1710) An Act for making good 
Deficiencies and satisfying the public 
Debts; and for erecting a Corporation to 
carry on a Trade to the South Seas. 
(158-162) 
23.9 Anne c 22 (1710) An Act for the 
Preservation of White and other Pine Trees 
growing in her Majesty's colonies ...... 
(206) 
24ý 12 Anne c 12 (1712) An. Act.. ror-the better 
Encouragement of the Making of English 
Sail Cloth in Great Britain. (212) 
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Ap endix II. I-P -411, 
The Distribution of the Monthly Rate per Man among 
Wages, Wear. and Tear, Victuallers and Ordnance. 
Year Monthly =ate Wages 
Wea£ 
an=ear 
Vietuals Ordnance 
1688 4.0.0. 
1689 4.0.0. (1) 
1690 4.5.0- 
1691 £4.5.0- 1.10. 0. 1.10. 0. 1. 0. 0. 0- 5- 0- 
1692 4.0.0. 1.8. 6. 1. 7. 6. 19. 0. 0- 5- 0- 
1693 4.5.0- 1.10. 0 1.10. 0. 1. 0. 0. 0. 5- 0- 
1694 4.5.0- 1.10. 0: 1. 8. 0. 1. 0. 0. 0. 7. 0. 
1695 4-5-0- 1.10. 0. 1. 8. 0. 1. 0. 0. 0. 0. 
1696 4.5.0- 1.10. 0 1. 8. 0. 1. 0. 0. 0. 0. 
1697 4.5.0. 1.10. 0: 1. 8. 0. 1. 0. 0. 0. 7. 0. 
1698 4.0.0. 1.10. 0. 1. ?. 6. 1. 0. 0. 0. 2. 6. 
1699 4.0. -0. 1.10. 0. 1. 7. 6. 1. 0. 0. 0. 2. 6. 
1700 4.0.0. 1.10. 0. 1. 7. 6. 1. 0. 0. 0. 2. 6. 
1701 4.0.0. 1.10. 01 1. 7. 0. 19. 0. 0. 4. 0. 
1702 4.0.0. 1.10. 0. 1. 7. 0. 19. 0. 0. 4. 0. 
11 ei ei ei - 98 
1714 
1 
4.0.0. 
1 
1.10. 
1 
0. 1. 
1 
7. 0. 
1, 
19. 0. 0. 
1 
4. 0. 
1 
The most useful sources of information on the division 
of the monthly rate are; H. M. C. H. L. VII 173-7; C-J-XVI, 
171-2; Ministry of Defence Library (Naval Section) Corbett 
The Navy Board in March 1689 hoped for a monthly 
rate of 94.0.0.. per man but in April the Commons 
granted L4.5.0. which it considered necessary in 
time of war (C. J. X, 65,80). As the sums of money 
granted to the navy in the early years of William's 
reign were not appropriated there is no clear 
indication as to how the monthly rate was divided 
before 1691. 
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MSS. Xl ff 101-2; P. R. G. Adm. 1/3592,4 Jan 1702;, P-R. Oe 
Adm. 1/3603,30 Sept. 1705; Ehrman, 484; Queen Anne's 
Navy, 36. 
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Appendix III 
Men Voted, Borne and Mustered. 
Voted Borne Mustered 
1688 12,714 
1689 79040 22,332 
1690 219695 31,971 
1691 29,026 35,317 
1692 30,000 40,274 
1693 33,010 43,827 
1694 33,692 47,710 
1 OrZ 6;; 'ý' 40,000 48,514 1696 402000 47,677 
1697 40,000 449? 43 
1698 109000 22,519 
1699 15,000 15,834 
1700 7,000 ? 9754 
1701 309000 22,869 
1? 02 40,1000 339363 30,973 
1703 40tOOO 409805 33,896 
1704 409000 409433 31,081 
1705 40tOOO 43,081 369646 
1706 409000 46,125 39,091 
1707 40,000 45,055 40,274 
1708 40,000 44,529 429072 
1709 40,000 479647 42t4O6 
1710 40,000 469493 429872 
1711 409000 46,735 43t516 
1712 40,000 38,106 35,991 
1713 30,000 219636 199725 
(6 mohths).,, 
109000 
(?, months) 
1714 10,000 1,3,098 129062 
It is a relatively simple matter to compile a list 
of the seamen voted by parliament for each year's service 
between 1688 and 1714, although even for these figures many 
of the printed sources are at variance for the years 
1688-1695. To compile lists of men borne (on the ships' 
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books) and the men actually present aboard (mustered) is 
far more difficult. Such lists can never be more than 
approximately accurate. At best they can indicate, in 
terms of man power, the expansiong stabilization and 
contraction of the navy and the discrepancy between the 
number of men signed on and that of those actually 
serving. 
The most full, and apparently authentic lists of 
seamen borne and mustered are usually those compiled some 
time after Anne's death. Contemporary lists, usually 
in runs of-. 'only a few years, are scattered throughout the 
Navy Board papers and elsewhere. Where two accounts of 
the same years, exist they rarely agree. The reasons for 
such disagreement and for inaccuracy are numerous. Ships 
were not, MUBtered. regularly and the muster masters charged 
with this duty met with obstruction- from ships I captains. 
There was a considerable time lag between a muster and the 
compilation of annual returns for the navy. Such 
compilations involved'great clerical effort and were not 
considered worthwhile-by the officials of the Navy Board. 
They, more than anyone else, knew that the hazards of war 
and sea prevented some returns of men borne or mustered 
from ever reaching their office. They knew of the 
obstacles to accurate statistics caused by the transference 
of men from one ship to anotherl desertiong death and 
falsifications. Their own policy in compiling lists of 
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men borne and mustered seems to have been generally 
consistent, they took an average for a year from the 
monthly returns and marines 'at. sea and on shore were 
included in their figures. 
The most useful sources of information about the 
numbers of seamen employed in the navy are: - 
1. A List of Men Voted and Men Borne (and 
men MUBtered 1711-14) 1688-1714, Ministry of Defence 
Library (Naval Section) Corbett MSS. XI ff. 108-9. 
2. Men Voted and Borne 1689-1714, Accounts and 
Papers Pt. 29,1868-9 C. J. XXXV9 693. 
3. Monthly list of men borne and mustered from 
1701-11 for the Commissioners of Public Accounts, Navy 
Office, 5 Sept. 1711, B. M. Addit. MSS. 59 439 ff. 94-8. 
4. P. R. Q. Adm. 1/3603,1 Dec. 1705- 
5. The Sergison Papers in the National Maritime 
Museum have much scattered information, especially 
useful are N. M. M. Ser/1019 f-103; Ser/102 ff-30,94-5; 
Ser/105 No. 37; Ser/111; Ser/112; Ser/118. 
6. Men Borne and Mustered 1702-69 C. J. XVIq 172. 
Men Voted 1688-97, H. M. C. H. L. VII, 173-8o 
8., Men Voted 1689-1714, G, Derrick, Memoirs of 
the Rise and Progress of the Royal Navy (1806) 290-2. 
These sources are the basis of the table above. 
Two additional points may be made about the manning 
of the navy. The first concerns the number of men 
necessary for the crew of a single ship. Each ship had 
three establishments, the highest, middle and low, The 
crew of a first rate, such as H. M. S. Victory would be 
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quoted at 754,650,544, a third rate such as H. M. S. 
Expedition at 476,398 and 322 for the three complements. 
(') 
The difference in numbers between a fleet or squadron, 
manned at highest and low complements was therefore 
considerable. The 130 ships of the fleet in February 
1701 needed 43,000 men at highest complements, 36,000 at 
middle and 28,000 at low complement. 
(2) 
The low complement represented the minimum number 
of men required to sail and, in desperation, fight a ship. 
Captains complained bitterly if ordered to sail while 
manned at low complement. 
(3) Middle complement represented 
the generally accepted level at which a ship was considered 
manned and capable of effective action. In the Dutch Wars 
this had been the standard fighting strength. 
(4) 
After 
1688 although these middle complements were adequate in 
home waters they provided no margin for the inevitable 
sickness that would weaken a crew in far waters. 
(5) 
Highest 
complement was an ideal: like most ideals it was rarely 
attained. 
Secondly it would appear from the table above that 
between 1708 and 1711 the navy mustered and therefore paid 
(1) C-J-XIII9 349. 
(2).. H. M. C. H. L. IV9 160., 
(3) C. S. P. Dom. Anne 110 251-2; P. R. O. Adm. 7/335, 
12 Aug. 1701. 
(4) C. S. P. Dome We &-Me 1690-1,300. 
(5) Ibid. We & Me 1693t 330; ibid. Anne 11,251-2. 
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between 3,000 and 3,5000 men more than the 40,000 voted 
. 
by parliament. These extra men represented little 
extra charge on the navy, as is made plain by a letter 
in which the Queen was assured that, 
'a considerable number of Your Majesty's 
ships have been employed abroad, where, 
when men die there are no opportunities 
of getting others in their room it 
is probable that the number of men 
actually borne for wages hath not. 
exceeded alto 5 ether as much is afore- 
mentioned. '(' 
The navy did not suffer financially but the mortality 
rates amongst those squadrons of the navy that served 
abroad must have been shockingly high. 
P. R. O. S. P. 42/89 19 Dec. 1710. 
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Appendix IV 
Naval Estimates and Parliamentary Grants for the 
Ordinary of the Navy 1688-1714, 
Year, I Estimate I Grant 
1688 
1689 130,000 (on civil 
list. ) 
1690 1009000 
1691 1009000. 0. 0. 1001000 
1692 1001000. 0. 0. - 1693 ioogooo. 0. 0. - 1694 859740. 0. 0. 859740 
1695 1119012. 0. 0. 85,740 
1696 135,958. 3. 5. 859740 
1697 1831884.18. 7. 859740 
1698 2009000. 0. 0. 1749078.19. 4. 
1699 2209000. 0. 0. 
11700 2469069. 7. 1. 184,342. 0. 0. 
1701 2199275. ?. 3. 190,353. 0. 0. 
1702 1789038. 2. 9. 1299314. 10. 3. 
1703 1599085. 2. 2. 1299314. 10. 3. 
1704 1681887.19. 6. - 1705 1379026. 8. 5. 1009000. 0. 0. 
1706 1481014. 8. 6. 1209000. 0. 0. 
1707 1399179.17. 6. 1209000. 0. 0. 
17c18 1499425. 4. 6. 120,000. 0. 0. 
1709 120,000. 0. 0. 
1710 120,000. 0. 0. 
1711 1759890.16. 9. 1209000. 0. 0. 
' l'712 1809000. 0. 0. 1759890- 16. 9 . 1713 2319311. 7. 0. 200,000. 0. 0. 
1714 2509490. 0. 3. 2459700. 0. 3. 
The figures in the table above are generally to be 
found in the Journals of the House of Commons. Other 
sources have sometimes been used, particularly for the 
years 1698 to 1700. In these years there was considerable 
508o 
doubt whether the costs of the Register Office and 
Marine Officers were properly a charge on the Ordinary. 
The report of the Commissioners of Accounts, H. M. C. 
H. L. 1 12-19, is a convenient source of explanation for 
the problems associated with the Ordinary between 1688 
and 16919 and see below pp. 87-90. 
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Appendix V 
Naval Debt 1689-1714 
, 
Year Sergiso Parliament 
1689 5679542.18.11. 
1690 190709799.10. 3. 
1691 1,4839444.0. 0. 
1692 1,5069782.4. 0. 
1693 197829597.0. 0. 
1694 1,9319246.0. 0. 
1695 21222,986.0. 0. 
1696 
1697 29522,523.0- 0- 
1698 29368,037.0- 0- 
1699 1,4409368.0. 0. 
1700 195429840.3. 3. 
1701 194991880.13. 9- 190499439.11. 6h. 
1702 21091,189.8. 6. 19016,767.3. 9. 
1703 293269817.14. 4. 
1704 2,7629035.2. 5- 292661864.17.10. 
1705 392369468.13. 4. 29641j037.17. 1. 
1706 39545,935.4. 1. 392119937.2.11. 
1707 39784947.7. 0. 395629751.8. 4. 
1708 49306,509.3. 8. 3,628,504.16. 6. 
1709 590799209.15.10. 499691247.2- 5. 
1710 5974'79822.16. 3. 59655,535.18. 0. 
1711 7,2319788.9.11. 
1712 295279119.16.11. 2,5279119-16.11. 
1713 290459624.5- 8- 
l'714 
Z 1 -- L -- -- 1 
The debt is given as it stood on 30 September of each 
year, The estimates of debt in the first column are those 
of the Navy Board. All but five of them come from the 
Sergison Papers, Estimates of Navy Debts 1671-1718, N. M. M. 
Ser/132. The other five come from N. M. 11. Ser/101 f 507- 
The figures in the second column are those for 30 September 
presented to the Commons and are from the Journals of the 
510o 
Commons. The naval estimates from the Sergison Papers 
do not include cash and tallies in the hands of the 
Treasurer of the Navy or some charges, such as that of the 
Register or Marine Officers, which the Navy Board did not 
consider a naval debt. 
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Appendix VI 
Extraordinary Grants to the Navy 
1689 For the expenses of war 700tOOO 
1690-1 For new ships 799892 
it of 11 570,000 
It Plymouth Docks 89116 
1691-2 For Plymouth Docks 15,890 
1692-3 For Plymouth Docks 239406 
if 4 Bomb ships 102908 
If 8 4th-rates 68,400 
1693-4, For Naval Debts 552,777 
1694-5 For 4 2ad-rates. 70,000 
11 Marine Officers 169972 
1695-6 For new ships 204,259 
11 Marine officers 16,972 
1696-? For Registry 59t485 
to Marine Officers 169972 
1697-8 For Naval Debt ? 009000 
Marines 55,520 
1698-9 For Paying off 3009000 
Officer Bounty 189000 
Extra Repairs 2909000 
1699-1704 No Grants 
1704-5 For stores and Portsmouth Dock 50,000 
1705-6 For ships' stores and Portsmouth 
Dock 28t238 
1706-7 For Portsmouth Dock 109000 
1707-8 For Portsmouth Dock 10,000 
1708-12 No Grants 
I 
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1713 For Half Pay 179000 
1714 For Naval Debts 300tOOO 
Chaplains 39000 
_Lists 
of extraordinary, grants are to be found in: - 
C. J. XV, 441-4; C. J. XVIq 238; P. R. O. Adm. 1/3608,23 Jan. 
1708; H. M. C. H. L. VII 173-8; C. Derrick, Memoirs of the 
Rise and Progress of the Royal Navy (1806) 290-2. 
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Appendix VII 
The. Strength of the Navy 1688-1714 
There are many lists, in print and in manuscript, 
giving the numbers and types of ship that made up the - 
navy, Few of the lists for any one year are identical'. 
The reasons for such variation, apart from simple 
inaccuracy, are many, The strength of the navy was 
constantly changing; increasing by construction, rebuildingg 
purchase and hire, diminishing by misadventure or action. 
Frequently the lists fail to specify whether or not they 
include all the ships available in whatever state of repair 
or just the ships in sea pay. 
By 1688 it was becoming common to grade ships in terms 
of guns and men, and ships of the four strongest grades, or 
rates, were ships that could take their place in the line 
of battle. 
(') 
The smaller shipsg of fifth and sixth rates, 
were too lightly armed for the line and were used mainly for 
scouting and trade protection, The ships of these six 
rates provided the real strength of the navy. They were 
assisted in some actions by specialist craft such as bomb 
ships, machine vessels and fire ships. The fighting ships 
were supported by- a variety of other vessels. The lists 
(1) Ehrman 1-6 o 
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of the period usually record advice boatss brigs, -II 
hospital ships,, hoys, hulks, ketches, pinkss pontoonsq 
smacks, store ships, towboats and yachts. 
(') 
" The table below is based uponlists which give'the 
numbers of ships available for service, that is ships in 
good repair which only needed men and stores to become 
operational. The numbers of the ships of the six rates 
are distinguished separately. The specialist support 
vessels are included in the total figure for auxiliary_ 
vessels. The years for which the strengths of the navy 
are given were selected to show the variations in the 
strength of the navy and on the basis of reliable lists. 
Most of these, and the fighting ships, are well 
described and excellently illustrated in B. Landstrom, 
The Ship (1961)o I 
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Year 
SHIPS of 
the LINE Rates 
-- - 
rA Cd 4.3 
0 
Specialist 
Support C-raft 
and Auxiliarre-s 
Total 
V=ese a 
1 
1 F 2 2 3 41 5 6. 
L-4 
1688 9 11 39 41 2 6 108 65 173 
1692 9 11 39 40 9 6 114 59 173 
1695 7 10 47 51 33 37 185 110 295 
1699 6 14 45 64 34 18 181 85 266 
1702 7 14 47 61 
. 
31 15 175 94 269 
1707 7 13 43 64 42 30 199 80 279 
1714 7 13 42 69 42 24 197 28 225 
The sources of the figures above are: - 
1688: Ehrman 625 
1692: ' C. S. P. Dom. W. & M. 1691-29 546. 
1695: H. M. C. H. L. Il 472. 
1699: Ibid. 111, 309- (1) 
1702: C. J. XV9 410 of. Queen Anne's Navy, 363. 
1707: C. J. XV9 418* 
1714: Queen Aimelis NavY 363. 
This list includes some ships that, by peace time 
standards, needed major repairs. 
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Appendix VIII 
Cruisers and Convoys in the reigns 
- of William and Anne 
The table that forms the substance of this appendix 
gives the number of operational cruisers and convoys on 
1 November for some of the war years between 1689 and 
1713. The figures are based upon the monthly lists 
prepared by the Navy Board. 
(') 
These lists record the- 
stations and duties of ships on the first day of each 
month. The November lists were chosen because they 
record the strengths for October, one of the busiest 
months of the year for home coming merchant shipping and 
the coastal trade. 
(2) The List Book for the period 1688-91, 
(3) 
the first of the series, is inaccurate, and the use of many 
small shipsý'dn duties connected with the war in Ireland 
makes it impossible to separate the ships emplojed on 
(1) P. R. O. Adm. '8/2-11. 
(2) Tables based on the lists for July and February show, 
for July, figures that are generally rather smaller 
than those for November, the figures for February 
' are very much smaller. Naval officials appreciated 
the'seasonal sparseness of trade and reduced the 
number Of ships accordingly, parliamentary legiala- 
tion takes no cognisance of this factor, 
(3) P. R. O. Adm. 8/1. 
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operational duties from those protecting trade. During 
1712 most ships'employed as cruisers and convoys were 
also used on quarantine duties in an attempt to prevent 
a 'Plague' from the Baltic from reaching England. 
(') 
The confusion in the List Books in describing the over- 
lapping duties of ships employed in the defence against 
French privateers and Baltic disease makes it, impossible 
to extract accurate figures for cruisers and convoys. 
Under the column in the table entitled, 'Convoys and 
Squadron Cruisers' are numbered the ships employed in 
groups, Such groups or squadrons include the Newcastle 
Convoy for the colliers, the Soundings, Irish(2)and 
Dunkirk Bquadrons. 
(3) 
Under the column entitled 'Detached 
Cruisers' are numbered the ships, or pairs Of ships, 
(4) 
stationed round the coaBtB of Great Britain. These are 
(1) There are many references to this 'plague' and the 
quarantine in C. T. B. XXVI and C. T. B. XXVII Pt. II. 
(2) The ships based on Ireland were frequently employed 
in transport or communication duties at the orders 
of the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland but the lists do 
not record the extent of these activities. 
A squadron blockading Dunkirk was more common In the 
early months of the year. 
(4) Fishery protection was frequently conducted by pairs 
of ships. 
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the real gua. Vdians of the coastal trade. Ships 
employed on continental convoys, naval duties such as 
reconnaissance and gathering intelligence, those on 
'private servicelg or 'attending' the Channel Islandsq 
small ships of less than 6th rate like ketches and sloops 
or ships entered in the List Books as being 'ordered to' 
duties of trade protection are not included in the table. 
(') 
This definition of cruisers and convoys is consistent with 
the wording of both the 1694 and 1708 legislation and with 
contemporary interpretation of the legislation. 
(2) 
Convoys and 
Squadron 
Cruisers 
Detached 
Cruisers, Total 
1692 9 6 15 
1693 11- 14 25 
1694 11 9 20 
1695 16 19 35 
1696 24 0 17 41 
1702 17 3 20 
1703 11 10 21 
1704 17 11 28 
1705 26 12 38 
1706 18 11 29 
1707 15 16 31 
1708 22 12 34 
1709 23 25 48 
1710 16 25 41 
1711 16 25 41 
Ships employed in all these ways and sloops and 
ketches are frequently included in Admiralty lists 
of cruisers and convoys presented to parliament* 
(2) B. M. Harl- 7474 f. 24o 
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Appendix IX 
Contemporary Sources for the Life 
of the Seamen 
The most useful sources from'the very considerable 
evidence in pamphlets, letters and reports are listed 
below. The persistence of the grievances is indicated 
by including one source before and one after the period 
under consideration. 
1. Anon, An Essay on the Navy (1702). 
2. Anon, An Inquiry Into the Causes of our 
Naval Miscarriages 4707), Harleian 
Miscellany XI. 
G. Everett, Encouragement for Seamen and Mariners 
(1695), Harleian Miscellany X. 
4. R. Gibson, Mr. Gibson's Memorial for the King 
(1693), Private Correspondence and 
Miscellaneous Papers of Samuel Pepys 
1679-1703, ed. J. R. Tanner (1926) 1, 
118-1259 
5- W. Hodges, Humble Proposals for the Relief, 
Encouragement, Security and Happiness 
of the Loyal Courageous Seamen of 
England (1695)- 
6. W. Hodges, Humble Representation of the Seaman's 
Misery (1694). 
Naval Songs and Ballads, ed. C. H. Firth 
(N. R. S. 1908) * 
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8. S. Pepys , 
9. S. Pepys, 
10* 
11. B. Slush, 
Samuel Pepys's Naval Minutes, ed. 
J-R. Tanner (N. R. S. 1926) 268. 
Tangier Papers of Samuel Pepys 
(1684), ed. E. Chappell (N. R. S. 1935) 
225-7. 
The Petitions of the Seamen. **** 18 
April 1797, Eng. Hist. Docs. XI, 
877-8. 
The Navy Royal or a Sea Cook Turn'd 
Projector (1709). 
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